People v. Scott CA4/3

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Filed 9/3/24 P. v. Scott CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063587

v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF1907834)

RONNIE GENE SCOTT, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Frederick Paul Dickerson, III, John M. Davis, and Joshlyn R.
Pulliam, Judges. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
A jury found Ronnie Gene Scott guilty of four counts of
committing a lewd act on a child younger than 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (a))1 and that he committed the offenses against more than one victim
(§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)). The victims were two sisters: Counts 1 through 3
concerned J.K., the younger sister (the younger girl), and count 4 concerned
L.K., the elder (the older girl). On appeal, Scott challenges only the conviction
on count 4 and the true finding on the multiple victim allegation. He claims
five errors: (1) the admission of evidence of Scott molesting the victims’ aunt
in 1989 when she was 10 years old; (2) the denial of his motion to sever
count 4 from counts 1–3; (3) the denial of his motion to dismiss count 4 under
section 995; (4) insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction on
count 4; and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed
to object to evidence of a pretext phone call between Scott and the victims’
father. Scott argues each claimed error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant
reversal of count 4 and the true finding. We disagree and affirm the
judgment.
FACTS
I.
SCOTT’S HISTORY WITH THE VICTIMS’ FAMILY
Scott’s relationship with the victims’ family began decades ago.
Scott and the victims’ paternal grandfather (the grandfather) grew up in

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.

2
Michigan, where the two became friends and remained close into adulthood.
The grandfather married and had a son (the father), who described Scott as
“kind of like a family uncle.” In the early 1990’s, the grandfather moved the
family to California, and Scott, then in his 30’s, came with them.
When the father grew up, he married and had six children,
including the younger girl and the older girl. Scott was a part of the
children’s lives “the whole time they were growing up.”
By 2011 or 2012, Scott and the father’s family were living on the
same property, owned by the paternal grandmother and grandfather. The
father’s family lived there, on and off, for six or seven years, although the
record does not reflect when they first moved in. On that property, the
father’s family lived in the main house, the grandparents lived in a smaller
house in the back, and Scott lived in a trailer, also in the back. The property
also had an outdoor playground, where the younger girl regularly played with
Scott.
II.
THE 2019 OFFENSE AGAINST THE YOUNGER GIRL AND SUBSEQUENT
INVESTIGATION
By 2019, the father’s family had moved to another property and
were living in their own home. One day that year, Scott visited the father’s
family at their home. That afternoon, as the father was barbecuing in the
backyard, he looked through a window into the living room and saw the
younger girl, then seven years old, and Scott together. They were in the living
room, inside a makeshift play fort made of sheets and blankets. The younger
girl was lying on her stomach, with Scott sitting next to her. She was wearing
oversized shorts but no underwear. The father saw Scott rub the younger

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girl’s calf and thigh and hold a cell phone over her butt as he was massaging
it. Scott lifted her shorts and looked at her butt and vaginal area.
The father texted his wife (the mother), who was in another
room, and then approached Scott and told him it was time to leave. Before
going, Scott whispered in the younger girl’s ear.
After Scott left, the mother asked the younger girl if anyone had
done anything inappropriate with her private parts. The younger girl said
“yes,” adding she was not supposed to tell anyone. She explained Scott liked
to tickle and lick her vagina and that it had happened before. She said that
this afternoon Scott wanted to take a “look” and rubbed her butt with his
hand. The parents called the police and took the younger girl to the hospital.
A few days later, the father placed a pretext phone call to Scott,
which was recorded by the police. The father asked Scott what happened the
other day with the younger girl. Scott stated he rubbed her legs and back,
“tried to play with her,” and touched her a “little bit.” He later said he
touched and rubbed her butt and may have “accidentally” touched her
vagina. Scott initially denied intentionally touching or licking her vagina but
eventually admitted to rubbing and licking it. According to Scott, the younger
girl was four when he first rubbed her vagina. Scott also admitted to rubbing
the vaginas of the older girl and the father’s cousin, C.W., who was the
victims’ aunt (the aunt).
As part of the investigation, the father and the police called the
aunt to ask about Scott. The police interviewed the younger girl and the older
girl.
III.
THE CHARGES AND TRIAL
An information charged Scott with four counts of a lewd act on a

