CourtListener 10104410•Midcoast ECO v. Cal. Coastal Commission CA1/3
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Filed 9/4/24 Midcoast ECO v. Cal. Coastal Commission CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MIDCOAST ECO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. A168036
CALIFORNIA COASTAL
COMMISSION, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CPF-21-517430)
Defendant and Respondent;
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.
The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act; Pub. Resources Code,
§ 30000 et seq., undesignated statutory references are to this code) is a
comprehensive statutory scheme governing coastal land use planning.
(§ 30001.5.) The Coastal Act requires local governments within coastal zones
to prepare a local coastal program (LCP), which includes land use plans,
zoning ordinances, zoning district maps, and implementing actions within
sensitive coastal resource areas. (§§ 30108.6, 30500.) Programs and
amendments thereto are subject to approval by the California Coastal
Commission (the Commission), which assesses whether programs and
amendments conform to Coastal Act policies. (§ 30510.) When reviewing
amendments, the Commission is exempt from certain requirements imposed
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by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), e.g., preparing initial
studies and environmental impact reports. (§ 21080.5; Cal. Code Regs., tit.
14, § 15251, subd. (f).) But because the Commission must avoid significant
adverse effects on the environment where feasible, it prepares a document
functionally equivalent to an environmental impact report (EIR) when
evaluating the environmental impact of activities, such as a LCP
amendment. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15250, 15252.) That document must
describe the proposed activity and either state the project would not have any
significant impacts, or provide alternatives to the activity with mitigation
measures to minimize significant adverse environmental impacts. (Id.
§ 15252, subds. (a)(1)–(2).)
The LCP of San Mateo County (the County) previously zoned an 11-
acre parcel located in an unincorporated coastal area for the development of
148 homes, with a mix of market rate housing and affordable housing. Later,
the County proposed amending its program by rezoning the parcel for only 71
homes, all affordable housing. The Commission certified the amendment,
concluding — based on a staff report and the administrative record — the
amendment conformed to Coastal Act policies and was not expected to result
in any significant environmental effects. In so doing, the Commission did not
consider the environmental effects of any specific housing development.
Midcoast ECO (Midcoast) — a nonprofit environmental group —
petitioned for a writ of mandate, alleging the Commission violated the
Coastal Act by certifying the amendment. It argued the amendment did not
conform to the County’s LCP or Coastal Act policies of, among other things,
protecting, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the coastal zone
environment. Midcoast also alleged the Commission certified the
amendment without complying with CEQA’s procedural and substantive
2
requirements, such as failing to evaluate reasonably foreseeable
environmental effects of the amendment, deferring its environmental review
of the specific housing development to a subsequent coastal development
permit process, and failing to respond to public comments regarding the
amendment. The trial court denied the petition, and Midcoast now appeals.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1980, the Commission approved the County’s LCP, establishing
policies to guide development within the County’s coastal zone and protect
coastal resources. The program authorized planned unit development (PUD)
districts that identify specific plans for future development on parcels. The
regulations applicable to PUD districts could be different from the adjacent
zoning districts with regard to setbacks, height, and other requirements.
As relevant here, the LCP designated an 11-acre parcel in north Moss
Beach as a priority site for affordable housing. The parcel is largely
undeveloped, located inland of Highway 1, and surrounded by medium
density residential development and open space. Montara Creek, a perennial
stream located approximately 250 feet to the northeast of the site, runs
parallel to the site’s northern border and empties into the Pacific Ocean.
Vegetation on the parcel consists of mostly grassland, coastal scrub, cypress
trees, and pine trees. The site is designated as medium-high density,
allowing development at densities from 8.1 to 16 housing units per acre. The
parcel’s PUD-124 zoning allows construction of 148 units with a density of
13.6 units per acre. The units must be a mix of market rate and affordable
housing, with 21 percent of the total units constructed reserved for low-
income housing and 14 percent of the total units reserved for moderate-
income housing. And by designating affordable housing as an LCP “priority
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use,” public services such as water and sewer are reserved specifically for
servicing the development.
In 2018, MidPen Housing Corporation (MidPen) proposed building an
affordable housing development, the Cypress Point Family Community
(Cypress Point), on the parcel. The development would include 18 two-story
buildings holding varying numbers of units each, for a total of 71 housing
units — a mix of one-, two-, and three-bedroom units, with a combination of
two-story townhouses and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990-accessible
single-level flats. All units, except for the manager’s apartment, would be
affordable to households earning up to 80 percent of the area median income.
Preference for housing would be given to people who currently live or work in
the region. The development would include an approximately 3,200 square-
foot community building containing, among other things, the general office,
manager’s office, and community room. The proposed density of the buildings
is six and one-half units per acre, significantly below the maximum density
allowed by the LCP plan designation. Approximately half of the site would
remain undeveloped.
In November 2020, the County sought to amend its LCP to alter the
parcel’s land use designation from medium-high density to medium density
residential. The LCP amendment would also change the County’s land use
plan to require all development proposals for the site to have 100 percent of
units designated for low-income housing — households earning up to 80
percent of the area median income — and allow a smaller, 71-unit project.
An implementation plan amendment would rezone the parcel from PUD-124
to PUD-140; eliminate the existing PUD-124 regulations that contained
development standards and an associated site plan for a larger, 148-unit
project with a minimum of 142 uncovered parking spaces; and replace the
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regulations with new development standards associated with a smaller
project. Those proposed regulations include, among other things, permitted
uses, density, height, setbacks, lot coverage, maintenance of 142 uncovered
parking spaces, and landscaping.
As part of the LCP amendment development and review process, the
County engaged in a land use and coastal analysis, including evaluating
habitat issues. The County submitted an amendment package containing
technical studies analyzing the potential significant environmental effects of
Cypress Point on matters such as air quality and greenhouse gas emissions,
biological resources, energy, hazardous materials, quantity and quality of site
stormwater runoff, and noise.1 It also included feasible mitigation measures
to reduce the identified effects. The County submitted the amendment, along
with the studies, to the Commission for certification that the amendment
conformed with the Coastal Act.
After reviewing the local record, as well as information submitted by
Midcoast and other public comments, Commission staff prepared a report
concluding the amendment and its implementing actions were consistent
with both chapter 3 of the Coastal Act — requiring the protection of public
access, sensitive habitats, scenic and visual qualities by situating
development in a way that avoids and minimizes adverse impacts — and the
County’s certified land use plan. The report also concluded, as required
under CEQA, that the proposed amendment was not expected to result in any
1 A LCP amendment submission must include, among other things,
“[a]ll policies, plans, standards, objectives, diagrams, drawings, maps,
photographs, and supplementary data, related to the amendment in
sufficient detail to allow review for conformity with the requirements of the
Coastal Act.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13552, subd. (b).) It must also
include any “environmental review documents” pursuant to CEQA, required
“for all or any portion of the amendment to the LCP.” (Id., subd. (e).)
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significant environmental effects. The report noted the current LCP included
maximum density standards for the parcel that allows more than twice as
much development than the proposed amendment. By reducing the density
of the parcel, the report explained, the amendment provided increased
flexibility to address any potential coastal resource concerns that might arise
through the coastal development permit process. For example, it allows for
more open space for any necessary resource buffers and landscaping. The
Commission subsequently approved the amendment after a March 2021
hearing.
Midcoast filed a combined petition for writ of mandate and a complaint
for injunctive relief, alleging the Commission approved the LCP amendment
without engaging in the proper level of environmental review under CEQA.
Midcoast also alleged the amendment failed to conform to Coastal Act policies
protecting coastal resources. It requested the trial court void the approval of
the amendment and issue, among other things, a permanent injunction
restraining the Commission and the County from processing the approval of
the amendment or from beginning construction on Cypress Point. The court
denied the writ and dismissed the complaint.
While this appeal was pending, the Legislature added an exemption to
CEQA under section 21080.40. (Stats. 2023, ch. 761, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)
The provision states, in relevant part, that CEQA does not apply to
“[r]ezoning, specific plan amendments, or general plan amendments required
specifically and exclusively to allow the construction of an affordable housing
project.” (§ 21080.40, subd. (b)(4).) On March 26, 2024, the County Board of
Supervisors passed a resolution approving, among other things, a general
plan land use map amendment regarding the Moss Beach parcel changing
the land use designation from medium-high density residential to medium
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density residential.2 On March 27, 2024, the County filed a notice of
exemption with the County’s Clerk Recorder stating Cypress Point is an
affordable housing project exempt from CEQA under section 21080.40.
The County also states it filed the notice of exemption with the State
Clearinghouse in the Office of Planning and Research on May 9, 2024.
DISCUSSION
Midcoast alleges various Coastal Act and CEQA violations in the case
before us. Those aggrieved by a Commission’s decision may seek judicial
review by petitioning for a writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5; Pub.
Resources Code, § 30801, subds. (a)–(b).) Courts independently review
whether the Commission proceeded in the manner required by law. (POET,
LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, 711 (POET).)
The trial court considers whether the Commission abused its discretion —
whether it “has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or
decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by
the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b); Ross v. California Coastal
Com. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 900, 921 (Ross).) In so doing, the court must
examine the entire record and consider all relevant evidence, “including that
2 The County asks us to take judicial notice of (1) board of supervisors
resolution No. 080239 approving, among other things, a general plan land
use map amendment and coastal development permit, for the Cypress Point
PUD; (2) a memorandum establishing Cypress Point satisfies the CEQA
exemption under section 21080.40; and (3) a notice of exemption. We grant
the County’s request with regard to the notice of exemption and the
resolution. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h) [taking notice of facts not reasonably
subject to dispute]; Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
1014, 1029, fn. 4, 1053 [judicially noticing documents relevant to the issue of
mootness of appeal].) We decline to take judicial notice of the memorandum.
The truth of the matters asserted in that document is not subject to judicial
notice, and its conclusions are reasonably subject to dispute. (Arce v. Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.)
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which detracts from the administrative decision,” but the court may not
substitute its own findings or inferences for those of the Commission’s. (Id.
at pp. 921–922.) Moreover, the Commission’s “findings and actions are
presumed to be supported by substantial evidence” — evidence that is
reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (Id., at p. 921; Young v.
Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 225.) The party challenging the decision
must demonstrate otherwise. (Ross, at p. 921.) The scope of review in the
trial and appellate courts is the same. (Ibid.)
I.
Midcoast challenges the Commission’s determination that the LCP
amendment complies with Coastal Act provisions. It argues the Commission
failed to evaluate whether the amendment conforms to the Coastal Act’s
requirements to minimize vehicle miles traveled, protect environmentally
sensitive habitat areas, or address hazard containment and cleanup.
