CourtListener 10099812•People v. Brown CA2/8
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Filed 8/30/24 P. v. Brown CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B327531
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA106418)
v.
BELLAGIO BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Altus W. Hudson, Judge. Affirmed.
Katharine Eileen Greenebaum, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Stefanie Yee and Melanie
Dorian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Bellagio Brown arrived uninvited at
his former girlfriend’s apartment and sexually assaulted her. He
was convicted of multiple offenses, including assault with the intent
to commit rape, sexual penetration, sodomy or oral copulation, and
sentenced to four years in prison. He contends the court
prejudicially abused its discretion in refusing to grant a
continuance of trial and in excluding his proffered impeachment
evidence regarding the victim. He further contends that his
conviction on count 6 for assault with intent to commit rape must be
vacated because the jury acquitted him of assault to commit rape as
a lesser included offense to count 1 and found him guilty of assault
with intent to commit sexual penetration as a lesser included
offense to count 2.
We reject all of defendant’s contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Defendant met D.S. at Santa Monica College in 2017. They
dated for several years and had two sons together—one born in
2018 and the other in 2020. In 2021, D.S. broke up with defendant,
finding him abusive, and moved into her own apartment with her
two sons. D.S. maintained contact with defendant via text and
FaceTime calls so that he could have a relationship with his sons,
but she did not allow defendant at her home and otherwise did not
see him in person.
On the afternoon of July 28, 2022, D.S. was getting ready for
work and awaiting her mother’s arrival to babysit the boys while
she was at work. When the doorbell rang, D.S. was on her
cellphone and did not bother looking to see who it was before
opening the door, believing it was her mother. However, she was
shocked to see that it was defendant. Defendant immediately
stepped inside, kissed D.S. on the mouth and hugged her. He then
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started pushing her toward the couch, saying they needed to talk.
D.S. told him repeatedly he needed to go, or words to that effect.
On the couch, defendant began groping D.S., pulling her top
up and putting his mouth on both of her breasts. At some point,
D.S. was able to get up and head toward the kitchen. She sent texts
to both her mother and her neighbor asking them for help and to
call 911. D.S. did not feel comfortable trying to call 911 in front of
defendant. Defendant became angry, and “forcefully” pushed D.S.
into the kitchen and up against the sink. He snatched her phone
from her and placed it on top of the refrigerator, out of her reach.
Defendant pressed up against D.S. from behind (D.S. was
facing the counter). He pulled her pants and underwear down and
attempted to place his penis and his fingers in her vagina. She felt
both against her bare skin. At some point, defendant also placed
his mouth on both sides of her buttocks. D.S. was eventually able to
grab a pan and swing it at defendant. She yelled at him to get out.
When D.S.’s mother arrived, defendant pushed past her and fled
the apartment. D.S. then called 911.
After the police arrived and talked to D.S., she was taken to
the hospital for a SART (Sexual Assault Response Team)
examination. The examination included the collection of samples
from D.S.’s mouth, left breast and right and left buttocks. Testing
performed on those samples showed that the male DNA collected
matched defendant’s DNA profile. Samples collected from D.S.’s
vaginal area were negative for male DNA.
According to defendant, he went to D.S.’s apartment that day
to visit with his sons which was something he did on a “regular”
basis. When he arrived, he and D.S. were being “romantic,” sitting
on the couch and consensually kissing each other. At some point,
they went to the kitchen and defendant tried to “escalate” the
situation by “kissing on her, like neck and breast and stuff like
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that.” Defendant also kissed D.S. on her bare buttocks. When he
did so, D.S. started screaming at him. She grabbed a knife and
began waving it at him. Defendant said D.S. had a new boyfriend
and she was being “manipulative,” wanting him there only on her
terms. He said she was trying to frame him. Defendant denied
grabbing D.S.’s phone and said he did not take off his own clothes
and did not touch her vagina.
Defendant was charged with forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261,
subd. (a)(2); count 1), sexual penetration by use of force (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(A); count 2), dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1);
count 3), sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a); count 4) and
assault with intent to commit rape, sexual penetration, sodomy or
oral copulation (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 6). The court dismissed
count 5 (stalking) at the preliminary hearing.
In December 2022, the case proceeded to a jury trial. Before
the start of voir dire and again, several days later, while voir dire
was underway, defense counsel requested a trial continuance to
consult a DNA expert. Defendant refused to waive time and
counsel requested the court grant the request over defendant’s
objection. The court denied the requests. The court also denied
defendant’s motion to introduce evidence of prior acts by D.S. as
impeachment. We reserve a more detailed discussion of these
rulings to parts 1 and 2 of the Discussion below.
