CourtListener 10104408•People v. Magana CA5
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Filed 9/4/24 P. v. Magana CA5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086224
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF300758A)
v.
ROLANDO GUZMAN MAGANA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda Myrle
Reed, Judge.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Galen N.
Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
This appeal challenges the partial denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6. (All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
In 2018, Rolando Guzman Magana (defendant) pleaded no contest to charges of
murder and attempted murder. His pleas were entered prior to the enactment of Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended sections 188
and 189. Those amendments “eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.)
Senate Bill 1437 also “created a procedural mechanism ‘for those convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek
relief’ where the two substantive changes described above affect a defendant’s
conviction.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449.) The process is now set forth
in section 1172.6, and it begins with the filing of a petition alleging three prerequisite
circumstances. One is that the petitioner “could not presently be convicted of murder …
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).) If this allegation is conclusively refuted by the petitioner’s record of
conviction, the petition can be denied without further proceedings.
Defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition with regard to one count of first degree
murder and four counts of attempted murder. The petition was granted as to the
attempted murder convictions but denied as to the murder conviction. Regarding the
latter, the trial court found defendant did not make a prima facie showing of eligibility
because his conviction was based on the provocative act doctrine.
As we will discuss, first degree provocative act murder requires the personal
mental state of actual malice. The necessary mens rea was clarified by the California
Supreme Court in People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653. A conviction of second
degree murder under the provocative act doctrine requires at least personal implied
malice. Accordingly, it has uniformly been held that post-2009 murder convictions based
2.
on the provocative act doctrine are unaffected by Senate Bill 1437 and thus fall outside
the scope of section 1172.6. Defendant does not disagree.
Defendant seeks reversal due to an alleged possibility the trial court “engaged in
inappropriate factfinding” at the prima facie stage, and because it “failed to refer to a
specific document in the record of conviction it was relying on.” The trial court was
indeed vague in referencing “the case conviction records” while rendering its decision.
However, it had no reason to provide a further explanation because defense counsel
expressly agreed with its conclusion regarding defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing
on the murder conviction.
Defendant’s claim fails based on principles of waiver and forfeiture, and also
failure to affirmatively demonstrate reversible error. Moreover, the appellate record
shows defendant’s first degree murder conviction could not have been based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony-murder rule. We affirm the
challenged ruling.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Charges
Defendant and two codefendants (Edgar Picazo and Francisco Manuel Padilla)
were jointly charged by information with murder based on the killing of Victor
Hernandez DeHaro (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), and with attempted premeditated murder
of J.R. and three other victims (§§ 187, 664; counts 2–5).
Defendant and his codefendants were also charged with discharging a firearm into
an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 6); attempted home invasion robbery (§§ 211, 213,
subd. (a)(1)(A), 664; count 7); assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b);
count 8); and first degree burglary (§ 459; count 9). For sentencing purposes, it was
alleged the murder occurred during the commission or attempted commission of robbery
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and/or burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G).) Gang and firearm enhancement
allegations were included in all counts.
The charging document distinguished between personal and vicarious liability for
certain firearm enhancements alleged pursuant to section 12022.53. Defendant was
alleged to have been an actual shooter in counts 1 and 2. (See id., subd. (d); People v.
Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1173.) The codefendants were alleged to be at least
vicariously liable under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). However, the
victim identified in the count 1 firearm enhancement allegation was not the person who
was murdered, i.e., DeHaro. Instead, defendant was alleged to have caused great bodily
injury or death to J.R. (one of the attempted murder victims) by personally and
intentionally discharging a handgun in connection with the murder of DeHaro.1 (See
People v. Laanui (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 803, 818 [“Because a section 12022.53
enhancement speaks to the circumstances of a particular count, … it must ‘be pleaded in
connection with every count as to which it is imposed’”].)
Count 1 further included, as to defendant only, a great bodily injury enhancement
under section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Defendant was alleged to have “personally
inflicted great bodily injury on J.R., not on an accomplice to the [count 1] offense ….”
Like section 12022.53, subdivision (d), the statutory language of section 12022.7,
subdivision (a) expressly limits its application to a victim “other than an accomplice.”
The significance of J.R. not being an accomplice will be apparent when we further
explain the provocative act doctrine, post.
1The first amended information, which was the operative pleading, alleged great bodily
injury “and” death. However, the record clearly shows J.R. did not die. According to J.R.’s own
testimony given nine years after the subject incident, he sustained nonlethal injuries from being
shot in the chest, left forearm, and right hand.
4.
All crimes were alleged to have occurred in May 2014. The operative first
amended information was filed in September 2016.
