People v. Bennett CA4/3

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Filed 9/16/24 P. v. Bennett CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062774

v. (Super. Ct. Nos. BAF2000509,
BAF2101142)
RONALD RAY BENNETT,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from judgments of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Joshua A. Knight, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Kevin Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
In back-to-back trials, a jury convicted Ronald Ray Bennett of
carjacking, simple assault, and evasion of a police officer endangering others,
and a second jury convicted him of two counts of domestic violence battery
causing traumatic condition. In this consolidated appeal, Bennett seeks
reversal, on four grounds: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to support the
carjacking conviction; (2) insufficiency of the evidence to support the domestic
battery conviction concerning an August 2021 incident; (3) sentencing error;
and (4) clerical error in the abstracts of judgment. We reject the first three
arguments, but we agree the abstracts of judgment need to be corrected.
FACTS
The first case concerned a crime against Bennett’s then-18-year-
old son, R.B. (the son). The second case concerned crimes against B.F., who is
Bennett’s wife and R.B.’s mother (the wife). We summarize the relevant facts
of each case separately, below.
I.
THE CARJACKING CASE
In the first case, case no. BAF2000509 (the carjacking case),
Bennett was charged with carjacking the son’s car (Penal Code, § 215,
subd. (a); count 1); assaulting the son with force likely to produce great bodily
injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2); and felony evasion of a police
officer endangering others (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 3).

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In May 2020, the son was driving his family home from a grocery
store trip. The son was driving his own car. Bennett was in the front
passenger seat, and the wife and their other child, then 12 years old (the
daughter), were in the back seat. On the ride home, the son and Bennett
began arguing. Bennett had picked up the son’s cell phone, located in the
center console, and began looking through e-mails and text messages. The
son demanded Bennett give him back the phone. Bennett refused, claiming
the wife was using the son’s phone to communicate with other men and cheat
on Bennett.
The son began to pull the car to the side of the road to confront
Bennett. At some point, Bennett began punching the son multiple times as he
was trying to stop the car. The son fought back, hitting Bennett as well. After
pulling over, the son exited the driver’s seat and went around to the
passenger side to continue the fight. The wife and the daughter also exited
the car. The wife pleaded with the men to stop fighting.
When the son approached the passenger side door, Bennett slid
across from the passenger’s seat to the driver’s seat while the car was still
running. The wife tried unsuccessfully to take the keys out of the ignition.
She told Bennett not to take the son’s car. Meanwhile, the son got into the
passenger’s seat and continued exchanging punches with Bennett. The son
also tried to grab the keys from the ignition and thrust the gear shift into
“park,” but Bennett was able to continue driving.
The car picked up speed, and while it was going 30–40 miles per
hour, the son was ejected from the car. At trial, the son and wife both
testified the son “fell” out of the car, to the best of their recollection. But a

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police detective who responded to the scene testified that the son had said
Bennett “pushed” him out of the car. And police bodycam recordings of
interviews of the son and the wife on the day of the incident were played for
the jury; their statements indicated Bennett had pushed the son out of the
car. The son suffered a bloody nose and lip from the fight, as well as bruises
and lacerations from the fall. The son testified he was afraid of Bennett, but
no threats were made by either of them that day.
The wife contacted Bennett to ask him to return the car. The day
after the incident, Bennett was supposed to meet the wife at a nearby
convenience store to get the car back, but Bennett drove away when she
refused to get in the car with him. The wife then called police to report she
spotted the “stolen” car.
A California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer responding to the call
saw the car and tried to pull Bennett over. When Bennett kept driving, CHP
and the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department gave chase for about
35 minutes, with Bennett driving at high speeds through residential
neighborhoods and committing a number of traffic violations until the car ran
out of gas.
A jury found Bennett guilty on counts 1 and 3. On count 2, the
jury acquitted Bennett of assault with force likely to produce great bodily
injury, finding him guilty instead of the lesser included offense of
misdemeanor simple assault (Pen. Code, § 240).1

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
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II.
THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE
In the second case, case no. BAF2101142 (the domestic violence
case), Bennett was charged with two counts of domestic violence battery
causing traumatic condition against the wife (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 1 &
2
6). It was also alleged Bennett committed these offenses while out on bail
from the charges in the carjacking case, a sentencing enhancement under
section 12022.1.
The first domestic violence incident occurred in August 2021
(count 6). Late one night, the wife returned home from work and began
arguing with Bennett. Bennett slapped her in the face. The police arrived and
took photos of the wife. Two photos of the wife were admitted at trial as
exhibit nos. 1 and 2. Trial exhibit no. 2 was a close-up of the wife’s face, with
the wife turning her lip to reveal a red mark inside her upper lip. At trial, the
wife was shown exhibit no. 1 and initially testified she did not see that she
had incurred any injuries. When shown exhibit no. 2, however, the wife
testified she noticed a cut underneath her upper lip, which occurred when
Bennett slapped her.
The second incident occurred a month later, in September 2021
(count 1). Bennett and the wife attended a car show in the afternoon. While
there, they drank alcoholic beverages. After the car show, the couple headed
to a pool hall to meet friends. While seated in their car in the parking lot of
the pool hall, Bennett and the wife had more drinks and began arguing.
Bennett was angry the wife had been friendly with a man at the car show.