On count 1, the jury found defendant not guilty of forcible
rape and guilty of the lesser included charges of misdemeanor
battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and misdemeanor assault (§ 240). On
count 2, the jury found defendant not guilty of sexual penetration
by force and guilty of the lesser included charges of attempted
forcible sexual penetration (§§ 289, subd. (a)(1), 664), sexual battery
(§ 243.4, subd. (a)), misdemeanor battery (§ 242), misdemeanor
assault (§ 240), and assault with intent to commit forcible sexual
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penetration (§ 220, subd. (a)(1)). The jury acquitted defendant of
dissuasion of a witness as charged in count 3. The jury found
defendant guilty as charged in counts 4 and 6, sexual battery by
restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a)) and assault with intent to commit rape,
sexual penetration, sodomy or oral copulation (§ 220, subd. (a)(1)).
The court sentenced defendant to a four-year midterm on
count 6 and stayed sentence on the remaining counts pursuant to
Penal Code section 654. Defendant was awarded 233 days
(202 actual, 31 conduct) of presentence custody credits.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Denial of Trial Continuance
a. Background
On December 2, 2022, the parties answered ready and were
sent to a trial department. The parties trailed until Friday,
December 9, 2022. That same day, before the court brought in the
panel of prospective jurors, the prosecutor reported that the DNA
testing of the samples collected during the victim’s SART
examination in July was still ongoing. She said that the DNA
report was expected within a week and asked the court for the right
to amend her witness list once the report was received because she
would not know which technician to call until then. Defendant
objected to the addition of any additional witnesses regarding DNA
evidence and testing. The court deferred its ruling.
The following Thursday, December 15, 2022, while voir dire
was underway, the prosecutor told the court she had received an e-
mail that morning that the report of the DNA testing was complete
and she had forwarded the report to defense counsel. The
prosecutor said she intended to introduce the report and wanted to
call senior criminalist, Learden Matthies, to testify about the DNA
testing and results. Defense counsel objected on the grounds it was
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late discovery and receipt of the evidence would deny defendant a
fair trial because he would not have the opportunity to consult with
a DNA expert. The prosecutor responded that it was not late
discovery, that everyone knew the testing was pending and
defendant chose not to waive time or consult with an expert.
The court said it would consider a brief continuance if
defendant was willing to waive time. Defense counsel advised the
court that defendant was continuing to assert his statutory right to
a speedy trial and was unwilling to waive it. Counsel requested
that the court grant the request for a continuance over defendant’s
objection because it was for his own benefit to have the services of a
DNA expert. The court denied the motion.
b. Analysis
In reviewing a denial of a motion to continue trial, we
consider “the circumstances of each case and the reasons presented
for the request to determine whether [the] trial court’s denial of a
continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process. [Citation.]
Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice, the trial
court’s denial does not warrant reversal.” (People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 450, italics added (Doolin).) “ ‘The party
challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of
establishing an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a
continuance is seldom successfully attacked.’ ” (People v. Ortiz
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 812.) Defendant has not established
that an abuse of discretion occurred here, nor has he shown
prejudice.
Defendant’s request to continue trial was made after the
parties had answered ready and were about to pick a jury. “A
midtrial continuance may be granted only for good cause.” (People
v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 469 (Winbush); see also Pen. Code,
§ 1050, subd. (e).) In order to show good cause, defendant was
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required to demonstrate to the trial court that he “ ‘prepared for
trial with due diligence.’ ” (Winbush, at pp. 469–470.) In exercising
its discretion, the trial court was required to consider numerous
factors including the benefit defendant anticipated by receiving the
continuance as well as the likelihood that benefit would result, the
burden on witnesses, jurors and the court, “ ‘ “ ‘and, above all,
whether substantial justice [would] be accomplished or defeated by
a granting of the motion.’ ” ’ ” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450.)
Here, defendant had long been on notice that samples had
been collected from the victim during her SART examination in
July and that those samples were being tested for DNA. Defendant
was also well aware of the prosecution’s intent to use the DNA
evidence at trial. Defendant offers no explanation for why an
expert had not been contacted and asked to be on call to review the
report once the DNA testing was completed.
Moreover, defendant has not demonstrated what benefit
defendant anticipated by obtaining a brief continuance and
presenting a DNA expert of his own. He only says in conclusory
fashion that a “fuller picture” of what the DNA evidence showed
could have been presented to the jury. But, defendant’s theory of
the case was that the physical contact was consensual, not that it
did not occur or that someone else was responsible. Indeed, when
defendant testified, he admitted kissing D.S. and putting his mouth
on D.S.’s breasts and bare buttocks, making the brief testimony of
the criminalist confirming the presence of his DNA on D.S.’s breast
and buttocks fairly insignificant in comparison. Further, the DNA
evidence showed there was no DNA found in any of the vaginal
swabs which defendant was able to argue, apparently successfully,
that no rape or sexual penetration had occurred. Nothing in the
record supports a conclusion the trial court acted arbitrarily or
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denied defendant due process by denying his midtrial request for a
continuance.
