Suleimanyan v. UTLA CA2/2

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Filed 9/5/24 Suleimanyan v. UTLA CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ASTINE SULEIMANYAN, B326607

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV10892)

UTLA et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard J. Burdge, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Greene Broillet & Wheeler, Tobin M. Lanzetta, Aaron L.
Osten; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy and Stuart B. Esner for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cohen Williams, Kathleen M. Erskine and Roya S. Ladan
for Defendants and Respondents.

******
Astine Suleimanyan (plaintiff) sued her former employer
and two of its staffers for various employment-related claims as
well as claims under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act)
(Civ. Code, § 52.1) and the Ralph Civil Rights Act (Ralph Act)
(id., § 51.7). The trial court entered summary adjudication for
the employer and summary judgment for the staffers on
plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim due to her failure to timely
exhaust her administrative remedies and on plaintiff’s Bane Act
and Ralph Act claims due to the absence of any evidence of
physical violence or a threat of such violence. Because we
independently conclude that these rulings were correct, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts1
A. Plaintiff’s employment
Plaintiff was hired by United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA)
in September 2015 to work as a political organizer. She resigned

1 Consistent with the pertinent standard of review, we
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of plaintiff (as the
party opposing summary adjudication and judgment) except in
the many instances in which plaintiff’s declaration in support of
her opposition conflicts with her prior deposition testimony, with
her discovery responses, or with other statements in her
declaration (because a party is not allowed to manufacture
disputes of fact by contradicting herself). (Scalf v. D. B. Log
Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1521-1522; Whitmire v.

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from her position in November 2019, although she took several
leaves of absence (from October 2017 to January 2018, from April
2018 to January 2019, and from August 2019 to November 2019).
UTLA also employed field director Brian McNamara
(McNamara) and representation coordinator Carl Joseph
(Joseph). Although plaintiff worked with those individuals,
neither of them served as her supervisor.
B. McNamara’s conduct
Plaintiff and McNamara did not get along, and they had
several tense interactions between the time she was hired and
October 12, 2017. Those include:
– When plaintiff did not arrive on time for a phone
bank event she was responsible for leading in the fall of 2015,
McNamara called her on the phone, and “yelled” and “cursed” at
her. When plaintiff eventually arrived, McNamara continued
their discussion in the hallway outside the event by “yelling” “in
[plaintiff’s] face” about how her tardiness was “unacceptable.”
Plaintiff felt “trapped” in the corner of the hallway with
McNamara, who was “a tall guy.” When event volunteers exited
the elevator into the hallway, McNamara ended the interaction
and plaintiff went into the event.
– When plaintiff at an April 2017 staff meeting raised
concerns that her assignments were too much to handle,
McNamara responded by “rais[ing] his voice” and commenting,
“How is this too much?” Plaintiff reported that this made her feel
“ambushed.”
– When plaintiff at a spring 2017 staff meeting said she
could not attend a meeting on the date proposed, McNamara

Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087; Davis v.
Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 731, 736.)

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“raised his voice” when asking why plaintiff could not attend.
Plaintiff responded that she would be on vacation. Plaintiff later
reported that McNamara had required her to disclose her
“private information” “public[ly]” (namely, that she would be on
vacation), and that this constituted a “tactic[]” of “public
humiliation” that was “abusive” and motivated to “sabotag[e]”
plaintiff and “tarnish[ her] reputation.”
– When plaintiff asked McNamara in May 2017 if she
could call into a staff meeting (rather than attend in person),
McNamara responded with the word “Yep” instead of the word
“Yes.”
– When plaintiff got up to leave a meeting early,
McNamara “pulled a chair in front [of her]” and asked, “Where
the fuck are you going?” Plaintiff went back to her seat, but
walked out of the meeting a few minutes later; when she did,
McNamara gave her “a very, very nasty look.”
– When plaintiff and McNamara attended a work-
related retreat in July 2017, McNamara asked plaintiff and
another UTLA employee whether they had completed the
assigned reading. After plaintiff confirmed that she had and
McNamara commented, “Well, that was fast,” plaintiff responded,
“Would you prefer I read out loud?” and “It’s always something
with you, [McNamara].” McNamara then “stepped forward,” “got
really close” to her face, and “aggressive[ly]” asked, “What did
you say?” Plaintiff reported this interaction—as well as her
feeling that McNamara was displaying “obsessive attention”
toward her at the retreat because he on two occasions
“immediately followed” her out of the meeting rooms into the
hallway—as amounting to “stalking” and “harassing” that made

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her “feel unsafe” and afraid that McNamara would “physically
harm” her.
– When plaintiff and McNamara attended a work
retreat at the Westin Bonaventure Hotel in July 2016,
McNamara rode the hotel’s iconic exterior glass elevator.
Plaintiff reported that, from the elevator, McNamara could see
into her hotel room (because plaintiff had not drawn the blinds)
and characterized McNamara’s use of the public elevator as
“peeping.”
McNamara never touched plaintiff and never engaged in
any sexually inappropriate conduct toward her.
McNamara’s last act toward plaintiff was on October 12,
2017.
C. Joseph’s conduct
Joseph repeatedly made vulgar and sexually charged
comments and gestures toward plaintiff between July 2016 and
October 2017. Those include:
– In 2016 and 2017, Joseph on three or four occasions
told plaintiff that there were things he “wanted to do to her.”
– In 2016 and 2017, when plaintiff would arrive at
office meetings and scan the room for a vacant seat, Joseph on
three or four occasions invited her to “sit on Big Papa’s lap.”2
These comments made plaintiff feel “devalued” and “humiliated.”
– Sometime in 2016 or 2017, plaintiff spit out her
chewing gum at a meeting and Joseph asked for the gum so he
could “taste” her.