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Counts 2 through 5 were dismissed before trial.
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The wife testified that Bennett may have slapped her inside the car. After the
two had left the car and were on the street, Bennett confronted the wife,
accused her of being unfaithful to him, and struck her in the face with the
back of his hand, causing her mouth to bleed.
A second, different jury convicted Bennett of both counts of
domestic violence battery causing traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a)).
III.
SENTENCING
At the end of the second trial, the trial court sentenced Bennett
in both cases. The People sought a total prison term of nine years eight
months, while Bennett asked for a total of five years four months.
As mitigating factors, Bennett stated he suffers from PTSD and
that alcohol played a significant role in at least one of the incidents. Bennett
lost most of his hearing when he was hit in the head at 17 years old, and he
was shot in the face two years later. The trial court, however, did not find he
was suffering from a mental or psychological condition. Although the court
sympathized with Bennett’s PTSD and loss of hearing, the court stated, “I
don’t find . . . these conditions significantly reduced his culpability.” The court
found the trauma suffered by Bennett was 22 years ago and thus not a factor
in his current crimes.
In considering aggravating factors, the trial court found that in
the carjacking case there was a “threat of great bodily harm” and “other acts
disclosing a high degree of callousness.” In the domestic violence case, the
court found Bennett’s actions towards his wife “callous.”

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The trial court considered his criminal history and found his
convictions “increasing in seriousness.” The court noted his criminal history
dating back to 1997, which included at least three prior domestic violence
convictions and three prison terms. The court acknowledged that before the
current offenses Bennett “spent at least close to eight years being crime-free,
except for [a] driving on a suspended license offense.” Nonetheless, the court
stated it did not believe the low term was justified given the “lack of any
mitigating circumstances.”
The trial court sentenced Bennett to a total of six years four
months. In the domestic violence case, Bennett was sentenced on count 1 to
the midterm of three years (deemed the principal count) and on count 6 to
one year (1/3 of the midterm). In the carjacking case, he was sentenced on
count 1 to one year eight months (1/3 of the midterm), on count 2 to 180 days
(stayed pursuant to § 654), and on count 3 to eight months (1/3 of the
midterm). The court found true the section 12022.1 enhancement but, as
requested by Bennett, struck the enhancement. In imposing this sentence,
the court largely adopted Bennett’s suggested sentence, except that it
declined to impose the two-year low term on count 1 in the domestic violence
case, instead imposing the three-year midterm. Bennett timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Bennett contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
carjacking conviction and one of the convictions for domestic violence battery
causing traumatic condition (count 6). We disagree.

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A. Standard of Review
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We
presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have
reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] ‘A reviewing court neither
reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’” (People v. Albillar
(2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) In other words, “‘the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
finding of fact.’” (People v. Lagunas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 996, 1007.)
B. Carjacking
Bennett argues there was no substantial evidence that he formed
the intent to take the car before using force or fear to do so.
“A conviction for carjacking requires proof that (1) the defendant
took a vehicle that was not his or hers (2) from the immediate presence of a
person who possessed the vehicle or was a passenger in the vehicle
(3) against that person’s will (4) by using force or fear and (5) with the intent
of temporarily or permanently depriving the person of possession of the

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vehicle.” (People v. Magallanes (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 529, 534; § 215,
subd. (a).)
“The requisite intent—to deprive the possessor of possession—
must exist before or during the use of force or fear.” (People v. Gomez (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 609, 618, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Elizalde
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 538, fn. 9.) And although the defendant must “‘exert
some quantum of force in excess of that “necessary to accomplish the mere
seizing of the property”’” (People v. Hudson (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 831, 835),
“any force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance will necessarily be more
force than required to seize the property” (id. at p. 839). In other words, “if a
victim resists during the initial seizure, the force applied is necessarily more
than required to seize the property absent resistance; and, if a victim does
not resist at the time of seizure, force applied to overcome subsequent
resistance is force in excess of that required to effect the initial seizure.”
(Ibid.)
Here, there was substantial evidence Bennett, in taking the car,
used force sufficient to overcome the son’s resistance. According to both the
son and the wife, Bennett punched the son multiple times as he was driving,
causing the son to pull over and step out of the car. Bennett then slid over to
the driver’s seat while the car was moving. Both the wife and the son told
Bennett not to take the car. According to the wife, she and Bennett “were
fighting over the keys to get them out of the ignition.” The son then jumped
back into the car. In an attempt to stop the car, the son also tried to pull the
keys from the ignition and was ultimately ejected from the car while Bennett
was swerving and driving away. The son testified, “I tried to grab the keys

