In re S.R. CA2/8

CourtListener 10113571CalctappSep 10, 2024

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Filed 9/10/24 In re S.R. CA2/8
Opinion following rehearing on court’s own motion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT

In re S.R., a Person Coming Under B332087
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00701A
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re PRINCETON N. et al., B332981, B333986
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00701B, C
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
S.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Stephanie M. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
These consolidated appeals involve siblings Princeton N.
and S.N. and their half sibling S.R. (together, the children). S.S.
(mother) is mother to all three. The father of Princeton N. and
S.N. is T.B. (N. father). S.R.’s father is deceased.
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights as to Princeton N. and S.N. and its legal
guardianship order as to S.R. Her appeals raise only one issue:
whether the juvenile court properly concluded it had no reason to
believe any of the children is an Indian1 child within the meaning
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
before entering the challenged orders. This is the second time we
have considered ICWA compliance in this case. (See In re S.R.
(Oct. 12, 2021, B307302) [nonpub. opn.].) We again find no error.
BACKGROUND
We limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the
matter before the court.
Though S.R. was also the subject of prior dependency
proceedings, this case began in 2019. In the detention report,
mother and N. father claimed Indian heritage. They did not
know which tribes but said they would obtain more information.
(In re S.R., supra, B307302.)

1 We use the term “Indian” as it is defined in section 1903 of
title 25 of the United States Code.

2
Mother completed but refused to sign an ICWA-020
parental notification of Indian status form. On the form she
wrote she might have “ ‘Cherokee and other’ ” Indian affiliations,
“ ‘but not sure of the tribe.’ ” (In re S.R., supra, B307302.) When
the investigator from the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) asked mother for
information about maternal grandparents as part of the
Department’s inquiry, mother declined to provide any. (Ibid.)
N. father did not file an ICWA-020 form. (In re S.R., supra,
B307302.) However, he told a Department social worker he was
Native American: “ ‘Chief, Cheyenne, Cherokee.’ ” (Ibid.)
Mother and father thereafter refused to cooperate with the
Department in its investigation of their claimed Indian ancestry.
(Ibid.)
With the limited information it had, the Department sent
notices for the three children to three Cherokee Tribes, the
Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
For Princeton N. and S.N., based on N. father’s claims, the
Department also sent notices to the Cheyenne Tribes. The
notices listed names and birth dates for mother or mother and
N. father, as applicable. They did not list any information for any
other relatives. (In re S.R., supra, B307302.)
Two tribes responded to the Department’s notices, the
Cheyenne River Sioux and the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians. The former reported that neither mother, N. father, nor
S.N. was enrolled in the tribe. The latter reported that, based on
the information provided, none of the children was registered or
eligible to register as tribe members. (In re S.R., supra,
B307302.)
In August 2020, at the dispositional stage of the case, the
juvenile court concluded ICWA did not apply. Mother and

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N. father both appealed that decision and we affirmed. (In re
S.R., supra, B307302.)
Subsequent to the August 2020 ICWA finding, the
Department continued its efforts to ascertain whether any of the
children has Indian ancestry. In January 2021, the Department
sought additional information from mother and N. father, but
“[t]he parents refused to acknowledge and reported that they
would not provide [the Department] with any information,
including names of any tribes or the names of anyone who may
have information regarding whether or not they have Native
American Ancestry.” This was consistent with the typical futility
of the Department attempting to communicate with the parents
throughout the case. As the juvenile court noted at a hearing in
October 2021, “every time the social worker spoke to the mother
and the [N.] father . . . , [the Department] and [its] social workers
have been met with hostility and aggressiveness with vulgar
language and with complete and utter disrespect.” This
continued in April 2022, when the Department reported N. father
behaving “nonsensical[ly]” and refusing to help the Department
contact mother, who had broken off communication with the
Department.
In October 2022, the Department again reported that
ICWA did not apply and the parents had not been available for
further inquiry. Around this time, S.R. was moved to the home of
maternal aunt Gloria A., who was being considered for legal
guardianship, while the other children remained in foster care.
The juvenile court ordered an inquiry of all maternal and
paternal relatives and for the Department to make “one last”
attempt to interview mother and N. father about Indian ancestry.
In February 2023, Gloria A. told the Department her side of
the family (maternal) had possible Indian ancestry but she did

