CourtListener 10103340•File
Full text
File 9/3/24 In re M.L. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re M.L., a Person Coming B331509
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. 23CCJP00138E)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LATOYA L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Latoya L., the former legal guardian of minor M.L., appeals
an order of the juvenile court adjudicating M.L. a juvenile court
dependent. She contends (1) insufficient evidence supported the
court’s Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision
(b)(1) jurisdictional finding that she failed or was unable
adequately to protect or supervise M.L., and (2) the juvenile court
should have exercised jurisdiction under section 601, subdivision
(a), rather than section 300. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Latoya’s Probate Legal Guardianship of M.L.
In July 2021, Latoya filed a petition in the probate court to
be appointed 14-year-old M.L.’s legal guardian. In her petition,
Latoya stated that she was a friend of M.L.’s mother, who had
been incarcerated since 2018; the identity of M.L.’s father was
unknown; and M.L.’s maternal grandmother, who was the child’s
previous legal guardian and with whom the child had resided in
Nevada, passed away in April 2021.
The probate court in July granted Latoya temporary
guardianship until December 2021. In October 2021, Latoya
requested that the guardianship be terminated. The probate
court denied the request and instead appointed Latoya M.L.’s
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2
legal guardian and extended the temporary letters of
guardianship. Latoya petitioned the probate court again in
February 2022 to terminate the legal guardianship. The probate
court denied the request without prejudice in April 2023.
II. The Referral and Investigation
In May 2023, Latoya reported to the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) that
she had been granted temporary legal guardianship of M.L. but
did not wish to be the child’s permanent legal guardian because
the child engaged in assaultive behavior with teachers and
students and at home. The Department interviewed Latoya, who
said she could no longer care for M.L. Although Latoya had been
trying to terminate the guardianship, her termination request
had been denied because the child did not have another
caregiver. M.L. was diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The child spit in
Latoya’s face, destroyed Latoya’s property, and threw milk at a
teacher. Although Latoya resided with M.L. in Nevada, they
visited Los Angeles weekly. On the day of the Department’s first
interview of Latoya in May 2023, Latoya had brought M.L. to a
Los Angeles hospital because the child threatened to kill herself,
banged her head on a car window, and threatened to jump out of
the car. The child had five prior hospitalizations. Latoya could
no longer care for M.L. due to the child’s behavioral and mental
health issues and was not interested in any services to have the
child continue in her care or remain in her home. Latoya gave
the Department consent to detain M.L. and place her in
protective custody.
3
The Department interviewed M.L. at the hospital. The
child was crying and upset that Latoya no longer wanted to care
for her. Latoya had told M.L. multiple times that she would not
be able to care for M.L. due to the child’s behavioral issues. The
minor admitted she had banged her own head on the car window
and attempted to jump out of the vehicle. When M.L. was four
years old, her half-brother sexually abused her. M.L. had not
lived with her mother since she was eight years of age. When she
lived with her mother, her mother’s boyfriend would hit the child
on her arm and leg. M.L. also saw him hit her mother. M.L. said
that Latoya recently hit her with a belt for refusing to take her
medication, being disrespectful, and having behavior problems at
school. The child attempted to run away from home but was
picked up by law enforcement several hours later.
M.L. told the Department she attended a school in Nevada
for children with behavioral issues. The Department interviewed
a counselor at the school, who said M.L. hit other children, yelled
at teachers, and threw things when she was upset. The
Department also contacted the Department of Juvenile Justice
Services in Nevada. A probation officer said M.L. was on
informal probation on an assault charge. The child also had two
prior misdemeanor cases, one for obstructing a peace officer and
another for harassment.
The hospital provided the Department with discharge
papers showing “[p]sychiatric problem” as the reason for M.L.’s
May 2023 emergency department visit. The child had been
discharged with a diagnosis that included “[s]uicidal ideation.”
In another interview with Latoya later in May 2023, Latoya
denied hitting M.L. with a belt or using physical discipline.
4
II. The Sustained Dependency Petition and Detention
In May 2023, the Department filed a dependency petition
on behalf of M.L. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). As
subsequently interlineated and sustained, the petition alleged, in
count b-1, that Latoya was unable and unwilling to provide M.L.
with ongoing care and supervision due to the child’s behavioral
issues, and such inability and unwillingness placed the child at
risk of serious physical harm.
The juvenile court ordered M.L. detained on May 24, 2023.
III. The June 2023 Jurisdiction and Disposition Report
A social worker reinterviewed M.L. in June 2023. M.L.
again said she was physically abused by Latoya. The child never
wanted to return to Latoya.
The social worker also talked to Latoya in June 2023.