Midcoast further argues there is insufficient evidence supporting any of the
Commission’s conformance findings.3 We disagree.
The Coastal Act, intended to protect and enhance the quality of the
coastal zone environment and its natural and man-made resources, governs
land use planning in the coastal zone. (§ 30001.5; Yost v. Thomas (1984)
36 Cal.3d 561, 565 (Yost).) The Commission has chief responsibility for
coastal planning and management, ensuring conformity with the Coastal Act.
(§§ 30004, subd. (b), 30500, subd. (a); Security National Guaranty, Inc. v.
California Coastal Com. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 402, 420 (Security
National).) But it is the local government that must prepare LCPs and
3 The Commission and County also contend section 21080.40 renders
Midcoast’s Coastal Act claims moot, an argument we address when
discussing Midcoast’s CEQA claims.
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implementing ordinances to promote the Coastal Act’s objectives, thus
ensuring responsiveness to local conditions. (§§ 30004, subd. (a), 30500,
subd. (a); Security National, at p. 420.) The LCP strives to ensure that
development within the coastal zone preserves the quality of the
environment, as well as its natural and artificial resources. (Citizens of
Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 571.) LCPs and
amendments thereto must be certified by the Commission. (Security
National, at p. 420; § 30512.)
An LCP consists of two parts: the land use plan and local
implementation program. (Keen v. City of Manhattan Beach (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 142, 145.) A land use plan consists of the relevant portions
of a local government’s general plan indicating “the kinds, location, and
intensity of land uses, the applicable resource protection and development
policies.” (§ 30108.5.) The Commission must certify a land use plan if it
meets the requirements of, and is in conformity with, the policies of chapter
3 of the Coastal Act, titled “Coastal Resources Planning and Management
Policies.” (§§ 30200 et seq., 30512, subd. (c); City of Chula Vista v. Superior
Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 472, 489 (Chula Vista) [“initial planning to be
done locally and the final approval to be done by a statewide agency with an
eye to statewide policies and limitations”]; Mountainlands Conservancy, LLC
v. California Coastal Com. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 214, 220.) These include
specific policies concerning, for example, protection of the marine
environment (§§ 30230–30236) and land resources, such as environmentally
sensitive habitats (§ 30240). It exercises its independent judgment when
reviewing these issues. (Chula Vista, at p. 490.) The Commission reviews
and certifies LCP amendments in the same manner, with some exceptions
not relevant here. (§ 30514, subds. (a)–(c).)
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The local implementation program details procedural steps of the
land use plan, including zoning ordinances, zoning districts, and other
implementing actions. (§ 30108.4; Security National, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th
at p. 420.) The Commission may only reject the implementation plan if it
“do[es] not conform with, or [is] inadequate to carry out, the provisions of the
certified land use plan.” (§§ 30513, subd. (b), 30512, subd. (a); Ross, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 928; Chula Vista, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 488 [the
Commission “can approve or disapprove but it cannot itself draft any part of
the coastal plan”].) The Commission must prepare a staff recommendation,
setting forth specific findings including statement of facts and legal
conclusions regarding whether the proposed land use plan conforms to the
requirements of the Coastal Act. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13532, subd. (a).)
The proposed findings must include any additional documentation,
governmental actions, or other activity necessary to carry out the Coastal Act
requirements. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13532, subd. (a).)
A.
Midcoast repeatedly argues the Commission impermissibly deferred
a site-specific environmental impact analysis of the LCP amendment to the
coastal development permit process. We disagree. Although Midcoast makes
this argument as part of its CEQA challenges, it is helpful to first address the
issue in a Coastal Act context. That is because the argument improperly
conflates the Commission’s state-level review of the County’s LCP
amendment with the County’s authority to issue a coastal development
permit after its project-level review of the development project — a power
the Coastal Act expressly delegates to local governments.
Generally, development in the coastal zone cannot occur without
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a coastal development permit. (Spotlight on Coastal Corruption v. Kinsey
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 874, 877; § 30600, subd. (a).) The Commission has the
ultimate authority to ensure coastal development conforms to Coastal Act
policies through the LCP approval process. (Charles A. Pratt Construction
Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075.) But
once the Commission certifies an LCP, its authority over coastal development
permits is generally delegated to the local government. (§ 30519, subd. (a).)
Hence, the Commission no longer exercises any review authority, aside from
appellate review, over new, proposed developments to which the LCP applies.
(Security National, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 421; § 30519, subd. (a).)
The County may only issue a coastal development permit if the
“proposed development is in conformity with the certified local coastal
program.” (§ 30604, subd. (b).) But it has “discretion to choose what action
to take to implement its” program. (Yost, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 572–573.)
For example, the Coastal Act “does not dictate that a local government must
build a hotel and conference center—that decision is made by the local
government.” (Yost, at p. 573.) “It merely requires local governments to
comply with specific policies—but the decision of whether to build a hotel or
whether to designate an area for a park remains with the local government.”
(Ibid.)
Thus, the LCP amendment does not require construction of Cypress
Point on the Moss Beach parcel, nor does it prohibit alternative projects.
Rather, it simply sets forth the parameters for any development on the
parcel — changing the land use designation from medium-high to medium
density residential; requiring any proposals for construction on the parcel be
reserved for low-income households; and changing zoning designation for the
parcel to PUD-140, adding a design review zoning overlay. In doing so, the
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amendment primarily precludes the development of a denser project and
mandates development of only affordable housing. But the Commission’s
certification allows the County to approve any potential future project — not
simply Cypress Point — that satisfies these standards and conforms to all
other applicable LCP policies. (Yost, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 572–573; Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13311 [coastal development permit shall be deemed
issued when, among other things, findings have been made that the proposed
development conforms to the Coastal Act].) Indeed, the amendment prohibits
construction on the parcel unless a coastal development permit and other
relevant permits have been approved. And the existing LCP requires a
coastal development permit for all development in the coastal zone. (Land
Use Plan Policy, 1.1.) Any future development depends on a variety of other
factors that, after an LCP is certified, are generally beyond the Commission’s
control.
In sum, the Commission did not impermissibly defer its requisite
analysis to a subsequent process.
B.
Midcoast contends the Commission failed to consider whether the land
use plan portion of the LCP amendment conformed to the Coastal Act’s
requirement for new developments to minimize vehicle miles traveled.
(§ 30253, subd. (d) [new development must, among other things, minimize
energy consumption and vehicle miles traveled].) While the Coastal Act fails
to define “vehicle miles traveled,” CEQA defines the term as “the amount and
distance of automobile travel attributable to a project.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
14, § 15064.3; cf. Strother v. California Coastal Com. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
873, 879–880 [if there is any inconsistency between the Coastal Act and
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CEQA, the Coastal Act controls].) The record reflects the Commission
considered whether the amendment would minimize this metric.
The Commission’s staff report acknowledged new developments must
minimize energy consumption and vehicle miles traveled, thus ensuring new
developments in existing developed areas with adequate public facilities and
services, such as traffic capacity, do not significantly impact coastal
resources. (§ 30253, subd. (d).) It emphasized there were traffic deficiencies
associated with the current LCP on the Moss Beach parcel, especially during
commute hours. Critically, any development on the parcel, even if there were
no change to the LCP, could exacerbate those deficiencies. But the proposed
density zoning in the amendment — medium density allowing 6.1 to 8
dwelling units per acre — is a reduction from the density authorized under
the current LCP — medium-high density allowing 8.1 to 16 units per acre.
According to the Commission, the amendment would reduce both the traffic
generated, i.e., vehicle miles traveled, and energy consumption generated
from any development on that site. Reasonably inferred, the reduced density
in the proposed amended LCP conforms to the Coastal Act’s requirement to
reduce vehicle miles traveled. (Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.)
Comparing the densities and intensities of land use in the LCP with
the proposed amendment to determine whether the amendment would
minimize vehicle miles traveled under the Coastal Act is not precluded by
Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012)
55 Cal.4th 783, despite Midcoast’s assertions. (Id. at p. 797.) Nothing in
Pacific Palisades — examining whether a project was exempt from the
Coastal Act — addresses that point. Rather, the court simply concluded the
mobile home owner’s statement that converting the park to residential
ownership would have no impact on the density or intensity of land use did
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not exempt the project from the Coastal Act’s jurisdiction. (Ibid.) Here, it is
undisputed the amendment is subject to the Coastal Act’s jurisdiction.
More importantly, reviewing the record, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the Commission’s finding that the proposed amendment
conforms to the Coastal Act’s policies regarding vehicle miles traveled. (Ross,
supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.) The Commission made this finding
primarily by relying on other provisions of the LCP, including that the
existing LCP already includes sufficient standards and requirements to
ensure traffic impacts are analyzed and mitigated. (Id. at p. 928 [construing
land use policy provisions and implementation plan provisions in reference to
each other to give each effect]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13552, subd. (c)
[requiring LCP amendment submission to include a discussion of the
amendment’s relationship to and effect on the other sections of the already-
certified LCP]; Land Use Plan Policy, 3.13.) The program requires the
development and implementation of a traffic impact analysis and mitigation
plan for new development through the coastal development process. (Land
Use Plan Policy, Appendix 1.A, 2.52 [“Prior to the approval of any coastal
development permit” application for a new development that generates any
net increase of vehicle trips on Highways 1 and/or 92, the development
applicant must develop and implement a traffic impact analysis and
mitigation plan that includes transportation demand management].)
Mitigation measures include transportation demand management, such as
establishing a shuttle service, establishing carpools or vanpools, and
subsidizing transit for employees of any proposed development. (Ibid.) The
amendment does not change these requirements, and nothing supports
Midcoast’s suggestion that the Commission could not consider these
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requirements when evaluating whether an amendment would minimize
vehicle miles traveled.
Moreover, in assessing traffic impacts including vehicle miles traveled,
the Commission report noted the County plans for specific transit and
roadway improvements — such as improving pedestrian and bicycle routes
between the parcel and downtown Moss Beach, and improving existing bus
stops — to help provide enhanced traffic flow for both existing and potential
development in the area. The plan requires expanded weekend bus service
that helps reduce traffic and encourages people to take public transportation.
To the extent Midcoast suggests the Commission disregarded certain
benchmarks identified by the California Department of Transportation
(Caltrans) for amendments to minimize vehicle miles traveled, this ignores
the record. Caltrans’ recommended designs encouraging walking, bicycling
and transit access were all addressed in the Commission’s report. There is no
basis to reverse the Commission’s decision as a reasonable person could have
reached the same conclusion as the Commission, that the LCP amendment is
consistent with the Coastal Act policy of minimizing vehicle miles traveled.
(Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 922 [when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, “ ‘it is for the Commission to weigh the preponderance of conflicting
evidence, as [the court] may reverse its decision only if, based on the evidence
before it, a reasonable person could not have reached the conclusion reached
by it.’ ”].)
C.
Midcoast contends the Commission failed to determine whether the
LCP amendment meets the requirements of, or is in conformity with, Coastal
Act policies protecting environmentally sensitive habitat areas. (§ 30240;
Mountainlands Conservancy, LLC v. California Coastal Com., supra,
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47 Cal.App.5th at p. 220.) We disagree. The Commission expressly
concluded the amendment conformed to both section 30240 and the County’s
Land Use Plan Policy 7.3 incorporating that Coastal Act provision.
Under the Coastal Act, environmentally sensitive habitat areas must
be protected from any significant disruption of habitat values. (§ 30240,
subd. (a).) The County’s land use plan, like the Coastal Act, defines an
environmentally sensitive area as “any area in which plant or animal life or
their habitats are either rare or especially valuable” (§ 30107.5; Land Use
Plan Policy, 7.1) “because of their special nature or role in an ecosystem” and
could “be easily disturbed or degraded by human activities and
developments.” (§ 30107.5.) The land use plan goes further, identifying
specific sensitive habitat areas, including all perennial and intermittent
streams as well as sand dunes.4 (Land Use Plan Policy, 7.1.) Development in
areas adjacent to environmentally sensitive habitat areas and parks and
recreation areas must be sited and designed to prevent impacts that
“significantly degrade those areas.” (§ 30240, subd. (b); Land Use Plan
Policy, 7.3, subds. (a)–(b).) Indeed, development must be compatible with the
continuance of those habitat and recreation areas. (§ 30240, subd. (b).)
The County’s existing LCP reiterates these requirements, noting that “[a]s
part of the development review process,” the applicant must “demonstrate
4 The County’s LCP identifies the following as sensitive habitat areas:
(1) habitats containing or supporting “ ‘rare and endangered’ ” species as
defined by the state Department of Fish and Wildlife, (2) all perennial and
intermittent streams and their tributaries, (3) coastal tidelands and marshes,
(4) coastal and offshore areas containing breeding or nesting sites and coastal
areas used by migratory and resident water-associated birds for resting areas
and feeding, (5) areas used for scientific study and research concerning fish
and wildlife, (6) lakes and ponds and adjacent shore habitat, (7) existing
game and wildlife refuges and reserves, and (8) sand dunes. (Land Use Plan
Policy, 7.1.)
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that there will be no significant impact on sensitive habitats.” (Land Use
Plan Policy, 7.5, subd. (a).) If significant impacts may occur, the applicant is
required to prepare a report identifying mitigation measures to protect
resources and comply with the sensitive habitat component, as well as
a program for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the mitigation
measures. (Ibid.)
Critically, the Commission concluded the amendment did not present
any environmentally sensitive habitat area concerns. The Commission noted
the County’s existing LCP includes a series of policies to protect coastal
resources, as indicated above. Any future development on the parcel would
be required to adhere to those policies. In view of those policies, the
Commission addressed the relevant issue here — whether anything in the
proposed land use policy language, designations, maps, and site plans as
applied to the parcel would suggest that a subsequent project might not be
capable of protecting coastal resources as required by the Coastal Act, or
whether the amendment needed changes or must be rejected. After
reviewing those policies, the Commission determined the proposed
amendment allows for development that appears consistent with Coastal Act
coastal resource protection requirements, where precise details can be readily
addressed through a subsequent coastal development permit process.
The record amply supports this determination. Based on a biological
resources assessment after searches of online resources and databases — the
Department of Fish and Wildlife’s California Natural Diversity Database,
California Native Plant Society’s Inventory of Rare and Endangered Plants,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s endangered and threatened species
list — as well as a complete physical survey of the Moss Beach parcel, the
parcel is not designated as an environmentally sensitive habitat area.
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There are no wetland, riparian, or other sensitive habitats on the parcel.
Although it is located within the James V. Fitzgerald Area of Special
Biological Significance — a broad land designation that appears to cover
approximately eight square miles — that area is not an environmentally
sensitive habitat area. A project biologist’s detailed investigation further
revealed no evidence of any rare plant or special status species on the parcel.
The Commission did not impermissibly confine its analysis to sensitive
habitat areas located on the parcel rather than including adjacent areas, as
Midcoast contends. Montara Creek, a perennial stream located
approximately 250 feet from the northern border of the parcel is an
environmentally sensitive habitat area, but the Commission concluded the
proposed amendment did not present any concerns regarding that area.
The LCP requires establishment of buffer zones on both sides of the riparian
corridors — relevant here, 50 feet outward from perennial streams — and
restricting development in those buffer zones. (Land Use Plan Policy, 7.11,
subd. (a), 7.12.) As the Commission noted, there is sufficient space on the
parcel to provide necessary buffers to protect close sensitive habitats,
consistent with the County’s Land Use Plan Policy 7.3. The amended
implementation plan — requiring any development to substantially conform
to those submitted to the County’s planning commission — indicates
development would not occur on the northern portion of the parcel. And as
the Commission concluded, by reducing the development density authorized
on the parcel, the land use plan amendment would provide a greater
opportunity to concentrate development away from any environmentally
sensitive habitat areas as compared to the existing land use plan. Sufficient
evidence supports the Commission’s conclusion that the amendment
18
conforms to the requirement that any development is designed and sited to
prevent impacts to that area. (§ 30240, subd. (b).)
Midcoast nonetheless insists the Commission’s analysis is inadequate
in several respects. It faults the Commission for failing to expressly address
the LCP amendment’s conformance with sections 30230 — maintaining and
enhancing marine resources to sustain healthy populations of marine
organisms — and 30231 — maintaining and restoring biological productivity
and coastal estuary and stream quality by minimizing wastewater discharge
and controlling runoff. According to Midcoast, the staff report does not
expressly address the effects of wastewater discharges or controlling runoff to
Montara Creek as a result of the LCP amendment. Moreover, an expert
opined that it was reasonably likely a new pump station would be required to
adequately remove wastewater from the Cypress Point development, thus
significant adverse wastewater impacts must be evaluated before the
amendment is approved. Midcoast further argues the report does not
consider protection of the terrestrial habitat adjacent to Montara Creek from
the erosion of lead-contaminated soils that would be disrupted during
construction. Nor did the report address surface water quality that would be
impacted during construction and operation of Cypress Point, or chemicals
used during construction that could be released into the environment if
spilled.
We are not persuaded. First, to the extent the Commission did not
expressly recite sections 30230 and 30231 when making its consistency
determinations, it nonetheless addressed the relevant resource protection
issues, and its findings are supported by substantial evidence. As the staff
report emphasized, Coastal Act policies require the protection of sensitive
habitats, and any future development on the Moss Beach parcel must meet
19
the County’s existing LCP policies protecting coastal resources. Those
provisions specifically address stormwater discharges. While there is
currently no existing storm drain on the parcel — stormwater runoff
percolates on site and excess runoff surface flows toward a street, ultimately
discharging to Montara Creek — the appendix to the County’s existing LCP
includes provisions requiring new developments to protect coastal water
quality by specifically identified methods. This includes maximizing on-site
infiltration of runoff, and implementing minimum stormwater pollution
prevention requirements, such as “[i]mplementing treatment [best
management practices] along with site design and source control [best
management practices] when the combination of site design and source
control” is “not sufficient to protect water quality as required” by the LCP.
(Land Use Plan Policy, 1.35, subds. (b), (f) & (k).) Those treatment best
management practices are designed to “remove pollutants and/or solids from
polluted stormwater runoff.” (Id., 1.35, subd. (b).) To the extent any project
drains directly to a sensitive habitat, it must implement post-construction
treatment best management practices. (Ibid.) Additionally, under the
County’s LCP, “[s]tormwater discharges from new development . . . shall not
cause an increase in the erosion potential of the receiving stream over the
pre-project” levels. “Increase in runoff flow and volume shall be managed so
that post-project runoff shall not exceed estimated pre-project rates and
durations, where such increased flow and/or volume is likely to cause
increased potential for erosion of creek beds and banks, silt pollutant
generated, or other adverse impacts” due to increased erosive force. (Land
Use Plan Policy, Appendix 1.A, subd. (4).)
Second, regarding wastewater discharges, the staff report explained the
County’s land use policies require new development be provided with
20
adequate water supplies and wastewater treatment facilities. It further
noted the land use plan requires water and sewer capacity reservations for
designated affordable housing sites, such as the Moss Beach parcel. To that
end, the Commission explained water and sewer service providers for the
parcel — the Montara Water and Sanitary District and Sewer Authority Mid-
Coastside — indicated there was enough capacity to serve an affordable
housing project at the proposed, reduced density. Indeed, water and sewer
capacity had already been reserved to serve the parcel under the County’s
existing LCP. A reduction in density thus potentially frees up more water
already reserved for other Coastal Act or LCP priority uses.
Finally, for protection against erosion of lead-contaminated soil during
construction, the Commission explained the County’s existing LCP requires
all new developments to comply with certain minimum requirements,
including cleaning up leaks and spills to prevent groundwater contamination
and discharge into the storm drain system, as well as employing site
planning and construction methods to reduce the need for pesticides and
contaminants, and prevent contact with stormwater. (Land Use Plan Policy,
Appendix 1.A (1), subds. (e), (g).) Any stormwater discharges from new
development projects “shall not cause an increase in the erosion potential of
the receiving stream over the pre-project (existing) condition.” (Id., Appendix
1.A (4).) Nothing in the LCP amendment changes these provisions, and
Midcoast does not demonstrate otherwise. (Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
p. 921.)
D.
We also reject Midcoast’s argument that the Commission did not
consider the LCP amendment’s conformance with Coastal Act policies
regarding hazard containment and cleanup with marine resources.
21
Section 30232 provides, in relevant part, “Protection against the
spillage of crude oil, gas, petroleum products, or hazardous substances shall
be provided in relation to any development or transportation of such
materials.” (§ 30232, italics added.) The Commission acknowledged
MidPen’s preliminary environmental evaluation analyzed the impacts of
hazardous materials on the Moss Beach parcel related to transport and use of
hazardous materials during construction of a future housing development.
That report identified proposed mitigation measures to address such impacts,
including preparation of a site plan prior to submitting a coastal development
permit application with required best management practices for construction.
But the Commission noted any development on the Moss Beach parcel must
incorporate the typical measures applicable to address hazardous materials
on site and their potential for impacts to coastal resources. The Commission
expressly stated the proposed amendment “does not present hazard concerns
necessitating changes to it or denial and can be found consistent with Coastal
Act and [LCP] hazardous material requirements.”
