Castro-Gonzalez v. Cazarez CA4/1

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Filed 9/13/24 Castro-Gonzalez v. Cazarez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN CASTRO-GONZALEZ, D081659

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-
00017427-CU-PA-CTL)
FELIPA CAZAREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Timothy B. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, John D. Marino, Emily I.
Ellse and Steven J. Renick for Defendant and Appellant.
Dolan Law Firm, Christopher B. Dolan and Allison L. Stone; The Arkin
Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Felipa Cazarez appeals a $100,000 jury award of punitive damages
arising from a personal injury action brought by Martin Castro-Gonzalez.
Cazarez claims the award is excessive in light of evidence regarding her
ability to pay it. Because she failed to move for a new trial on this basis
below, she waived this claim. We resolve this case by memorandum opinion
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
851–854), and affirm.
I.
In 2019, Castro-Gonzalez was standing next to his car when Cazarez
crashed her car into it. The impact caused Castro-Gonzalez’s car to rotate
and strike him, causing serious injuries and permanent paralysis. Cazarez
was driving while intoxicated.
In a criminal proceeding, Cazarez pled guilty to felony driving under
the influence and was sentenced to six years in prison. She was released in
June 2022, after serving approximately two and a half years.
While Cazarez was in prison, Castro-Gonzalez brought a negligence
suit against her seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
The only evidence regarding Cazarez’s financial condition came
through her oral testimony at trial, in December 2022. During Castro-
Gonzalez’s case-in-chief under Evidence Code section 776, Cazarez testified
she had been employed at a hospital for 19 years before the incident. While
working at the hospital, Cazarez was a member of a union, had a pension,
and earned $24 or $25 per hour. She did not know how much money, if any,
she might receive in the future from the pension.
At the time of the trial, Cazarez was working 40 hours per week as a
pharmacy cashier earning $17.50 per hour. She worked overtime
approximately once a month. She had no savings or property of value, nor
did she receive or expect to receive money from any other source. Cazarez
claimed she could not secure a second job because she needed to care for her
children.

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As to her expenses, Cazarez testified she was living paycheck to
paycheck and spent her income on a monthly bus pass, phone bill, food,
clothes, shoes, and other items for her two children, who were 12 and 15
years old at the time. She and her children lived in her mother’s house. She
had not paid rent since being released from prison six months prior, but
intended to resume $1,000 monthly rent payments.
The jury awarded Castro-Gonzalez $16,602,050 in compensatory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Cazarez filed a timely appeal
from the judgment, challenging only the punitive damages award.
II.
Cazarez’s briefing on appeal conflates the separate questions of:
(1) whether there is meaningful evidence of her financial condition in the
record, and (2) whether the punitive damage award is excessive. At oral
argument, Cazarez’s counsel conceded there was sufficient evidence of her
financial condition but argued that evidence showed she had no ability to pay
any punitive damages, much less the amount the jury awarded. Her counsel
clarified that Cazarez’s only position on appeal was that the award was
excessive in light of the evidence regarding her ability to pay. Because
Cazarez did not move for a new trial on this basis, which her counsel also
conceded, she cannot challenge the amount of the award on appeal.
The proper level of punitive damages is an amount not so low that the
defendant can absorb it with little or no discomfort, nor so high that it
destroys, annihilates, or cripples the defendant. (Rufo v. Simpson (2001)
86 Cal.App.4th 573, 621–622 (Rufo).) “‘The point that damages are excessive
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must be presented to the
lower court on the motion for new trial.’” (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co.
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 918 (Schroeder).) Failure to move for a new trial on the

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ground of excessive damages precludes a challenge to the amount on appeal if
the challenge turns on the credibility of witnesses, conflicting evidence, or
other factual questions. The power to weigh the evidence and resolve issues
of credibility is vested in the trial court, not the reviewing court. Thus, trial
courts are in a better position than appellate courts to resolve disputes over
the proper amount of damages based on the evidence presented at trial.
When a defendant first challenges a damages award on appeal, without a
motion for new trial, they unnecessarily burden the appellate courts with
issues that can and should be resolved at the trial level. (Greenwich S.F.,
LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 739, 759.)
Whether the punitive damages awarded against Cazarez was excessive
based on her ability to pay it turned on the resolution of conflicting evidence
and her credibility. On the one hand, Cazarez testified she lived paycheck to
paycheck, and argued she thus had no ability to pay any amount of punitive
damages. On the other hand, Cazarez testified she earned a $17.50 hourly
wage for an approximate income of $3,000 per month. Although she did not
provide specific figures for her expenses, the jury could draw reasonable
inferences based on her explanation of her obligations: a monthly bus pass, a
phone bill, food, clothes, shoes, and other items for her two children. (Ruth v.
Lytton Sav. & Loan Asso. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 831, 844.) Because Cazarez
did not own a car, house, or any property of value, the jury could also
reasonably infer she did not have a mortgage, loans, or other significant
liabilities. (Ibid.) She also testified that she intended to resume $1,000
monthly rent payments, although she had not paid rent since being released
from prison six months prior. The jury could have discredited her claim that
she would eventually pay rent. Ultimately, Cazarez’s ability to pay the
punitive damages award based on the evidence of her financial condition

