In re Hill

CourtListener 10098916CalctappAug 29, 2024

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Filed 8/2/24; Modified and Certified for Pub. 8/29/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re MICHAEL S. HILL, A166191
on Habeas Corpus.
(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. HC846751)

In 1987, Michael Hill was convicted of two murders and sentenced to
death. He has always maintained the murders were committed by Michael
McCray,1 whose statements to the police incriminating Hill (and
incriminating himself as an aider and abettor) were a significant part of the
People’s case at trial. McCray invoked his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination and did not testify at trial, but his statements were
admitted under the declaration against penal interest exception to the
hearsay rule. Some two decades after Hill’s convictions, he learned that the
prosecution had failed to disclose evidence that the district attorney’s office
had promised not to prosecute McCray for offenses arising from the conduct
he described during the investigation of this case.
Hill filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a number of
claims, two of which are at issue on this appeal. First, Hill contends that the

1 McCray is no longer alive.

1
People’s failure to disclose this evidence violated Brady v. Maryland (1963)
373 U.S. 83 (Brady). Second, he contends the People violated Napue v.
Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264 (Napue) by knowingly allowing McCray to testify
falsely at the preliminary hearing that he had received no leniency for his
testimony against Hill and then to assert an invalid claim of privilege to
avoid testifying at trial, enabling the People to present McCray’s statements
to the police while denying Hill the opportunity to cross examine McCray.
The trial court found that Hill failed to establish a prima facie case and
dismissed his claims. We conclude the petition’s allegations were sufficient to
make a prima facie case of Napue and Brady violations and remand for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I.
Hill’s Conviction and Post Trial Proceedings
A. The Offenses
Our description of the case presented at trial is taken largely from the
California Supreme Court’s opinion affirming Hill’s convictions. (People v.
Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959 (Hill), overruled on unrelated grounds in Price v.
Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13), supplemented as
appropriate by our review of the trial record. After a preliminary hearing
held in April and May 1986, Hill was charged by information on May 19,
1986, with two counts of murder, one count of robbery, special circumstances
of multiple murder and murder committed during a robbery, and
enhancements for use of a firearm, and alleged that he had previously been

2
convicted of possession of narcotics for sale. (Hill, at pp. 972-973.)2 Hill
pleaded not guilty and denied the special circumstances and other
allegations, but subsequently amended his plea to admit the alleged prior
conviction. (Id. at p. 973.)
1. The People’s Case
“On August 15, 1985, the bodies of Anthony Brice, Sr. (Brice), and his
four-year-old son, Anthony Brice, Jr. (Anthony), were found by police on the
floor of the jewelry store operated by Brice” at 38th and Foothill in Oakland,
California. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 971, 974.) “Each victim had been
shot in the head at close range with a .38-caliber gun. The appearance of the
crime scene suggested there had been a robbery. Within a week after the
killings, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors offered a $5,000 reward
for information resulting in the arrest and conviction of the killer(s).” (Hill,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 971.)
The primary investigator on the case, Oakland Police Department
Sergeant Gerald Medsker, learned of Hill’s possible involvement on
August 22, 1985. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972.) On September 11,
1985, Hill gave three statements to the police, recorded on audio tape, in
which he incriminated McCray, an illegal drug dealer. (Id. at p. 972.)
McCray was arrested that evening.3 (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 972.)
The police found a pouch of jewelry in McCray’s automobile, which he said he
had won in a poker game. (Ibid.) In the room where McCray was living, the

2 The information additionally alleged enhancements for infliction of
great bodily injury, but the prosecution later amended the information by
striking these allegations. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 973.)
3 Although the police looked for McCray based on the information from
Hill, he was arrested for unrelated offenses.

3
police found “found twenty-eight assorted gold chains in an envelope, two
shotguns, three baseball bats, an assortment of shotgun, rifle, and pistol
ammunition, empty .38- and .44-caliber shells, and narcotics paraphernalia.”
(Ibid.)
“When interrogated by the police, McCray incriminated [Hill] by
asserting as follows: [Hill] had owed McCray $600 for cocaine. On the day of
the Brice killings, McCray loaned [Hill] a .38-caliber handgun and
ammunition. McCray provided [Hill] with the gun because [Hill] had said he
intended to use it in a robbery. [Hill] returned to McCray’s house the
afternoon of the killings with a brown paper bag containing at least three
dozen gold chains and one dozen watches. [Hill] also had about $300 in cash,
which he claimed to have taken from a jewelry store. He gave McCray $150
in cash and jewelry worth about $450.” (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 972.) Hill
removed the gun McCray had given him from his waistband and unloaded it;
McCray was “ ‘pretty sure’ there were three empty shells taken from the
gun.” (Id. at p. 976.)4 McCray was never charged with any offense related to
the robbery and murders.
The prosecution’s theory at trial was that Hill robbed and killed the
Brices because he was under pressure to repay a drug debt to McCray, and
that McCray was Hill’s accomplice as a result of having loaned him the gun
with knowledge that Hill intended to use it to commit a robbery. (Hill, supra,
3 Cal.4th at p. 973.) McCray did not testify. Sergeant Jerry Harris, Sergeant

4 McCray was interviewed in several segments between 11:32 p.m. on
September 11, 1985, and the early afternoon on September 12, and only
portions of the interviews were tape recorded. Specifically, the officers
recorded a portion of the interview from 12:08 to 12:38 a.m., a portion from
1:01 to 1:05 a.m., and a portion beginning at 5:28 a.m.