Plea Agreement and Sentencing
A jury trial was scheduled to begin on August 22, 2018. On the first day of trial,
defendant and his codefendants entered into a global plea agreement. All parties
stipulated to a factual basis for the pleas based on the preliminary hearing transcript and
“the police reports.”
Defendant pleaded no contest to counts 1 through 5. He admitted the murder “was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” He also admitted the truth of the gang and firearm
enhancement allegations. During the proceeding, the prosecutor made the following
statement regarding the firearm enhancements: “Just so the record is clear, … the victim
being discussed is not the deceased counterpart. The victim is the living homeowner
victim, who was not an accomplice.”
Under the terms of the plea agreement, counts 6, 7, 8 and 9, as well as the special
circumstance allegations for count 1, were to be dismissed at the time of sentencing. The
section 12022.7 allegations were stricken as duplicative of elements included in section
12022.53, subdivision (d). The trial court provided an indicated sentence of 25 years to
life in prison.
For reasons not fully explained by the current appellate record, sentencing was
delayed until May 14, 2019. On that date, defendant was sentenced according to the plea
agreement. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 25 years to life for first degree
murder, with punishment for all related enhancements “stayed.” Concurrent sentences of
15 years to life were imposed for the four convictions of attempted premeditated murder.
The remaining charges were dismissed.
5.
The timing of events raises a question not addressed in the parties’ briefing: Was
defendant “convicted” within the meaning of section 1172.6 before or after the enactment
of Senate Bill 1437? As explained, he pleaded no contest to first degree murder in
August 2018, but the pronouncement of judgment did not occur until May 14, 2019—
nearly six months after the amendments to sections 188 and 189 had taken effect.
Defendant, in his section 1172.6 petition, actually declared he was convicted in 2019.
This district has held that persons convicted of murder after Senate Bill 1437’s effective
date of January 1, 2019, are ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
(People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 296, 298–299.) Because we are affirming
the trial court’s denial of relief on other grounds, it is unnecessary to decide whether the
Reyes holding would apply in this case.2
Defendant’s Direct Appeal
For purposes of explaining the procedural history of this case, we take judicial
notice of our records in People v. Magana (Oct. 15, 2020, F079496) [nonpub. opn.]
(Magana I). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; see, e.g., People v. Putney (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 1058, 1063, fn. 4; People v. Gonzalez (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 246, 248, fn.
2.)
2As a general rule, a defendant is convicted “upon the return of a guilty verdict by the
jury or by the entry of a plea admitting guilt.” (People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998,
1001.) However, “[t]he term ‘conviction’ has no fixed definition and is susceptible to different
meanings that must be derived from the surrounding context.” (People v. Kirk (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 715, 718; accord, People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008.) Section
1172.6 describes a postsentencing procedure, both in terms of the available relief (resentencing)
and by reference to “the court that sentenced the petitioner.” (Id., subds. (a), (b)(1).) A section
1172.6 petition essentially “supplements a defendant’s traditional direct appeal by providing an
opportunity to make arguments that did not exist at the time of the appeal, but have arisen since
2019 as a result of recent statutory amendments.” (People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862,
867.) For defendant, the opportunity to make arguments based on Senate Bill 1437 existed
before he was sentenced and prior to the filing of his direct appeal (discussed post).
6.
The notice of appeal in Magana I was filed on June 20, 2019. In other words,
nearly seven months after the enactment of Senate Bill 1437. As far as the record shows,
defendant never raised any issues concerning Senate Bill 1437, did not otherwise seek to
withdraw his plea, and never disputed the factual basis for his plea.
In Magana I, defendant alleged a technical and inconsequential error regarding the
trial court’s description of his punishment for attempted murder. The trial court had
imposed concurrent prison terms “of seven years to life, with a minimum parole
eligibility of 15 years.” Defendant took issue with the words “seven years to life” and
argued the correct phrasing was simply “‘life’” with a minimum parole ineligibility
period of 15 years. Defendant also requested corrections to the abstract of judgment.
The People stated a nonobjection to deleting the “seven years” language from the
sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment. The People agreed with defendant’s
request to further amend the abstract by deleting references to certain inapplicable
statutory provisions. This court granted the requested relief. The remittitur in Magana I
issued on December 15, 2020.
Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
On January 24, 2023, defendant filed a petition for resentencing. Acting without
legal representation, defendant used a preprinted form designed for use in proceedings
under former section 1170.95. However, former section 1170.95 was renumbered as
section 1172.6, without substantive change, on June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10;
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.) The trial court evidently excused
defendant’s reliance upon former section 1170.95 and treated the petition as one seeking
relief under section 1172.6.