That determination is supported by the record. The County’s existing
LCP includes mandatory policies requiring all new development to address
contamination. (Land Use Plan Policy, 1.35, subd. (e).) Specifically, all new
land use development shall protect coastal water quality by “[m]inimizing the
introduction of pollutants into coastal waters (including the ocean, estuaries,
wetlands, rivers, streams, and lakes).” (Ibid.) All new developments must
comply with additional requirements, such as cleaning up leaks and spills
immediately to prevent soil contamination. (Land Use Plan Policy, Appendix
1.A (1)(e).) Again, nothing in the amendment allows for future development
that avoids or fails to mitigate potential impacts from the presence of
22
hazardous soils, nor does Midcoast identify any. There was no procedural
error, and none of Midcoast’s assertions persuade us otherwise.
In sum, the record demonstrates the Commission did not abuse its
discretion under the Coastal Act in concluding the LCP amendment
is consistent with Coastal Act policies — it proceeded in the manner
required by law and its decision is supported by the evidence. (Ross, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.)
II.
Midcoast contends the Commission’s CEQA review of the proposed LCP
amendment suffers from multiple deficiencies — that it failed to analyze the
amendment’s reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts, mitigation
measures, and project alternatives, and failed to find the amendment had no
significant environmental effect. In supplemental briefing, the Commission
and the County argue section 21080.40 renders these claims moot. We reject
both arguments.
“CEQA is a comprehensive scheme designed to provide long-term
protection to the environment.” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game
Com. (1997)16 Cal.4th 105, 112.) Public agencies must refrain from
approving projects with significant environmental effects on the
environment — “a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in
any physical conditions within the area affected by the project” including
land, water, flora, and fauna — if “there are feasible alternatives or
mitigation measures that can substantially lessen or avoid those effects.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15382; City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1421.)
Generally, before engaging in projects that may have a significant
effect on the environment, state and local governments must submit EIRs,
23
detailing the proposed project’s likely environmental impacts, methods to
minimize those impacts, and alternatives to the proposed project. (Pesticide
Action Network North America v. Department of Pesticide Regulation (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 224, 238–239 (Pesticide Action); Save Berkeley’s
Neighborhoods v. Regents of University of California (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
226, 235.) But certified regulatory programs,5 such as the Commission’s
program for approving LCPs, are exempt from this requirement. (Santa
Barbara County Flower & Nursery Growers Assn. v. County of Santa Barbara
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 864, 872; Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 930,
935; § 21080.5, subd. (d); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15251, subd. (f).) Instead,
certified regulatory programs may submit a substitute document — here, the
Commission’s staff report — that includes a description of the proposed
action with alternatives to the action, and mitigation measures to minimize
any significant adverse effect the activity has on the environment.
(§ 21080.5, subd. (d)(3)(A); Friends, Artists & Neighbors of Elkhorn Slough v.
California Coastal Com. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 666, 694; San Joaquin River
5 “To qualify for such certification, the regulatory program must be
governed by rules and regulations that: (1) require that an activity will not be
approved or adopted as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or feasible
mitigation measures available that would substantially lessen any significant
adverse impact the activity might have on the environment (§ 21080.5,
subd. (d)(2)(i)); (2) that include guidelines for the preparation of the project
plan and for an evaluation of the proposed activity ‘in a manner consistent
with the environmental protection purposes of the regulatory program’
(§ 21080.5, subd. (d)(2)(ii)); (3) that require the administering agency to
‘consult with all public agencies which have jurisdiction, by law, with respect
to the proposed activity’ (§ 21080.5, subd. (d)(2)(iii)); and (4) that require that
‘final action on the proposed activity include the written responses of the
issuing authority to significant environmental points raised during the
evaluation process.’ (§ 21080.5, subd. (d)(2)(iv).)” (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of
Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1230.)
24
Exchange Contractors Water Authority v. State Water Resources Control Bd.
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1125–1126.)
If the Commission concludes the project would not have a significant or
potentially significant effect on the environment, the Commission must state
there are no alternatives or mitigation measures proposed to avoid or reduce
any significant effects. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15252, subd. (a)(2).) The
statement must be supported by documentation to show the possible effects
the agency examined in reaching this conclusion. (Ibid.) The agency’s final
action on the proposed activity must include written responses of the issuing
authority regarding significant environmental points raised during the
evaluation process. (§ 21080.5, subd. (d)(2)(D).) Although certified
regulatory programs are not required to prepare an EIR, they remain subject
to CEQA’s broad policies of avoiding significant adverse effects on the
environment where feasible. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15250.)
We review the agency’s action, not the trial court decision, for a
prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible
Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 426–427.)
An agency abuses its discretion under CEQA in two ways — by failing to
proceed in accordance with CEQA, or by reaching factual conclusions that are
unsupported by substantial evidence. (Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of
Newport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.5th 918, 935 (Banning Ranch).) Whether the
agency employed the correct procedures is reviewed de novo. (Citizens of
Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 564; Banning
Ranch, at p. 935.) Violations of CEQA’s procedural requirements are
prejudicial if they deprive “the public and decision makers of substantial
relevant information about the project’s likely adverse impacts.” (Neighbors
for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013)
25
57 Cal.4th 439, 463.) But we review the agency’s factual conclusions for
substantial evidence. (Banning Ranch, at p. 935.) In doing so, we do not
substitute our judgment, even if an opposite conclusion would have been
equally or more reasonable. (Ibid.) And we do not weigh conflicting evidence
in disputes regarding whether there are adverse effects on the environment
or whether those effects could be better mitigated. (Laurel Heights
Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d
376, 393 (Laurel Heights).) We set aside the Commission’s decision only
if the petitioner demonstrates the agency’s failure to follow the law is
prejudicial, or the failure is presumptively prejudicial, such as when the
Commission fails to comply with mandatory procedures. (Sierra Club v. State
Bd. of Forestry, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1236.) We address each of the parties’
arguments in turn.
A.
The Commission argues section 21080.40 exempts the approval of the
proposed LCP amendment from CEQA. According to the Commission, the
County filed with the county clerk a notice of exemption stating the general
land use map amendment and the coastal development permit for Cypress
Point are exempt from CEQA under that provision. That determination,
which has not been challenged, is now final and not subject to further review.
(§ 21167, subd. (d) [requiring an action or proceeding alleging a public agency
improperly determined a project is not subject to CEQA must be commenced
within 35 days from the date of filing].) As a result, the Commission argues,
Midcoast’s CEQA and Coastal Act claims are moot. We disagree.
A project may be exempt from CEQA as a matter of statute. (§ 21080,
subd. (b).) “ ‘If a public agency properly finds that a project is exempt from
CEQA, no further environmental review is necessary.’ ” (CREED-21 v. City
26
of San Diego (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 501.) The agency must “ ‘only
prepare and file a notice of exemption.’ ” (Ibid.) But determining whether
the Commission’s certification of the LCP amendment is exempt from CEQA
is a matter of statutory interpretation — an issue of law that we review de
novo. (Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 43, 55.) We “adopt the construction that best gives effect to
the Legislature’s intended purpose.” (California Building Industry Assn. v.
Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 381.)
The statutory language is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.
(Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529.) We give
the words their ordinary meaning, viewing “them in light of the statute as
a whole.” (Ibid.)
The Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1449 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.), adding section 21080.40. (Stats. 2023, ch. 761, § 1, eff. Jan. 1,
2024.) It provides, in relevant part, that CEQA does not apply to the
“issuance of an entitlement by a public agency for an affordable housing
project” or “[r]ezoning, specific plan amendments, or general plan
amendments required specifically and exclusively to allow the construction of
an affordable housing project”— “a project consisting of multifamily
residential uses only or a mix of multifamily residential and nonresidential
uses, with at least two-thirds of the square footage of the project designated
for residential use.” (§ 21080.40, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1) & (4).) The affordable
housing project must satisfy an array of requirements, including all the
residential units within the project, excluding the managers’ units, dedicated
to lower income households. (Id. subds. (a)(1)(A), (C).) Critically, if “a lead
agency determines that an activity is not subject to [CEQA] pursuant to this
section and determines to approve or carry out the activity, the lead agency
27
shall file a notice of exemption.” (Id., subd. (d), italics added.) “ ‘Lead agency’
means the public agency which has the principal responsibility for carrying
out or approving a project.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15367.)
Considering section 21080.40 in the context of CEQA’s statutory
framework, the Commission is the relevant lead agency here. (Pineda v.
Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 529.) That is, it is
the Commission, not the County, that has the burden of complying with
CEQA in connection with the County’s LCP amendment. (Ross, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) Section 21080.9 provides CEQA “shall not apply
to activities and approvals by any local government . . . as necessary for the
preparation and adoption of [an LCP] or long-range land use development
plan.” (Italics added.) Instead, the Commission certifies LCPs —
“certification of [an LCP] or long-range land use development plan by the
California Coastal Commission” pursuant to the statutes governing LCPs,
“shall be subject to the requirements” of CEQA. (§ 21080.9.) While an LCP
may be amended by a local government, no such amendment “shall take
effect until it has been certified by the commission.” (§ 30514, subd. (a).)
Once the Commission certifies the LCP, “ ‘review authority for development
within that portion of the coastal zone passes to the local government.’ ”
(McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 272.) Reading
these provisions together, the Commission — the public agency with
principal responsibility for approving an LCP amendment — must determine
whether the proposed amendment is exempt from CEQA under section
21080.40 and, if so, must file the notice of exemption in the relevant public
offices.
28
That did not occur here. While the County filed a notice of exemption
stating its consideration of a general plan land use map amendment and
coastal development permit are exempt under section 21080.40, the County
is not the “lead agency” charged with determining whether the LCP
amendment is exempt. (§ 21080.40, subd. (d).) In the absence of any notice
of exemption filed by the Commission, its certification of the proposed LCP
amendment — the relevant issue before the court — is not exempt under
section 21080.40.
The Commission and County do not address this issue in their briefing.
Rather, they argue the County’s issuance of the coastal development permit
for Cypress Point and the County’s subsequent filing of its notice of
exemption moots Midcoast’s CEQA claims as well as its Coastal Act claims.
Not so. A “case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no
practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.’ ” (MHC Operating
Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.)
As a preliminary matter, the Commission and County fail to identify any
support for their argument that approval of the coastal development permit
for Cypress Point moots Midcoast’s Coastal Act claims. Indeed, the County
concedes the text of section 21080.40 does not exempt LCP amendments from
the Coastal Act.