2 This was Joseph’s self-ascribed nickname; plaintiff
requested that Joseph give her a nickname and he anointed her
“High Maintenance.” Plaintiff denied having “any type of feeling
about” that moniker.

5
– In July 2017, Joseph told plaintiff he wanted to
perform a sexual act and then crudely gestured that act during a
dinner at a work retreat.
Plaintiff would confront Joseph about his comments and
gestures: She told him that his comment about wanting to “do
her” and his crude gesture made her feel uncomfortable. In
response, Joseph would “laugh . . . off” his conduct and claim he
was “just joking.”
Joseph did not physically touch plaintiff, restrict her
movement, or aside from the one gesture, do “anything physically
toward [her] that made [her] feel intimidated.”
Joseph did not make any comments or gestures after
October 2017, although plaintiff claims that he “looked [her] up
and down” when they passed on a stairwell in January or
February 2018.
II. Procedural Background
A. The pleadings
On March 17, 2020, plaintiff sued UTLA, McNamara, and
Joseph (collectively, defendants). In the operative second
amended complaint, plaintiff alleged various employment and
tort claims: Against all defendants, she alleged claims for (1)
sexual harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.); (2) violation of the Bane Act;
and (3) violation of the Ralph Act; against UTLA alone, she
alleged claims for (1) gender discrimination under FEHA; (2)
retaliation under FEHA and the Labor Code; (3) failure to
prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under
FEHA; and (4) constructive discharge in violation of public policy.

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B. Motion for summary adjudication/judgment
Defendants moved for summary adjudication and/or
judgment as to the sexual harassment, Bane Act, and Ralph Act
claims asserted against them. They argued that (1) plaintiff’s
sexual harassment claim was barred because she failed to timely
exhaust her administrative remedies as required under FEHA,
and (2) plaintiff’s Bane Act and Ralph Act claims failed as a
matter of law because there was no evidence that she faced a
threat of physical violence.3
After a full round of briefing and a hearing, the trial court
issued a 20-page ruling on November 3, 2021 granting
defendants’ motion. The court ruled that plaintiff’s sexual
harassment claim was barred for failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies, finding there was “no evidence” to
support “equitable tolling” of the statutory deadlines. The court
ruled that, although there were triable issues of fact regarding
whether plaintiff “truly felt intimidated,” defendants were
entitled to judgment on her Bane Act and Ralph Act claims
because she adduced no evidence of any “violence or threats of
violence” against her.
C. Trial
Plaintiff proceeded to trial on her remaining claims against
UTLA in the fall of 2022. She voluntarily dismissed the claims
for gender discrimination under FEHA and retaliation under the
Labor Code, and the jury rendered a verdict for UTLA on the
remaining claims for retaliation under FEHA, failure to prevent
retaliation, and constructive discharge.

3 Defendants also argued that the Bane Act claim was time-
barred, but the trial court did not rule on that issue and we
likewise need not reach it here.

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D. Appeal
Following the entry of judgment for defendants, plaintiff
timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in summarily
adjudicating (1) her FEHA sexual harassment claim due to the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) her Bane Act
and Ralph Act claims due to the absence of any evidence of
violence, threats of violence, or intimidation.
A trial court may grant summary adjudication or judgment
to a defendant on a “cause of action” if “there is no triable issue of
material fact” and the defendant “is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law” on that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subds. (c), (f)(1) & (o)(1); Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29
Cal.4th 473, 480; QDOS, Inc. v. Signature Financial, LLC (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 990, 998; State of California v. Continental Ins.
Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1031 [summary adjudication is
“‘procedurally identical to [a] motion[] for summary judgment’”].)
The moving party (usually, the defendant) bears the initial
burden of showing that the plaintiff cannot establish “[o]ne or
more of the elements of [her] cause[s] of action” or by showing a
valid affirmative defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(1) &
(p)(2).) Once that initial burden is met, the plaintiff bears the
burden of “show[ing] that a triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or [an affirmative] defense.”
(Id., subd. (p)(2).) Summary adjudication or judgment should be
denied only when there are “genuine” or “triable” issues of fact to
be resolved at trial—that is, when “the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find . . . in favor of the party opposing
the motion.” (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226