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child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)) and alleged they were committed
against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)). Count 1 concerned the
2019 offense against the younger girl, counts 2–3 concerned offenses against
the younger girl when the family and Scott were living on the grandparents’
property, and count 4 concerned an incident with the older girl.
Scott moved to set aside count 4 on the ground the magistrate
judge (Judge Frederick Paul Dickerson, III) had held him to answer on the
offense without reasonable or probable cause, under section 995. The trial
court (Judge John M. Davis) denied the motion.
Scott later moved to sever count 4 from the remaining counts.
The trial court (Judge Joshlyn R. Pulliam) denied the motion.
At trial, the father, the mother, the younger girl, the older girl,
the aunt, and the investigating officer testified in the People’s case-in-chief.
The audio recording of the pretext call and the video recording of the police
interview with the younger girl was played to the jury. For count 1, the
father, mother, and younger girl (then age 10) testified to the 2019 offense
(when she was seven), as we have summarized above.
For counts 2 and 3, the younger girl testified Scott had done
similar things to her while he and the family were living on the
grandparents’ property. According to her, while she was in the backyard
playground, “he [Scott] would normally just tell me to take off my shorts, and
he would let me play on his phone as a reward for letting him do that.” She
testified, “It would be right next to the slide where he would lick my vagina
at.” Sometimes Scott would take her to his trailer and give her soda or chips.
He would tell her to keep it a secret. When asked how often it occurred, the
younger girl testified: “Every time he would see me, which was kind of like

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daily, but sometimes he would be busy, so it wasn’t like every day, but every
time that I would see him, it would happen.”
For count 4, the offense occurred in 2011 or 2012, when the older
girl was seven or eight years old, respectively. She was 18 when she testified.
The older girl had known Scott all her life and, at some point, had considered
him her “best friend.” According to her, “[w]henever we used to play, he
would always spin us, like he would spin us around and tickle us and play
with us in that way.” Once while they were at the grandparents’ property,
Scott held her above the ground, holding onto her around her stomach, and
“lifted up [her] pants and looked” at her butt. Scott’s hand never touched her
butt or vagina. While recounting the event, she added, “I also don’t remember
much of my childhood at all, so I don’t know what else he has done.”
On cross-examination, the older girl was asked about a
conversation in 2015 with a social worker. The social worker asked her if
anyone had touched her inappropriately, and the older girl replied that it
hadn’t happened. She further testified: “I’m not sure, but I also was at that
point barely coming to terms with the fact that the person I grew up with was
molesting me and my sister, so I wasn’t very --I wasn’t very aware of what
was actually going on, and I did not want to admit it to myself nor anyone
else.”
A police investigator, who interviewed the older girl in 2020,
testified the older girl said that, when she was five or six years old, Scott
“moved her shorts and underwear . . . to get to her vagina.”
Over defense objection, the aunt testified Scott had begun
molesting her in 1989, when she was ten. Back then, she had considered him
family. When Scott visited her family in the summer, he would molest her
while she was in bed. Scott’s “pattern” was to go to the bathroom, sneak into