4
Medsker’s investigative partner, testified to portions of the statements that
McCray gave to the police after his arrest. (Id. at p. 976.)
Derek Agnew testified that he had entrusted Brice with about $550
cash to keep in the store’s safe. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 973.) Two days
before the killings, Agnew went to the store and gave Brice an additional
$150 for safekeeping. (Ibid.) Hill was in the store and Agnew testified that
as he started counting his money, Hill “ ‘was in my business.’ ” (Ibid.) Agnew
sometimes purchased jewelry from Brice which he then resold. He had seen
Hill at the store six or seven times, usually just talking with Brice but once or
twice purchasing jewelry. It was obvious that Hill and Brice were friends.
Robert Fox, a costume jewelry salesman, was in Brice's store at about
noon on the day of the killings and noticed that Brice had a large amount of
currency in his pocket. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 973.) Hill came into the
store while Fox was there and was the only person in the store with the
Brices when Fox left. (Ibid.)
Denine Houston and her boyfriend Sam Dartez lived in a house in
Oakland that was rented by Rudy Wilkins and Annie Mae Smith; at the time
of the offenses, Hill, who was Wilkins’s cousin, was also staying there.
Houston testified that she heard Hill tell her boyfriend on the morning of
August 13, 1985, that he had a “lick up” (meaning “robbery”) at a “slum shop”
(meaning “fake jewelry store”) “ ‘on Foothill off of 38th and he can get in
because he know the people real good, and he had to have some money cause
he was tired of being broke.’ ”5 (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 973-974.) On the

5 In her statements to the police, Houston did not say that Hill had
talked to Dartez about a “lick” around two days prior to August 15; she said
this for the first time at the preliminary hearing.

5
morning of August 15, Hill “ ‘was talking about going to get his piece [gun],
going to take care of his business,’ ” then returned an hour or two later with a
gun similar to the .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver in evidence at trial.6
(Id. at p. 974.) Although Houston testified that Hill pulled the gun out and
showed it to her, when interviewed by the police during their investigation,
she had said she did not get a good look at the gun because she saw it when
Hill was putting it in his pants or coat. Hill told Houston he was tired of
being broke, left and returned three or four hours later with a brown paper
bag containing “ ‘a bunch of slum jewelry,’ ‘pockets full of money,’ and an
‘eight ball [one-eighth ounce] of cocaine.’ ” (Ibid.)
Houston testified that she had seen Hill with slum jewelry every day
for two weeks prior to the day of the murders, and that Hill did not sell the
jewelry for money but rather traded it for drugs. She acknowledged that she
“got high all day long every day” and that at the time of trial she was on
probation for selling crack and in custody for a probation violation.
Dartez, Houston’s boyfriend, testified that a day or two before the
killings, Hill said, “ ‘He got a lick up and he’s going to have some money.”
(Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 974.) Dartez had known Hill for three to four
years and sold slum jewelry with him. (Id. at p. 975.) On August 15, Dartez
had gone to court for a 9:00 a.m. appearance on a cocaine possession charge
but after a short time returned to the house because the matter was
continued to the afternoon. He got back at about 9:30 or “something to 10:00”
and did not see Hill at the house between then and when he left for court in
the afternoon. As he was leaving for court, he saw defendant coming toward
the house with a “ ‘big grocery bag’ containing ‘slum jewelry, watches, chains,

6 The gun in evidence was not the gun used in the robbery but was
offered as an exemplar of a .38-caliber pistol.

6
a whole bunch of chains.’ ” (Ibid.) Dartez had never seen Hill with so much
jewelry before. (Ibid.) Hill said, “ ‘Man, we got work to do,’ meaning to
Dartez that they needed to sell the jewelry.” (Ibid.) Hill gave Dartez $20 to
buy cocaine, which Dartez bought and consumed with Hill at the house.
(Ibid.) Later that day, Hill paid for cocaine that someone brought to the
house; he had “ ‘a lot of money . . . a wad.’ ” (Ibid.) Marta Daniels, McCray’s
“ ‘common law’ sister-in-law,” came to the house around 3:30 then left with
Hill after the group had partaken of the cocaine.
Smith saw Hill at the house on August 15 with “ ‘a bag of jewelry, some
money and a gun’ ” that was “substantially similar” to the one in evidence.
(Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 974.) Hill said, “ ‘This is the way to get yours’ ”
(ibid.) and paid her and Rudy some money he owed them. Hill also had some
cocaine, which she, Hill, Houston and Dartez smoked. Smith testified that
she did not smoke much cocaine; she generally used heroin.
Wilkins testified that on the morning of August 15, Hill showed him a
.38-caliber revolver similar to one in evidence and asked for some .38-caliber
bullets, which Wilkins did not have. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 974.) Hill
left and returned midafternoon with a brown paper bag full of gold-colored
necklaces and a “ ‘wad of money’ ” in his pocket. (Ibid.) Hill repaid Wilkins
$30 and said that “ ‘he had knocked over a jewelry store and he had snuffed
somebody.’ ” (Ibid.) Wilkins testified that he used heroin, including on
August 15, but that he used it in the afternoon, not the morning. Wilkins
acknowledged he was “falling asleep” while testifying but denied it was
because he was on drugs.
Daniels testified that Hill came to the apartment where she and
McCray both lived on the morning of August 15, 1985, and spent about five
minutes with McCray. Daniels asked Hill for a dollar and he said he had no

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money but “would have one ‘when he got through with his lick.’ ” (Hill,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 974.) “To Daniels, a ‘lick’ meant a ‘robbery,’ a ‘scam,’ a
‘con,’ or ‘any kind of thing where you get something for doing something
wrong.” (Ibid.) Hill left, then returned a few hours later and Daniels let him
in; neither she nor McCray had left home. Daniels did not see a gun or
jewelry on Hill’s person and did not see him with a grocery bag of jewelry;
when shown that she had told the police Hill was carrying a brown paper
bag, she testified that she did not remember seeing this. After Hill spent
about five minutes with McCray in his room, Hill and McCray each gave
Daniels $50 to buy cocaine. Hill had a “ ‘fan of money’ that Daniels estimated
to be ‘about 600 dollars’ ” and said “ ‘he had to have his and he was going to
get it and this is what he got.’ ” (Hill, at p. 974.) Daniels testified that she
did not go to Wilkins’ house on the afternoon of August 15.
Wilbert Winchester, who had known Hill for many years, testified that
“perhaps a day or two, maybe a week” after the murders, Hill asked if he
wanted to buy a .38-caliber pistol. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 975.)
Winchester declined because he did not want a pistol and he was on parole.
(Ibid.) He did not see a gun. (Ibid.)
Ranee Bennett, a methadone addict, first met Hill on August 19, 1985,
at a taco restaurant. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 975.) Hill “ ‘said he was
trying to down [sell] some pills and a gun’ ” and she could see a gun in his
waistband that “resembled” the one in evidence and Hill said was a .38–
caliber. (Ibid.) Hill left but returned later that day; he said he had nowhere
to stay and Bennett offered to let him stay at her home. (Ibid.) He no longer
had the gun. (Ibid.) On or about August 30, Bennett asked Hill about a
robbery and murder because “she had been hearing things” and he said he
had done it. (Ibid.) She asked “ ‘why did he shoot the kid and he said