8
Cal.App.4th 830, 860; Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York
Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1176, fn. 2 [applying
these standards to motions for summary adjudication].)
We independently review a grant of summary adjudication
or summary judgment. (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015)
62 Cal.4th 340, 347.) We also independently review whether the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies bars a claim.
(Alexander v. Community Hospital of Long Beach (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 238, 251.)
I. Plaintiff’s FEHA Sexual Harassment Claim
A. Pertinent law
1. FEHA and its administrative exhaustion
requirement, generally
FEHA is meant to “safeguard the rights of all persons to
seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination” or
harassment. (Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 407,
420.) FEHA contemplates a two-step process—namely, (1) the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (the Department)
enforces FEHA administratively by “‘receiv[ing], investigat[ing]
and conciliat[ing] complaints of unlawful employment
discrimination’” and harassment; and (2) if and only if this
administrative process is exhausted, individual employees may
then sue their employers in court. (Kim v. Konad USA
Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345 (Kim);
Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
918, 931 (Pollock); Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 83
[“exhaustion of FEHA administrative remedies is a prerequisite
to judicial relief on a statutory cause of action”].)
To exhaust FEHA’s administrative remedies, an employee
must first file a “verified complaint” with the Department within

9
“one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful
practice” occurred. (Former Gov. Code, § 12960, subds. (b) & (d);
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10009, subd. (e); Romano v. Rockwell
Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 492.) Even after this
administrative complaint is filed with the Department, the
employee may sue her employer in court only after the
Department issues a “right-to-sue notice,” which happens (1)
when the employee elects to “forgo having the [D]epartment
investigate [her] complaint” by requesting an “immediate right-
to-sue notice” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 10005, 10004, subd. (c);
Clark v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 289, 305); or (2)
when no immediate right-to-sue notice is sought, when the
Department has investigated the verified complaint for 150 days
(as well as pursuing any attempts at “conciliation and/or
settlement”) without filing its own civil complaint against the
employer or has, prior to the 150-day window, determined it will
not pursue legal action (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (b); Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, §§ 10005, subd. (e), 10024, subd. (a), 10025, subd. (a),
10026, subd. (a), 10004, subd. (a), 10031, subd. (a); Martin v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1726
(Martin); Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116,
1120-1121.) An employee has one year to file suit after receiving
the right-to-sue notice. (Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1413 (Acuna).)
If the employee does not submit a “right-to-sue complaint”
with the Department seeking to bypass any investigative process
and obtain an “immediate right-to-sue notice” (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 2, § 10005), then the process of filing a verified complaint has
many steps. The process starts with the employee filing a “Pre-
Complaint Inquiry” designed to have the Department gather

10
factual information about the alleged FEHA violation. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 10002, subd. (a).) Consistent with well-settled,
pre-2020 law that this initial inquiry filing is not a verified
complaint (Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. (1996)
47 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1515; Holland v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 940, 946, fn. 8 (Holland)),4 the
standardized form used for the Department’s pre-complaint
inquiry is captioned “Pre-Complaint Inquiry” and explicitly
indicates that it “is not a filed complaint.” Once the inquiry form
is filed, the Department then “initiate[s] the investigative
process” by “conducting an intake interview” with the employee.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 10002, subd. (b), 10007, subd. (a).)
Using the information it acquires in that process, the
Department then “draft[s] the language” of the administrative
complaint. (Id., § 10009, subd. (a).) Because the complaint must
be verified by the employee (id., § 10009, subd. (c)), the employee
“may propose modifications” to the Department’s draft complaint,
but the Department is not obligated to accept those proposed
edits (id., § 10009, subd. (f)). The final step is for the employee to
sign and verify the complaint, and the date of the employee’s
signature is the date on which the verified complaint is deemed
filed with the Department. (Id., § 10009, subds. (c) & (d).)
An employee’s failure to file a timely verified complaint
with the Department—that is, within one year of the “alleged

4 Our Legislature changed the law effective January 1, 2020
to provide that “filing a complaint means filing an intake form”
(Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (b)), but the Legislature clarified in a
new subdivision effective January 1, 2022 that this provision does
not apply retroactively to revive claims—like plaintiff’s—that
became untimely prior to the new law (id., subd. (f)(3)).

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unlawful practice”—constitutes a failure to exhaust FEHA’s
administrative remedies (Holland, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p.
945; Kim, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345 [“[e]xhaustion
includes the timely filing of administrative complaints”]; Pollock,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 931 [“‘The timely filing of an
administrative complaint’ before the [Department] ‘is a
prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action for damages’”];
Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1052
(Valdez)), and is a basis for dismissing a FEHA claim on
summary judgment (Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1724).
It is the employee-plaintiff who bears the burden of proving that
she exhausted her administrative remedies. (Kim, at p. 1345.)
2. Equitable tolling
Because an employee’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies does not divest a trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction (Holland, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 946;
McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45
Cal.4th 88, 107), courts retain an equitable power to excuse the
untimely filing of a complaint with the Department (Accardi v.
Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 349). As pertinent
here,5 courts may deem the one-year deadline to file an
administrative complaint equitably “tolled” in situations where
the Department (1) “misleads the [employee] about filing

5 Courts also retain the equitable power to reach back and
excuse unexhausted claims that are part of a “continuing
violation” (Acuna, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412; Valdez,
supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1052), but that doctrine is not
implicated here.