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her room, pull her blankets down, rub her vagina over her underwear, and
smell his fingers when finished. According to the aunt, this happened at least
every weekend in the summer months until she was thirteen.
The aunt further testified that when she was 13, she told her
mother Scott was molesting her. Her mother never called the police, but after
the aunt’s disclosure, Scott moved to California with the grandparents. The
aunt made “a lot” of comments about the molestation to her mother, but her
mother didn’t want to hear it and “always ha[d] excuses.”
The defense did not call any witnesses. Defense counsel, however,
cross-examined the father about stealing from Scott shortly after the 2019
offense. The father admitted stealing two blank checks from Scott, forging
both checks to appear as though Scott had written them each for $2,500 to
the father, and depositing them, because he felt his “kids deserved
something.” Both deposits were reversed once the bank discovered the fraud.
In closing, the prosecutor argued count 4 was satisfied by Scott
touching any part of the older girl’s body to sexually gratify himself: “Even
moving her shorts, moving her underpants to look at it, that is a lewd act. He
doesn’t actually have to touch the vagina to be a lewd act. If he’s moving her
clothing and touching her while doing it to look at her vagina and sexually
gratify himself, that’s enough. But he also admitted that he touched her
vagina as well. Was that a different occasion? We don’t know. But even if you
go just on what [the older girl] testified to, this still is a touching under
[section] 288.”
The jury found Scott guilty as charged and found true the
multiple victim enhancement. Scott was sentenced to 15 years to life in
prison for each count, for a total of 60 years to life. He timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I.
EVIDENCE OF OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES
Over defense objection, the trial court allowed the People to
present evidence of Scott’s sex offenses against the aunt, under Evidence
Code section 1108. Scott argues the offenses against the aunt lacked
probative value because they were so dissimilar to the alleged offenses
against the two girls. He further contends the offenses against the aunt were
too inflammatory and remote in time, should have been deemed unduly
prejudicial, and thus should have been excluded under Evidence Code
section 352. We conclude the court did not err.
“When a defendant is accused of a sex offense, Evidence Code
section 1108 permits the court to admit evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other sex offenses, thus allowing the jury to learn of the
defendant’s possible disposition to commit sex crimes. [Citation.] The court
has discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude the evidence if it is
unduly prejudicial. [Citation.] The evidence is presumed admissible and is to
be excluded only if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative
value in showing the defendant’s disposition to commit the charged sex
offense or other relevant matters. [Citation.] The court’s ruling admitting the
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Cordova (2015) 62
Cal.4th 104, 132, italics added (Cordova).)
Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) In performing this analysis, the

8
court generally considers five factors: “(1) whether the propensity evidence
has probative value, e.g., whether the uncharged conduct is similar enough to
the charged behavior to tend to show the defendant did in fact commit the
charged offense; (2) whether the propensity evidence is stronger and more
inflammatory than evidence of the defendant’s charged acts; (3) whether the
uncharged conduct is remote or stale; (4) whether the propensity evidence is
likely to confuse or distract the jurors from their main inquiry, e.g., whether
the jury might be tempted to punish the defendant for his uncharged,
unpunished conduct; and (5) whether admission of the propensity evidence
will require an undue consumption of time.” (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 1096, 1117.) “A trial court balances this first factor, i.e.,
the propensity evidence’s probative value, against the evidence’s prejudicial
and time-consuming effects, as measured by the second through fifth factors.”
(Ibid.)
A. Probative Value
Although a court may consider the dissimilarities between the
uncharged acts and the charged acts, “dissimilarity alone does not compel
exclusion of the evidence. ‘“[T]he charged and uncharged crimes need not be
sufficiently similar that evidence of the latter would be admissible
under Evidence Code section 1101, otherwise Evidence Code section 1108
would serve no purpose. It is enough the charged and uncharged offenses are
sex offenses as defined in [Evidence Code] section 1108.”’” (Cordova, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 133.) Any dissimilarities between the acts go to their weight,
not their admissibility. (People v. Hernandez (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 953,
967.)
Here, the offenses are all sex offenses under Evidence Code
section 1108 and thus have probative value. (Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at