4
not know which tribe or through which ancestor. She promised
to investigate herself. The social worker requested contact
information for those with whom Gloria A. would inquire but
Gloria A. refused, explaining the maternal great-aunt she
intended to ask “hardly answers her telephone” and Gloria A. did
not have contact information for N. father, his relatives, or any
person related to S.R.’s father.
The same day, the social worker spoke with mother.
Mother refused to give the social worker any information,
including any contact information for S.R.’s father’s relatives.
The social worker also spoke with N. father, who denied
knowledge of any Indian ancestry.
At a hearing a few days later, the juvenile court noted the
Department’s additional ICWA inquiry and asked counsel if they
wanted to be heard on the matter. None did, and the court found
no reason to believe any of the children have Indian ancestry.
Yet the Department thereafter continued its ICWA inquiry.
In July 2023, it again asked mother about Indian ancestry, and
she again refused to answer. In July and August 2023, the
Department tried to reach N. father by phone “to no avail.” But
in July 2023, maternal aunt Gloria A. told the Department she
believed her ancestors were from the Cherokee and Geechee
Tribes. She provided names of some of her relatives: maternal
great-aunts Beatrice S. and Gloria S., maternal great-great-
aunt Mary Louis R.R., and maternal great-great-great-aunt
Beatrice R. She also provided birth dates for Beatrice S. and
Mary Louis R.R. Again, maternal aunt told the Department she
would make further inquiry with a maternal great-aunt (specified
this time as Gloria S.) herself.
While the Department was unable to contact maternal
great-aunt Gloria S. directly, it learned from maternal cousin

5
Angel S. that Gloria S. had previously mentioned maternal
great-aunt Beatrice S. had Indian ancestry and believed her
family was part of the Cherokee Tribe. However, maternal aunt
Gloria A. cast doubt on that report. Gloria A. had managed to
speak to Gloria S. and Gloria S. stated she was unsure about any
Indian heritage. Gloria A. promised to reach out to another
relative and text the Department if she obtained any additional
information. She later confirmed she was unable to obtain any
additional information.
The Department’s direct contact with three other relatives
yielded no information of use.
S.R. was never able to contact any of her father’s relatives
and simply repeated what maternal aunt Gloria A. had said
about Indian heritage on mother’s side—that it was possible but
uncertain and she could not identify a tribe.
In August 2023, the Department submitted it had complied
with its ICWA inquiry obligations. Of the three possible tribal
affiliations the family had suggested, the Department concluded
Cheyenne and Cherokee were ruled out by the responses it
received to its 2019 notices to the tribes. And the Geechee Tribe
is not federally recognized, rendering it irrelevant to the
Department’s ICWA compliance obligations. Based on this
record, the juvenile court found the Department had complied
with ICWA as to S.R. and appointed maternal aunt Gloria A. to
be S.R.’s legal guardian.
In December 2023, the juvenile court made the same
findings of ICWA compliance as to Princeton N. and S.N. and
terminated parental rights.
Mother, who had persistently refused to cooperate in the
Department’s efforts to conduct its ICWA inquiry, appealed these
rulings to contend the Department’s inquiry was inadequate.

6
On August 14, 2024, we filed an opinion affirming the
juvenile court’s decision based on mother’s failure to even
attempt to show any prejudice as a result of the decision. This
was a sufficient basis for affirmance under our decision in In re
M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 71, in which we held some
showing of prejudice was necessary before we would reverse a
juvenile court order for inadequate ICWA inquiry.
A few days later, our Supreme Court filed Dezi C. v.
Angelica A. (Aug. 19, 2024, S275578) ___ Cal.5th ___ [2024 Cal.
Lexis 4634] (Dezi C.), which excused a showing of prejudice where
there has been an inadequate ICWA inquiry. In doing so, it
disapproved of the prejudice analysis in In re M.M., supra, 81
Cal.App.5th 61. (Dezi C., at p. *54, fn. 18.)
Both parties filed petitions for rehearing. We deny those
petitions because the record still supports affirmance for the
reasons stated in this modified opinion.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable ICWA Law and Standard of Review
In involuntary state court proceedings concerning child
custody, such as these dependency proceedings, ICWA requires
notice to the relevant Indian tribe “where the court knows or has
reason to know that an Indian child is involved.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(a).) It is incumbent upon the court administering such a
proceeding to inquire whether the subject child is an Indian child.
The scope of the duty on the court, as well as certain participants
in the proceeding (including county welfare departments, like the
Department), is defined by federal regulations and related state
law. (See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 (2024); Welf. & Inst. Code,2