12
obligations,” or (2) “commits errors in processing the [employee’s]
complaint.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10018.)6
Because the power to equitably toll is, by its very nature,
grounded in “equity” (Denney v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1234 (Denney)) and requires a
“balancing [of] the equities” (Rodriguez v. Airborne Express (9th
Cir. 2001) 265 F.3d 890, 901-902), the doctrine of equitable tolling
is more likely to be invoked when “[t]he equities favor” the
employee, such as when she (1) “diligently pursued [her] claim,”
(2) “was misinformed or misled by the [Department],” (3) “relied
in fact on the misinformation or misrepresentations of that
agency, causing [her] to fail to exhaust [her] administrative
remedies,” and (4) “was acting pro se at the time.” (Rodriguez, at
p. 902.) Critically, an employee’s diligence and lack of negligence
while exhausting her administrative remedies is not merely a
pertinent factor to equitable tolling—it is an absolute
prerequisite. (Id. at p. 902, fn. 12 [“Diligence is required for the
successful invocation of virtually any equitable doctrine”];
Scholar v. Pacific Bell (9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 264, 268
[“claimant’s failure ‘to exercise due diligence’” is fatal]; Watson v.
Chubb & Sons, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 32 Fed. Appx. 827, 828-829;
Lehman v. United States (9th Cir. 1998) 154 F.3d 1010, 1016
[equitable tolling is “not available to avoid the consequences of

6 Equitable tolling is also appropriate when the Department
“improperly discourages or prevents the [employee] from filing at
all” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10018), but that basis is not
implicated here. Although plaintiff argues that there may be
other grounds for equitable tolling, her argument points to the
various circumstances bearing on the propriety of tolling due to
misleading conduct or errors in processing, rather than setting
forth an additional, independent basis for tolling.

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one’s own negligence”]; cf. Holland, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p.
947 [“diligen[ce] in pursuit of [administrative] remedy” counsels
in favor of equitable tolling].)
Because equitable tolling is a defense to the failure to
exhaust, once an administrative complaint is shown to be
untimely (and hence unexhausted), the burden shifts to the
employee to prove the propriety of equitable tolling. (Holland,
supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 945.)
B. Facts pertinent to administrative exhaustion7
1. Pre-complaint inquiry form
On October 16, 2017, plaintiff filled out and filed the
Department’s “Pre-Complaint Inquiry” form. Plaintiff’s hand-
written responses on the form state that the conduct at issue
occurred from April 17, 2017 to October 13, 2017. Her narrative
response on the form discussed only McNamara’s conduct;
plaintiff did not mention Joseph and, unlike McNamara and
UTLA, she did not list Joseph as a “respondent.”

7 To sidestep plaintiff’s assertions that the trial court
wrongly excluded portions of her declaration and wrongly
resolved factual disputes between her declaration and the
employment agency’s business records, we will consider the
excluded portions of her declaration and, as noted above, resolve
all factual disputes, including those between plaintiff’s
declaration and the records, in plaintiff’s favor except those
created by inconsistencies in plaintiff’s declaration or by
contradictions between that declaration and plaintiff’s prior
discovery responses.

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2. Pre-complaint investigation by the Department
a. Initial interview in November 2017
On November 4, 2017, the Department sent plaintiff an
acknowledgement that her “inquiry ha[d] been received,” and
assigned a Department analyst to her case five days later.
On November 13, 2017, the analyst emailed plaintiff asking
to schedule an interview “to obtain more information about [her]
complaint.” They agreed to conduct the interview the next week.
The analyst confirmed the interview in a letter to plaintiff
summarizing that she had “filed a Pre-Complaint Inquiry” with
the Department, and the Department would “determine if [her]
complaint warrants further investigation” or “prosecution.”
The interview occurred on November 20, 2017.
b. Requests for further information in 2018
The Department analyst next reached out to plaintiff on
March 14, 2018 to ask her for a copy of her UTLA paystub.
Plaintiff responded that she did not remember the analyst, and
asked him to “hold off” until they had another conversation
because she does not “know what this [is] for.”
On June 11, 2018, the Department analyst reached out to
plaintiff again, this time to ask her to “explain” what
“professional growth opportunities” she was denied (which was
an adverse action she listed on her inquiry form). Although we
accept as true plaintiff’s statement in her declaration that she
“described in detail all specifics that [the analyst] requested,” she
provides no date for her response beyond asserting she was
“always prompt in responding.” It is undisputed, however, that
on September 4, 2018, the Department analyst called and
emailed plaintiff stating that he did not have the information he
had requested in June 2018 and needed it so it could “be included