9
p. 132.) Indeed, the offense committed against the aunt bore multiple
similarities to those against the two girls so as to be considered highly
probative on the question of whether Scott committed the charged offenses.
In all offenses, Scott targeted girls under the age of 14 within the same
family. He established a relationship of trust with the family, acting as if he
were a “family uncle” or “best friend,” and befriended all three girls. Scott
focused on the girls’ crotch area—looking at their butt or vagina, or rubbing
or licking their vaginas. In sum, the offenses were very similar in nature and
thus had great probative value.
B. Prejudicial and Time-Consuming Effects
According to Scott, the alleged offenses against the aunt were
more inflammatory than the charged offenses because the abuse against the
aunt endured for three years every summer weekend. But evidence of the
alleged abuse inflicted on the younger girl is equal to or exceeds that of the
aunt. Scott licked the younger girl’s vagina; he did not simply rub it as he had
done with the aunt. And according to the younger girl, Scott would do it every
time he saw her, “which was kind of like daily.”
Scott also argues the offenses against the aunt were too remote in
time. But “[n]o specific time limit exists as to when an uncharged crime is so
remote as to be excludable.” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063,
1099.) Courts have admitted evidence of other offenses dating back decades.
(See e.g., People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 992–994, [other sex
crime committed 34 years before charged crime not too remote]; People v.
Soto (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 966, 977–978, 991–992, [victims were defendant’s
sister and niece; evidence of continuous molestation of second sister between
22 or 23 years to 29 or 30 years before charged crimes, and of a third sister 21
or 22 years before the charged crimes, not too remote].)

10
Here, the offenses against the aunt were committed between
1989 and 1991. The offense against the older girl was in 2011 or 2012. And
the most recent offense against the younger girl was in 2019. The time
between these offenses was at most 30 years (measuring from the first to last
offense) and at least 20 years (from the last offense against the aunt to the
offense against the older girl). Given the probative value in establishing a
pattern of molestation by Scott over a 30-year period, we cannot say the
offenses against the aunt were too remote.
Finally, Scott argues evidence of the offenses against the aunt
was prejudicial because of the risk the jury would improperly punish Scott for
those offenses. But in our review of the record, we find no evidence the jury
sought to punish Scott for the offenses against the aunt. As noted by the
People, the jury was instructed it could, but was not required to, consider the
alleged offenses against the aunt for the purpose of deciding whether Scott
“was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses,” such as those he was
alleged to have committed against the two girls. The jury was further
instructed not to consider the evidence for any other purpose. (CALCRIM No.
1191A.) Where, as here, “[t]he jury was given an effective instruction by the
trial court to consider the evidence only for proper limited purposes, . . . we
must presume the jury adhered to the admonitions.” (People v. Hollie (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1277.)
In sum, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting the evidence of sex offenses under Evidence Code section 1108.
II.
MOTION TO SEVER
Scott contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to sever count 4 under section 954. He does not argue count 4 fails to

11
meet the statutory requirements for joinder with counts 1–3; rather, he
claims the court was required “in the interests of justice and for good cause
shown” to grant the motion to sever. We conclude the denial was not an abuse
of discretion.
As relevant here, section 954 permits joinder of “two or more
different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) The
Legislature enacted the statute to avoid “‘the increased expenditure of funds
and judicial resources which may result if the charges were to be tried in two
or more separate trials.’” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 772 (Soper).)
For this reason, “joinder of charged offenses ‘is the course of action preferred
by the law.’” (Ibid.)
Here, the charges were identical: All counts alleged Scott
committed a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)). We
thus conclude the counts were properly joined under section 954. (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 686 (Westerfield) [whether offenses properly
joined under section 954 is a question of law and is subject to independent
appellate review].)
“‘Nonetheless, a trial court has discretion to sever properly joined
charges in the interest of justice and for good cause.’” (Westerfield, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 688.) “‘When exercising its discretion, the court must balance
the potential prejudice of joinder against the state’s strong interest in the
efficiency of a joint trial.’” (Ibid.) We review a ruling on a motion to sever
based on “a determination as to whether separation is required in the
interests of justice . . . for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14
Cal.4th 155, 188.)
The defendant bears the burden of showing the trial court abused
its discretion in denying a motion to sever and “‘“‘must make a clear showing