8
because they knew him. . . . He said it was a jewelry store. . . . It was in
Oakland. . . . It was a man and his son. . . . [Hill] Said it was a robbery. . . .
The robbery was supposed to have been done with a .38.’ ” (Ibid.)
Arthur Allen, a jailhouse informant, was Hill’s cellmate at the Santa
Rita jail in September 1985. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 975.) Allen testified
that Hill said he shot two people and robbed a jewelry store; that “ ‘[h]e
shot . . . the older man because I guess he thought he was going for a gun or
some kind of weapon, but he just shot the boy because [the] boy could have
recognized him’ ”; and that before being shot, the little boy said, “Uncle
Mike.” (Id. at pp. 975-976.) As noted in Hill, Allen testified that Hill said
“ ‘there was blood all over the counter’ at the jewelry store” but this was
contradicted by a police officer’s testimony that no blood was found on the
counter. (Id. at p. 976.) Allen also testified that Hill said he owed a $30,000
to $35,000 drug debt. Allen was in jail for receiving stolen goods and “was
released from custody earlier than normal after informing his jailers of
defendant’s admission.” (Ibid.)
Another jailhouse informant, Clifford Turner, met Hill in May or
June 1985, at which time Hill offered to sell him a gun; he was subsequently
arrested and was in the cell next to Hill’s when Hill arrived at Santa Rita.
(Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 976.) Turner testified that Hill “admitted he had
robbed Brice and killed Anthony because ‘the little boy knew him as
Uncle Mike.’ ” (Ibid.) According to Turner, Hill said he used a .357 magnum,
which was the type of weapon Hill had tried to sell Turner. In
December 1985, Turner pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery, two counts
of assault with a deadly weapon and a petty theft with a prior conviction and,
while awaiting sentencing, wrote to the district attorney, “offering to ‘help the
state . . . if the state is willing to help me, and if not I’m still willing to help

9
the District Attorney’s office.’ ” (Ibid.) At the time, Turner was “ ‘very
angry’ ” at Hill.” (Ibid.)
A pathologist testified that he extracted two slugs from Brice’s head
and one from Anthony’s head. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 976-977.) A
police department criminalist testified that all three slugs had been fired
from a .38-caliber gun. (Id. at p. 977.) The gun introduced as People's
exhibit No. 4-A was one of four brands of .38-caliber handguns that could
have fired the slugs. (Ibid.)
As will be discussed infra, Hill’s postconviction habeas petitions alleged
that not only McCray but virtually all the prosecution witnesses received
favorable treatment from the prosecution in connection with their own
criminal matters and/or rewards for the information they provided. None of
this allegedly suppressed evidence was available for impeachment of the
prosecution witnesses at trial.
2. The Defense Case
Hill’s defense was that Michael McCray had killed the Brices and was
attempting to exculpate himself by incriminating Hill. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th
at p. 977.) Hill testified that “several of the prosecution witnesses were
either lying or mistaken as to his alleged statements and actions.” (Ibid.) He
testified that he had known Brice about 12 years and was a friend of both
Brice and Anthony. (Ibid.)7 On August 15, Hill went to Brice’s store “to get
some slum jewelry and to attempt to sell some videocassette recorders
(VCR’s). He knocked on the door and was let into the shop by Robert Fox.
Brice and Anthony were in the store. Fox then left and Brice asked defendant
to buy some cigarettes.” (Ibid.) Hill used the door keys to let himself out of

7 Hill was also a friend of Brice’s wife, whom Hill had known since
grade school.

10
the store and, as he was walking to a grocery, he saw McCray in a car parked
across the intersection from Brice’s store; as he was returning, McCray called
out to him. (Ibid.) Hill approached and McCray asked who was in the
jewelry store and whether Brice had any money. (Ibid.) Hill said both Brices
were there, returned to the store, used the keys to enter and told Brice about
the conversation he had just had with McCray. (Ibid.)
About 10 minutes later, there was a knock at the door and Hill looked
out and saw McCray. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 977.) Hill told Brice that
McCray was at the door and Brice threw him the keys and told him to open
the door. (Ibid.) McCray entered, pulled out a gun, went behind Brice and
fired the gun. (Ibid.) Hill ducked and fled the store. (Ibid.) He heard a
second shot as he fled. (Ibid.)
Hill paid a passing motorist to drive him away from the scene and got
out a few blocks away. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 977.) As he walked down
the street, he saw a friend who paid him $650 for VCRs Hill had sold him.
(Ibid.) As this was happening, McCray drove up and gave Hill a grocery bag
of slum jewelry “like that he had seen in Brice’s store.” (Ibid.) Hill did not
want the jewelry because he knew it was stolen, but he took it and began
walking toward the house where he was living. (Ibid.) On the way, he came
across Dartez and asked him to help sell the slum jewelry. (Ibid.) Dartez
declined and Hill gave him $20 to buy cocaine, which they smoked at the
house. (Id. at pp. 977-978.) Dartez then left for a court appearance, and Hill
remained at the house. Later that afternoon, more cocaine was delivered to
the house and Hill paid $150 for it. (Id. at p. 978.) Marta Daniels came to
the house at about 4:30 p.m. and Hill gave her the grocery bag and about one-
half of the jewelry McCray had given him earlier. (Ibid.)