15
in the complaint.” Plaintiff did not respond to the analyst’s early
September entreaties.
3. Initial draft complaint
On September 7, 2018, the Department analyst sent
plaintiff a draft complaint. The draft complaint alleged that (1)
plaintiff experienced sexual harassment by McNamara between
July 2016 and October 2017, and (2) plaintiff was denied equal
pay on the basis of her gender.
Accompanying the draft complaint was a cover letter. That
letter asked plaintiff to “sign and return” the complaint if she
“agree[s] with the language,” but if not, to contact the analyst to
discuss any “concerns.” The cover letter also explicitly advised
plaintiff that (1) “[t]he law requires that a complaint be filed
within one (1) year from the date of the discriminatory act,” so
plaintiff should sign it or discuss any concerns with the language
“as soon as possible,” and (2) plaintiff’s failure to respond within
10 days would result in the Department closing her case.
On September 9, 2018, plaintiff contacted the analyst and
told him that the draft complaint was “inaccurate.” On a
September 10, 2018 call, plaintiff elaborated that she was
confused over whether she was sexually harassed by McNamara
or was discriminated against on the basis of gender. Plaintiff did
not at that time provide any edits, and instead promised the
analyst she would email him proposed language.
When plaintiff did not send the analyst her proposed edits,
he left her voicemails on September 21, 2018 and September 28,
2018 and sent her an email on September 28, 2018: Each
communication requested “the edited complaint language” so the
complaint could be finalized for her signature; the analyst cut

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and pasted the draft complaint’s allegations into the email as a
reminder.
4. October 2018 edits
Although no edits from plaintiff appear in the
Department’s file and plaintiff did not during discovery produce
any email from her containing those edits (because she
inconsistently blamed her email provider for intentionally
deleting them and herself for accidentally deleting them), we
accept as true plaintiff’s declaration that she emailed her
proposed (but unspecified) edits at some unspecified time in
October 2018.
5. January 2019 edits including Joseph
On January 8, 2019, plaintiff emailed the Department
analyst to complain that she had sent her proposed edits to him
“a few months ago” and had not heard back.8 When the analyst
told plaintiff on a January 10, 2019 call that he never received
her edits, plaintiff asked for the draft complaint language once
again. The analyst emailed plaintiff that language later that
day.
Two weeks later, on January 23, 2019, plaintiff provided
edits and for the first time included allegations regarding Joseph.
Plaintiff also for the first time requested an immediate right-to-
sue letter from the Department.
6. Revised draft complaint
After plaintiff made two more requests for status updates
in February 2019, the Department analyst sent plaintiff a revised

8 Because plaintiff provides no greater specificity, we cannot
construe this as indicating that the proposed edits were sent any
earlier than the uncertain October 2018 timeframe she provided
elsewhere.

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draft complaint for signature on March 1, 2019. The revised
draft complaint alleged that (1) plaintiff experienced sexual
harassment by McNamara and Joseph between July 2016 and
October 2017, (2) plaintiff was denied equal pay on the basis of
her gender, and (3) a reprimand plaintiff received in April 2018
was retaliation for her complaints of harassment. The cover
letter accompanying the revised draft complaint contained the
same provisos as the cover letter sent in September 2018.
Plaintiff refused to sign the revised draft complaint
because, “according [to] the research [she had] done,” the
complaint should bear the date she filed her inquiry form—not
the date of the draft.
The Department analyst referred plaintiff to a supervisor,
and plaintiff—now represented by counsel—worked with the
supervisor to finalize the complaint. Plaintiff forwarded the
supervisor all of her email correspondence with the analyst; there
were no emailed edits from October 2018.
7. Verified complaint and right-to-sue notice
Plaintiff signed and verified the revised draft complaint on
April 19, 2019 and, in accordance with the law, the verified
complaint was dated as of that date (rather than the date
plaintiff filed the inquiry form).
The Department issued plaintiff a right-to-sue notice on
February 21, 2020.
C. Analysis
Because UTLA’s liability for sexual harassment turns on
the conduct of McNamara and Joseph, and because the last
alleged unlawful act committed by McNamara and Joseph differs,
we analyze the timeliness of plaintiff’s exhaustion of
administrative remedies as to McNamara and Joseph separately.

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1. Claim based on McNamara’s conduct
Plaintiff’s allegation in her verified complaint with the
Department that McNamara’s alleged harassment ended on
October 12, 2017 is conclusive, and obligated her to file her
administrative complaint by October 12, 2018.9 Because it was
not filed until April 19, 2019, plaintiff did not timely exhaust her
administrative remedies. The burden thus shifted to plaintiff to
establish triable issues of material fact as to the applicability of
equitable tolling.10 Plaintiff resists that the burden shifted to
her, arguing that it remained on the Department to show that
any delay was her fault, but plaintiff’s argument misapplies the
above-cited precedent: Although defendants as the moving
parties had the initial burden of showing their entitlement to
relief on summary adjudication or judgment, defendants met this
burden when they showed plaintiff’s verified complaint was

9 Although plaintiff hand-wrote on the inquiry form that the
“last date of harm” was October 13, 2017, her verified complaint
with the Department states that the conduct occurred “on or
before” October 12, 2017; we need not tarry over this one-day
discrepancy because plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her
administrative remedies based on either date.

10 We note that, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, equitable
tolling is an issue for the court, not the jury. (Hopkins v.
Kedzierski (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 736, 745-746; Doe v. Marten
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029; cf. Brome v. Dept. of the
California Highway Patrol (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 786, 790-791
[discussing how “reasonable jury” could find disputed issues as to
equitable tolling, but not confronting issue of which trier of fact
must address issue on the merits]; see generally People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 155 [“‘“An opinion is not authority for
propositions not considered”’”].)

