Creditor's Adjustment Bureau v. Bathe CA1/2

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Filed 9/24/24 Creditor’s Adjustment Bureau v. Bathe CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CREDITOR’S ADJUSTMENT
BUREAU, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168116

v. (Sonoma County
DAVID LLOYD BATHE, Super. Ct. No. SCV270405)
Defendant and Appellant.

David Lloyd Bathe appeals from a trial court order denying his motion
to set aside a default and default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (b). The default was entered seven weeks after the
complaint and summons were served on Bathe, the default judgment was
entered less than two months after entry of default, and Bathe filed his set-
aside motion just two and one half weeks after entry of judgment. The trial
court concluded that Bathe’s statement in his declaration supporting his
motion that he failed to timely respond to the complaint because he mistook
the date of a case management conference as the deadline for him to respond
to the complaint was not credible, and that even if Bathe was genuinely
mistaken about the deadline to respond, his mistake was inexcusable. We
conclude that the trial court’s denial of the set-aside motion was an abuse of
discretion, and therefore we shall reverse.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Complaint and Default
Plaintiff Creditor’s Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (CAB), is a collection
agency. As the assignee of the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF),
CAP sued Bathe, who did business as Bathe Builders, alleging that he
contracted with SCIF for a workers compensation policy and then failed to
pay the premium of $96,343.38, which had been “assessed after audit by
[SCIF] at the conclusion of [the] policy.”1 The complaint comprised four
causes of action, for breach of contract, open book account, account stated,
and reasonable value, and sought damages with interest and costs of suit, as
well as attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717.5 on the causes of action
other than breach of contract.
Bathe was personally served with the summons, complaint, and notice
of case assignment on April 4, 2022. The summons, on Judicial Council Form
SUM-100, stated “NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide
against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days.
Read the information below. [¶] You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this
summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this
court and have a copy served on the plaintiff.” Because service was April 4,
2022, the 30-day deadline was May 4, 2022. The notice of case assignment

1 “SCIF is at once both an agency of the state and an insurance

carrier. . . . [Citations.] [F]or purposes of the worker’s compensation
insurance laws . . . SCIF is an ‘insurer’ on the same basis as any private
carrier offering workers’ compensation insurance.” (P.W. Stephens, Inc. v.
State Compensation Ins. Fund (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1833, 1835-1836.) SCIF
is also a state agency, but it is “exempt from many of the immunities,
requirements, restrictions and procedures applicable generally to state
agencies. It is also subject to laws generally applicable to private insurance
carriers.” (Id. at p. 1836.)

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that was served with the summons and complaint stated that a case
management conference was set for a specific date: July 21, 2022.2
On May 20, CAB served Bathe by mail a request for entry of default.
The request was filed on May 23 and the default was apparently entered the
same day.
On June 9, CAB filed a request for default judgment in the amount of
$112,926.80. The request was served on Bathe by mail. The request was
supported by two short declarations, one from Melissa Klopstock, a “Premium
Collections Specialist” at SCIF, and one from attorney Michael Frischer. As
the custodian of the files pertaining to Bathe’s account, Klopstock declared
the documents attached to her declaration were from SCIF’s files and had
been prepared in the ordinary course of business by “employees and/or agents
of [SCIF] having personal knowledge of the occurrences which are cited in
said documents.” Klopstock stated that SCIF had issued a workers
compensation insurance policy to Bathe; Bathe had become indebted to SCIF
under the policy for an amount shown in an outstanding invoice, a copy of
which was attached; Bathe had failed to pay anything toward the balance
despite a demand; and the account had been assigned to CAB for collection,
as reflected in an attached document entitled “Assignment.” What appears to
be the second page of a two-page invoice was attached to Klopstock’s
declaration. The invoice states it is a “Final Audit Statement,” but contains
no information about when, how, or by whom the audit was conducted.
Frischer’s declaration addressed the calculation of interest, the costs incurred
by CAB, and stated that in view of the amount of the debt, CAB was entitled