11
Hill testified on cross-examination that several of his statements
during his police interrogation were false and that he initially concealed
McCray’s alleged involvement because he was afraid of McCray. (Hill, supra,
3 Cal.4th at p. 978.)
Several prosecution witnesses testified on cross-examination that later
on the evening of August 15 McCray came to the house several times looking
for defendant and saying he “ ‘wanted his shit.’ ” (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at
p. 978.)
B. Legal Proceedings
The jury found Hill guilty as charged of the count of robbery and two
counts of first degree murder, found true the charged special circumstances
and personal use of a firearm. After the conclusion of trial and entry of the
abstract of judgment and commitment order, the court, “acting on
information from” the prosecutor, entered an order providing for distribution
of the reward money authorized in 1985 as follows: $1,500 to Bennett, $500
each to Allen and Turner, $400 each to Wilkins and Houston, $350 to
Daniels, $300 each to Smith, Dartez, and two individuals who do not appear
to have testified at trial, and $150 to Robert Fox.
Hill’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
(Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 971.) In 1998, he filed identical petitions for writ
of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court and in federal district
court. Federal proceedings were stayed pending completion of exhaustion
proceedings in state court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition
in 2006 and the federal stay was lifted in February 2007, but the matter was
again stayed in 2008 due to competency proceedings that lasted several
years. Hill’s competency was deemed restored in 2012.

12
After postconviction discovery proceedings, which focused on evidence
allegedly withheld by the prosecution in violation of Brady, Hill amended his
federal habeas petition to add claims based on newly discovered evidence.
His amended petition, filed on November 2, 2018, alleged 16 claims, many
with multiple subparts. On September 27, 2021, the federal district court
found some of Hill’s claims to be unexhausted, ordered Hill to present these
claims to the state court within 30 days, and stayed federal proceedings.
II.
The Present Habeas Petition
A. Background
1. McCray’s Testimony at the Preliminary Hearing
McCray was called as a witness for the defense at the preliminary
hearing and appeared with counsel Judith Browne. He testified that he had
been convicted in federal court of distributing heroin and was to be sentenced
the following week, and acknowledged that he had prior convictions for
manslaughter, robbery, receiving stolen property and “ex-con with a gun” and
had served prison terms for the manslaughter and robbery. Under the advice
of counsel, he exercised his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer
questions about Hill, events on August 15, 1985, or Brice and his son.
McCray then testified that in September 1985, while under arrest for
possession of cocaine and possession of a sawed-off shotgun, he gave a
statement to the police about his whereabouts on August 15, 1985. When
asked, “did any anyone from the Oakland Police Department ever promise
you any kind of immunity, partial immunity or leniency if you gave them a
statement with respect to this particular case?” McCray responded, “No sir;
they did not.” He denied that anyone from the Oakland Police Department
“promised [him] any kind of leniency” in this case.

13
When asked whether he was “promised any kind of leniency by the
district attorney’s office of Alameda County if [he] would have testified in this
particular case,” McCray answered that he “had not.” He responded the
same way when asked whether he had “personally had any contact with any
members of the Alameda County District Attorney’s office.” When McCray
was asked whether he had “received any information through [his] lawyers
with respect to any kind of form of leniency that might be involved with
respect to any charges which might be forthcoming [¶] . . . [¶] . . . in the
murder of Anthony Brice, Sr., and Anthony Brice, Jr.,” the court sustained
McCray’s attorney’s attorney-client privilege objection.
When McCray again invoked his privilege against self-incrimination in
response to questions about the Brices, defense counsel asked the court to
order the district attorney to provide McCray with immunity so that he could
testify. The prosecutor objected, and the trial court denied the request.
2. McCray’s Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Trial
At trial, McCray was a prosecution witness. At the beginning of the
trial, while discussing scheduling and other housekeeping matters after the
jury was selected, the prosecutor told the court he was expecting to have
“somebody here to represent” McCray because “in fact and legally he would
be and is an accomplice both before and after the fact.” The prosecutor stated
that “[w]e are not going to give him immunity” and his “impression” was that
McCray would “take the Fifth,” making McCray unavailable for trial and
therefore allowing admission of taped statements McCray made to the
Oakland police that were against his penal interest under the hearsay

14
exception for declarations against interest.8 The prosecutor went on to say
the parties would need to determine which of McCray’s statements were
against penal interest and the court would need to rule on their admissibility.
Defense counsel agreed that McCray’s statements against penal interest were
admissible but pointed out that to the extent any of his statements were
exculpatory, they would not come within the hearsay exception.
Outside the presence of the jury, McCray testified that he was
currently in federal custody and knew Hill, whom he identified in court. He
then refused to answer a series of questions about August 15, 1985, on the
grounds it might incriminate him: whether he recalled seeing Hill on the
morning of August 15, 1985, whether he recalled giving Hill a gun that
morning, whether Hill returned that afternoon with a “bag full of jewelry and
assorted watches and things like that,” and whether Hill removed three
empty shell casings from the cylinder of a .38-caliber Smith and Wesson
handgun. Asked if he intended to claim his Fifth Amendment privilege to
refuse to answer any questions related to events on August 14, 15 and 16,
1985, McCray said “yes” and the prosecutor said he had no further questions.
On cross examination, asked if it was true that he went to the jewelry
store in the area of 38th and Foothill on August 15, 1985, and killed a four-
year-old child, McCray initially responded that it was not true, then after his
attorney interjected and the two conferred, McCray refused to answer and

8 Under the hearsay exception for declarations against interest, as
relevant here, “[e]vidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient
knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, . . . so
far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it
to be true.” (Evid. Code, § 1230.)

15
the court struck the initial response. Defense counsel asked if it was true
that McCray went to the jewelry store on August 15, 1985, and killed Brice,
and McCray refused to answer. McCray was excused.
At this point, the prosecutor told the court that the first requirement
for introducing McCray’s statements against penal interests had been
satisfied because McCray was unavailable. The prosecutor reiterated that
based on some of McCray’s statements, “he legally would be both an
accessory before and after the fact at least to a robbery, which under the law
of felony murder would make him accessory, aider and abettor to both
homicides because of actions taken before and after the crimes themselves.
[¶] At this time we are not going to provide Mr. McCray with any immunity
under [section] 1324. Therefore his invoking the Fifth Amendment makes
him unavailable at this time.”
Counsel and the court then went through the transcripts9 of McCray’s
statements to determine which would be admitted. Defense counsel stated
that he intended to call one of the officers who took McCray’s statements and
question him about questions and answers counsel believed were declarations
against McCray’s penal interest. The parties agreed as to admissibility of
most of the statements and the court ruled on the few that were disputed.
3. Discovery of Previously Undisclosed Evidence
According to the allegations of the present habeas petition, in 2007, the
People produced documents in postconviction discovery pursuant to Penal
Code section 1054.9, which became effective on January 1, 2003. (Stats.
2002, ch. 1105, § 1; In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 690.) One of the

9 The transcripts were marked as defense exhibits for purposes of the

hearing.