19
untimely and hence not exhausted; that showing itself shifted the
burden to plaintiff to show equitable tolling applies, which
dovetails neatly with the general rule that the burden of showing
administrative exhaustion rests with the plaintiff (accord,
Holland, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 945).
a. Misleading conduct
An employee may be entitled to equitable tolling of the one-
year deadline for filing a verified complaint with the Department
if the Department “misle[d]” the employee about her “filing
obligations.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2., § 10018.) To trigger
equitable tolling, the Department must make an affirmative
statement or action, such as giving the employee “inaccurate
advice” or “assurances” that procedural noncompliance will be
overlooked. (Holland, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 946-947
[Department inaccurately “assured” employee that he “need not
be concerned” about upcoming administrative deadlines]; Denney,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234 [agency inaccurately told
employee that administrative complaint alleging one claim was
“sufficient” to exhaust as to different claims]; Albano v. Schering-
Plough Corp. (9th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2d 384, 386-387 [same].)
The trial court here correctly ruled that the undisputed
facts show plaintiff’s untimely verified complaint is not excused
by any misleading conduct by the Department. At no point did
the Department incorrectly advise or assure plaintiff that she
could ignore pending deadlines; to the contrary, the Department
analyst when transmitting the draft complaint on September 7,
2018 explicitly advised plaintiff of the pending one-year deadline
and the need for alacrity.
Plaintiff responds with what boils down to three
arguments.

20
First, plaintiff argues that the Department analyst in some
correspondence referred to plaintiff’s “Pre-Complaint Inquiry”
form as a “complaint,” such that plaintiff was misled into
believing that she had already filed her verified complaint once
she filed her Pre-Complaint Inquiry. We reject this argument.
The inquiry form itself said that it was not a complaint. (And
contrary to what plaintiff suggests, our Legislature’s decision to
amend the law to make the filing of an inquiry form synonymous
with the filing of a verified complaint—and to not make that
change retroactive—indicates that, prior to this amendment, the
inquiry form and the verified complaint were not synonymous.)
The analyst reminded plaintiff in September 2018 that the
complaint was due “within one (1) year from the date of the
discriminatory act,” and plaintiff knew—because she wrote it on
the inquiry form—that McNamara’s acts ended on October 13,
2017. What is more, the whole purpose of the months-long back-
and-forth between plaintiff and the analyst was to prepare and
file the verified complaint, which would have made no sense if—
as plaintiff now asserts—she had already filed a qualifying
complaint. Taking all of this together, the analyst’s occasional
use of informal shorthand in calling the “Pre-Complaint Inquiry”
form the “complaint” could not have misled plaintiff as a matter
of law. We decline to adopt a rule that rests on the notion that
employees are effectively potted plants who cannot read, do
math, or understand the context in which statements are made.
Second, plaintiff argues that even if the Department did
not affirmatively mislead her, she was “[]reasonabl[y]” confused
and the Department therefore misled her by not clarifying and
correcting her unstated confusion. This argument relies on the
wrong legal standard.

21
Third and lastly, plaintiff argues that she is not a lawyer.
This is true, but it does not alter the fact that the Department did
nothing to mislead her.
b. Errors in processing the complaint
An employee may be entitled to equitable tolling of the one-
year deadline for filing a verified complaint with the Department
if the Department “commits errors in processing [her] complaint.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10018.)
The trial court here correctly ruled that plaintiff’s untimely
verified complaint is not excused by any Department errors in
processing her complaint because, contrary to what she asserts
on appeal, the undisputed facts show she was, as matter of law,
not diligent in prosecuting her complaint. Although she filed her
inquiry form soon after McNamara’s conduct ended and she
responded quickly to the Department analyst’s request for an
interview in November 2017, plaintiff thereafter (1) told the
analyst in March 2018 to “hold off” on processing her complaint;
(2) did not contemporaneously dispute the analyst’s report that
he never received the information he requested from plaintiff in
June 2018; and (3) waited between three and seven weeks to
provide proposed edits to the analyst in response to the initial
draft complaint sent in September 2018, despite being warned
that the deadline was looming (and, at that time, was just five
weeks away). Even if we indulge in speculation that plaintiff
sent edits to the analyst at the beginning of the vague “October
2018” timeframe plaintiff provided in opposition to the summary
adjudication motion, that would have still left the Department
less than two weeks to consider whether to accept or reject her
edits, redraft the complaint, and recirculate it for her
consideration. Plaintiff accuses the Department of “slow

