People v. Auxila CA1/5

CourtListener 10122822CalctappSep 20, 2024

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Filed 9/20/24 P. v. Auxila CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
A169442
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Marin County
Super. Ct. No. SC222386A)
ISHMEL AUXILA,
Defendant and Appellant.

Ishmel Auxila (appellant) appeals following his convictions for making
criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422) and violating a criminal protective order
(id., § 166, subd. (c)(1)(A)). The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in denying appellant’s motion made pursuant to People v. Marsden
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We affirm.
BACKGROUND1
In July 2023, a jury found appellant guilty of violating a criminal
protective order, but was unable to reach a verdict on the criminal threats
charge and the court declared a mistrial on that count.

1 We recite only those facts relevant to this appeal.

1
In September 2023, before the start of a second trial retrying appellant
on the criminal threats count, appellant brought a Marsden motion. At the
Marsden hearing, appellant raised multiple issues with his attorney, a
deputy public defender: (1) the public defender’s office had a conflict of
interest, which appellant did not identify; (2) he provided his attorney with
contact information for multiple potential witnesses but they were not
subpoenaed or contacted in sufficient time; (3) he requested his attorney
subpoena documents; and (4) he requested his attorney make certain motions
and other filings, identifying only a motion based on double jeopardy.
Appellant’s attorney responded that she had been a lawyer for 27 years
and had been representing appellant since his arrest in March 2023. With
respect to the asserted conflict of interest, counsel stated that in a prior case,
the prosecution intended to call appellant’s father as a witness and the public
defender’s office had previously represented appellant’s father, thereby
creating a conflict with representing appellant in that case. In this case, the
prosecution did not intend to call appellant’s father as a witness, so that
conflict was not present. With respect to the potential witnesses, the
attorney’s investigator had attempted to contact them, was able to locate two,
and one agreed to testify and was on the witness list. The second located
person stopped responding to the attorney and her investigator, and counsel
made the strategic decision not to subpoena that person because the resulting
testimony could be bad for appellant. As for the documents identified by
appellant, counsel had subpoenaed them from the Internal Revenue Service
but had not yet received them. With respect to the filings requested by
appellant, counsel stated she had repeatedly requested the court release
appellant before trial but the requests were denied. Counsel had researched
double jeopardy and found caselaw adverse to appellant’s position, but had

2
nonetheless made an oral motion, which the court denied. At the conclusion
of these remarks, appellant’s counsel stated, “What I am concerned about is
that I do have -- and I’m oscillating back and forth. I am concerned that
[appellant] does not trust me and, you know, that it is -- this issue is the most
difficult issue in our relationship between attorney and client, and it does
cause me some concern.”
In response, appellant asserted there was a conflict that “has nothing
to do with my father,” explaining, “every time [the victim] makes these false
accusations against me, . . . the public defender don’t represent me because
it’s a conflict. Anytime I ask what’s the conflict, nobody wants to tell me
what the conflict is.” Appellant’s counsel then clarified that the public
defender’s office represented appellant in a 2007 case, a 2011 case, and the
instant case, but had declared a conflict in a 2022 case. The court explained
to appellant, “So the facts of all those cases are different in terms of witnesses
and the people who may be involved, so there could be a conflict in one case
and not in another,” and the fact that there was a conflict in one case “does
not mean that the conflict exists for all time and for all cases.”
The trial court denied the Marsden motion, finding the record indicated
appellant’s counsel “is representing you effectively and assisting you
effectively and that there is not a basis for me to discharge her.”2
At the retrial on the criminal threats count, a jury found appellant
guilty. Appellant admitted a prior strike allegation and the trial court
sentenced him to four years in prison.

2 The trial court also denied a subsequent Marsden motion made during

the second trial. Appellant raises no claim of error with respect to this
ruling.

3
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Marsden motion. We disagree.
“Established principles govern our assessment of whether the court
abused its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion. ‘Once a
defendant is afforded an opportunity to state his or her reasons for seeking to
discharge an appointed attorney, the decision whether or not to grant a
motion for substitution of counsel lies within the discretion of the trial judge.
The court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Marsden motion “ ‘unless
the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially
impair the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.’ ” [Citations.]
Substantial impairment of the right to counsel can occur when the appointed
counsel is providing inadequate representation or when “the defendant and
the attorney have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that
ineffective representation is likely to result.” ’ ” (People v. Myles (2012)
53 Cal.4th 1181, 1207 (Myles).)
Appellant primarily points to counsel’s expression of her concern that
appellant did not trust her, arguing this obligated the court to either grant
the Marsden motion or inquire further. We disagree. Counsel did not state
any lack of trust rendered ineffective representation likely. That appellant
purportedly did not trust counsel does not render the court’s ruling an abuse
of discretion. “ ‘If a defendant’s claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get
along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of
substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any
appointment, and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of
their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law.’ ” (Myles, supra,
53 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)

4
Appellant also contends that, when he told the court the public
defender’s office had been conflicted in a prior case but no one told him why,
the court was obligated to inquire. Counsel explained the history of the
public defender’s office’s representation of appellant, including that a
prosecution witness in a prior case created a conflict. No further inquiry was
necessary. Appellant has failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the
court’s denial of his Marsden motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

(A169442)

5

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