2 Subsequent dates are in 2022 unless otherwise stated.

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to $1,200 in fees under Civil Code section 1717.5 because Bathe’s obligation
was incurred “in an action based on a book account.”
On June 21, CAB served Bathe by mail with a copy of a case
management statement, indicating that CAB requested a nonjury trial,
estimated a trial length of 2-4 days, and that no trial had been set because
the case was not at issue and judgment was pending entry.
On July 15 a default judgment was entered against Bathe in the
amount of $112,926.80, based upon the declarations submitted by CAB.
B. Motion to Set Aside Default
On August 2, less than three weeks after the entry of the default
judgment, Bathe, represented by counsel, moved to set aside the default and
default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure, section 473, subdivision (b)
(section 473(b)), based on Bathe’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. The motion was supported by two declarations, one from
Bathe and one from his attorney, Kelsey L. O’Rourke, to which a proposed
answer to the complaint was attached.
Bathe testified in his declaration that when he reviewed the complaint
and other documents served on him in April, he believed that the July 21
hearing date in the notice of assignment was the deadline for him to respond
to the lawsuit. He met with an attorney on July 15, and learned for the first
time that a default had been entered against him and that July 21 was the
date of a case management conference date, and not the deadline to file a
response. He then retained counsel to set aside the default and defend him.
He disputed the debt asserted in CAB’s complaint and requested the
opportunity to litigate the matter on the merits. He testified that his failure
to obtain an attorney sooner and timely respond to the complaint was based
on his mistake and inadvertence.

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Attorney O’Rourke testified in her declaration that on July 26, after she
was retained to represent Bathe, she called CAB’s attorney Kenneth Freed to
request a set-aside of the default judgment, and that the next day Freed
informed her that CAB would not stipulate to setting aside the default
judgment.
CAB opposed Bathe’s set-aside motion, which it characterized as
“terribly disingenuous,” on three grounds: Bathe had unclean hands;
confusion between a case management conference date and the responsive
pleading deadline constituted inexcusable neglect; and Bathe failed to
exercise diligence.
C. Trial Court Ruling
Bathe’s motion was set on the trial court’s weekly law and motion
calendar on February 17, 2023, and no testimony or other evidence was
presented. In advance of the hearing, the trial court issued a tentative ruling
denying the motion. The court concluded that “[d]efendant’s statement that
he mistook the case management conference date as the date to file a
response in this action is not credible.” After quoting at length from the
notice of assignment and summons that were personally served on Bathe, the
ruling stated that Bathe “has not provided any legitimate reason why he
could not understand [the] basic instructions” included in the documents, and
stated that “even if [Bathe] was genuinely mistaken, such mistake is
inexcusable.” For this last proposition, the trial court relied on McClain v
Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399 (McClain).
After hearing oral argument, the court adopted the tentative ruling,
which is set forth verbatim in the written order filed on March 13, 2023.

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This appeal followed.3
DISCUSSION
Bathe argues on appeal that the trial court erred by not granting his
request for relief under section 473(b). He also raises four issues that he did
not raise below: the default judgment is void because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to award CAB attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717.5; the
judgment is void because the complaint does not allege a viable cause of
action; the judgment is voidable because it was procured through extrinsic
mistake or fraud; and the judgment is void because the prove-up declaration
from SCIF employee Klopstock does not fulfill the requirements set forth in
Code of Civil Procedure section 585, subdivision (d). Because we conclude
that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Bathe’s motion for relief under
section 473(b), we do not reach Bathe’s other arguments.
But before we address the merits of Bathe’s appeal, we consider the
motion he has filed in this court “to report false declaration prepared and
submitted by respondent’s counsel,” which CAB has opposed. We deferred
taking action on the motion until we ruled on the merits of the appeal.
A. Bathe’s Motion to “Report False Declaration”
1. Additional Background
The very first argument in CAB’s trial court brief opposing Bathe’s set-
aside motion is that relief from default should be denied because Bathe has

3 With his opening brief on appeal, Bathe filed a request for judicial

notice, which CAB opposed. We deferred ruling on the request until we ruled
on the merits of the appeal, and we now deny it. The documents are not
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. (See Sweeney v. California Regional
Water Quality Control Bd. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1118, fn. 3 [denying
request for judicial notice of documents that “are unnecessary to resolve the
issues before us”].)