16
previously undisclosed documents was a letter dated February 13, 1986, from
Assistant District Attorney Albert Meloling to Assistant Public Defender
Judith Browne,10 who at that time represented McCray. The letter,
exhibit 38 to the petition (“exhibit 38”), refers to the municipal court docket
number for Hill’s case and states: “Pursuant to our recent conversation with
reference to the above subject, this letter is written to assure you that
Michael McCray will not be charged or tried for any crime arising out of his
conduct disclosed to this office during our investigation which resulted in the
charges reflected in Oakland Municipal case # 265771.”
Hill alleged that exhibit 38 was not disclosed prior to or during Hill’s
trial, during his direct appeal or during the pendency of his habeas petition
in the California Supreme Court despite Hill’s multiple discovery requests
and the People’s obligation to produce it even without a request. Obviously,
it also was not produced prior to the preliminary hearing, which took place in
April and May 1986.
Hill additionally alleged that the previously undisclosed evidence
included impeachment material related to many of the prosecution’s
witnesses other than McCray. Although Hill’s claims directly based on
nondisclosure of this evidence are not at issue on this appeal,11 he argues
that the trial court was required to consider his allegations and supporting
documents as part of the record on which the court based its determination
whether Hill sufficiently showed that exhibit 38 was material.

10 The letter is addressed to “Judy Brown.” We use the name and
spelling counsel provided at the preliminary hearing.
11 These claims (claim 2, subclaims H-Q) were among those denied by
the trial court as to which we denied Hill’s request for a certificate of
appealability.

17
B. Legal Proceedings
Hill filed the present petition on October 27, 2021. With the exception
of claim 2, subclaims A through G, and claim 16, the trial court denied Hill’s
claims as successive (Pen. Code, § 1509, subd. (d); In re Friend (2021)
11 Cal.5th 720) or otherwise procedurally barred (In re Miller (1941)
17 Cal.2d 734, 735 [prior petition on same grounds denied]). Subclaims A
through G of claim 2 were based on the alleged failure of the People, for over
20 years, to disclose evidence that the prosecution had agreed not to
prosecute McCray. Claim 16 alleged cumulative error.
Hill alleged that the undisclosed evidence was material impeachment
evidence, the suppression of which violated the prosecution’s obligations
under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, and that the suppressed evidence enabled
the prosecution to knowingly present false evidence in violation of Napue,
supra, 360 U.S. 264. The alleged false evidence was McCray’s testimony at
the preliminary hearing that he had not received any kind of leniency for his
statements incriminating Hill. The petition alleged that the People used this
false testimony to deceptively enable McCray to assert his privilege against
self-incrimination at trial, which in turn enabled the prosecution to introduce
McCray’s statements incriminating Hill without subjecting McCray to cross
examination.
As we will explain in greater detail, the trial court found that Hill
established two of the three requirements for a Brady violation, as exhibit 38
was “clearly impeachment material” and therefore “ ‘favorable to the
defense’ ” and it was not disclosed to the defense until long after trial. It
found Hill failed to establish a prima facie case for relief, however, because
the evidence against him at trial was “so overwhelming that the failure to
disclose the non-prosecution agreement does not undermine this court’s

18
confidence in the verdict.” As to the Napue claim, the court found Hill did not
establish a prima facie case because he failed to plead that false evidence was
presented to the jury, as the court believed was required under Napue.
Accordingly, the court denied these claims and denied claim 16 because it did
not find “any error to cumulate.”
Hill appealed and requested a certificate of appealability. We
concluded no certificate of appealability was required as to claim 2, subclaims
A-G, and claim 16 because the trial court did not deny those claims as
successive. (Pen. Code, § 1509.1, subd. (c).) Accordingly, the appeal could
proceed as to those claims. We denied the request for a certificate of
appealability as to the remaining claims in the petition.
DISCUSSION
I.
Introduction
There is quite a bit of overlap between Hill’s claims under Napue,
supra, 360 U.S. 264 and Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, as both turn on the
significance of exhibit 38. Hill contends the prosecution’s suppression of
exhibit 38 and support for what Hill sees as an invalid exercise of privilege by
McCray had two primary consequences: First, the defense was unable to
undermine McCray’s credibility with evidence that he was motivated by self-
interest to support the prosecution and, second, McCray was able to falsely
assert a constitutional privilege not to testify when in fact there was no
prospect of him being prosecuted for the offenses in which his testimony
would incriminate him. Since the prosecution expressly declined to grant
McCray immunity, McCray’s invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination made him unavailable for trial, resulting in the admission of
his statements to the police under the hearsay exception for statements

19
against penal interest and depriving the defense of the ability to subject him
to cross examination. Hill’s Napue claim centers on the prosecution’s alleged
misconduct in knowingly presenting a false picture of McCray’s potential
criminal liability. Although a Brady claim does not require proof that the
failure to disclose material favorable evidence was intentional, in this case
the alleged misconduct is part of the Brady claim as well because the
nondisclosure is what allowed the prosecution to allegedly mislead the
defense and the court.
II.
Habeas Standards
“Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally
attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy
burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove
them.” (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) “When presented with a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court must first determine whether the
petition states a prima facie case for relief—that is, whether it states facts
that, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief—and also whether the stated
claims are for any reason procedurally barred.” (People v. Romero (1994)
8 Cal.4th 728, 737; Duvall, at pp. 474-475.) “ ‘Conclusory allegations made
without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief,
let alone an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.]” (Duvall, at p. 474.) “If no
prima facie case for relief is stated, the court will summarily deny the
petition. If, however, the court finds the factual allegations, taken as true,
establish a prima facie case for relief, the court will issue an [order to show
cause].” (Id. at p. 475.) “Issuance of an [order to show cause] signifies the
court's preliminary determination that the petitioner has pleaded sufficient
facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.” (Ibid.)