Defendant checked boxes on the form petition to allege (1) the charging document
in his case “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
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under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”; (2) he was “convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or [he] accepted a plea offer
in lieu of a trial at which [he] could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder”;
and (3) “[he] could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes made to … §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” (Boldface and
underscoring omitted.) Defendant also checked a box to request the appointment of
counsel. In a space designated for identifying the year of conviction, defendant wrote
“2019.”
On May 1, 2023, the People filed a brief entitled, “People’s Notice of Ineligibility
for Resentencing Per PC § 1172.6.” (Some capitalization omitted.) The opposition brief
noted, with bolded emphasis, that defendant was convicted of first degree murder based
on an admission of willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation. The People further
asserted defendant was convicted based on the provocative act doctrine and was therefore
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. More specifically, it was argued defendant
“cannot seek relief under the felony murder provision of section 1172.6, as his
accomplice, Victor Hernandez-DeHaro, was shot and killed during the home invasion by
the victim, [J.R.].” The rest of the brief discussed applicable law and summarized
evidence from the preliminary hearing. Defendant’s eligibility for resentencing on the
attempted murder convictions was not addressed.
The appellate record does not contain an order granting defendant’s request for the
appointment of counsel. However, the proof of service attached to the People’s
opposition brief shows it was served on the attorney who represented defendant at the
prima facie stage of the section 1172.6 proceedings. The defense apparently did not
8.
respond to the People’s opposition.3 (See § 1172.6, subd. (c) [“The petitioner may file
and serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor’s response is served”].)
On May 4, 2023, the trial court held a joint hearing on both defendant’s petition
and a section 1172.6 petition filed by a codefendant, Edgar Picazo. The court began by
providing a tentative ruling:
“I have fully reviewed the case conviction records, as well as the
defendants’ motions and the People’s opposition here. I’m inclined to
deny, finding defendants were convicted of the first degree murder under
the Provocative Act Doctrine, which is not applicable to 1172.6. However,
each defendant has several convictions for attempted murder which I do
believe they are eligible for.”
After making the quoted statements, the trial court invited a response from
defendant’s attorney. His counsel said, “Your Honor, I believe that the Court’s correct in
its analysis as far as it relates to the homicide, as well as the attempted homicide. I
believe that they fall within under [sic] 1172.6.” The trial court then asked for input from
codefendant Picazo’s attorney, who replied, “Your Honor, I agree, as well.”
Following the initial remarks of both defense attorneys, the hearing focused on the
attempted murder convictions. There was discussion of a recent section 1172.6 hearing
involving the other codefendant, Francisco Manuel Padilla, during which the People had
reportedly “elected to dismiss the attempted murders.” The prosecutor said, “Your Honor
we are prepared to do that with regards to [Picazo], but not [defendant]. [Defendant] was
the actual shooter in the case, and he was convicted of murder with malice aforethought
3We note the People’s opposition was not filed within 60 days of service of defendant’s
petition as required by section 1172.6, subdivision (c). However, the deadline “shall be extended
for good cause.” (Ibid.) The trial court may have ordered or permitted a different briefing
schedule, but the record is silent on this issue. In the clerk’s transcript, defendant’s petition is
followed by a transport order dated February 2, 2023, which indicates the trial court scheduled a
hearing for May 4, 2023. Next is the People’s opposition brief, and then a minute order
regarding the proceedings on May 4, 2023.
9.
in the same transaction as the attempted murder, with the additional violations of
12022.53(d).”
During another exchange between the trial court and the prosecutor, the court said,
“I’m familiar with the facts, at least generally, that [defendant] was involved with the
shoot-out with one of the victims. One of the victims killing one of the defendants. So
his conviction for murder was off of that.” Defendant’s opening brief acknowledges the
court was referring to the death of DeHaro and meant that “a victim in the case had killed
one of the participants in the robbery[/burglary].” We agree this is the only reasonable
interpretation. (Obviously, a person killed during the subject incident could not have
later been named a defendant in a criminal prosecution.)
The hearing concluded with the trial court denying defendant’s petition as to the
murder conviction for failure to make a prima facie showing under section 1172.6. Over
the prosecutor’s objections, the trial court found a prima facie showing was made as to
the attempted murder convictions. An evidentiary hearing was scheduled regarding the
attempted murder counts.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on May 9, 2023. This appeal pertains only to
defendant’s conviction of first degree murder. No claims have been made regarding the
attempted murder convictions.