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unclean hands. The argument, which appears under the heading “Defendant
has engaged in fraudulent activity and is untrustworthy,” is based primarily
on a declaration from Blanca Macias-Chavez, an auditor for SCIF. CAB
contends that Bathe’s “unclean hands” arose from “deceitful and fraudulent
conduct in an effort to avoid paying earned premiums,” which amounts to an
argument on the merits of CAB’s complaint. Later in its opposition to the
set-aside motion, CAB repeats its contentions that Bathe was deceitful, and
concludes the argument it presents under the heading “Defendant’s
purported excuse is not remotely credible” by reiterating its claim that Bathe
has “unclean hands stemming from his scheme to avoid paying workers
compensation premiums.”
After this appeal was initiated but before any briefs were filed, Bathe
filed a “motion” in this court to report a “false declaration” submitted to the
trial court by respondent’s counsel Freed.4 The motion, supported by a
declaration from Bathe’s appellate attorney Mark Mosely, argues that the
Macias-Chavez declaration, which was prepared and submitted to the trial
court by CAB’s attorney Freed, contains false statements about her
interactions with Bathe and her purported search of public records
concerning his receipt of a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan.5 Bathe’s

4 The motion is entitled, “Appellant’s Motion Pursuant to Rule of

Professional Conduct 8.3 and California Rule of Court 8.54 to Report False
Declaration Prepared and Submitted by Respondent’s Counsel.”
5 The PPP loan figured prominently in CAB’s opposition to Bathe’s set-

aside motion. In opposing Bathe’s motion and arguing that Bathe had
unclean hands, CAB contended that Bathe’s receipt of a PPP loan was
evidence that Bathe had employees, which contradicted his statements to
SCIF that he had no employees. CAB contended that Bathe “was either lying
to the Federal Government or lying to SCIF on his voluntary payroll report
and during the audit!” (Bathe contests CAB’s contentions, claiming that PPP

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appellate attorneys learned of the asserted falsehoods in June 2023 (after
Bathe filed his notice of appeal from the trial court ruling), in the course of
taking Macias-Chavez’s deposition in a separate class action lawsuit filed
against SCIF. In July 2023 they notified CAB’s and SCIF’s attorneys with
reference to Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct,
which requires attorneys to take remedial measures if they have offered
material evidence that they later come to know is false. Bathe argues that
the false statements in Macias-Chavez’s declaration were material because
they were the basis of repeated accusations in CAB’s opposition papers in the
trial court that Bathe “had fraudulently claimed he did not have employees,”
and they appeared to influence the trial court’s finding that Bathe was “not
credible.” Bathe further argues that the failure of CAB’s counsel to take
action after being notified of the false declaration and while this case was on
appeal “constitute[s] apparent violation of ethical rules involving dishonesty,
deceit or intentional misrepresentation within the meaning of Rule 8.3 of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct,” and therefore Bathe’s attorneys
were filing a motion to “report such apparent violations to a tribunal with
‘the power to investigate or act upon such misconduct,’ and thereby to
discharge their ethical duty under that Rule.”
CAB’s response to Bathe’s motion to report, supported by a declaration
from attorney Freed, argues that the false statements in the Macias-Chavez
declaration were not material, as evidenced by the trial court’s basing its
order solely on the ground that Bathe’s excuse for failing to timely respond to
the complaint constituted inexcusable neglect and not relying on any part of
the Macias-Chavez declaration, let alone the false statements, in denying

loans were available to sole proprietors like him to protect their personal
income.)