22
walking” the processing of her complaint, but the undisputed
facts show she was the slow walker.
Plaintiff responds with what boils down to four arguments.
First, plaintiff argues that the Department committed
errors in processing her complaint because the analyst did not
produce a draft complaint until early September 2018, five weeks
before the one-year deadline was to expire. For support, she
argues that the Department’s regulations require analysts to
assign “priority” when a statute of limitations is about to expire,
and to accept any “written statement or correspondence” as the
employee’s administrative complaint when “necessary to avoid
missing the statute of limitations for filing [a verified compliant]
with the [D]epartment.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 10008, subds.
(a) & (b), 10010, subds. (a) & (c).) This argument does not negate
our conclusion that plaintiff was not diligent as a matter of law.
Moreover, this argument ignores that the reason it took the
analyst nearly 11 months to produce a draft complaint is because
plaintiff told him to “hold off” at the four-month mark and
because the analyst did not receive information plaintiff said she
transmitted in June 2018. The regulations plaintiff cites do not
compel a contrary conclusion: The duty to give priority grants a
“priority for the purpose of scheduling an intake interview” when
the statute of limitations is about to run (id., § 10008, subd. (a))
(but here, the intake interview was conducted almost
immediately after plaintiff filed her inquiry form and long before
the statute of limitations was about to expire), and the
Department’s ability to accept other filings in lieu of a verified
complaint applies “[i]f the statute of limitations would expire
before an intake interview could be scheduled and completed for
a complaint filed for investigation” (id., § 10010, subd. (a)) (but

23
again, the intake interview in this case was conducted long before
the limitations period would expire).
Second, plaintiff argues that the Department had a duty to
file the unverified first draft of her complaint by the October 12,
2018 deadline because one of the Department’s regulations
obligates the Department to “file the unverified complaint and
accept it as received” where the employee “cannot verify a
complaint for investigation before the applicable statute of
limitations runs.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10009, subd. (d).) As
a threshold matter, it is not clear the Department’s duty under
this regulation is triggered here because the analyst got the
initial draft complaint to plaintiff five weeks prior to the statute
of limitations deadline, which may not qualify as a situation
where the employee “cannot verify a complaint” before the
deadline. More to the point, plaintiff called the analyst days after
receiving the draft complaint, told him it was “inaccurate” and
that she would be sending edits. In effect, she told him to hold off
and then did nothing for weeks. The regulation does not compel
the Department to file a knowingly inaccurate complaint when
the employee has promised to provide edits that would correct
those inaccuracies. And nothing in the regulation obligates a
court considering equitable tolling to ignore the employee’s lack
of diligence and her role in creating the circumstances that may
implicate the regulation in the first place.
Third, plaintiff argues that the Department’s first draft
complaint was riddled with errors, and that the analyst’s alleged
careless drafting constitutes errors in the processing of her
complaint. This argument overlooks that the allegations
involving McNamara were largely the same in this initial draft
complaint and the final complaint plaintiff verified and signed;

24
the analyst’s initial draft complaint as to McNamara was thus
not riddled with errors. What plaintiff characterizes as “error” is
the initial draft complaint’s omission of any facts regarding
Joseph, but, as noted below, plaintiff presents no evidence that
she asked the Department to include allegations regarding
Joseph until January 2019, long after the limitations period ran
as to McNamara in October 2018.
Fourth and finally, plaintiff argues that any result that
does not favor her amounts to a “‘procedural gotcha’” because the
Department “lulled” her “into believing that she had done what
was necessary to preserve her rights”—leaving her shocked and
surprised when the trial court concluded her verified complaint
was untimely. Because, as we have concluded, the undisputed
facts show that the Department did nothing to mislead plaintiff,
this argument lacks any factual foundation in the record and
amounts to a request that an employee’s misapprehension of
deadlines—no matter how formed—entitles her to ignore those
deadlines. That is not the law, and would obliterate most
deadlines if it were.
2. Claim based on Joseph’s conduct
Plaintiff’s allegation in her verified complaint that Joseph’s
alleged harassment ended in October 12, 2017 is conclusive, and
thus obligated her to file a verified complaint with the
Department by October 12, 2018. The first time plaintiff asserted
that Joseph’s conduct continued into January or February 2018
was during her deposition.11 Because her verified complaint was

11 Plaintiff did not identify the early 2018 incident when
Joseph looked her “up and down” as she walked down a staircase
in (1) her complaint to UTLA’s human resources department filed
shortly after the incident, (2) her inquiry form or any iteration of

25
not filed until April 19, 2019, plaintiff did not timely exhaust her
administrative remedies under either timeline. The burden thus
shifted to plaintiff to establish triable issues of fact as to the
applicability of equitable tolling.
Because, as noted above, the undisputed facts show no
misleading conduct by the Department, the sole remaining basis
for equitable tolling is any errors in the processing of plaintiff’s
complaint. However, plaintiff’s lack of diligence is even more
pronounced as to Joseph because the first time that plaintiff even
mentioned him to the Department was in January 2019, despite
Joseph’s conduct occurring at a minimum one year prior.
Although plaintiff’s declaration indicates that she provided the
Department “edits” to correct “inaccuracies” in the initial draft
complaint in October 2018, this language says nothing about
adding new allegations regarding an entirely different person; we
decline to speculate that plaintiff’s choice of words meant
something beyond what she said, and plaintiff has offered no
other evidence as to the content of her October 2018 missive to
the analyst. Even if we assume that Joseph’s final act of “looking
[her] up and down” while passing her on a staircase occurred in
February 2018, that means plaintiff waited 11 months to raise
the issue. She was not diligent, and that lack of diligence
dictates that equitable tolling not apply as a matter of law.
II. Plaintiff’s Bane Act and Ralph Act Claims
To prevail on a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must establish
that (1) the defendant has “interfere[d]” with the “exercise or
enjoyment” of her constitutional rights, (2) “by threat,
intimidation, or coercion,” and (3) with the “specific intent to

her administrative complaint filed with the Department, or (3)
her operative complaint filed in the trial court.