Record Augmentations
Defendant and the People both filed unopposed requests to augment the record on
appeal. Defendant’s motion to augment was filed and granted prior to the submission of
his opening brief. A supplemental clerk’s transcript was also filed prior to defendant’s
opening brief. The People’s motion to augment was filed with the respondent’s brief and
was granted prior to the filing of defendant’s reply brief.
10.
Defendant’s Augmentation
As a result of defendant’s motion to augment, the appellate record now contains
material from the trial court proceedings postdating the partial denial of defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition.
In July 2023, defendant personally filed a handwritten document entitled,
“Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Eligibility for Relief as To Count 1, or Request for
Reconsideration of Denial.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Defendant’s filing notably
included the following statements regarding his murder conviction: “This incident
related to a May 2014 home-invasion robbery involving the death of an accomplice. The
deceased accomplice had been inside the house when the victim fired the fatal shots.”
(Some capitalization omitted.) The trial court later issued a minute order summarily
denying defendant’s “pro per request.”
In August 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (d), regarding the attempted murder convictions. J.R. (the victim
named in count 2 and in the count 1 firearm enhancement) and two of his siblings
testified. The siblings were the people identified as the victims in counts 3 and 4. The
lead detective in the underlying criminal investigation also testified. The victim named in
count 5 did not testify.
J.R. and his siblings testified to being present during a burglary of their home at
approximately 5:00 a.m. on the date in question. J.R. and E.R. both testified to seeing at
least two intruders inside the house. The intruders made a loud entrance by “kicking the
door down.” J.R. was awakened by the sound of glass shattering and armed himself with
a pistol after hearing E.R. call out to him.
Once armed, J.R. opened his bedroom door and saw a masked intruder (DeHaro)
in front of him. DeHaro was pointing a handgun toward E.R.’s bedroom, which was
located across from J.R.’s bedroom. J.R. fired upon DeHaro, who immediately fell to the
11.
ground. DeHaro’s body lay motionless, showing no further signs of life. J.R. admitted
he did not immediately know that DeHaro was dead but became aware of it during the
course of the incident.
After shooting DeHaro, J.R. proceeded into E.R.’s room. E.R. had been
“screaming,” and upon entering the room J.R. saw that a second intruder (allegedly
defendant) “had [E.R.] on the floor.” The second intruder, who also had a gun, turned
around to face J.R. and began firing at him. A gun battle ensued as both men shot at each
other until they ran out of ammunition. Although J.R. sustained multiple gunshot
wounds, he temporarily immobilized the second intruder by shooting him in the lower
body. J.R. “pistol-whipped” the man before running back to his room to get another gun.
While retrieving a second weapon, J.R. heard the sound of gunfire coming from
outside the residence. J.R. went to his bedroom window and saw a van parked outside.
He also saw someone shooting at the house. When things got quiet, J.R. ventured outside
and saw that DeHaro’s body had been dragged out of the house and left in the driveway.
The van and all other perpetrators were gone.
During the detective’s testimony, the People introduced crime scene photographs.
One photo showed “a blood trail or drag marks coming from inside the residence hallway
out to the driveway.” Another showed DeHaro’s dead body. Investigators had lifted up
DeHaro’s shirt for the photo to reveal “a gunshot wound to the left torso.”
The trial court ultimately found the People did not meet their burden to show the
attempted murder convictions were not based on a theory of imputed malice.
Defendant’s petition was therefore granted as to those convictions. It bears repeating that
the partial granting of defendant’s petition is not at issue in this appeal. We express no
opinion about whether the trial court was correct or incorrect in its decisions regarding
counts 2 through 5.
12.
Supplemental Clerk’s Transcript
The supplemental clerk’s transcript contains an amended abstract of judgment
dated November 17, 2023. It shows all of the attempted murder convictions were vacated
and stricken from the judgment. The current abstract of judgment reflects a conviction of
first degree murder with a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
People’s Augmentation
Because of the People’s motion to augment, the appellate record now contains the
preliminary hearing transcript. In pertinent part, this transcript shows defendant
stipulated to the fact DeHaro died from a gunshot wound. He further stipulated that the
bullet “entered [DeHaro’s] upper left chest area and exited through his upper right back.”
All preliminary hearing testimony was given by law enforcement witnesses.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage is reviewed de
novo. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) If mistakes were made, they are
subject to a harmless error analysis under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (See
People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973; People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1227, 1239 [trial court’s prima facie ruling of ineligibility affirmed despite
improper reliance on factual summary in earlier appellate opinion]; People v. Hurtado
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 892 [“a trial court’s statutory omissions at the first step of the
section 1172.6 process are not state or federal constitutional violations”].) The Watson
test asks whether it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, at p. 836.)
II. Legal Overview
Murder is the killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd.