20
“Our standard of review is de novo with respect to questions of law and
the application of the law to the facts. We accept as final the superior court’s
resolution of pure questions of fact if they are supported by substantial
evidence. (In re Collins (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1181.)” (In re Richards
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 948, 960.)
III.
Hill Established a Prima Facie Claim under Napue.
A. Governing Principles
Napue, supra, 360 U.S. 264, reiterated the “established” rules that “a
conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by
representatives of the State” violates due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and “[t]he same result obtains
when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears.” (Napue, at pp. 265, 269.) Napue confirmed
that this principle applies to false evidence bearing on the credibility of a
witness. (Id. at p. 269.) As the California Supreme Court has described the
governing rules, “the prosecution has the duty to correct the testimony of its
own witnesses that it knows, or should know, is false or misleading. (In re
Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 595, disapproved on other grounds in In re
Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6.)” (People v. Morrison (2004)
34 Cal.4th 698, 716-717.) “Due process also bars a prosecutor's knowing
presentation of false or misleading argument.” (Id. at p. 717.) “ ‘[A]
prosecutor’s knowing use of false evidence or argument to obtain a criminal
conviction or sentence deprives the defendant of due process.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 633.)
Relief for a Napue violation requires proof of materiality. (Panah v.
Chappell (9th Cir. 2019) 935 F.3d 657, 664.) Reversal of the conviction is

21
required if the false evidence used by the prosecution “may have had an effect
on the outcome of the trial” (Napue, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 272), meaning there
is any “ ‘reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury.’ ” (Panah, at p. 664, quoting Hayes v. Brown
(9th Cir.2005) 399 F.3d 972, 985.) This standard “generally has been equated
with the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard of Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.” (In re Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 578 . 598,
disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1991) 9 Cal.4th [535,] 545,
fn. 6 (Sassounian); United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 680, fn. 9
(Bagley) [Napue standard “is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error
standard”].) “[A] Napue claim fails if, absent the false testimony or evidence,
the petitioner still ‘received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” (Panah, at p. 664, quoting Hayes, at p. 984.)12

12 Hill accuses the People of attempting to “dumb down the
constitutional requirements of Napue and due process by referring to a
California procedural rule that permits a habeas corpus petition predicated
upon ‘[f]alse evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue
of guilt or punishment’ and ‘introduced against a person at a hearing or trial’
[§ 1473, subd. (b)(1)].” (Italics added.) According to Hill, the People then
“bootstrap[]” the “substantial materiality requirement” to statements in
Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 546, that “[f]alse evidence is
‘substantially material or probative’ if it is ‘of such significance that it may
have affected the outcome,’ in the sense that ‘with reasonable probability it
could have affected the outcome . . . .’ ”
Contrary to Hill’s description, Sassounian did not “misstate the Napue
standard for relief.” Sassounian was discussing the requirements of
section 1473, not due process. The People’s brief accurately states those
statutory requirements separately from the requirements of Napue, which
the People correctly state requires a showing that there is “ ‘a reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury.’ ”

22
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court found Hill failed to establish a prima facie case because
he did not show that McCray testified falsely or that there was a reasonable
probability the alleged false testimony could have affected the jury. As to the
latter, the court rejected Hill’s “contention that the colloquy at [Hill’s]
preliminary hearing, at which McCray invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege, constituted testimony falling within the ambit of Napue” and
concluded the jury could not have been misled by McCray’s testimony
because it never heard that testimony. In the trial court’s view, “[t]he
essence of a Napue violation is the presentation of misleading evidence to the
jury. None of the allegedly false or misleading information here was
presented to the jury.” The trial court further found that McCray’s statement
at the preliminary hearing that he did not receive any promises of leniency
“ ‘in exchange for his testimony’ ” was not “on its face false” because Hill
conceded that exhibit 38 was not an “immunity agreement.”
C. Analysis
Hill’s Napue claim is multilayered. First, he argues McCray falsely
testified at the preliminary hearing that he was not offered leniency by the
prosecution when in fact the prosecution had promised he would not be
“charged or tried” for any crimes “arising out of his conduct disclosed to [the
prosecutor’s] office” during the investigation of this case, and the prosecution
knew this testimony was false and did nothing to correct it. Next, the
prosecutor falsely represented to the trial court that McCray could be
prosecuted as an accomplice or accessory to the murders based on his
statement that he provided the gun to Hill knowing that it was to be used in
the planned robbery, which led the trial court to uphold McCray’s exercise of
his privilege against self-incrimination. The prosecutor then refused to give

23
McCray immunity, leading the trial court to find McCray unavailable and
rule that his statements to the police incriminating Hill were admissible
under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. (Evid.
Code, § 1230).
In sum, Hill argues that after knowingly presenting false evidence to
the judge at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution “leveraged the
falsehood” to secure rulings that allowed it to present McCray’s unsworn
statements to the jury at trial with the defense unable to cross examine
McCray as to the benefit he was receiving from the prosecution or any other
basis for challenging his credibility.13
1. Napue Applies to Use of False Evidence to Obtain a
Conviction, Not Solely False Testimony to a Jury.
The parties agree that the first basis of the trial court’s ruling was
erroneous, and we concur: To the extent the trial court found Hill failed to
state a Napue claim because McCray’s allegedly false testimony was
presented at the preliminary hearing rather than at trial, the court was
incorrect. Napue and the cases it discussed involved false testimony at trial,
but the principle was not limited to this context. Rather, Napue held that “a
State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to

13 Although Hill refers to the prosecution “presenting” false evidence at
the preliminary hearing, the allegedly false answers were given on direct
examination by the defense. Neither of the parties address whether the
prosecutor’s obligation to correct testimony he or she knows or should know is
false extends to testimony by a witness who initially is called by the defense
(such as here, at a preliminary hearing) but later becomes the People’s
witness at trial. Regardless, Hill alleged, and argues, that the prosecution
also “knowingly use[d] false evidence” to obtain his conviction (Napue, supra,
360 U.S. at p. 269) by supporting McCray’s claimed right to refuse to testify
at trial and using his unavailability to justify admission of his unsworn
statements to the police, untested by cross examination.