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

7
§ 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481.)
We describe the duty of inquiry as having up to three
“phases” in any given case. The first phase—“initial inquiry”—
applies in every case. In general terms, initial inquiry requires
the court and county welfare departments like the Department to
ask certain persons about the child’s possible Indian ancestry.
(See § 224.2, subds. (a), (b), (c); In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
558, 566.)
Where “initial inquiry” gives “reason to believe” the child is
an Indian child, but there is insufficient information to make a
definitive determination, the second phase—“further inquiry”—
comes into play. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) Further inquiry requires
more robust investigation into possible Indian ancestry, including
interviewing the parents and extended family members,
contacting the BIA, and contacting the relevant tribe or tribes.
(See ibid.; In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) In
contacting the tribe or tribes, the county welfare department is
obligated in this phase to “shar[e] information identified by the
tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
eligibility determination, as well as information on the current
status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(c).)
Where, as a result of further inquiry or otherwise, the
juvenile court has “reason to know” a child is an Indian child, the
third phase is triggered. This phase requires formal notice to be
sent to the applicable tribe or tribes so as to facilitate their
participation in the proceedings. (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(1); In re D.F.,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 568.)
“The duty to inquire begins with the initial contact,
including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting child
abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the
child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The court and

8
county welfare department “have an affirmative and continuing
duty” to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under
section 300 may be or has been filed may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
Mother claims error in both the first and second phases of
inquiry. She complains the Department failed to satisfy its
obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2,
subdivision (b) to inquire with the children’s statutorily defined
“extended family members.” (Ibid.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2);
§ 224.1, subd. (c).) And she complains the Department failed to
satisfy its obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (e) to
further inquire based on “information suggest[ing] eligibility in
the Cherokee tribe” it obtained from extended family members it
did interview.
The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply
implies that (a) neither the Department nor the court had a
reason to know or believe the child was an Indian child; and
(b) the Department fulfilled its duty of inquiry. (In re Josiah T.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401; see also § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
Some courts review both such findings for substantial evidence
(see ibid.), while others review the former for substantial
evidence and the latter for abuse of discretion (see In re Ezequiel
G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004, disapproved on another
ground in Dezi C., supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis
4634, at p. *54, fn. 18].) While expressly reserving on what
standard of review applies to these findings, the Dezi C. court
“note[d] . . . that the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination
that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and fully diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, at p. ___ [2024
Cal. Lexis 4634, at p. *32].) “ ‘A [juvenile] court abuses its

9
discretion only when “ ‘ “[it] has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.” ’ ” [Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re Ezequiel G., at pp. 1008-1009.)
2. Analysis
Applying a deferential standard of review, we affirm the
juvenile court’s finding that the ICWA does not apply. The record
reflects that the Department made substantial and persistent
efforts to ascertain whether the children were Indian children
from the outset of the case, and the juvenile court was attentive
to those efforts and encouraged them, while recognizing the
challenges the Department faced in obtaining information from
the family.
Mother’s claimed initial inquiry error centers on the
Department’s reliance on maternal aunt, Gloria A., to interface
with certain other extended family members instead of making
the inquiry directly with them.
The Dezi C. court confirmed that a county welfare
department’s failure to ask “every possible extended family
member” about possible Indian ancestry is not error. (Dezi C.,
supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 4634, at p. *32].)
Rather, “ ‘[t]he operative concept is those people who are
reasonably available to help the [Department] with its
investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian
ancestry should be asked.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding the Department had acted with adequate diligence to
interview extended family members. Though the Department
asked Gloria A. for the contact information of at least one person