(a).) Actual malice and express malice are terms synonymous with the intent to kill.
13.
(§ 188, subd. (a)(1); People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653.) Implied malice
generally refers to acting with a conscious disregard for a danger to human life. (People
v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 190; see § 188, subd. (a)(2).) “Because malice may be
implied, second degree murder does not require a specific intent to kill. To elevate that
offense to murder in the first degree on a malice theory, the defendant must act with a
specific intent to kill that is formed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.”
(Mumin, at p. 190.)
“Under the old felony-murder doctrine, a defendant was liable for first degree
murder if their confederate killed someone while they (the defendant) participated in the
commission or attempted commission of a qualifying felony. [Citation.] The necessary
mental state was simply the intent to commit a qualifying felony.… [P]ut differently,
malice was imputed to the participant based on their willingness to commit a felony our
Legislature deemed ‘“inherently dangerous to human life.”’” (People v. Lopez (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 566, 574.)
“Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it existed before Senate
Bill 1437, a person could be held liable not only for the crime they intend to commit with
their confederate (the target crime), but also for any other offense (nontarget crime)—
including murder—‘committed by the confederate as a “natural and probable
consequence” of the crime originally aided and abetted.’” (People v. Lopez, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at pp. 574–575.) “[T]he necessary mental state was simply the intent to aid
and abet an accomplice in the commission of a criminal act that, ‘judged objectively,’
would ‘naturally, probably, and foreseeably result in a murder.’ [Citation.] Like the old
felony-murder rule, malice was imputed based on the defendant’s willingness to
participate in a crime.” (Id. at p. 575.)
14.
Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 to prohibit the imputation of malice to a
defendant “based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) The
amendment effectively “barred the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine
to obtain a murder conviction.” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 440.) Senate
Bill 1437’s amendment to section 189 revised the felony-murder rule. Liability under a
felony-murder theory is now limited to (1) actual killers; (2) those who acted with
express malice in aiding and abetting the commission of first degree murder by the actual
killer; and (3) “‘major participants in the underlying felony’ who ‘acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868–869, quoting
§ 189, subd. (e)(3).)
A The Provocative Act Doctrine
The provocative act doctrine and the felony-murder rule are, and always have
been, mutually exclusive theories of murder liability. (See People v. Washington (1965)
62 Cal.2d 777, 781.) The latter theory “can be invoked only when the defendant or an
accomplice actually commits the killing.” (People v. Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p.
661, fn. 2.) “When someone other than the defendant or an accomplice kills during the
commission or attempted commission of a crime, the defendant is not liable under felony-
murder principles but may nevertheless be prosecuted for murder under the provocative
act doctrine.” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 654.)
“A variation on the law of transferred intent, the provocative act doctrine holds the
perpetrator of a violent crime vicariously liable for the killing of an accomplice by a third
party, usually the intended victim or a police officer.” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 654.) This theory of liability “requires proof that the defendant personally
harbored the mental state of malice, and either the defendant or an accomplice
intentionally committed a provocative act that proximately caused an unlawful killing.”
15.
(Id. at p. 655.) “When the defendant or surviving accomplice acts in such a manner and
the third party kills in response, the provocateur can be said to have proximately caused
the resulting death notwithstanding the intervening use of deadly force by the third
party.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 603.) To constitute first degree
murder under the provocative act doctrine, the defendant must have “acted with express
malice formed after deliberation and premeditation.” (Gonzalez, at p. 655, fn. 9; accord,
People v. Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 662.)
“The classic provocative act scenario occurs when a perpetrator of the underlying
crime instigates a gun battle, usually by firing first, and a police officer, or victim of the
underlying crime, responds with privileged lethal force by returning fire ….” (People v.
Mejia, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 602–603.) However, the provocative act doctrine
“applies to any conduct that is ‘“fraught with grave and inherent danger to human life”’
so as to show a conscious disregard for human life.” (People v. Lima (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 259, 266.) “A provocative act is one that goes beyond what is necessary to
accomplish an underlying crime and is dangerous to human life because it is highly
probable to provoke a deadly response.” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p.
655.) Liability cannot rest solely upon the decedent’s own actions (Mejia, at p. 603, fn.
4), but “[c]ase law establishes that there may be more than one cause prompting an act of
lethal resistance—that is, more than one provocative act” (People v. Briscoe (2001) 92
Cal.App.4th 568, 586).