24
obtain a tainted conviction.” (Napue, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 269.) As the
People recognize, “[p]resenting false evidence to secure a conviction at any
proceeding violates the principle that a prosecutor’s interest ‘in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’
(Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88; In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th
873, 883.)”
Hill alleged that McCray falsely testified at the preliminary hearing
that he received no leniency from the prosecution in exchange for his
testimony, and exhibit 38 was a promise of leniency given in exchange for
McCray’s statements incriminating Hill. He further alleged that McCray
asserted his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer
questions about the robbery and murders despite the fact that the district
attorney’s office had promised not to prosecute him. He alleged that this
assertion of privilege allowed McCray and the People to deceptively obtain
rulings allowing the People to present McCray’s statements incriminating
Hill without McCray being subjected to cross examination. If true, these
allegations surely described prosecutorial use of false evidence to obtain a
conviction even though the jury did not hear McCray’s preliminary hearing
testimony.
2. The Trial Court Erred in Finding McCray’s Preliminary
Hearing Testimony Was Not False.
In finding McCray did not testify falsely at the preliminary hearing, the
trial court primarily addressed McCray’s denial that he was “promised any
kind of leniency by the district attorney’s office of Alameda County if you

25
would have testified in this particular case.” (Italics added.)14 The trial court
emphasized that McCray was asked whether he received any promises of
leniency “ ‘in exchange for his testimony’ ” and this phrasing was critical to
the court’s reasoning that because Hill conceded exhibit 38 was not an
immunity agreement, McCray’s denial was not false.15 California’s immunity

14 The court dismissed two other “allegedly false statements” as “[e]ven
less relevant”—McCray’s denial that he was promised leniency or immunity
by anyone from the Oakland Police Department and the question whether he
had received information from his attorneys about potential leniency, which
McCray did not answer due to his attorney’s sustained objection. Hill does
not focus on these statements in his briefing here.
The trial court did not specifically address the other response Hill
argues was false—McCray’s denial that he had “ ‘personally had any contact
with any members of the Alameda County District Attorney’s office.’ ” Our
review indicates that the exhibits to the petition support an inference that
McCray personally met with Meloling but fall short of actually demonstrating
this fact. Exhibit 42 to the petition does not appear in the record but was
described by the trial court as “a memorandum dated September 26, 1985”
advising “ ‘Department #6 Calendar Attorneys’ ” that “McCray was a witness
against [Hill],” that “Assistant District Attorney Meloling agreed to release
McCray on his own recognizance ‘after he gives a taped statement to
[Meloling] on Monday (9/[3]0)’ and that “ ‘[McCray] wants immunity before he
talks.’ ” Exhibit 43 consists of prosecutor’s notes including, in an entry dated
September 26, 1985, “He is our witness vs. Hill 187,” and, on September 30,
1985, “[McCray] O.R.’d per Bud Meloling, “[McCray] to keep in contact w/
[Officer] Medsker,” and “10/1 . . . Px vacated.” This chronology suggests that
McCray in fact met with Meloling on September 30, but does not document
that he in fact did so. As the trial court observed, “[i]t is not clear from the
record whether McCray ever actually gave the taped statement referenced in
Exhibit 42.”
15 The trial court observed that “despite what appears to be the
contemplation of a possible grant of immunity by the prosecution, the fact
that McCray invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and did not testify
against [Hill] strongly suggests that such an agreement was never
consummated.” The court was referring to exhibit 44 to the petition, a page
of district attorney notes that includes a January 14, 1986 entry saying “Also,

26
statute, section 1324, contemplates an exchange of immunity for testimony; it
“permits grants of immunity to secure testimony.” (People v. Ervin (2000)
22 Cal.4th 48, 81.) Specifically, section 1324 provides for court orders
compelling testimony, upon request of the prosecution and after a hearing,
when a witness refuses to testify on grounds of self-incrimination and is
privileged to do so but specifies that “no testimony or other information
compelled under the order or any information directly or indirectly derived
from the testimony or other information may be used against the witness in
any criminal case.” “[W]here a witness receives immunity, that witness’s
testimony is compelled and the witness no longer has a privilege against self-
incrimination.” (People v. Morgain (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)
The “in exchange for testimony” phrasing of the question McCray was
asked is similarly critical to the People’s argument that because exhibit 38
was not written to compel testimony, it would not have protected McCray
from prosecution if he had testified—in other words, exhibit 38 was not a
grant of immunity subject to section 1324. This point is demonstrated, the
People maintain, by the fact that McCray’s attorney—to whom exhibit 38 was
written—advised him to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, which
she would not have done if she understood the letter as providing immunity.
The People further argue that the promise not to prosecute could not have

per [Meloling] . . . we may give McCray immunity (under [Penal Code section]
1324).” It is clear McCray was not given official immunity pursuant to
section 1324—the prosecutor’s express refusal to give him immunity was the
basis for his assertion of privilege at trial. But we know from exhibit 38,
which refers to a “recent conversation [on the] subject,” that at some point
prior to February 1986 the prosecution did assure McCray he would not be
prosecuted.

27
been in exchange for testimony because exhibit 38 was written months after
McCray made his statements to the police.
Hill does not claim exhibit 38 was an immunity agreement; to the
contrary, he expressly states in his briefs that the letter was not an immunity
agreement and argues that “[w]hether or not it was a quid pro quo is
irrelevant.” Hill contends that a promise not to prosecute McCray for any
crimes arising from the conduct he described is nevertheless a promise of
leniency, and that McCray therefore testified falsely when he denied that he
was promised “any kind of leniency” by the prosecution.
We agree that a promise not to prosecute McCray for crimes arising
from his conduct in relation to this case—conduct the prosecutor at trial
expressly stated made McCray an aider and abettor to the offenses—cannot
be seen as anything other than some form of leniency. But this point does not
address the phrasing of the question McCray was asked. Focusing on the
literal phrasing, the People argue that McCray’s testimony was not false
because he incriminated Hill months before Meloling wrote exhibit 38 and,
therefore, not in exchange for the promise, and because McCray incriminated
Hill in statements to the police, not in testimony. (Martin v. Lizarraga
(C.D.Cal. June 2, 2017, No. EDCV 16-1702-AG(KS)) 2017 WL 6883766, at
p. *13 [preliminary hearing testimony that police made no promises in
exchange for jailhouse statements incriminating defendant not shown to be
false by post-trial statement that prosecutor made promises to induce her
testimony].) The People’s position is that McCray truthfully testified he was
not promised leniency “in exchange” for “testimony” even though he did in
fact receive leniency after incriminating Hill—he was promised he would not
be prosecuted and he was not charged with the offenses in which he
implicated himself.