2. Exclusion of Evidence
a. Background
In a pretrial motion, defendant proffered evidence of several
prior incidents involving D.S. that counsel argued showed she had a
history of engaging in violent acts. Defendant argued they were
relevant to her credibility and admissible as impeachment. In the
trial court, defendant sought to introduce multiple prior acts but
argues here only that the court erred in excluding two of the
incidents: one from January 2018 and the other from October 2021.
The incident in January 2018 involved an altercation between
defendant and D.S. after which both were arrested for domestic
violence but neither one was charged. Defense counsel argued that
D.S. had admitted at the preliminary hearing that she charged at
defendant with a knife during that altercation. Defense counsel
said that conduct showed moral turpitude and should be admitted.
The second incident in October 2021 involved defendant and D.S.
and other unidentified individuals. As with the January 2018
incident, D.S. was not charged or convicted of any crime. Defense
counsel relied on a brief video clip showing a portion of the incident
and said it was another example of D.S.’s propensity for violence.
The video clip showed D.S. physically confronting defendant and
then turning towards a car and hitting the windshield with her
hands. The court excluded both incidents as irrelevant.
b. Analysis
“A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct
involving moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony
conviction, subject to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under
Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856,
931 (Clark).) The trial court’s latitude under section 352 to exclude
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impeachment evidence is broad. (Clark, at p. 931.) Evidence may
be properly excluded “ ‘if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’
An exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 will be
affirmed unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and
the ruling resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Winbush, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 469.)
The two incidents at issue here did not involve prior
convictions. They involved two prior altercations between D.S. and
defendant that did not result in any charges or convictions. Clark
explains that where, as here, the proffered impeachment evidence is
misconduct other than a prior conviction, additional factors must be
considered in assessing admissibility. “This is because such
misconduct generally is less probative of immoral character or
dishonesty and may involve problems involving proof, unfair
surprise, and the evaluation of moral turpitude. [Citation.] As we
have advised, ‘courts may and should consider with particular care
whether the admission of such evidence might involve undue time,
confusion, or prejudice which outweighs its probative value.’ ”
(Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 931–932.)
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to
exclude these two incidents. There was insufficient evidence
presented supporting the conclusion they reflected on D.S.’s
character or propensity for dishonesty and would undoubtedly have
entailed an undue consumption of time and confusion of the issues.
They were properly excluded under Evidence Code section 352.
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3. Count 6 (Assault with Intent to Commit Rape, Sexual
Penetration, Sodomy or Oral Copulation)
Defendant contends his conviction on count 6 for assault with
intent to commit rape must be vacated because the jury acquitted
him of assault to commit rape as a lesser included offense to count 1
and found him guilty of assault with intent to commit sexual
penetration as a lesser included charge on count 2. In his opening
brief, defendant cites to Penal Code section 1023 and argues he
cannot be twice placed in jeopardy and convicted of the same offense
for which he was acquitted. In his reply brief, defendant concedes
that section 1023 is not applicable to a single criminal prosecution.
However, he argues that count 6 must still be vacated because a
defendant may not be convicted of two offenses arising from a single
act when one is a lesser offense of the other. We reject defendant’s
argument.
“In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant
can lead to convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged.’
[Citations.] But a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits
multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.”
(People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.) “The proscription
against multiple convictions for both a greater and lesser included
offense applies only where both offenses are based upon a single
act.” (People v. Cortez (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 395, 410.)
The jury’s verdicts here did not violate the rule prohibiting
multiple convictions on necessarily included offenses arising from a
single act. The testimony of D.S. supported a finding that
defendant committed numerous separate sexual offenses against
her. She attested to a course of assaultive conduct by defendant
from the time he entered her apartment, maneuvered her to the
couch and then forced her up against the counter in the kitchen.
Defendant’s own testimony corroborated that he performed multiple
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acts, claiming the various acts were consensual. In closing
argument, the prosecutor argued that multiple criminal acts
occurred. She explained to the jury that count 1 (forcible rape) was
based on defendant’s attempt to rape D.S. with his penis and
count 2 (forcible sexual penetration) was based on defendant’s
attempt to put his fingers in her vagina. The prosecutor said
count 6 (assault with intent to commit rape, sexual penetration,
sodomy or oral copulation) “is for all the touching that took place
before the actual rape and sexual penetration.” Defendant has not
shown any basis for disregarding the jury’s findings and vacating
his conviction on count 6.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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