More importantly, their argument ignores the process for approving
development in coastal zones. Absent an exemption, the Commission’s
certification of a county’s LCP amendment is subject to CEQA; review
authority for development passes to the county only once (and if) the
Commission has certified the LCP amendment or project. (§ 21080.9;
McAllister v. County of Monterey, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 272.) Filing
29
a notice of exemption for the coastal development permit does not necessarily
preclude us from providing Midcoast with any effectual relief. While a
project “may be complete”— e.g., a certain project has already been built —
“mitigation measures could still be imposed to reduce or avoid the significant
environmental impacts alleged in the petition,” such as requiring a party
to engage in proactive lead removal or limiting hours of use of the
property. (Vichy Springs Resort, Inc. v. City of Ukiah (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
46, 56.) Thus, even though the County has already approved a coastal
development permit for Cypress Point, we could still order the Commission to
impose or consider mitigation measures or other alternatives before certifying
the proposed LCP amendment.
In sum, Midcoast’s CEQA claims are not moot.6 Hence, we reach the
merits of its CEQA claims.
B.
Midcoast contends the Commission procedurally erred under CEQA by
failing to analyze the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of future
development resulting from the LCP amendment. It further contends the
Commission improperly deferred that analysis to the coastal development
permit process. After reviewing the issue de novo, we disagree. (Banning
Ranch, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 935 [de novo standard of review for issues of
omitting essential information from an environmental review document,
a procedural issue].)
Environmental reports “should be prepared as early as feasible in the
planning process to enable environmental considerations to influence project
6 We express no opinion about whether section 21080.40 exempts from
CEQA the issuance of a coastal development permit for the development of
Cypress Point.
30
program and design and yet late enough to provide meaningful information
for environmental assessment.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15004, subd. (b).)
Possible future development need only be considered in the Commission’s
environmental impact analysis if it is “reasonably foreseeable” and “will be
significant in that it will likely change the scope or nature of the initial
project or its environmental effects.” (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at
p. 396.) But considering the environmental impacts of a possible future
development subject to its own review is unnecessary when evaluating the
impacts of the project at issue. (Ibid. [“if the future action is not considered
at [the] time [of the initial project], it will have to be discussed in a
subsequent EIR before the future action can be approved under CEQA”].)
Because the LCP amendment proposed changes to the County’s land
use plan, the Commission’s staff report contains an adequate and
appropriately abbreviated analysis of the amendment’s reasonably
foreseeable impacts regarding the type of development authorized by the
amendment. “CEQA recognizes that environmental studies in connection
with amendments to a general plan will be, on balance, general.” (Schaeffer
Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 625
(Schaeffer); Chula Vista, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 487 [LCP documents
“serve essentially the same function as a general plan”]; see also § 30108.5
[a land use plan is a portion of a local government’s general plan].) An
environmental review of “ ‘a project such as the adoption or amendment of
a comprehensive zoning ordinance or a local general plan should focus on the
secondary effects that can be expected to follow from the adoption, or
amendment.’ ” (Schaeffer, at p. 625.) But there is no requirement that the
environmental document be as detailed as one that is required for a specific
construction project. (Ibid. [authorizing a city to adopt a negative declaration
31
if it perceives no substantial evidence that a project may cause a significant
effect on the environment where project was not at the development stage
and declaration makes clear specific development requires future
environmental review].) Indeed, the level of specificity in an environmental
document will correspond to the level of specificity of the underlying activity
being assessed. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15146.)
The report discussed relevant coastal resource issues with the LCP
amendment, specifically its analysis of the amendment’s conformity with
Coastal Act policies. The Commission considered the potential effects of the
LCP amendment on traffic and circulation, public services, fire hazard
response, hazardous materials, visual resources, community character, and
biological resources. Among other things, it relied on the County’s thorough
land use and coastal resource analysis as part of its LCP amendment
development and review process, which included evaluating habitat issues
and site stability and safety. The Commission’s evaluation was further
informed by MidPen’s environmental assessment of Cypress Point, which
included reports evaluating, among other things, the impacts of a
development on the aesthetics and visual resources, the emission of
greenhouse gases during the construction and operation, biological resources
including species and habitats, use of energy of an affordable housing
development and its compliance with energy efficiency regulations,
hazardous materials, traffic and transportation facilities and services, as well
as reports analyzing cumulative impacts of potential development projects.
(City of Antioch v. City Council (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1325, 1337 [agency
only has the responsibility to evaluate and consider “most probable
development patterns”].)
32
After examining these issues, the Commission concluded “the evidence
in the record shows that the site appears capable of accommodating a
residential use at the intensity and density identified by the LCP amendment
without significant coastal resource impacts, individual or cumulative.”
Accordingly, approval of the proposed LCP amendment was not expected to
result in any significant environmental effects — a conclusion the
Commission supported with documentation demonstrating the possible
effects it examined in reaching this conclusion. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,
§ 15252, subd. (a)(2).) There is no merit to Midcoast’s assertion that the
Commission procedurally erred by failing to assess the LCP amendment’s
reasonably foreseeable impacts. (Compare with Banning Ranch, supra,
2 Cal.5th at pp. 924, 927 [city violated CEQA because its EIR failed to
consider any potential and already-identified environmentally sensitive
habitat areas on a site before, as the lead agency, it approved a development
project].)
To the extent Midcoast, relying on Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 116 and Friends of the Sierra Railroad v. Tuolumne Park &
Recreation Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 643, argues the Commission’s
decision enables future development, thus triggering CEQA review of any
planned development before it could approve the amendment, that argument
is unfounded. Those cases simply address whether a particular action
constitutes a “project” triggering CEQA review before it can be approved.
(Save Tara, at p. 122 [conditional agreement for private development on
property site constituted an approval of a project requiring preparation of an
EIR before project approval]; Friends of the Sierra Railroad, at pp. 654, 656,
664 [transfer of property was not a project under CEQA that required an
EIR].) Here, there is no dispute that the project before the Commission was
33
the LCP amendment, not Cypress Point. And as set forth above, the
Commission engaged in the requisite CEQA review before approving the
amendment.
We further reject Midcoast’s assertion that the Commission’s CEQA
review was incomplete because it deferred a more site-specific analysis of
Cypress Point’s environmental impacts to a later environmental review
during the coastal development permit process. As previously discussed,
although the proposed LCP amendment was being driven by the potential
development of Cypress Point, the Commission did not have an independent
duty to consider that specific development’s environmental impact. The
amendment does not foreclose the development of a different project on the
same parcel. The LCP amendment only defines the maximum development
parameters for the Moss Beach parcel, expressly stating “[a]ll development
shall substantially conform to the plans presented to the San Mateo County
Planning Commission.” (Italics added.) The Commission acknowledged the
LCP amendment “is intended to facilitate the development of a 100%
affordable housing project” that meets specific requirements related to a
smaller development project than the one authorized under the County’s
current LCP. (Italics added; Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010)
50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396–1397 [use of indefinite articles such as “any and all”
signals a general reference, while use of a definite article, such as “the” or
“these” refers to a specific place or thing].) Thus, the Commission considered
the reasonably foreseeable impacts to the site and surrounding environment
due to the amendment, including those associated with the type of
development that the amendment would allow — those attributable to the
proposed zone change and implementation plan.
34
Moreover, the Commission was not the lead agency for carrying out or
approving a specific development project like Cypress Point. (Compare with
Banning Ranch, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 939, 927 [rejecting city’s argument
environmentally sensitive habitat areas would be fully considered during
permitting phase of a development project since the city, as the lead
agency — a public agency with principal responsibility for carrying out or
approving a project is responsible for preparing an EIR — “must take a
comprehensive view in an EIR”].) The Commission thus clarified that “the
planning determination here at the [LCP] amendment stage does not replace
the requirement for a [coastal development permit] at a future date for any
proposed residential project.” (Italics added.) The Commission did not —
and could not — fully evaluate all the potential specific environmental effects
of Cypress Point, a separate project that, at the time, would be subject to its
own environmental review. (Schaeffer, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 625;
Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 396.) Indeed, Midcoast’s arguments
challenging the Commission’s actions here sharply contrast with those it
made while the County was considering amending its LCP — it previously
acknowledged the Commission would not review a precise development plan
of the Moss Beach parcel because any plans were merely conceptual.
Relying on POET, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th 681 — concluding a public
agency violates CEQA by approving regulations before considering the
requisite environmental review document — Midcoast insists the
Commission did not complete an environmental review before project
approval. (POET, at pp. 725, 727.) Nothing in POET compels this
conclusion. The Commission staff prepared a detailed staff report analyzing
the LCP amendment’s conformance with chapter 3 of the Coastal Act, as well
as its impact on environmental and coastal resources. It issued the report
35
recommending approval of the LCP amendment on February 26, 2021, and
an addendum to the staff report the following month. The Commission then
voted to certify the LCP amendment based on the findings in the staff report
and accompanying materials. The Commission did not engage in a post hoc
rationalization approving the LCP amendment — it approved the
amendment after considering its environmental effects as identified in the
staff report. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 394.) In sum, the
Commission did not err procedurally under CEQA by deferring a more site-
specific analysis of Cypress Point’s environmental impacts to the coastal
development process.
C.
Midcoast contends the Commission violated CEQA by choosing an
improper baseline to evaluate environmental impacts — comparing the LCP
amendment’s environmental impacts to those resulting from potential
development under the existing LCP’s zoning rather than the existing
environment. We disagree.
The fundamental goal of an environment review document “is to inform
decision makers and the public of any significant adverse effects a project is
likely to have on the physical environment.” (Neighbors for Smart Rail v.
Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 447.)
Determining whether a project is likely to have significant environmental
effects requires the lead agency to “use some measure of the environment’s
state absent the project” — a baseline for environmental analysis.
(Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality
Management Dist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, 315.) Generally, “baseline physical
conditions” are “the physical environmental conditions” in the project’s
vicinity “at the time” before the project is implemented. (Cal. Code Regs.,
36
tit. 14, § 15125, subd. (a).) We review de novo whether the baseline selected
by the Commission was consistent with CEQA. (John R. Lawson Rock & Oil,
Inc. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 77, 104.)
The Commission evaluated the LCP amendment’s environmental
impacts in relation to both a “no-project alternative” and the development
permissible under the County’s existing zoning and plan designations. This
comparison was proper. The purpose of describing and analyzing a no-project
alternative “is to allow decisionmakers to compare the impacts of approving
the proposed project with the impacts of not approving the proposed project.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15126.6, subd. (e)(1).) The no-project analysis
discusses the existing conditions at the time of the environmental analysis as
well as those reasonably expected to occur in the foreseeable future if the
project is not approved. (Id., subd. (e)(2).) “When the project is a revision of
an existing land use or regulatory . . . the ‘no project’ alternative will be the
continuation of the existing plan, policy or operation into the future.” (Id.,
subd. (e)(3).) Critically, the “no project alternative analysis is not the
baseline for determining whether the proposed project’s environmental
impacts may be significant, unless” — as is the case here — “it is identical to
the existing environmental setting analysis.” (Id., subd. (e)(1), italics added.)