12
of prejudice’”’” by showing “the denial ‘exceeded the bounds of reason.’”
(Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 689.) This showing must be stronger
“‘“than would be necessary to exclude other-crimes evidence in a severed
trial”’” under Evidence Code section 1101. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p.
774.)
We evaluate these claims based on “‘the showings made and the
facts known by the trial court’” when it ruled. (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 689.) We “‘consider four factors: (1) whether evidence of the crimes to be
jointly tried is cross-admissible; (2) whether some charges are unusually
likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case has
been joined with a stronger case so that the spillover effect of aggregate
evidence might alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and
(4) whether any charge carries the death penalty or the joinder of charges
converts the matter into a capital case.’” (Ibid.) And we balance the potential
prejudice to the defendant from a joint trial (second through fourth factors)
against the benefits to the state (first factor). (Ibid.) A finding of cross-
admissibility on “‘“[the first] factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any
suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly
joined charges.”’” (Ibid.)
In this case, there is no dispute the two sets of offenses were
cross-admissible under Evidence Code section 1108, and this showing alone is
sufficient to justify the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever. (Westerfield,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 689.)
Counts 1–3 were not “unusually likely to inflame the jury”
against Scott on count 4. (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 689.) All charges
involved a child under 14 years of age and thus were equally serious offenses.
Although the offense against the younger girl could be viewed as more

13
inflammatory because Scott licked her vagina on a regular basis, it would be
reasonable to conclude both offenses would be equally devastating to a child.
Indeed, the older girl testified that in 2015 she was “barely coming to terms
with the fact that the person I grew up with was molesting [her] and [her]
sister . . . and [she] did not want to admit it to [her]self nor anyone else.” This
testimony suggests the older girl suffered profound emotional injury,
notwithstanding her lack of memory on the extent of abuse she endured.
Finally, count 4 was not a weaker case than counts 1–3, such that
“‘the spillover effect of aggregate evidence might alter the outcome of some or
all of the charges.’” (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 689.) When assessing
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the cases, we are mindful that “the
benefits of joinder are not outweighed—and severance is not required—
merely because properly joined charges might make it more difficult for a
defendant to avoid conviction compared with his or her chances were the
charges to be separately tried.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 781.) In both
cases, the two girls described how Scott touched them inappropriately when
they were young. The trial court thus could reasonably find the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the cases did not weigh in favor of severance.
Finally, for all the reasons discussed above, we reject Scott’s
contention that, even if the trial court’s severance ruling was correct at the
time, the severance resulted in “‘gross unfairness’ amounting to a denial of
defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial or due process of law.” (People v.
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 46.)
III.
MOTION TO SET ASIDE COUNT 4
Scott contends the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his
pretrial motion to set aside count 4 under section 995. According to Scott, the

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magistrate judge’s order holding him to answer on count 4 was improperly
based solely on his extrajudicial statements from the pretext call—a violation
of the corpus delicti rule, which “requires some evidence that a crime
occurred, independent of the defendant’s own statements.” (People v.
Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 721 (Ledesma).) We need not decide whether
the court erred, however, because we conclude Scott cannot show resulting
prejudice.
Under section 995, a defendant may move to set aside an
information “based on the sufficiency of the record made before the
magistrate at the preliminary hearing.” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47
Cal.4th 1050, 1071–1072); § 995, subd. (a)(1)(B).) On appeal from a denial of a
section 995 motion, a defendant must show the denial was erroneous and
prejudicial. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 140.) The
defendant, however, cannot show prejudice if he or she was convicted “after a
trial in which . . . the prosecution presented sufficient evidence as to those
matters.” (Ibid.)
As we explain below in the next section, there was substantial
evidence at trial from which the jury could find Scott guilty on count 4. Given
this conclusion, we conclude Scott cannot prevail on his section 995 claim.
IV.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE ON COUNT 4
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on count 4, Scott
again relies on the corpus delicti rule that there must be “some evidence that
a crime occurred, independent of the defendant’s own statements.” (Ledesma,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 721.) Scott claims that, other than his own
statements, no evidence was presented at trial of him touching the older girl
inappropriately. Not so.

