People v. Negrette CA2/6

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Filed 9/16/24 P. v. Negrette CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330452
(Super. Ct. No. 1387246)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

DAVID MICHAEL
NEGRETTE,

Defendant and Appellant.

David Michael Negrette appeals a judgment following a
2023 resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 In
2013, Negrette pled no contest to two counts of second degree
robbery (§ 211); first degree burglary (§ 459); unlawful taking of a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); and evading an officer (id.,
§ 2800.2, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to an
aggregate 18-year prison term. That sentence included a one-

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1

otherwise stated.
year prior prison term enhancement and a five-year prior serious
felony conviction enhancement.
At the 2023 resentencing hearing, the trial court dismissed
the one-year prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b))
and resentenced Negrette to an aggregate 17-year prison term. It
rejected Negrette’s request to dismiss the five-year prior serious
felony conviction enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)),
finding that Negrette was a danger to public safety.
We conclude, among other things, that: 1) the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by deciding not to strike the
enhancement, but 2) the court erred by not deciding Negrette’s
custody credits. We remand to the trial court to decide his
custody credits. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS
On May 23, 2011, Negrette entered a bank. He gave the
teller a note stating, “This is a holdup.” The teller gave him more
than $3,000.
On June 9, 2011, Negrette went back to the bank. He
approached the teller and stated, “Give me all your money fast.”
The teller opened the “cash drawers” and gave him $2,292.
On the evening of June 9, Georgia Young noticed that her
2001 Toyota Avalon was missing. It had been parked in the
garage of her residence. She called police.
A sheriff’s deputy spotted the stolen vehicle. He activated
his lights and siren and pursued the vehicle. Negrette fled. He
reached speeds “in excess of 120 miles an hour.” He went off the
freeway and crashed into a ditch.
In 2013, Negrette pled no contest to two counts of second
degree robbery, first degree burglary, unlawful taking a vehicle,

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and evading an officer. The trial court sentenced him to 18 years
in prison.
In 2021, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75. It
retroactively invalidated, with one exception, any sentence that
included a one-year prior prison term enhancement. (§ 667.5,
subd. (b).) Where a defendant has such an enhancement, the
trial court is required to strike it and to “recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Negrette’s
sentence included the one-year enhancement and a five-year
prior serious felony enhancement. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) After
notification from the Secretary of the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation that Negrette’s sentence included a one-year
enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court scheduled a
resentencing hearing.
Negrette requested the trial court to strike both the one-
year enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and the five-year
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). As to the five-year
enhancement, he claimed there were mitigating factors that
supported striking it, including that the current offense was
connected to mental illness; he was 24 years old when he
committed the offense that qualified for the five-year
enhancement; and the enhancement is based on an old
conviction.
The People opposed striking the five-year enhancement
because of Negrette’s long criminal record, his unsatisfactory
performance on parole, and his violent conduct while in prison.
The trial court struck the one-year enhancement and
resentenced Negrette to an aggregate prison term of 17 years. It
denied the request to strike the five-year enhancement. (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1).)

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The trial court found, “The Defendant suffers from a long
criminal history, as well as a significant history of an
unwillingness to abide by the rules. Specifically, the Defendant
has been convicted of forcible rape, been to prison five times, and
in the current offense robbed a bank twice, committed residential
burglary, and led deputies on a dangerous, high-speed chase.
While in prison, the Defendant has suffered several rules
violations, tested positive for marijuana multiple times, made
alcohol in his cell, and has been involved in multiple fights.
Taking all of the above into account, the Court finds that the
Defendant continues to be a threat to public safety and uses its
discretion to not strike the Penal Code Section 667 [subdivision
(a)(1)] enhancement.”
DISCUSSION
Not Striking the Five-Year Enhancement
Negrette contends the trial court erred by not striking the
five-year enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) because it did not
make sufficient findings on the mitigation factors he presented.
“Section 1385 [subdivision] (c)(2) provides that in
determining whether to dismiss an enhancement ‘under this
subdivision,’ the court must consider nine listed mitigating
circumstances if proven by the defendant [citation], ‘unless the
court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287,
296, italics added.) “That provision means that if the court finds
that dismissal of an enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’
then the court need not consider the listed mitigating
circumstances.” (Ibid., italics added.) The trial court found
Negrette was a danger to public safety.

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Moreover, the trial court’s findings show it considered
mitigating factors. It ruled, “[T]his court does not find that there
are any new mitigating circumstances that would warrant the
granting of a Romero motion.” (Italics added.) It said there was
no “documentation” to show psychological factors as a
contributing factor. The court also found Negrette’s conduct in
prison was not mitigating; it was “aggravating.”
Negrette claims the trial court did not mention all the
mitigating factors in the statute and the factors he proposed as
mitigating. But “we presume the trial court followed the law.”
(People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092.) “[T]he fact
that a court did not specifically mention certain evidence does not
mean that the court ‘ignored’ that evidence.” (Ibid.) It may
simply indicate that “the court did not consider such evidence to
have appreciable mitigating weight.” (People v. Tully (2012) 54
Cal.4th 952, 1064.)
The People claim the trial court could also implicitly reject
the mitigating factors Negrette highlighted. They note the claim
that he was mentally ill at the time he committed his most recent
offenses is based on speculation and not evidence directed to the
specific time he committed the offenses. It is also not consistent
with our decision that affirmed his conviction. (People v. Negrette
(Oct. 15, 2014, B248706) [nonpub. opn.].) There we concluded his
18-year sentence was “commensurate with the nature of
Negrette’s crimes and his individual circumstances.” (Ibid.,
italics added.) He has not shown that his 1991 rape offense was
the product of a one-time youthful indiscretion. He was an adult,
24 years old, when he committed that offense. The claim this was
an old conviction is not mitigating given his subsequent long
criminal record. From this the court could find he “did not