The provocative act doctrine and the natural and probable consequences doctrine
are also mutually exclusive theories. (See People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854,
867; People v. Swanson (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 604, 612–615.) The latter is a theory of
aiding and abetting liability for a killing committed by an accomplice, under which the
accomplice’s malice is imputed to the defendant. In a provocative act murder, the killer
16.
is not an accomplice; nobody is aiding and abetting the killer; and the defendant must
personally harbor the mental state of malice. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p.
655.)
In short, the provocative act doctrine “is the only murder theory available when
someone other than the defendant or an accomplice kills during the commission or
attempted commission of a crime.” (People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1168
fn. 1, italics added.) Because the provocative act doctrine requires a defendant to
personally harbor malice, it is unaffected by Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to the Penal
Code and remains a viable theory of murder liability. (People v. Antonelli (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 712, 721, rev. granted Oct. 18, 2023, S281599; People v. Mancilla, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 859, 865–870; People v. Swanson, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp.
608, 613–617; People v. Johnson (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 257, 269.) Therefore, a
defendant convicted of provocative act murder is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law.4 (Antonelli, at p. 715.)
4The California Supreme Court granted review of People v. Antonelli, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th 712 to determine the following issues: “(1) Is defendant entitled to resentencing
pursuant to … section 1172.6 on the ground that malice could be imputed to the defendant under
the provocative act theory of murder for convictions occurring before 2009 (see Sen. Bill
No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.); People v. Concha[, supra,] 47 Cal.4th 653)? (2) Did the trial
court err by not considering the jury instructions in determining defendant was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law for a provocative act murder?” (Pending Issues Summary, Cal.
Supreme Ct. (Aug. 30, 2024)
<https://supreme.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/supremecourt/default/2024-08/pendingissues-
crim%20-%20083024_0.pdf> [as of Sept. 4, 2024].) As previously noted, 2009 is the year in
which the high court explained, in Concha, the mental state required for a first degree murder
conviction under the provocative act doctrine. Because defendant’s plea and the underlying
incident both postdate Concha by several years, it does not appear that the outcome in Antonelli
will have any impact on this case.
17.
B. Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6 governs a process available to defendants who were convicted of
murder or attempted murder under a theory invalidated by Senate Bill 1437. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Such persons may file a petition for resentencing with the court in
which they were convicted. (Id., subd. (b)(1).) Successful petitioners are entitled to have
the “‘conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction[,]’
vacated and to be ‘resentenced on the remaining charges.’” (People v. Arellano (2024)
16 Cal.5th 457, 464.) “[A] successful petitioner who was charged with murder
‘generically, and the target offense was not charged[,]’ is entitled to have the murder
conviction ‘redesignated’ as ‘the target offense’ of the natural and probable consequences
theory—or the ‘underlying felony’ of the felony murder—and to be resentenced
accordingly.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met [citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to … Section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill 1437.”
(People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) “When the
trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required
information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief.’” (Strong, at p. 708, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (c).) The
initial assessment occurs during what is commonly known as the prima facie stage. (See,
e.g., People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
971.) The term “record of conviction” has never been fully defined in this context, but it
18.
includes “the trial evidence, the jury instructions, and closing arguments of counsel.”
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) If the petitioner was convicted by plea, it
would include the charging document, change of plea form, and any facts he or she
stipulated to or otherwise admitted were true. (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1206, 1211–1212; People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 448.)
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a
trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.] … [T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and
correctly set very low.’” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) “‘However, if the
record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Id. at p. 971.)
“At the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that
he or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to
section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation is refuted by the
record.” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) “In the plea context, a petitioner
convicted of murder is ineligible for resentencing if the record establishes, as a matter of
law, that (1) the complaint, information, or indictment did not allow the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or another theory of imputed malice; (2) the petitioner was not
convicted under such theory; or (3) the petitioner could presently be convicted of murder
or attempted murder under the law as amended by [section 1172.6].” (People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987, italics added.)
If the trial court’s records conclusively establish the petitioner’s ineligibility for
relief, the court may summarily deny the petition without further proceedings. (People v.
19.
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If the petitioner makes the necessary prima facie
showing, the court must issue an order to show cause as to why the petition should not be
granted. (Ibid.) “If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall provide a
statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
There is a split of authority regarding the extent to which a trial court can rely on a
preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage. (Compare People v. Williams
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375, 403–405 with People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158,
1166–1169, rev. granted May 1, 2024, S284232, People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
982, 988–990, rev. granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643, and People v. Patton (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 649, 657–658, rev. granted June 28, 2023, S279670.) In respondent’s brief,
the People’s arguments are based in part on the holdings of Patton and Pickett. Because
we are able to resolve defendant’s appeal without reaching those issues, this opinion
takes no position on the split of authority and does not reach the People’s arguments
regarding Patton and Pickett.