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On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) We “‘neither reweigh[ ] evidence nor
reevaluate[ ] a witness’s credibility.’” (Ibid.) Our power “‘begins and ends with
the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.’”
(People v. Lagunas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 996, 1007.)
With an exception not applicable here, it is a felony for “a person
[to] willfully and lewdly commit[ ] any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with
the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14
years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust,
passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child.” (§ 288, subd. (a),
italics added.) “‘Any touching of a child under the age of 14 violates this
section, even if the touching is outwardly innocuous and inoffensive, if it is
accompanied by the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of either the
perpetrator or the victim.’ [Citation.] By focusing on the defendant’s intent to
sexually exploit a child rather than on the nature of the defendant’s offending
act, section 288 ‘assumes that young victims suffer profound harm whenever
they are perceived and used as objects of sexual desire.’” (People v. Shockley
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404.)
Here, even without Scott’s statements, there was substantial
evidence from which the jury could find Scott guilty on count 4. The older girl
testified that when she was a young child Scott spun her around, lifted her
shorts, looked at her butt, and commented that she wasn’t wearing

16
underwear. This touching is enough to satisfy the touching requirement in
section 288: “Nothing in [the] language [of the statute] restricts the manner
in which such contact can occur or requires that specific or intimate body
parts be touched. Rather, a touching of ‘any part’ of the victim’s body is
specifically prohibited.” (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442.) And
although the older girl could not recall at trial whether Scott had touched her
vagina, the police investigator testified that the older girl had previously
stated Scott once moved her shorts and underwear to get to her vagina. (See
People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 44 [“Prior inconsistent statements
admitted under Evidence Code section 1235 may be considered for their truth
as well as for impeachment”].) There was also testimony of Scott molesting
other family members, both before and after this incident with the older girl.
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Scott’s touching of
the older girl—by spinning her and moving her shorts—was done “with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying [his] lust, passions, or sexual
desires.” (§ 288, subd. (a).)
V.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Before trial, the People moved to admit evidence of the pretext
call. When the trial court asked for his position on the issue, Scott’s trial
counsel replied, “I would just submit to the [c]ourt.” The evidence was
admitted. On appeal, Scott argues he received ineffective assistance because
his counsel failed to object to that evidence. We are unpersuaded.
As an initial matter, to the extent Scott argues his statements
during the pretext call should have been excluded because they were
involuntary, the argument is waived because it was not raised below. (People
v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435.)

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As for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to prevail a
defendant must show deficient performance by counsel and resulting
prejudice. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 (Mickel).) Counsel’s
performance is deficient if it falls “‘below an objective standard of
reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.’” (Ibid.) Resulting
prejudice is shown when “‘there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.”’” (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 451
(Staten).)
Counsel’s “‘[f]ailure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally
ineffective legal representation.’” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175,
206.) This is because we afford “‘great deference to counsel’s tactical
decisions’” and “will reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative evidence that counsel had
‘no rational tactical purpose’ for an action or omission.” (Mikel, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 198.) “‘If the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or
failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was
asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.’”
(Huggins, at p. 206.)
In this case, we cannot conclude Scott’s trial counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for not objecting. Scott does not argue—and the
record does not show—he asked his counsel for an explanation, but to no
avail.
Nor can we rule out the possibility the decision not to object was
tactical. In admitting evidence of the pretext call, the trial court found it did

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not present any issues under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 or
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36. The court stated that if counsel
later believed parts of the pretext call should be excluded, “we can readdress
it at that time.” A week later, the court granted Scott’s in limine motion to
exclude his postarrest statements during a police interview, including
statements that he rubbed the younger girl’s back, legs, butt, and vagina. The
court found Scott’s Miranda waiver was voluntary but not knowing or
intelligent. Given these evidentiary rulings, Scott’s trial counsel could have
reasonably believed a later objection to the voluntariness of the pretext call
would have been overruled. (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387
[“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make motions or
objections that counsel reasonably determines would be futile”].)
Even if his trial counsel erred by not objecting to the pretext call
evidence, Scott has not shown resulting prejudice. The jury heard testimony
from the two victims, the father, the mother, the aunt, and the investigating
officer which together revealed Scott’s decades-long history of child
molestation and inappropriate touching of the older girl. (See Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 695 [in assessing prejudice, court must
consider totality of the evidence].) Thus, even if the pretext call had been
excluded, it is not reasonably probable the result would have been different.
(Staten, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 451.) For these reasons, Scott’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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