Here, the Commission described the environmental setting in a
sufficient manner to allow an understanding of the significant effects of
proposed projects and their alternatives. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15125,
subd. (a).) It noted the Moss Beach parcel as “inland of Highway 1,
surrounded by medium density residential development and open space, and
largely undeveloped (except for some remnant development from previous
buildings and two water tanks).” The parcel connects to Highway 1
approximately 0.1 miles to the north and is approximately one-half mile from
37
Moss Beach’s commercial district to the south. Those remnants include slab
foundations, “retaining walls, and unpaved internal roadways that are
largely overgrown with vegetation.” MidPen prepared a report noting the
Moss Beach parcel is zoned for residential development and was previously
used for military and firefighter training facilities. In its current condition, it
does not contain any agricultural or forestry resources, nor is the parcel
zoned for mineral extraction or designated as containing any mineral
resources of state, regional, or local importance.
The Commission asked MidPen and the County to evaluate
alternatives to the proposed LCP amendment. MidPen expressly identified
a “No Project (No Build) Alternative,” which could be implemented without
changing the existing site zoning. In such circumstances, the site would
remain in its present, undeveloped condition. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,
§ 15126.6, subd. (e)(1).) It then compared the impacts of the no-project
alternative to the impacts associated with the amendment. Under the no-
building alternative, for example, MidPen determined the Moss Beach parcel
would not be developed and hence would not have any impacts on biological
resources. In contrast, MidPen explained the LCP amendment would have
biological impacts — while it would not result in the loss of any protected
species, it would potentially disturb nesting raptors on the forested northern
portion of the parcel due to construction of a housing development. It did the
same for aesthetic and visual resources, cultural resources, energy,
environmental justice, geology and soils, and greenhouse emissions, among
other things. The Commission staff report expressly relied on these technical
and related reports and materials when assessing significant environmental
impacts of the LCP amendment. (Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 943
[administrative record containing a city’s analysis of feasible alternatives to
38
a project demonstrates the Commission considered alternatives to a proposed
LCP amendment].) Thus, the Commission’s determination of the impacts of
the LCP amendment was consistent and coherent “relative to leaving the
land in its existing physical condition.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn.,
Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 710.)
Midcoast insists the Commission improperly evaluated the
environmental impacts of the LCP amendment by using the potential
development under the County’s present LCP as the baseline. True, MidPen
assessed whether the LCP amendment’s impacts would be as significant as
those under the existing zoning. But when a project involves the alteration of
a previously adopted plan, an environmental review document must compare
the project with “ ‘existing physical conditions’ but should also compare it
with ‘potential future conditions discussed in the [previously adopted]
plan.’ ” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno, supra,
150 Cal.App.4th at p. 707.) The comparison between the project with
potential future conditions discussed in a previously adopted plan is
important for enabling “the public and decision makers to identify possible
inconsistencies between the proposed project and the previously adopted
plan.” (Ibid.)
Relying on MidPen’s evaluations, the Commission performed that
analysis here. MidPen found that allowing the development of a medium-
high density housing as authorized under the current LCP would have
additional potential impacts to nesting raptors because it would result in the
removal of trees. MidPen engaged in a similar analysis — comparing the
impacts of the no-project no-building alternative with those from the existing
LCP and the amendment — for other impacts, such as air quality, geology
and soils, and hazards and hazardous materials. Given the analysis of the
39
no-project alternative, as discussed above, using potential future conditions
under the existing LCP as a point of comparison was not improper.
(Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno, supra,
150 Cal.App.4th at p. 707.) The Commission proceeded in the manner
required by law by using both baselines for assessing significant
environmental effects from the LCP amendment.
D.
Midcoast challenges the Commission’s finding that the proposed LCP
amendment is not expected to result in any significant environmental effects.
According to Midcoast, the record contains substantial evidence supporting
a fair argument the proposed LCP amendment will have several significant
impacts on the environment. Specifically, it contends the Commission relied
on various environmental evaluations — the County’s LCP amendment
resolution, preliminary evaluation, biological assessment, cultural resource,
and traffic impact analysis — that constitute substantial evidence the
environmental impacts from the amendment will be potentially significant.
It also argues the Commission failed to support its determination the
proposed LCP amendment would not have any significant environmental
effect with proper documentation. We disagree.
We review determinations regarding a potential environmental
impact’s significance for substantial evidence — “enough relevant
information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair
argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions
might also be reached.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15384, subd. (a); League to
Save Lake Tahoe v. County of Placer (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, 94.) Agencies
have discretion on whether to classify an environmental impact as
significant, “depending on the nature of the area affected.” (W.M. Barr & Co.,
40
Inc. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
406, 433.) If the agency determines that a project impact is insignificant, the
substitute document must contain a brief statement indicating the reasons
for that conclusion. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15128.) Midcoast bears the
burden of demonstrating with citations to the record the existence of
substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of significant environmental
impact. (Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1379.)
At the outset, and contrary to Midcoast’s suggestion, there is no conflict
between the environmental impact evaluations relied upon by the
Commission — evaluating and identifying significant impacts from
developing Cypress Point — and the findings in the Commission’s staff
report — evaluating and identifying the impacts from the implementation of
the proposed LCP amendment. The evaluations regarding potential impacts
resulting from a potential Cypress Point development informed the
Commission’s environmental review of the amendment, but they were not the
focal point of the Commission’s evaluation. (Schaeffer, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 623, 626–627 [noting a traffic evaluation resulting from development of
a golf course may influence that project’s program and design, but it does not
“describe a specific environmental effect that can be expected to follow from
adoption” of an amendment to the city’s general plan to add a mixed use to
the existing zoning allowing a parcel to be used as an industrial park].) For
instance, the evaluations upon which the Commission relied identify several
impacts from Cypress Point that “will be mitigated at a subsequent stage of
development.” (Id. at p. 626.) But the evaluations do not “describe a specific
environmental effect that can be expected to follow from adoption” of an
amendment to the County’s LCP. (Ibid.) For that reason, the Commission,
looking at the amendment and the existing LCP policies, determined the
41
proposed amendment includes “all feasible measures to ensure that
potentially significant environmental impacts of new development are
minimized to the maximum extent feasible.” The mere decision to adopt the
amendment “leads [the Commission] not one step closer to an ecological point
of no return.” (Ibid.)
More importantly, Midcoast, citing solely to potential impact
determinations in technical reports for the preliminary Cypress Point plans,
fails to satisfy its burden of identifying all the relevant evidence in the record
to demonstrate the absence of substantial evidence supporting the
Commission’s determination that the proposed LCP amendment will not
result in significant environmental impacts. (Citizens’ Committee to Complete
the Refuge v. City of Newark (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 460, 470; Ross, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 921–922.) First, MidPen’s traffic impact analyses —
identifying seven significant and unavoidable impacts of traffic delays
generated at various intersections resulting from Cypress Point — does not
sustain Midcoast’s burden. As the Commission noted, the Moss Beach parcel
in its existing state already has traffic deficiencies. The Commission
expressly acknowledged any development on the parcel could exacerbate
those deficiencies. But the Commission explained that, on a plan level, the
County’s existing LCP policies requires the development and implementation
of a traffic impact analysis and mitigation plan through the subsequent
coastal development permit process.7 In particular, existing land use plan
7 The Commission noted some mitigation measures could include
developing and implementing potential transit and roadway improvements,
such as improving pedestrian and bicycle routes between the Moss Beach
parcel and downtown Moss Beach and improving existing bus stops — the
same recommendations made in MidPen’s traffic impact analysis. These
would help provide for enhanced traffic flow for both the existing and planned
development in the area.
42
policies mandates new developments to assess and mitigate negative traffic
impacts as much as possible. (Land Use Plan Policy, 3.13.) With these
existing LCP policies in place, there was no potentially significant
environmental impact to traffic. As the Commission noted, these existing
LCP policies prohibit any future development to be inconsistent with its
policies and protects against adverse coastal resource impacts associated with
traffic. Reliance on these provisions in making its determination was
appropriate — the Commission was only engaging in a plan-level review of
the amendment, not Cypress Point. (Ross, at p. 945 [applying various
provisions of an LCP to reduce significant adverse effects on visual
resources].) Midcoast offers no evidence to suggest it would be unreasonable
to expect any future development compliance with these policies.
Midcoast’s reliance on an August 2020 biological resource assessment,
finding a significant impact to the California red-legged frog from the
Cypress Point development similarly fails to satisfy its burden. That
biological assessment explained the Moss Beach parcel does not provide the
appropriate aquatic habitat necessary for the species, it has not been
observed on the parcel, and there are no documented occurrences of the
species on the parcel A dense cypress tree habitat along the northern border
of the parcel in fact separates the parcel from any appropriate aquatic
drainage habitat. According to the assessment, the likelihood of the red-
legged frog’s presence on the parcel where construction could take place is
low given the lack of an aquatic habitat and lack of shaded moist areas — all
statements Midcoast ignores. (Mani Brothers Real Estate Group v. City of
Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1402 [“As with all substantial
evidence issues, an appellant challenging the evidence must lay out the
evidence favorable to the other side and show why it is lacking”].) The
43
assessment deemed the impact of any development to the species as
significant solely if the species migrates over the parcel to the uplands
immediately surrounding the aquatic habitat along the northern border of
the parcel. But it emphasized mitigation measures employed during any
development, such as standard avoidance, consulting with a biologist, and
obtaining regulatory approvals and authorizations from the California
Department of Fish and Wildlife.
The Commission’s staff report appropriately addressed these findings,
noting there have been no documented rare or special status species on the
parcel. To the extent that any subsequently appear or are identified, the
Commission explained the County’s existing LCP habitat protections would
continue to apply to future development proposed at the site through the
coastal development permit process to appropriately address any habitat
issues, including avoidance and construction best management practices.
The record amply supports this conclusion. For instance, the LCP program
requires the applicant for a development, as part of the development review
process, to “demonstrate that there will be no significant impact on sensitive
habitats.” (Land Use Plan Policy, 7.5, subd. (a).) If it is determined
significant impacts may occur, the permit applicant must “provide a report
prepared by a qualified professional which provides: (1) mitigation measures
which protect resources and comply with the policies of the Shoreline Access,
Recreation/Visitor-Serving Facilities and Sensitive Habitats Components,
and (2) a program for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of
mitigation measures.” (Ibid.) In addition, there must be “an appropriate
program to inspect the adequacy of the applicant’s mitigation measures.”
