CourtListener 10123001•Teixeira v. Borello CA3
Full text
Filed 9/20/24 Teixeira v. Borello CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
----
GABRIEL TEIXEIRA, C098610
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FL0769)
v.
CATARINA BORELLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Plaintiff Gabriel Teixeira filed a petition to determine parentage (petition) in El
Dorado County where his former girlfriend defendant Catarina Borello had lived before
moving out of state with the parties’ child. As part of the proceedings related to the
petition, Borello obtained a domestic violence restraining order. Believing El Dorado
County lacked jurisdiction to hear Teixeira’s petition, the trial court denied the petition
and vacated the domestic violence restraining order.
Borello appeals, arguing the trial court erred by finding it lacked jurisdiction.
Borello further raises various procedural claims aimed at reversing the trial court’s order.
1
Teixeira, representing himself in propria persona, did not file a brief on appeal. We agree
with Borello that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the petition under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Act) (Fam. Code,1 § 3400 et seq.) and
thus it also had jurisdiction to hear the request for a domestic violence restraining order
made during that proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the
petition and vacating the domestic violence restraining order. Given this result, we do
not need to address Borello’s remaining procedural claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 18, 2022, Teixeira filed the petition to determine his parental
relationship to a four-month-old child he had with Borello. In the petition, Teixeira
declared that Borello lived in California. In a declaration of jurisdiction filed with the
petition, Teixeira declared the child lived with Borello in El Dorado County from birth
until the filing of the petition.
On November 8, 2022, Borello filed a request for a domestic violence restraining
order. In a text message submitted with Borello’s request for a restraining order and in
an accompanying request for child custody, Borello indicated that she and the child had
not lived in California since the beginning of August. On December 2, 2022, the court
issued an order restraining Teixeira from abusing or contacting Borello. In the order,
Teixeira’s address was listed as being in Quincy, which is located in Plumas County.
On March 2, 2023, the trial court continued a hearing due to inclement weather.
In an accompanying tentative ruling, the trial court indicated it had “concerns regarding
El Dorado County being the proper jurisdiction for this matter.” Specifically, the court
cited to documents filed in the case, which provided Borello lived out of state, Teixeira
1 Further undesignated section references are to the Family Code.
2
lived in Plumas County, and the child was born in Placer County. On its own motion, the
trial court set a hearing to address the issue of jurisdiction.
On March 6, 2023, after a hearing where all parties were present, the trial court
adopted its tentative ruling finding that El Dorado County did not have jurisdiction over
the matter because no party lived in the county. Accordingly, the trial court denied
Teixeira’s petition and “vacate[d] all orders nunc pro tunc back to the date of issue of
[December 2, 2022],” which included the domestic violence restraining order.
Borello appeals.
DISCUSSION
Borello contends the trial court erred by finding El Dorado County lacked
jurisdiction to hear Teixeira’s petition and her request for a domestic violence restraining
order. We agree.
“The [Act] is the exclusive method of determining subject matter jurisdiction in
child custody cases. [Citations.] Subject matter jurisdiction over a child custody dispute
either exists or does not exist at the time the petition is filed, and jurisdiction under the
[Act] may not be conferred by mere presence of the parties or by stipulation, consent,
waiver, or estoppel. [Citation.] [¶] The purposes of the [Act] are ‘to avoid jurisdictional
competition between states or countries, promote interstate cooperation, avoid relitigation
of another state’s or country’s custody decisions and facilitate enforcement of another
state’s or country’s custody decrees.’ ” (Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
1276, 1287.)
“ ‘Pursuant to the [Act], California courts have jurisdiction over child custody
determinations only if the child’s home state is California, or the child’s home state does
not have jurisdiction or declined jurisdiction in favor of California. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] The [Act] prioritizes home state jurisdiction over other bases of jurisdiction.”
(Schneer v. Llaurado, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.)
3
Relevant to this appeal, in determining jurisdiction based on a child’s home state,
section 3421 provides that a California court “has jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination” if “[t]his state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months
before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a
parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.” (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 3402 defines the home state of a child less than six months as “the state in which
the child lived from birth with any [parent or person acting as a parent].” (§ 3402, subd.
(g).)
Here, the parties’ court filings establish the child lived in California from birth to a
few weeks before the petition was filed. Thus, California was the child’s home state
within six months of the commencement of the proceeding because the child had lived in
California since birth. (§ 3402, subd. (g).) Further, although the child was absent from
the state at the time the petition was filed, Teixeira, the child’s father, continued to live in
California. Accordingly, as a California court, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the
petition at the time it was filed. (§ 3421, subd. (a).)
Once a state exercises jurisdiction under the Act, it “has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over the determination until either of the following occurs: [¶] (1) A court of
this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and
a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that
substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationships”; or “(2) [a] court of this state or a court of
another state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a
parent do not presently reside in this state.” (§ 3422.) The trial court did not make a
finding concerning Borello’s connection to California or the location of the evidence
supporting the future custody order, and Teixeira remained in California. Thus, section
3422 cannot serve as the basis to find a lack of jurisdiction.
4
Under the Act, a court “may [also] decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if
it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum,” but must first “allow the parties to submit
information” and consider “all relevant factors,” including those set forth in section 3427,
subdivision (b). (§ 3427, subds. (a), (b).) The trial court neither allowed the parties to
submit information nor considered the relevant statutory factors. Thus, section 3427
cannot be the basis for the trial court’s finding of a lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
trial court had jurisdiction to hear the petition and the related request for a domestic
violence restraining order.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition and vacating the domestic violence restraining
order is reversed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(5).)
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
5
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