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presented a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court in the first
instance on a motion for new trial. An appellate court ordinarily defers to the
trial court’s denial of such motion because of the trial judge’s greater
familiarity with the case. (Rufo, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.) Cazarez’s failure
to move for a new trial precludes her from arguing on appeal that the
punitive damages award was excessive. Her counsel claimed at oral
argument that such motion was unnecessary to argue that an award of
punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the record contains
meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial condition. (Adams v.
Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109.) Cazarez’s argument fails because her
counsel conceded at oral argument the record contains substantial evidence of
Cazarez’s financial condition, counsel further confirmed the only issue on
appeal was whether the award was excessive in light of the evidence
regarding her ability to pay, yet Cazarez failed to move for a new trial.
(Schroeder, 11 Cal.3d at p. 918.)
III.
The judgment is affirmed. Castro-Gonzalez is to recover his costs on
appeal.

CASTILLO, J.

I CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

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O’Rourke, Acting P. J., Dissenting

I respectfully dissent. I have no quarrel with well-settled authority
requiring a party to move for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages
before raising it on appeal. However, this doctrine has no application to the
case at hand: “Failure to move for a new trial on the ground of excessive
damages precludes a challenge to the amount on appeal if the challenge turns
on the credibility of witnesses, conflicting evidence, or other factual questions.”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4, italics added.)
The key inquiry is Felipa Cazarez’s net worth or ability to pay, with
“evidence of [her] actual wealth” including not just earnings but liabilities.
(Doe v. Lee (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 612, 621.) The record in this case is devoid
of evidence Cazarez is capable of paying punitive damages in any amount.
She has no assets and earns $17.50 an hour. There are no conflicts in this
evidence. In seeking punitive damages, it is Martin Castro-Gonzalez’s
burden of proof to establish Cazarez’s financial condition. (Adams v.
Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109.) The majority does not explain why
there is a conflict in Cazarez’s testimony that she spends all her wages to
provide basic necessities and her testimony that she earns $3,000 per month
when Castro-Gonzalez failed to produce any evidence to the contrary.
Cazarez’s credibility is the only material issue that could have been
decided by the jury. But irrespective of its determination, the outcome is the
same—the punitive damages are excessive. If believed, she has no assets and
her wages are wholly inadequate to pay the award. If not believed, there is
no contrary evidence of her financial condition. A jury decision to disbelieve
Cazarez does not cure Castro-Gonzalez’s failure to meet his burden of proof or
create a conflict in the evidence; instead, it creates an evidentiary void.
In Doe v. Lee, the court held the admitted evidence did not support a
$230,400 punitive damages award: “The record does not show that appellant
has any other assets [than a one-sixth interest in an LLC worth $230,400] to
his name. It does not contain any record or analysis of his liabilities or
expenses—though we know he owes over $800,000 in compensatory damages.
It does not show that he has a source of income that would enable him to pay
off the compensatory damages award, cover his necessary expenses, and pay
the punitive damages award without rendering him destitute. If an interest
in the property is appellant’s primary asset and represents roughly all of his
wealth or potential wealth—and we have no reason to conclude otherwise, as
respondents have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate otherwise—this
award would take up all of it, and prior decisions suggest an award taking up
that magnitude of a person’s assets is excessive.” (Doe v. Lee, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at pp. 621-622.) A punitive damages award “ ‘can be so
disproportionate to the defendant’s ability to pay that the award is excessive
for that reason alone.’ ” (Id. at p. 619, quoting Adams v. Murakami, supra, 54
Cal.3d at p. 111.) The “purpose of punitive damages is not served by
financially destroying a defendant. The purpose is to deter, not to destroy.”
(Adams v. Murakami, at p. 112; see also Doe v. Lee, at p. 619.)
Under these principles, Cazarez is entitled to support herself and her
children. But I additionally invite the majority to join me in taking judicial
notice that the entirety of Cazarez’s wages necessary to do so are exempt
from garnishment to satisfy a judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
sections 706.050 through 706.051 and California Courts “Guide to earnings
withholding order for employers” (<https://selfhelp.court.ca.gov/guide-
earnings-whithholding-orders-emloyers>).

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Because of the particular circumstances of this case, this court is as
capable as the trial court to decide whether the punitive damages award is
excessive. It is as a matter of law. The judgment awarding punitive damages
should be reversed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

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