(Ibid.) Prior to permit issuance, a qualified biologist must prepare a report,
among other things, demonstrating any development will not impact the
44
functional capacity of rare and endangered organism habitats and
recommending mitigation if development is permitted adjacent to those
habitats. (Id., subds. (c)–(d) [sensitive habitats component].) Recommending
specific mitigation provisions to address this concern was unnecessary,
contrary to Midcoast’s assertions. The existing LCP already contained those
protective provisions. (Chula Vista, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 488
[Commission “does not create or originate any land use rules and
regulations”].) Midcoast makes no effort to refute the above or explain how
the record insufficiently supports the Commission’s conclusion that any
impact to biological resources from the LCP amendment is not significant.
The same is true for Midcoast’s reliance on MidPen’s preliminary
environmental evaluations, indicating development of Cypress Point would
have a significant impact from transport and use of hazardous materials
during construction. The evaluation stated there were potential impacts to
groundwater and surface water quality during construction and operation of
Cypress Point. But it recommended development of a site management plan
with best management practices and implementing stormwater pollution
prevention best management practices as well as erosion control, both of
which would reduce these potential impacts to less than significant.
Consistent with that finding, the Commission noted that potential impacts
from soil could be addressed through the preparation of a site management
plan, which would be required during the coastal development permit process
for Cypress Point. Indeed, the County’s LCP contains various policies
governing new development to prevent stormwater pollution — all new
development must at minimum comply with the requirements to “[a]void or
minimize and mitigate the potential adverse impacts to water quality from
new development by using pre-construction, during construction, and post-
45
construction best management practices”; and “[p]revent the flow of liquid
building materials and wastes onto impervious surfaces and into storm
drains and waterways.” (Land Use Plan Policy, Appendix 1.A 1. (a), (b).)
Incorporating mitigation measures in the Commission’s staff report to
address this impact was thus unnecessary.
Midcoast similarly gains no traction by arguing a cultural resource
evaluation determined the Cypress Point development would have a
significant cultural impact on a Native American archeological deposit.
The evaluation explained there is an archeological deposit within a small,
well-defined area on the Moss Beach parcel, approximately 80 feet by 30 feet.
Radiocarbon analysis of dietary shell fragments found on the parcel revealed
the samples dated back to the 1500s to 1600s and 1000s to 1200s. But the
survey also revealed materials such as glass, plastic, and metal, and that the
parcel has been used as a dumping site for various materials including
garbage, rocks, and spoils dirt. Thus, based on historic patterns of grading
and construction on the parcel, it is possible that the archeological deposit
was simply imported from a nearby archeological site, located on Point
Montara approximately 150 feet from the northwest corner of the Moss Beach
parcel. It could have also represented a heavily disturbed basal layer of a
deeper site removed during historic earthmoving on the property. The
evaluation recommended site excavation through an archeological salvage
program prior to construction, archeological monitoring during construction
through the use of field archeologists, and notifying a project archeologist if
any individual artifacts are discovered during earthmoving activities.
The Commission staff report acknowledged these findings, noting there
was the potential for subsurface cultural materials to be present in
undisturbed portions of the parcel. But according to the Commission, the
46
proposed LCP amendment’s reduction in housing development density allows
for a greater opportunity to concentrate development away from any
significant cultural resources. Moreover, the existing LCP policies regarding
cultural resource protection, the Commission explained, would continue to
apply to future development to mitigate impacts to cultural resources.
Indeed, the County’s land use plan requires a determination of “whether or
not sites proposed for new development are located within areas containing
potential archaeological/paleontological resources.” (Land Use Plan Policy,
1.25.) Before any approval of development in such a sensitive area, a
qualified archaeologist/paleontologist must prepare and submit for review
and approval a mitigation plan, “adequate to protect the resource[s].” (Ibid.)
Considering these measures that address the existence of cultural resources
on the Moss Beach parcel when any such development would occur, the
Commission reasonably concluded any impact from the amendment would
not be significant.
Consequently, Midcoast fails to demonstrate the existence of
substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of the proposed LCP
amendment’s significant environmental impact. (Gentry v. City of Murrieta,
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379.) An adequate basis supported the
Commission’s finding of no significant or potentially significant impacts from
the amendment.
We also reject Midcoast’s unsupported assertion that the Commission
abused its discretion by failing to demonstrate how its finding was
meaningfully derived. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15252, subd. (a)(2)(B)
[requiring a statement that a project would not result in any significant or
potentially significant effects on the environment be supported by
documentation to show the possible effects the agency examined in reaching
47
the conclusion]; Pesticide Action, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 247.) The
Commission expressly made its determination by referencing its prior
discussion regarding relevant coastal resource issues. As outlined above, the
Commission explained and supported with documentation its reasons for
finding that each identified significant environmental impact from developing
Cypress Point did not pose an issue to coastal resources. (Gentry v. City of
Murrieta, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380 [relying on the entire
administrative record to support the conclusion a project would not adversely
impact a specific environmental issue].) Though lacking organization, the
staff report was adequate and complete, demonstrating a good faith effort at
fully disclosing the “analytic route [the Commission] traveled from evidence”
in the record to its determination. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v.
County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515; San Joaquin Raptor Rescue
Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 659 [environmental
review document should not require public “to sift through obscure minutiae
or appendices” to find important components of the analysis].)
E.
Midcoast contends the Commission violated CEQA because it was
required, but failed, to evaluate mitigation measures and feasible
alternatives. Not so.
Reviews conducted under a certified regulatory program — as here —
require the agency to affirmatively demonstrate that “notwithstanding a
project’s impact on the environment, the agency’s approval of the proposed
project followed meaningful consideration of alternatives and mitigation
measures.” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com., supra,
16 Cal.4th at p. 134.) But significantly, Midcoast fails to identify the project
for which mitigation measures or alternatives should have been evaluated.
48
That omission is critical — mitigation measures and alternatives are only
necessary to “avoid or reduce any significant or potentially significant effects
that the project might have on the environment.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,
§ 15252, subd. (a)(2)(A)–(B).) Otherwise, the document used as a substitute
for an EIR or negative declaration in a certified program must include a
“statement that the agency’s review of the project showed that the project
would not have any significant or potentially significant effects on the
environment and therefore no alternatives or mitigation measures are
proposed to avoid or reduce any significant effects on the environment.”
(Ibid; see also Pesticide Action, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 245.)
As discussed above, the Commission concluded the project at issue —
the proposed LCP amendment — would not have any significant effect on the
environment, a finding supported by substantial evidence. The Commission
further explained the County’s existing certified LCP policies and
requirements already ensure impacts of future developments would be
mitigated or avoided at the coastal development permit stage, a finding
Midcoast does not dispute. Consequently, the Commission proposed no
alternatives or mitigation measures to avoid or reduce those effects. This
was proper. While Midcoast repeatedly cites to significant environmental
effects resulting from the development of Cypress Point, and its attendant
proposed mitigation measures and feasible alternatives to the development of
Cypress Point, that was not the project before the Commission. We discern
no CEQA violation.8
8 In any event, the record reflects the Commission did consider
potential alternatives to the proposed amendment. This included MidPen’s
analysis of alternatives, such as reducing the number of affordable units that
would reduce the air quality, energy, greenhouse gas, hydrology and water
quality, and transportation and traffic impacts from Cypress Point. Of
49
F.
Midcoast contends the Commission violated CEQA by failing to provide
written responses to significant environmental issues raised in public
comments regarding the development of Cypress Point — traffic and
transportation impacts, biological impacts, wastewater, and hazardous
material impacts to the soil on the Moss Beach parcel. We disagree — this
argument ignores that the Commission was assessing the environmental
impacts of the proposed LCP amendment, not Cypress Point.
Commission staff must respond to significant environmental points
raised during the evaluation process of an LCP. (§ 21080.5, subd. (d)(2)(D);
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13533, subd. (b); Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th
at p. 940.) Responding to every comment raised is unnecessary — only the
most significant questions raised in opposition to the project warrant a
response. (Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire
Protection (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1356.) Those responses may be
included in the staff report. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 13533, subd. (b),
13552, subd. (a) [LCP amendment submission must include copies or
summaries of significant comments received and local government’s
responses to the comments].) Generally, where the failure to consider public
comments frustrates the purpose of the public comment requirement, it is
the four alternatives MidPen assessed — no project, medium density
development, reduced number of units, and development under the existing
LCP zoning — the no-project alternative had no environmental impacts and
the reduced unit alternative either reduced the environmental impacts or
had the same impact as compared to the amendment. Yet that alternative
compromised on the County’s LCP goal of maximizing affordable housing and
would be less competitive for financing options compared with Cypress Point.
MidPen also considered development on parcels aside from Moss Beach, but
noted one had a significant slope that would create technical hurdles to
developing the site.
50
prejudicial error. (Environmental Protection Information Center v. California
Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 487.) We review de
novo this mixed question of law and fact — whether the Commission
responded to the public comments with sufficient detail to enable those who
did not participate in the preparation of the environmental review document
to understand and meaningfully consider issues raised with the proposed
LCP amendment. (County of Butte v. Department of Water Resources (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 147, 159.)
Here, the Commission staff report addressed the public comments
regarding Cypress Point globally, properly noting its review is limited to the
impacts of the proposed LCP amendment. It emphasized its assessment
does not replace an environmental review for a coastal development permit
at a future date for any proposed residential project. (Ross, supra, 199
Cal.App.4th at p. 941 [responses to comments regarding the approval of an
LCP are not specific as those generated during the coastal development
permit process].) The Commission staff report explained the “proposed
amendment does not predetermine an outcome that would allow for a project
that does not protect coastal resources as required by the Coastal Act.”
Rather, the proposed zoning designations and standards would accommodate
a residential development similar to the surrounding, already developed
residential neighborhood. Critically, the Commission noted the County’s
existing LCP would retain all of its coastal resource protection standards
with which any future proposed development project must comply. (Id.
at p. 941 [relying on additional LCP provisions to address impacts to view
resources in response to public comments].) We discern no insufficiency in
this response. (Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire
Protection, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356 [insufficiency of responses to
51
environmental objections may be grounds for issuing a writ of mandate to set
aside agency decision].)
Setting aside the legal question of whether CEQA requires the
Commission to respond to public comments regarding a potential future
project rather than the proposed LCP amendment, the Commission did in
fact provide responses to public comments regarding soil impacts, sewage and
wastewater discharge, biological impacts, and traffic impacts, as described
below.
1.