Latoya asked how she would be able to care for M.L. without
resources. Latoya said that she “did the best with [her] abilities”
but M.L. “came with a lot of trauma.” A lot of M.L.’s behavior
came from that trauma. M.L. would “scratch herself and self-
harm.” Latoya said that M.L. “wouldn’t have gotten this bad, if I
had resources.” She further stated, “The system is unfair to the
caregiver, if I have lack of knowledge with a child with behavioral
issues.” Latoya said she would have to leave or call off work and
“it started being a lot.” Latoya again denied abusing M.L. and
said that “[M.L.] doesn’t understand the consequences” of her
statements claiming abuse. Latoya started feeling unsafe and
put cameras in her home. She stated, “No one wanted to care for
[M.L.]”
The Department reported that there were no relatives at
the time to assess for placement. It observed that Latoya had
filed requests to terminate her legal guardianship at various
5
times and assessed Latoya as having neither “the knowledge nor
appropriate support to deal with a child with trauma.”
IV. The Jurisdiction Hearing and Subsequent Events
At the jurisdiction hearing on June 15, 2023, the juvenile
court sustained count b-1 of the petition.2 On June 21, 2023,
Latoya petitioned the juvenile court to terminate her probate
legal guardianship under section 728,3 and the juvenile court
signed an order terminating the guardianship on July 25, 2023.4
DISCUSSION
Latoya contends the juvenile court’s section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), jurisdictional finding that she failed or was
unable to adequately protect M.L. from the risk of serious
physical harm to the child should be reversed because (1) it was
not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the juvenile court
erred by not exercising jurisdiction under section 601 instead.
We disagree.
2 The juvenile court struck counts alleging that M.L. had no
parent to provide care and basic necessities of life.
3 Section 728, subdivision (a), authorizes the juvenile court to
terminate the probate guardianship of a child who is the subject
of a section 300 petition.
4 At the jurisdictional hearing, Latoya’s counsel told the
juvenile court that M.L. had a delinquency case in Nevada for her
behavior. In July 2023, the juvenile court stated that “the
probation and the [district attorney’s] office” in Nevada agreed to
dismiss the Nevada delinquency action with the understanding
that the juvenile court in this case would have jurisdiction.
6
I. The Appeal Is Moot
As a preliminary matter, we consider whether Latoya’s
appeal is moot. “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide
actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into
effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A
case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a]
court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant
him any effective relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’
two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must
complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “In this
context, relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ ” (Id. at p. 277.)
Latoya does not appeal or otherwise challenge the juvenile
court’s guardianship termination order—an order that she had
herself requested—and does not argue that M.L. should be
returned to her care. To the contrary, in her June 21 termination
request, Latoya stated she was “no longer willing to provide care
for the child, does not wish to receive reunification services, and
does not wish to continue as the child’s legal guardian[ ].”
Latoya’s appeal thus appears to be moot.
Latoya contends the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding
that she failed or was unable to adequately protect M.L. is the
equivalent of “[v]illainizing” her. Latoya essentially contends
that her ongoing harm is that the finding is stigmatizing.
Regardless of whether that were true, however, “stigma alone is
not enough to avoid mootness.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
7
p. 278.) We nonetheless will exercise our discretion to consider
Latoya’s appeal on the merits. (See id. at p. 282 [“[e]ven when a
case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to
reach the merits of the dispute”].)
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Finding of Jurisdiction over M.L. Under Section 300,
Subdivision (b)(1)
A. Governing law and standard of review
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides in part that a child
is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child.”
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; see In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892; see In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
678, 685.) “ ‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
I.J., at p. 773.)
8
B. Substantial evidence supported the court’s
jurisdictional finding
At the jurisdiction hearing, Latoya acknowledged that M.L.
self-harmed, injured others, and “desperately need[ed]” services
that the juvenile court could provide. Latoya argued, however,
that she should not be held accountable for M.L.’s behavior when,
after the child’s prior legal guardian passed away, she had
merely stepped in to help and “did what she could,” but did not
have enough resources to aid M.L.
On appeal, Latoya similarly contends the juvenile court’s
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) jurisdictional finding was not
supported by substantial evidence because the evidence showed
Latoya did “everything possible, within her means, to help
[M.L.],” including seeking hospitalizations and providing therapy
and medication, but the child “needed more.” As in the juvenile
court, Latoya does not seriously dispute that M.L. was at risk of
physical harm. Rather, her argument is essentially that the
jurisdictional finding should be reversed because there was
insufficient evidence that she was at fault or to blame for the risk
of harm to the minor.