C. Analysis
Defendant attempts to combine two distinct claims, perhaps in an effort to mask
flaws in both. In the opening brief, he argues “[t]he statement of reason[s] provided by
the trial court … failed to refer to a specific document in the record of conviction it was
relying on.” The argument continues: “This lack of reference to the actual record of
conviction makes it virtually impossible to know what information the trial court actually
relied on to deny resentencing relief on the murder conviction.” Elsewhere defendant
claims the trial court erred by “failing to state what part of the record of conviction it was
relying on to support its ruling.”
It appears defendant is alleging a failure to comply with the following requirement
in section 1172.6, subdivision (c): “If the court declines to make an order to show cause,
20.
it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” We reject the
assertion of error. The trial court’s explanation accurately stated the law in terms of
section 1172.6 being inapplicable to provocative act murder convictions. Having “fully
reviewed the case conviction records,” the court concluded defendant was ineligible for
relief on the murder count because he was convicted “under the [p]rovocative [a]ct
[d]octrine.” When defendant’s attorney was asked to respond to this explanation, counsel
said, “Your Honor, I believe that the Court’s correct in its analysis as far as it relates to
the homicide ….”
Later in the hearing, while discussing the attempted murder convictions, the trial
court said it was “familiar with the facts” to the extent defendant’s murder conviction was
based on one of the victims killing one of the perpetrators. The statement was made in
the context of explaining to the prosecutor its rationale for finding a prima facie showing
was made as to counts 2 through 5. Nevertheless, the court’s remarks made clear its
reason for denying the petition as to count 1, i.e., first degree murder. Because defense
counsel had already expressly agreed with the court’s analysis and stood silent after
hearing its further explanation, the trial court had no reason to cite specific portions of the
record upon which it had relied. Under these circumstances, the court’s obligation to
“provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons” for denying relief was met.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Defendant’s second claim relies on the false premise that the statement of reasons
was “deficient …in its … lack of reference to or reliance on any case-specific document
in [the] record of conviction.” We are being asked to assume the trial court “engaged in
inappropriate factfinding” based on the possibility such an error may have occurred.
Defendant argues the court “apparently based its finding on the record in another
codefendant’s case” simply because proceedings involving codefendant Padilla were
21.
mentioned by the prosecutor and the attorney for codefendant Picazo. This is sheer
conjecture. There is no indication the trial court based its ruling on the records in
Padilla’s case.
Next, defendant points to certain documents in the appellate record that
supposedly do not support the court’s ruling. For example, he argues “the murder charge
was generic and did not allege [a provocative act] theory, nor did [defendant], in pleading
no contest to [count 1], admit to engaging in a provocative act murder.” In the reply
brief, he responds to the People’s augmentation of the record by arguing the preliminary
hearing transcript is also inconclusive.5
Defendant’s arguments disregard the fundamental rules of appellate procedure.
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and
error must be affirmatively shown.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564; see Lynch v. Birdwell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 839, 846, [“Error, it is elementary, will not
be presumed in favor of reversing a judgment”].) Trial courts are likewise presumed to
have known and followed the relevant law. (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
5As previously stated, we are not considering the People’s arguments concerning the
preliminary hearing transcript. Regarding the charging document, defendant fails to address the
naming of J.R. as the firearm enhancement victim in count 1. Defendant does not attempt to
explain how a violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (d) could have been pleaded based on
the shooting of someone other than the decedent unless the murder charge was based on the
provocative act doctrine. Defendant is also mistaken in claiming the special circumstance
allegations under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) indicated the People “originally intended to
pursue conviction under a felony murder theory.” Murder liability under the felony-murder rule
is possible “only when the defendant or an accomplice actually commits the killing.” (People v.
Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 661, fn. 2.) The same is not true of the felony-murder provisions
of section 190.2. “[B]y its terms, section 190.2 subdivision (a)(17) does not limit the special
circumstances it defines to murders based on a ‘felony-murder’ theory.” (People v. Kainzrants
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080; see id. at p. 1081 [holding “the fact appellant was convicted
of ‘provocative act’ murder rather than ‘felony murder’ is irrelevant to whether the murder
qualified as a special circumstance murder under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)”].)
22.
524, 549–550; People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496; see Evid. Code, § 664
[“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed”].) Here, the trial court’s
remarks during the hearing generally acknowledged the rules about factfinding:
“[A]ppellate courts have become quite strict in determining I can’t deny finding a prima
facie case unless it is a matter of law.”