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out of the ignition while [we were] still fighting. [We were] fighting and
trying to control the car at the same time.” And according to the police
detective who interviewed him, the son stated Bennett had pushed him from
the car. On this record, a reasonable jury could have concluded Bennett used
force against the son in excess of that necessary to accomplish the mere
taking of the car.
Bennett argues the relevant timeframe to determine when force
or fear was used began when he crossed over to the driver’s seat and began
driving the car. He contends the jury rejected the People’s theory that he
pushed the son out of the car, so there was no evidence to support a finding
that he used force or fear when he drove off. Even if the jury had found the
son fell out of the car instead of being pushed, there was evidence that
Bennett fought off the wife and the son for control of the car keys. That
evidence was sufficient to support a finding Bennett took the car by force.
Given the substantial evidence to satisfy the force element, we
need not and do not consider whether there was substantial evidence to
support a finding Bennett used fear to take the son’s car.
C. Domestic Violence Battery Causing Traumatic Condition
Bennett contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him
of count 6. Specifically, he claims the evidence at most proved he slapped the
wife once “with no discernible injury, minor or otherwise, except for a red
mark on her upper lip.”
It is a felony for a person to “willfully inflict[ ] corporal injury
resulting in a traumatic condition” on his or her spouse. (§ 273.5. subds. (a)–
(b).) As relevant here, “[a] traumatic condition is a condition of the body such

10
as a wound or internal or external injury, whether minor or serious, caused
by physical force.” (People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 137 (Abrego);
§ 273.5, subd. (d).) It includes, for example, “‘“sprains, bruises, fractures,
dislocation, concussion—indeed traumata of all kinds.”’” (Abrego, at p. 137.)
“It is injury resulting in a traumatic condition that differentiates this crime
from lesser offenses,” such as simple assault. (Ibid.)
In this case, the wife testified Bennett slapped her in the face.
She initially testified she couldn’t remember whether she was injured from
the slap, but when shown trial exhibit no. 2, the wife confirmed she received
an injury to the inside of her top lip. We have reviewed the two trial exhibits
depicting the wife’s face on the day of the incident. Specifically, exhibit no. 2
shows the wife lifting her top lip to reveal the inner skin and a red mark on
the inside of her lip. From this photo, a reasonable jury could conclude the
wife suffered a bruise or possibly a puncture to the skin. This is evidence of a
traumatic condition. (See, e.g., People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078,
1085 [bruising is sufficient evidence of traumatic condition]; People v. Wilkins
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 771 [redness on face and soreness to face and neck
sufficient evidence of traumatic condition].)
In his reply brief, Bennett acknowledges exhibit no. 2 shows a
mark on the wife’s inner top lip, describing it as “more like a sore or a bruise,
not an actual cut or injury.” But “[w]hether a reasonable trier of fact could
reach a different conclusion based upon the same facts does not mean the
verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence.” (People v. Mora and Rangel
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 490.) Evidence of a bruise or redness on the wife’s inner

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lip was enough for a jury to reasonably find a traumatic condition resulted
from Bennett’s slap.
Finally, Bennett’s reliance on the facts of Abrego, supra, 21
Cal.App.4th 133 is misplaced because they are distinguishable from our case.
There, the appellate court concluded there was “no evidence of even a minor
injury sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition” of a traumatic condition.
(Id. at p. 138.) The victim testified that although the defendant struck her,
she did not feel pain, “had not been injured or bruised,” and did not seek
medical treatment. (Id. at p. 136.) Although the victim had told a responding
police officer that her face and head were sore and tender where the
defendant struck her, the officer did not notice any injuries. (Ibid.) Here,
unlike in Abrego, the wife testified to receiving an injury to her lip and there
was photographic evidence supporting her testimony.
We thus conclude sufficient evidence supports the conviction on
count 6.
II.
SENTENCING
Bennett argues that at sentencing the trial court abused its
discretion in three ways. First, the court imposed the midterm of three years,
instead of the two-year low term, on count 1 in the domestic violence case.
Second, the court imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent, prison terms
for most of the remaining convictions, and failed to state why. Third, in the
domestic violence case, the court relied on the aggravating factor that
Bennett had “pushed” his son out of the car—a fact the jury did not find to be
true and, in any event, could not be considered for sentencing on the