Midcoast argues the Commission failed to respond to comments that
the Moss Beach parcel has lead concentrations in the soil exceeding
environmental screening levels, the extent of the lead contamination is
unknown, and lead testing should be submitted to regulatory agencies.
This argument is meritless.
The Commission issued a response referring to a supplemental
environmental evaluation report prepared by MidPen and attached as an
appendix analyzing the impacts of hazardous materials on the Moss Beach
parcel and those related to construction of any future development. (County
of Butte v. Department of Water Resources, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 182
[petitioner failed to demonstrate CEQA violation where the Department of
Water Resources cited a study in the record in response to comments]; City of
Long Beach v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 889,
902 [relying on external consultant report attached to environmental review
document assessing impacts and mitigation measures in response to public
comments] (Long Beach).) In that evaluation report, MidPen acknowledged
the presence of possible toxic substances in the soil on the parcel. Both the
Commission and MidPen note that mitigation measures to address these
52
issues include preparing a site management plan prior to submitting a
coastal development permit application with required best management
practices for construction. The Commission explained the coastal
development permit application requires a more detailed soil analysis and
requirements regarding handling potentially contaminated soils during
construction, as well as methods to ensure residents, Montara Creek, and the
James V. Fitzgerald Marine Reserve are protected from contaminated soils.
Additionally, as the Commission noted, any future development on the parcel
must incorporate typical measures to address hazardous materials on the
site — the same recommendations made by Midcoast’s soil expert. Indeed,
the LCP amendment does not allow for future development that fails to avoid
or mitigate potential impacts from the presence of hazardous soils. Midcoast
cannot credibly deny the Commission responded to these public comments.
To the extent Midcoast insists the Commission’s response lacked
details sufficient to inform the public about specific levels or extent of soil
contamination, we disagree. The level of detail in the Commission’s response
was commensurate to the level of detail of the proposed project — the LCP
amendment and the significant environmental impacts that may occur from
rezoning the Moss Beach parcel. (Long Beach, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at
p. 901 [“level of detail required in a response to a comment depends on factors
such as the significance of the issues raised, the level of detail of the proposed
project, the level of detail of the comment, and the extent to which the matter
is already addressed” in, among other things, “responses to other
comments”].)9
9 On a related note, it appears comments regarding soil contamination
were duplicative of information the Commission already considered. (Cf.
Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry
& Fire Protection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 488 [no prejudicial error where any
53
2.
Similarly, the Commission adequately responded to public comments
regarding sewage. According to an expert presented by Midcoast, Cypress
Point’s wastewater impacts must consider the local sewage system’s history
of discharges of inadequately treated or raw sewage, releasing raw sewage
into the Pacific Ocean and Half Moon Bay. The expert also noted that it is
reasonably likely a new pump station would be needed for Cypress Point to
adequately remove wastewater to a neighboring sewage conveyance system,
and an improperly designed station could result in sewage spills. As a
preliminary matter, the Commission’s response — the existing LCP requires
adequate sewer capacity be set aside to serve a higher density residential
development — appropriately focused on the proposed LCP amendment, not
Cypress Point. (Long Beach, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 901–902 [“level of
detail required in a response to a comment depends on factors such as . . . the
level of detail of the proposed project”].)
agency omits responses to public comments that were duplicative of
information an agency already considered].) A MidPen consultant
determined the lead concentrations in one sample of the soil on the Moss
Beach parcel exceeded levels for residential land use. A statistical analysis of
the soil was performed to establish site-wide background concentration for
lead and to evaluate its potential human health risk in shallow soils. The
consultant recommended as a precautionary measure the development of a
site management plan to address potential environmental conditions that
may be encountered during future development. The site management plan
would provide certain health and safety plans, such as guidelines for
sampling and managing impacted or potentially impacted soils, and
notification for appropriate regulatory agencies during site development.
The consultant prepared the report for the County’s use, which was
subsequently relied upon by the Commission in making its determination
regarding certifying the LCP amendment.
54
Moreover, as the Commission noted, the Sewer Authority Mid-
Coastside represented the wastewater treatment system has adequate
capacity for growth particularly for residential development on the Moss
Beach parcel. Again citing MidPen’s environmental report, the Commission
explained evidence in the record demonstrated development on the Moss
Beach parcel at the scale presented in the proposed LCP amendment could be
accommodated without resulting in significant impacts to coastal resources.
(Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Johnson (1985)
170 Cal.App.3d 604, 628 [responses supported by scientific authorities or
explanation may be sufficient to satisfy the requirement for providing a
meaningful, reasoned response to public comments].)
That report noted there are no specific utility plans for sewer pipelines
for development on the Moss Beach parcel — “project details will be more
fully developed upon receipt of utility plans.” But any construction of sewer
system improvements would be routed to provide setbacks between new
facilities and existing water and wastewater pipelines, and to avoid other
existing utilities. And implementation of the proposed improvements and
sewer connection will be required to comply with the County’s ordinances as
well as the Montara Water and Sanitary District Code, both of which would
reduce potential secondary impacts. (Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 941
[no violation of CEQA content requirements during LCP amendment process
where report responded to comments by noting mitigation measures would be
imposed on the subject parcel].) Moreover, because the Moss Beach parcel
has been designated a priority land use, wastewater service capacity has
been reserved under the existing LCP. And Montara Water and Sanitary
District, the entity servicing the parcel, continually maintains the sanitary
sewer system, some of these maintenance improvements could support sewer
55
collection for any future development. The Commission’s responses
appropriately “contain a brief, accurate description of the issue raised” —
acknowledging comments regarding adequate sewer capacity, need for a
sewage pump station, the potential for spills, and exacerbating existing
sewage problems — and set forth detailed reasons for rejecting the particular
comments. (Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire
Protection, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.)
Midcoast nonetheless argues the Commission failed to address
comments regarding past discharges of raw sewage. The staff report
indicates otherwise. The Commission noted “[w]ith regard to the potential for
impacts from future project-related sewage overflows, these assertions are
speculative.” Indeed, those historic discharges are not an environmental
impact of the proposed LCP amendment. But any such potential sewage
overflows, the Commission continued, would “be appropriately addressed
through the requisite [coastal development permit] application and analysis.”
We see no inadequacy in this response.
3.
The Commission’s response to comments regarding traffic impacts is no
different. Midcoast maintains the Commission did not specifically respond to
certain analytical issues raised in a peer review letter from an engineering
firm regarding the methodology in the preliminary traffic analysis for
Cypress Point. According to the engineering firm, the analysis omits
weekday trip generation estimates, is unreliable, is incomplete with regard to
mitigation, and does not resolve identified significant traffic impacts.
Moreover, the planned 142 parking spaces exceeds County requirements and
would increase Cypress Point traffic impacts, and there are likely to be
56
significant adverse traffic impacts to a particular intersection resulting from
Cypress Point.
The Commission noted its staff report analysis of traffic impacts relied
on numerous technical traffic studies provided by both MidPen and the
County, including two Cypress Point-specific traffic assessments as well as
a larger community planning level assessment through the County. It
acknowledged existing traffic deficiencies in the area surrounding the Moss
Beach parcel, including specific intersections with Highway 1 during
commute periods. But the Commission noted any future development project
affected by the proposed LCP amendment must address potential traffic and
circulation impacts, and the existing LCP already includes sufficient
standards and requirements to ensure those impacts are analyzed and
mitigated. Any future project under the amendment could only be approved
if it addressed traffic impacts. We agree with the Commission that no
specifically detailed response was required, given that it was analyzing the
impacts from the proposed LCP amendment, not Cypress Point. (Ross, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 941 [indicating the Commission has no obligation to
respond to public comments with a “level of specificity that would normally
be carried out at a coastal development permit juncture” when it is currently
in the process of approving an LCP].)
In addition, the Commission cited the County’s current process of
identifying potential transit and roadway improvements, such as improving
pedestrian and bicycle routes between the parcel and downtown Moss Beach,
improving existing bus stops, which the County intends to approve prior to
any coastal development permit for a future development on the parcel.
Those measures are intended to help enhance traffic flow to both existing and
57
planned development in the area. Accordingly, the Commission
appropriately responded to comments related to traffic impacts.
4.
Midcoast contends the Commission did not respond to public comments
regarding biological impacts — that MidPen’s analysis failed to assess
whether Cypress Point would violate various federal environmental
protection laws and California wetlands conservation policy because
endangered species and habitats may be present on the Moss Beach parcel,
the vegetation assessment performed was incomplete, and Cypress Point will
likely adversely impact wetlands because it lacks any storm drain
infrastructure. This argument ignores the record.
Analyzing whether Cypress Point would violate federal Endangered
Species Act of 1973, Clean Water Act, or other California conservation
policies was unnecessary. As the Commission responded, there “is no
documented evidence to date that any special status species are present on
the [Moss Beach parcel], either currently or historically.” It explained the
absence of these species is due to the site being “exposed to on-going human
presence including some vehicle and pedestrian traffic” — it is disturbed and
otherwise occupied by ruderal vegetation. Moreover, the Commission
expressly responded to comments regarding Cypress Point’s drainage by
stating “it has been addressed by the letter provided by” MidPen’s consultant,
attached to the staff report addendum. That letter explains MidPen’s
supplemental environmental evaluation report evaluates the potential for
Cypress Point to result in hydrologic or water quality impacts to Montara
Creek and the James V. Fitzgerald Area of Special Biological Significance.
The report notes that Cypress Point would be required to obtain coverage
under a general permit for discharges of stormwater associated with
58
construction activity. Cypress Point, the report explained, must also be
consistent with the County’s municipal regional permit for stormwater and
the James V. Fitzgerald Area of Special Biological Significance pollution
reduction program for stormwater discharge during and after construction.
Accordingly, the report rejected the public comment about discharges, noting
the comment does not provide any evidence that would change this
conclusion. Referring to MidPen’s responses and its analysis, all contained as
an appendix to the staff report addendum, in response to the public comment
was proper. (Long Beach, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 [references to
office of environmental health and safety memorandum and an
environmental consultant’s findings regarding proposed mitigation measures
provided the public with sufficient detail “to comprehend and meaningfully
consider the issues raised by the proposed project and the conclusions” the
school district reached regarding mitigation measures].) The Commission’s
responses satisfied CEQA requirements.
In our view, the Commission disclosed and carefully considered the
environmental consequences of the proposed LCP amendment, explained the
reasons for its approval, and afforded the public “an opportunity to
participate meaningfully in the environmental review process.” (Ballona
Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 466–467.) Thus, there is no basis to reverse the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Commission is entitled to costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (a).)
59
_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A168036; Midcoast Eco v. California Coastal Commission
60
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