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Bathe’s motion to set aside the default judgment. CAB argues that under
these facts no corrective measures were required.
2. Analysis
In view of the fact that the trial court’s order denying Bathe’s motion to
set aside the default judgment says nothing about Bathe’s alleged unclean
hands and makes no reference to the Macias-Chavez declaration or any of the
purported evidence contained therein, including the false statements, and in
the absence of a reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the set-aside motion,
we decline to speculate whether the trial court was influenced by the Macias-
Chavez declaration.6
Nevertheless, CAB’s arguments to the trial court about Bathe’s
credibility were intertwined with its arguments about his alleged unclean
hands, which, as we have noted, rested largely on the Macias-Chavez
declaration.7 Among other things, CAB’s opposition to Bathe’s set-aside
motion described Bathe as having been “caught red-handed lying about no
employees by the fact that the auditor knew from public records that the
company had obtained a PPP loan.” But the motion to report false
declaration contends that the subsequent deposition of the auditor (Macias-

6 The record on appeal includes a settled statement of the hearing on

Bathe’s motion to set aside the default. The settled statement recites the
procedural history of the motion and states that no party or counsel had
arranged for a court reporter and all parties waived a reporter for the
proceedings. As for the issues before the trial court, the statement says only
this: “The court provided all parties and counsel an opportunity for argument
pertaining to the court’s tentative ruling. Upon conclusion of argument, the
court adopted and affirmed its tentative ruling previously published.”
7 CAB’s arguments to the trial court about Bathe’s lack of credibility

spared nothing: exclamation marks, underscores, and vitriolic language
permeate the portions of CAB’s trial court brief that address Bathe’s
purported unclean hands and lack of credibility.

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Chavez) reflects that she had not reviewed public records and it was Bathe
himself who volunteered to her that he had a PPP loan.
CAB argues in its response to Bathe’s motion to report false declaration
and in its respondent’s brief on appeal that the trial court did not rely on the
Macias-Chavez declaration in ruling on Bathe’s set-aside motion. And CAB
does not argue in its respondent’s brief that Bathe has unclean hands. We
shall thus disregard the Macias-Chavez declaration and CAB’s trial court
arguments concerning unclean hands in addressing the merits of this appeal.
Further, although the trial court concluded that Bathe’s excuse for not
timely responding to the complaint was not credible and that even if it was,
his mistake was not excusable, on appeal CAB retreats from all of its
contentions in the trial court regarding Bathe’s credibility: CAB presents no
argument in its appellate brief as to Bathe’s credibility, and insists that the
trial court based its order “solely” on the grounds that Bathe’s excuse for
failing to respond to the complaint constituted inexcusable neglect. (Italics
added.) We thus disregard CAB’s trial court arguments concerning Bathe’s
credibility, and we also disregard the trial court’s finding of non-credibility as
to Bathe’s statement in his declaration that he mistook the deadline to
response to the complaint. In addressing the merits with respect to section
473(b) we consider only Bathe’s claimed confusion about the deadline for
responding to CAB’s complaint constitutes “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.” (§ 473(b).)
Yet the issue of alleged attorney misconduct in connection with the
Macias-Chavez declaration remains. We take seriously Bathe’s motion “to
report false declaration.” We decline to take further action on this issue at
present because, as we discuss below, the trial court order denying the
motion to set aside default judgment must be reversed in any event. The

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effect of our decision is that this case will return to the trial court to be
decided on the merits, and we will leave it to the trial court in the first
instance to determine what if any steps should be taken to investigate or act
upon the alleged misconduct that is raised in Bathe’s motion and denied in
CAB’s response, and to take any appropriate corrective action. (See Cal.
Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2024-025 at
pp. 6-15 [discussing judges’ obligations when attorney misconduct occurs],
available at <http://www.judicialethicsopinions.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/CJEO-Formal-Opinion-2024-025.pdf>.)
B. Merits of the Appeal
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
We begin with first principles. “Proceeding to judgment in the absence
of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American
jurisprudence: ‘[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried
upon its merits, and it looks with disfavor upon a party, who, regardless of
the merits of the case, attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise,
inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary.’ ” (Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21
Cal.4th 958, 963.)
Accordingly, section 473(b) authorizes the court to relieve a party “upon
any terms as may be just . . . from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Section 473(b) also requires the
party to “diligently seek relief ‘within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding
six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.’ ”
(Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 694 (Fasuyi), quoting
section 473(b).)