The Supreme Court rejected a nearly identical argument in
In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 (R.T.). In that case, R.T., a 14-
year-old child, repeatedly ran away from home and skipped
school. R.T.’s mother tried without success to supervise and
protect R.T. and sought support from the Department and law
enforcement. The mother later arranged for the child to live with
the maternal grandparents because the grandfather worked with
troubled youth, but R.T. threw a chair at him. The Department
filed a section 300, subdivision (b)(1) petition alleging R.T. was at
substantial risk of serious physical harm due to the mother’s
9
failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect her. (R.T.,
at p. 625.) R.T.’s mother argued subdivision (b)(1) jurisdiction
was unwarranted because she had done “everything possible” to
control her daughter’s behavior and was not at fault for the risk
of harm to the child. (R.T., at p. 633.)
The Supreme Court agreed that the mother did not create
the danger to R.T.—to the contrary, the mother had made
“concerted (and at times desperate) efforts to protect and
discipline R.T.” (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The court
nonetheless found that the record supported the juvenile court’s
exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). It
explained: “Whether it was [the child’s] misbehavior and
disobedience, or mother’s inability to supervise or protect [the
child], . . . does not matter here. The basis for jurisdiction under
section 300[, subdivision] (b)(1) is whether the child is at
‘substantial risk’ of ‘serious physical harm or illness.’ [Citation.]
As mother admits, ‘[t]here is no doubt that [the child] . . . was at
substantial risk of serious harm.’ In that regard, given the
substantial risk of harm that [the child] faced, there is little
question that mother was unable to ‘adequately’ supervise or
protect [the child].” (R.T., at pp. 634–635.) Holding that
dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) is authorized
“without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for
her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child,” the court
affirmed the assertion of jurisdiction over the child. (R.T., at pp.
624, 637.)
Here, there was substantial evidence that M.L. was at risk
of serious physical harm: She had threatened to kill herself and
engaged in other behavior showing a desire for self-harm. There
was also substantial evidence that, as she herself acknowledged,
10
Latoya lacked the resources to adequately protect M.L. and was
unwilling to continue to care for the child as a result of the child’s
behavioral issues. Thus, regardless of whether there was any
evidence that Latoya was at fault or blameworthy for her
inability to protect M.L. from risk of harm, there was
nevertheless substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), jurisdictional finding.
III. Latoya Fails To Show the Juvenile Court Erred by
Exercising Jurisdiction Under Section 300 Rather
Than Section 601
Latoya contends the juvenile court erred by exercising
jurisdiction over M.L. under section 300 rather than section 601,
subdivision (a), which she asserts was “more appropriate for
addressing the child’s needs.” (See § 601, subd. (a) [a minor
between the ages of 12 and 17 “who persistently or habitually
refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of
the minor’s parents, guardian, or custodian, or who is beyond the
control of that person” “is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court”].)
She argues an assessment should have been, but was not, made
pursuant to section 241.1 by “the agencies involved” whether
jurisdiction should be exercised under section 601 as opposed to
section 300.
Under section 241.1, “[w]henever a minor appears to come
within the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602,
the county probation department and the child welfare services
department shall . . . initially determine which status will serve
the best interests of the minor and the protection of society.”
(§ 241.1, subd. (a).) The minor may not be designated as a dual
status child—a “minor simultaneously both a dependent child
11
and a ward of the court”—unless certain requirements are met.
(§ 241.1, subds. (d), (e).) The failure to adhere to section 241.1,
however, is not jurisdictional and does not deprive the juvenile
court of jurisdiction over a minor. (In re M.V. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1509–1510.) Moreover, the failure to
object to the absence of a section 241.1 assessment results in
forfeiture. (In re M.V., at p. 1508.)
As the Department points out, Latoya did not argue in the
juvenile court that jurisdiction should be exercised under
section 601 rather than section 300 and did not object to the
absence of any section 241.1 assessment. She has thus forfeited
the issue. In any event, the Supreme Court held in R.T., supra,
3 Cal.5th 622 that a minor can be within the jurisdiction of both
sections 300 and 601; in such a case, the juvenile court will
determine which kind of jurisdiction “ ‘will serve the best
interests of the minor and the protection of society.’ ” (R.T., at p.
635.) Latoya has not demonstrated that M.L. would have been
better served had the juvenile court taken jurisdiction under
section 601, rather than section 300. And, as the Supreme Court
in R.T. stated, “[M]other’s preferred approach [that is, exercising
jurisdiction under section 601 rather than under section 300]
would bring with it demonstrably negative repercussions for [the
child]: ‘the delinquency finding carries with it a stigma that may
follow the minor throughout his or her life.’ ” (R.T., at p. 636.)
12
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BERSHON, J.*
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
13
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.