The People highlight the fact “defense counsel expressly agreed with the court’s
conclusion that [defendant] was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the murder
[was] a provocative act murder.” In his reply brief, defendant mischaracterizes the issue
by stating the People have merely noted “defense counsel did not contest the trial court’s
conclusion.” But it was more than a mere failure to argue against the ruling; it was an
outright concession. The concession is the very reason why we do not know exactly what
part of the record was relied upon by the trial court.
We observe the clerk’s transcript in Magana I includes, unlike the current
appellate record, a copy of the People’s trial brief that was served upon defendant a few
days prior to his acceptance of the plea agreement. Almost nine pages of the brief are
devoted to explaining the provocative act doctrine and its applicability to this case. (Cf.
People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 13 [for purposes of § 1172.6, the record of
conviction includes parties’ closing arguments]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
90, 106 [same].) This is not to suggest the trial brief is conclusive proof of defendant’s
ineligibility under section 1172.6. It only underscores the possibility of the court’s
records containing a stipulation or other judicial admission that DeHaro was killed by
J.R., i.e., someone other than defendant or an accomplice. The same is true of
defendant’s pro se motion from July 2023 in which he acknowledged the “deceased
accomplice” was killed by one of the crime victims.
23.
This case is distinguishable from People v. Williams, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 375.
In Williams, a two-justice majority held a section 1172.6 petitioner need not provide a
refutation to the People’s opposition at the prima facie stage, even if the opposition relies
on “uncontroverted facts presented at a preliminary hearing.” (Williams, at p. 404
[disagreeing with People v. Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163, 1165–1170, rev.
granted, and People v. Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 987, 989–990, rev. granted].)
The Williams appellant filed a reply to the People’s opposition, but it merely “argued that
he had pled a prima facie case and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” (Williams, at
p. 384.) The Williams opinion provides little information about the appellant’s prima
facie hearing, but it explains the trial court denied the petition in a written decision based
on its review of “the complaint, transcripts of the change of plea hearing and preliminary
hearing, and the abstract of judgment.” (Ibid.) The Williams majority concluded those
items did not adequately support the trial court’s ruling. (Id. at pp. 387–389.)
In this case, defendant did not respond to the People’s opposition. More
significantly, at the prima facie hearing, defendant’s attorney expressly agreed with the
court’s analysis regarding his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. Claims are not
waived or forfeited “when a party, while making the appropriate objections, acquiesces in
a judicial determination.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 212.)
But here there was no initial objection. When defense counsel goes beyond merely
acquiescing to a ruling and affirmatively embraces or joins in it, the defendant cannot
later claim the court erred. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49;
People v. Reynolds (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 [“A party forfeits his or her right
to attack error by implicitly agreeing or acquiescing at trial to the procedure objected to
on appeal”]; see also People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 713–714 [failure to
object to trial court’s reliance on inadmissible evidence at § 1172.6 evidentiary hearing
24.
forfeited claim of inadmissibility on appeal]; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688,
696 [same].)
Independent of the above analysis, any errors the trial court may have committed
were harmless. First, defendant’s plea to first degree murder with the admission of
willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation is conclusive proof he was not convicted
under a natural and probable consequences theory. In People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th
155, the California Supreme Court held “that a defendant cannot be convicted of first
degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Id.
at p. 167.) The Chiu opinion was published in June 2014. Defendant’s plea was entered
in August 2018, more than four months prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1437.
Because the law already prohibited a conviction of first degree premeditated murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine at the time of defendant’s plea,
Senate Bill 1437’s abrogation of that doctrine could not have affected the validity of his
conviction. A section 1172.6 petitioner cannot establish a prima facie case based on a
theory of imputed malice that was already prohibited before the enactment of Senate Bill
1437. (People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 935–936; People v.
Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 867–868; see People v. Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 298–299.)
Second, the augmented record contains J.R.’s evidentiary hearing testimony
regarding his killing of DeHaro. In a murder case where the killer is someone other than
the defendant or an accomplice, there are no legally valid theories of imputed malice. If
the lethal act was not committed by the defendant or an accomplice, the felony-murder
rule does not apply. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 654.) The provocative
act doctrine “is the only murder theory available.” (People v. Flores, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 1168, fn. 1.) The law on this issue was already established at the time
25.
of defendant’s prosecution and prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1437. (See
Gonzalez, at p. 654 [“When someone other than the defendant or an accomplice kills
during the commission or attempted commission of a crime, the defendant is not liable
under felony-murder principles”]; People v. Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 661, fn. 2
[“the felony-murder rule can be invoked only when the defendant or an accomplice
actually commits the killing”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying relief under section 1172.6 as to defendant’s conviction of first
degree murder is affirmed.
PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
26.
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