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As we have explained, “ ‘ “A motion seeking [relief under section 473(b)]
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s
decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]
However, the trial court’s discretion is not unlimited and must be ‘ “exercised
in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not
to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.” ’ [Citations.] [¶] Section
473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to
seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if
relief is granted. [Citations.] In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be
required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’ [Citations.]
[¶] Moreover, because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the
merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the
party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial court order
denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on
the merits. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Fasuyi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 695,
quoting McCormick v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 352, 359-
360.)
This means that where a defendant promptly seeks relief, and there is
no showing of prejudice to the plaintiff, “ ‘ “very slight evidence will be
required to justify a court in setting aside the default,” ’ ” and “ ‘[u]nless
inexcusable neglect is clear, the policy favoring trial on the merits prevails.’ ”
(Fasuyi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 696, quoting Elston v. City of Turlock
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233, 235.)
2. Analysis
Bathe filed his motion for relief well within the statutory time limit of
six months. By filing his motion less than two and a half months after the
apparent entry of default in May, and less than three weeks after the entry of

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the default judgment and his learning of the default, he promptly sought
relief. (See Fasuyi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 689, 696 [defendant filing
motion to set aside 16 days after learning of default judgment has promptly
sought relief].) CAB has made no showing of prejudice, and Bathe’s
declaration constitutes evidence to support his claim for relief. Accordingly,
Bathe should be given the opportunity to defend against CAB’s claims on the
merits “ ‘[u]nless inexcusable neglect is clear.’ ” (Id. at p. 696.)
The summons that was served on Bathe was clear that a response to
CAB’s complaint was to be filed and served within 30 days of service, and the
notice of assignment, on which Bathe claims he relied, was clear that a
written response to the complaint was to be filed “as required by the
summons.” That said, the very same paragraph of the notice of assignment
that referred Bathe to the summons also stated that a case management
conference had been scheduled for July 21, which was the only actual date
that appeared on the summons or notice of assignment. “Within the context
of section 473(b) neglect is excusable if a reasonably prudent person under
similar circumstances might have made the same error.” (Austin v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 929, italics added.)
A reasonably prudent layperson reviewing the document at issue here might
have misunderstood the difference between a case management conference
and the response to a complaint, despite the fact that the conference was
more than 30 days after the receipt of the documents, and therefore believed
that he had until mid-July to act on the complaint. Here, once Bathe learned
otherwise, he acted promptly to retain counsel and seek to have the default
set aside. There is no basis to believe that this is a case where Bathe
belatedly “c[a]me to regret past inaction or sitting on [his] rights.” (McClain,
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.)

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“Each case must be determined upon its own peculiar facts and
circumstances.” (Goodson v. Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32, 42-43
(Goodson).). The facts of this case are unlike the facts of McClain, on which
the trial court relied in concluding Bathe’s mistake was inexcusable. In
McClain, where this court affirmed a trial court order denying defendants
relief from default, the trial court found that the defendants—who included
the attorney who represented them—failed to respond to plaintiffs’ complaint
“ ‘despite not only knowing of the action, but actually taking part in it.’ ”
(McClain, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 406, 410.) Among other things, at a
case management conference, where defendant/attorney Kissler was present,
the court had stated, “either we get an answer from Ms. Kissler or you take a
default on this case.” (Id. at p. 407, italics omitted.) A minute order served
on the parties after the conference stated, “No later than July 22, 2016, a
default must be filed for Defendant Karen Kissler ind. & dba Karen Kissler
Esq. unless an answer has been filed.” (Ibid., italics omitted) No answer was
filed; plaintiffs sought a default, which was entered; and eventually
defendant moved to vacate entry of the default, which was denied. (Id. at pp.
408-409.)
The facts here are also unlike the facts of Goodson and Gilio v.
Campbell (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d Supp. 853 (Gilio), which CAB cites in its
appellate brief as supporting the trial court’s decision. In Goodson, supra,
252 Cal.App.2d 32, the defaulting party was the plaintiff, who represented
himself in initiating and pursuing his complaint. (Id. at p. 40.) Then, after
being served with a cross-complaint, he claimed he “did not ‘understand its
significance’ ” or know that he was required to file an answer. (Ibid.) And
apparently he did not consult a lawyer until much later: he did nothing until
almost two months after the default judgment was entered against him on