5
refrain from criminal activity,” he “did not add maturity to age,”
and he “was often in prison.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 163.)
Abuse of Discretion in Finding
Negrette Was a Danger to Public Safety
The trial court has discretion to not strike the
enhancement based on its assessment that the defendant
constitutes a danger to public safety. The issue on appeal is
whether the court abused its discretion. (People v. Brugman
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) Negrette has the burden on that
issue. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) He
must show the decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
The trial court may consider the defendant’s most recent
crimes as a factor in deciding whether he would pose a threat to
public safety. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 299.) In 2013, Negrette was convicted of two counts of second
degree robbery, first degree burglary, unlawful taking of a
vehicle, and evading an officer. In committing the evading
offense, he drove a vehicle at speeds “in excess of 120 miles an
hour.” In pleading no contest, in 2013, he admitted that he had
a prior strike conviction.
The trial court may also consider the defendant’s prior
criminal history. (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 658;
People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279,
1297.) Negrette had a significant prior criminal record. In 1991,
he was convicted of rape. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) In 1989, he was
convicted of receiving stolen property. (Former § 496.1.) In 2000,
he was convicted of being under the influence of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550.) In that year he was

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also convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. (§ 290.) In
2003, he was convicted of felony vehicle theft. (Veh. Code,
§ 10851, subd. (a).) In 2006, he was convicted of petty theft with
priors. (§ 666.) In 2008, he was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).)
Another factor is the defendant’s performance on parole.
(People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 163-164; People v.
Stone (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 707, 716.) Negrette had numerous
parole violations. The People’s evidence showed he violated
parole five times relating to his 1991 rape conviction. He violated
parole 10 times related to his petty theft with priors conviction.
The trial court may also consider the defendant’s conduct in
prison. (People v. Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 658; In re
Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1219; People v. Superior Court
(Kaulick), supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297; In re Bettencourt
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 780, 804-805; id. at p. 804 [unsuitability
for release into the community may be shown by a prisoner’s
“ ‘serious misconduct in prison’ ”].) Negrette’s performance in
prison supported the court’s finding that he had not been
rehabilitated. The court noted that he had “been to prison five
times.” Negrette repeatedly engaged in violent behavior. The
People showed that in 2022 he repeatedly struck another inmate
in the face. In 2019, he fought with another inmate and
continued to fight even after “intervention by prison guards.” In
2017, he “battered another inmate causing serious injury.” The
other inmate suffered “fractures in the left-side orbital bones.”
He committed other rules violations.
The prosecutor stated that Negrette “was offered drug
treatment in the past,” but he “chose not to involve himself in
treatment.” Negrette said he completed some rehabilitation

7
programs in prison. But the trial court could properly consider
his recent violence in prison in 2022, 2019, and 2017, and his
rules violations to find that he had not shown successful
rehabilitation. (In re Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1219; In
re Bettencourt, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804-805; People v.
Stone, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 716.)
Negrette’s long criminal record, parole history, and prison
conduct show a three-decades-long pattern of committing crimes,
recidivism, multiple parole violations, and recalcitrant and
violent prison behavior. The trial court could reasonably find this
long history showed Negrette’s inability to stop committing
crimes and engaging in violent behavior. It found, “Defendant’s
conduct while incarcerated, rather than mitigating his
circumstances, actually makes his circumstances more
aggravating . . . .” It could find the combination of all these
negative factors shows a threat to public safety. (People v.
Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 658; In re Lawrence, supra, 44
Cal.4th at p. 1219.)
The Custody Credits
Negrette notes the trial court ordered the prison to
calculate his custody credits. It said, “[T]he Court hereby orders
that [California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
recalculate the Defendant’s credits.”
The People contend that “the court and defense counsel
agreed that procedure was the best course of action due to the
complexity of the calculations.” But the trial court has the
responsibility to decide factual issues whether routine or complex
and it has the means to decide complex issues by taking evidence
with the assistance of counsel.

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Moreover, the sentencing court has the mandatory duty to
determine a defendant’s custody credits. (People v. Buckhalter
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 41.) That duty cannot be delegated to
another entity (People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 16) or any
“nonjudicial officer.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897,
902; In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)
DISPOSITION
The case is remanded to the trial court for the court to
calculate Negrette’s custody credits. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J.

CODY, J.

9
Clifford R. Anderson III, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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