10
she asked about Indian heritage, Gloria A. declined to share it.
The Department also asked her for contact information for other
relatives that she was unable to provide. On a different occasion,
Gloria A. offered to contact another extended family member
about possible Indian ancestry and text the Department if she
obtained any additional information. Two weeks later, she
reported she did not obtain any additional information.
The Department did not rely exclusively on Gloria A. to
contact family members, however. It also asked four maternal
cousins, and attempted to ask, albeit unsuccessfully, paternal
grandmother, paternal great-aunt, and the mother of a half
sibling.
On the record before us, it was not an abuse of discretion
for the juvenile court to find the Department satisfied its initial
inquiry obligation by relying, in part, on Gloria A. to
communicate with other family members. First, the record
supports the inference that Gloria A. insisted on reaching out to
these family members herself and would not share contact
information with the Department. Second, in the context of a
case where the parents were openly hostile to and refused to
assist the Department in making its inquiry, it is understandable
that the Department took help where it could get it. “Where . . . a
parent largely fails . . . to provide names and contact information
for extended family members, [the Department’s] ability to
conduct an exhaustive ICWA inquiry necessarily is constrained.”
(In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082.) “[W]e cannot ask
the [Department] to intuit the names of unidentified family
members or to interview individuals for whom no contact
information has been provided.” (Ibid.)
Mother does not contend the Department had contact with,
or contact information for, extended family members with whom

11
it failed to inquire. Under the circumstances of this case, and on
the record provided, we cannot say the juvenile court acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or irrationally in determining that the
Department had done enough. The court had pushed the
Department to make additional efforts to inquire, the
Department made additional efforts, and it came up with nothing
more than speculation about possible Cherokee heritage—the
same speculation the family had offered from the beginning of the
case but was never substantiated. “The juvenile court has
discretion to determine when enough is enough.” (In re H.B.
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 721.)
Regarding the duty of further inquiry, mother fails to show
error. She contends the Department had a duty to further
inquire based on statements from various maternal family
members in 2023 that there was a possibility of some affiliation
with the Cherokee Tribe. However, the Department had already,
in 2019, contacted the three Cherokee Tribes, the Secretary of the
Interior, and the BIA based on mother’s claim of possible
Cherokee heritage. Additionally, the Department made efforts to
interview the parents and family members and obtained
biographical information about some of them. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(2)(A), § 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) However, the
Department was limited in its ability to gather information due
to lack of cooperation from the family. Ultimately, the relevant
information provided did nothing more but echo what mother
claimed in her form ICWA-020—that she might have Cherokee
heritage but did not know the tribe or anything more. The only
new information mother observes the Department had was the
names of four, and birth dates of two, family members that might
have been somehow connected to a Cherokee Tribe (or the

12
nonfederally recognized Geechee Tribe), and a vague statement
that some maternal relatives were from “DC and Texas.”
Mother fails to show that not re-contacting the same
Cherokee Tribes with this additional information violated the
Department’s duty of further inquiry. She does not assert a
violation of the Department’s obligation to share “information
identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a
membership or eligibility determination,” which would constitute
a violation of section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(C). Nor does she
cite authority that the Department was obligated to revisit with
the tribes possible eligibility for membership based on
information of this nature. It is simply unexplained how the
continued unconfirmed, and apparently unconfirmable, rumors of
some family connection to a Cherokee Tribe were sufficiently
pertinent to the children’s possible Indian status warranted
asking the same tribes about eligibility again. (Cf. In re Hunter
W. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469 [“ ‘family lore’ ” is not
“ ‘reason to know a child would fall under [ICWA]’ ”.)
The only case mother cites as part of her discussion of the
adequacy of the Department’s further inquiry is In re E.C. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 123. That case found an inadequate further
inquiry where the county welfare department had information
that various family members “may be enrolled members of the
Apache tribe” and there was no record the department ever
contacted that tribe. (Id. at p. 134.) Elsewhere, she discusses In
re N.G. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474. In that case, the court found
an inadequate further inquiry where the department contacted
various tribes the father listed on his form ICWA-020, which did
not include any Cherokee Tribe, but did not contact any Cherokee
Tribe when its investigation uncovered information that paternal
relatives were members. (Id. at pp. 478-479.)

13
Here, the Department did contact each federally recognized
tribe in which it was suggested the children might be eligible for
membership. The tribes did not find eligibility. It then received
more speculative information about some undefined family
connection to the same tribes and did not re-inquire. Under the
circumstances, we cannot say the juvenile court’s implicit
determination that the Department’s further inquiry was duly
diligent “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders, including its finding with
respect to the children’s Indian heritage, are affirmed.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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