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the cross-complaint, and almost one month after more than $7,000 of his
assets were levied upon, at which point an attorney filed a motion on his
behalf to set aside the default. (Id. at pp. 34-35.) Evidence before the trial
court, including his proceeding in pro per in pursuing his own complaint,
supported the inferences that “plaintiff’s plea of ignorance was false”;
moreover, plaintiff had acknowledged his obligation to the defendant but
“intentionally ignored [the cross-complaint] to forestall payment of his
obligation and would have continued to do so had not . . . his assets been
levied upon.” (Id. at p. 40.)
Here, in contrast, Bathe does not claim ignorance of the need to answer
the complaint—he mistook the case management conference date for the date
to respond to the complaint. And there is no evidence that he seeks to
postpone paying a debt that he has acknowledged. To the contrary, Bathe
states in his declaration that he disputes the debt asserted in CAB’s
complaint. Bathe consulted a lawyer before what he thought was the
deadline, and once he learned a default judgment had been entered against
him, he immediately retained counsel to set aside the default and defend him
on the merits. We cannot say that his mistake was clearly inexcusable under
the circumstances.
Nor is this case like Gilio, where the appellate department reversed a
trial court order granting defendant’s motion to vacate a default and set aside
a default judgment. (Gilio, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 858.) There,
the constable who served the summons and complaint advised the defendant
at the time of service “to take care of the matter before it went too far,” and
defendant responded that he would take care of it the next day, but did not do
so. (Id. at p. 855.) After a default judgment was entered, the same constable
told defendant that a judgment had been entered and a writ of execution had

15
been issued. (Ibid.) The defendant then consulted the plaintiff’s attorney,
who advised him to retain counsel if he wanted to contest the satisfaction of
the judgment, but the defendant did not consult an attorney until a month
after that. (Ibid.) The defendant offered a host of somewhat contradictory
excuses for his delay: he testified “that he was not familiar with the law; that
he had no knowledge that plaintiff could get a judgment against him; that he
thought he would be called into court before a judgment could be taken
against him; . . . [and] that he was very busy.” (Id. at pp. 855-856.) He also
testified that initially he thought he should not defend the suit, because he
would injure his business reputation, but then changed his mind. (Id. at p.
856.) The appellate department found no basis for a mistake of fact or law,
because the summons stated that judgment could be taken against him if he
did not respond within 10 days, defendant did not claim he was unaware of
the contents of the summons and complaint, and in any event failure to read
the summons would be no excuse. (Id. at p. 857.) The appellate department
further concluded that defendant was grossly negligent in delaying so long to
contact an attorney after speaking with plaintiff’s counsel; and observed that
a change of mind is not a ground for vacating a judgment. (Id. at pp. 857-
858.) Here, in contrast, Bathe contends that he reviewed but misunderstood
the documents he received. These documents stated that a response to the
complaint was required within 30 days, but also identified a case
management conference date with no explicit indication of the connection
between the two dates. And as we have stated, we cannot conclude his
mistake was inexcusable. And, unlike in Gilio, there is no evidence here of
gross negligence or a change of mind.
In sum, we conclude that on the facts here, it was an abuse of
discretion to deny Bathe’s set-aside motion.

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DISPOSITION
The March 13, 2023 order denying Bathe’s motion to set aside the
default and default judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the
trial court with instructions to enter a new order granting the motion and for
any further proceedings on the motion to report false declaration. Bathe
shall recover his costs on appeal.

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_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

A168116, Creditor’s Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Bathe

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