26
violate” her civil rights. (Civ. Code, § 52.1; Schmid v. City &
County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 483; Shoyoye
v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 956-957
(Shoyoye).) To prevail on a Ralph Act claim, a plaintiff must
establish that (1) the defendant made a “discriminatory”
distinction on the basis of a protected characteristic the
defendant perceived the plaintiff to have, (2) the defendant
engaged in “violence” or “intimidation by threat of violence,” and
(3) the defendant acted with a “discriminatory motive.” (Civ.
Code, § 51.7; Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1268, 1290-1291 (Gabrielle A.); CACI Nos. 3063,
3064.)
Both the Bane Act and the Ralph Act require proof of (1)
violence, (2) threatened violence, or (3) intimidation through
physical acts or words. (Civ. Code, §§ 52.1, 51.7.) A threat of
violence requires “some expression of intent to injure or damage
[the] plaintiff[] or [her] property.” (Ramirez v. Wong (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 1480, 1486-1487; Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (j).)
Intimidation and coercion are terms of art under the Acts,
reserved for “egregious interferences with constitutional rights,
[and] not just any tort” such as assault. (Julian v. Mission
Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395; Shoyoye,
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 960-961 [detention of plaintiff
insufficient].) Speech that does not explicitly threaten violence is
not actionable as intimidation or coercion unless the plaintiff
“reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be
committed against them or their property” by the defendant and
that the defendant has the present ability to carry out that
violence (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (k); Gabrielle A., supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1289-1290.) In this situation, the question is

27
whether “‘a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the
plaintiff, [would] have been intimidated by the actions of the
defendant and have perceived a threat of violence.’” (Winarto v.
Toshiba Am. Electronics Components, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 274
F.3d 1276, 1289-1290 (Winarto).)
We independently agree with the trial court that plaintiff’s
Bane Act and Ralph Act claims fail as a matter of law. It is
undisputed that neither McNamara nor Joseph engaged in
violence toward her. It is also undisputed that neither
McNamara nor Joseph ever threatened violence because at no
point did either of them express an intent to injure plaintiff or
her property. There is also insufficient evidence as a matter of
law to establish that McNamara or Joseph ever intimidated or
coerced her in a manner that would make a reasonable person
perceive a threat of violence. To be sure, McNamara raised his
voice, used profanity, and invaded plaintiff’s personal space, but
he never balled a fist, pounded a table, or did anything physical
to create a reasonable belief that the “anger” and “hostility”
plaintiff perceived would translate into violence. And, to be sure,
Joseph made foul and offensive sexual remarks that alluded to
sexual conduct to which plaintiff would not have consented, but
Joseph also never touched plaintiff and never indicated he would
engage in nonconsensual sexual conduct, so his conduct and
words would not have caused a reasonable person to perceive a
threat of violence.
Plaintiff responds with what boils down to four arguments.
First, plaintiff argues that Joseph is a lawyer, and that
lawyers are more intimidating because they (ostensibly) know the
law and what they can get away with. We decline plaintiff’s

28
invitation to create a separate, more plaintiff-friendly standard of
liability for defendants who happen to be lawyers.
Second, plaintiff argues that she subjectively felt
intimidated. We must credit her evidence of such, but the
definition of intimidation turns on a reasonable person, not on
subjective perception.
Third, plaintiff argues that precedent compels a ruling in
her favor. It does not. She cites Winarto, supra, 274 F.3d 1276,
but the defendant in that case kicked the plaintiff and then
“feigned kicking her on many other occasions” (id. at pp. 1289-
1290). Such actual use of violence and threatened re-use of
violence is absent here. Plaintiff also cites Harris v. Stampolis
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, Long v. Valentino (1989) 216
Cal.App.3d 1287, Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1403, and C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169
Cal.App.4th 1094. But none of these cases involves the Bane Act
or Ralph Act, or their specific requirement of violence, threatened
violence, or intimidation/coercion. Long involves the Unruh Civil
Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.), Myers involves sexual
harassment under FEHA, and C.R. involves common law sexual
harassment. (Long, at p. 1290; Myers, at p. 1425; C.R., at p.
1112.) Harris involves the civil harassment statute (Code Civ.
Proc., § 527.6); while that statute requires a “credible threat of
violence,” it defines that term of art more expansively than the
intimidation/coercion requirement under the Bane Act and Ralph
Act because it need only “‘place a reasonable person in fear for . . .
her safety’” rather than perceiving a threat of violence. (Harris,
at p. 498; Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(2).)
Fourth and finally, plaintiff argues that McNamara’s and
Joseph’s words and conduct were intimidating when viewed “in

29
context.” Although we agree that context is important
(Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal
Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1250,
disapproved on other grounds by Cohen v. Superior Court (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 706, 727, fn. 11), we have already accounted for
context in examining what a reasonable person in plaintiff’s
shoes would perceive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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