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unrelated domestic violence conviction. But because Bennett failed to object
on these grounds below, we conclude he has forfeited them on appeal. Even if
we were to consider the merits, we would conclude the arguments fail.
A criminal defendant who did not object to the sentence at trial
“‘may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices.”’” (People v.
Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) Forfeited objections include “‘“cases in
which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and
cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a
particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state
any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.”’” (Ibid.) At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court announced its intended sentence and
stated its reasoning, and counsel had the opportunity to object. Although trial
defense counsel asked clarifying questions, he did not object on the grounds
that Bennett asserts on appeal. For this reason, his claims are forfeited on
appeal.
Even if we were to consider the merits, we would conclude
Bennett failed to show the trial court’s sentence choices were an abuse of
discretion. When a lawful sentence is challenged on appeal, “we are guided by
two fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the
sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.”’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely

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because reasonable people might disagree.”’” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376–377 (Carmony).)
Bennett’s first complaint concerns the imposition of the three-
year midterm sentence on count 1 in the domestic violence case. He contends
the trial court impermissibly relied on the aggravating factor of “callousness”
from the unrelated carjacking case. Bennett’s third complaint is related to his
first: He argues the court impermissibly relied on the aggravating factor that
he had “pushed” his son out of the car when sentencing him on the unrelated
domestic violence conviction. Although the court stated Bennett displayed a
“high degree of callousness” by pushing his son, nowhere in the record does
the court state it was choosing the midterm sentence for the domestic battery
conviction in part because of this aggravating factor. For this reason, Bennett
fails to show the court abused its discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 376–377 [sentencing court presumed to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives].) And as we will discuss, infra, the court could have properly
considered this aggravating factor for another reason: to impose consecutive
prison terms for the other convictions.
Bennett’s second complaint concerns the trial court’s failure to
state why it imposed consecutive terms for count 6 in the domestic violence
case and counts 1 and 3 in the carjacking case, and its alleged abuse of
discretion in doing so. Unless expressly prohibited by another statute, a
sentencing court has the discretion under section 669 to impose concurrent or
consecutive terms for multiple convictions. (People v. Woodworth (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 1473, 1479.) The court generally must state its reasons for its
sentencing choice on the record. (§ 1170, subd. (c); People v. Scott (1994) 9

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Cal.4th 331, 349.) But it is precisely because the court did not state reasons
for imposing consecutive terms and because Bennett failed to object below
that Bennett cannot now show the court abused its discretion. (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377 [sentencing court presumed to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives]; People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
709, 725 [“Defendant’s citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his
burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion”].)
In any event, “[o]nly a single aggravating factor is required . . . to
impose a consecutive sentence.” (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622,
728–729.) Such factors include, for example, whether “[t]he crimes and their
objectives were predominantly independent of each other;” whether they
“involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence;” whether they “were
committed at different times or separate places”; and “[a]ny circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation, whether or not the factors have been stipulated to
by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or
the judge in a court trial.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a)–(b).) Here, the
court described Bennett’s crimes against his wife and son to be “callous,” and
it could have properly relied on this aggravating factor to impose consecutive
prison terms.
In sum, Bennett has not met his burden of showing the court’s
sentencing decisions were irrational or arbitrary. We thus conclude the court
considered the relevant sentencing factors. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.409 [“Relevant factors enumerated in these rules must be considered by the
sentencing judge, and will be deemed to have been considered unless the
record affirmatively reflects otherwise”].)

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III.
ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT
Finally, Bennett argues the abstracts of judgment do not
accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. The
People concede the issue, and we accept the concession.
At the oral pronouncement of judgment, the trial court awarded
Bennett a total of 57 days in the carjacking case (50 days of actual time plus
7 days of conduct credit) and a total of 412 days in the domestic violence case
(358 days of actual time plus 54 days of conduct credit). The abstracts of
judgment, however, reversed these numbers—with the abstract for the
carjacking case showing 412 total days and the abstract for the domestic
violence case showing 57 total days. On remand, the abstracts of judgment
should be amended to reflect the correct custody credits. (People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court with the following
instructions. In case no. BAF2000509, the court is instructed to correct the
abstract of judgment, filed August 31, 2022, to reflect 57 days of total credits
(50 days of actual time plus 7 days of conduct credit) as of the August 26,
2022, hearing. In case no. BAF2101142, the court is instructed to correct the
abstract of judgment, filed August 31, 2022, to reflect 412 days of total credits
(358 days of actual time plus 54 days of conduct credit) as of the August 26,
2022, hearing. The court is further instructed to prepare amended abstracts
of judgment for both cases and forward certified copies to the Department of

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Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgments are
affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.

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