28
The People’s assumption that a promise of leniency can be “in
exchange” for a witness’s incriminating statement only if the promise
precedes the statement is too narrow. Here, the prosecution would not
necessarily have been able to use McCray’s statements to the police as
evidence at trial; they were hearsay. The exhibits to the petition document
that the prosecutor wanted more from McCray than the statements he had
already given: As of about two weeks after McCray’s statements to the
police, the district attorney’s office wanted to get a statement from McCray
and McCray told his attorney he wanted immunity before he would talk. As
the trial court noted, “[i]t is not clear from the record whether McCray ever
actually gave the taped statement referenced in Exhibit 42.” There is no
apparent reason the promise not to prosecute McCray could not have been
intended to induce him to adhere to his statements in further statements or
testimony. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why else the district attorney would
have promised not to prosecute McCray.
Even if not technically false, McCray’s preliminary hearing testimony
was highly misleading, which can be sufficient basis for a Napue violation. In
U.S. v. Barham (5th Cir. 1979) 595 F.2d 231 (Barham), critical witnesses for
the government in a case in the Northern District of Alabama testified that
they had not been promised leniency or other consideration by the
prosecuting authorities in return for their testimony against Barham. (Id. at
p. 239.) In fact, they had received such promises from the prosecutor in the
Middle District of Tennessee, as documented in a letter to the prosecutor in
Barham’s case. (Ibid.) Barham stated, “The testimony heard by the jury, if
not outright lies, certainly conveyed the false impression that none of these
three witnesses had received any promises of leniency or other
considerations. And the Government, through the prosecuting attorney,

29
knew that its witnesses had conveyed to the jury something other than the
truth.” (Id. at p. 241.) Applying Napue and related cases and explaining that
proper evaluation of the witnesses was “especially important” because the
case involved two sets of witnesses, all implicated in some stage of the
charged criminal enterprise, who “presented irreconcilable stories,” Barham
reversed the judgment. (Barham, at pp. 242-243.)
Although the allegedly false testimony in the present case was not
presented to the jury, assessment of its falsity is analogous. McCray denied
that anyone from the police department promised him any kind of immunity
or leniency if he provided a statement, that the district attorney’s office
promised him any kind of leniency if he testified in this case and that he
personally had any contact with any member of the district attorney’s office.
When Hill’s attorney asked McCray whether he had received any information
through his attorneys regarding leniency with regard to potential charges in
this case, McCray was not required to answer because the trial court
sustained McCray’s attorney’s attorney-client privilege objection. Taken as a
whole, McCray’s testimony gave the impression he had not been promised or
received any form of leniency from the People in connection with this case.
(See Barham, supra, 595 F.2d at p. 241; Alcorta v. Texas (1957) 355 U.S. 28,
31 [finding due process violation where witness’s testimony, “taken as a
whole, gave the jury [a] false impression”].) This impression was supported
by McCray’s assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination in response
to all questions related to Hill and the August 1985 offenses. Yet some two
months before the preliminary hearing, McCray had been assured he would
not be prosecuted for any crimes arising from the conduct disclosed to the
prosecutor’s office during its investigation of this case. The Barham court
said of one witness’s answer to a question, that while “truthful in a narrow,

30
literal sense, its effect was to deny much more than the truth warranted.”
(Barham, at p. 241.) McCray’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was of a
similar nature.
3. The Petition Sufficiently Alleged that the Prosecution Used
False or Misleading Evidence and Argument to Obtain
Hill’s Conviction.
Hill’s Napue claim is based on allegations that the prosecution
exploited McCray’s misleading testimony and affirmatively misled the court
by supporting McCray’s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination,
refusing to give him immunity and arguing his statements to the police were
admissible due to his unavailability—all without informing the defense or the
trial court that the district attorney’s office had promised McCray he would
not be prosecuted for any crimes arising from the conduct related in his
statements. It was not solely McCray’s prerogative to claim the privilege. “It
is the duty of a court to determine the legitimacy of a witness’ reliance upon
the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-375 (1951).
A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he
simply would prefer not to give.” (Roberts v. U.S. (1980) 445 U.S. 552, 560,
fn. 7.) “As to each question to which a claim of privilege is directed, the court
must determine whether the answer to that particular question would
subject the witness to a ‘real danger’ of further crimination.” (Rogers, at
p 374.) Here, when the court at Hill’s trial upheld McCray’s assertion of the
privilege, it did not know the district attorney’s office had promised that
McCray would not be prosecuted for crimes arising from his statements about
the offenses. Defense counsel should have had the opportunity to argue the
significance of exhibit 38 with respect to McCray’s privilege against self-

31
incrimination and the court should have been able to make an informed
decision on any issues raised.
As we have said, the People make no effort to explain the purpose or
legal significance of the promise not to prosecute McCray. Although this
promise did not satisfy the requirements of the immunity statute, Hill argues
that it eliminated the basis for McCray’s exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination because McCray faced no risk of prosecution for what he would
say in trial testimony. The People assert that McCray had a right to refuse
to testify because exhibit 38 did not confer immunity and, absent
section 1324 immunity, could not have been compelled to testify. The People
do not address whether the promise made in exhibit 38 would have been
enforceable if McCray had chosen to testify in reliance on the assurance he
was given in exhibit 38.
Recognizing that exhibit 38 was not a grant of statutory immunity, we
are not convinced by the People’s argument that the district attorney’s
documented nonprosecution promise was an insufficient basis to reject
McCray’s invocation of privilege and compel him to testify. Prosecutors’
promises of immunity may be binding even if not made in compliance with
section 1324. (People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914-915; Griego v.
Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 568, 573.) “Although immunity in a
felony proceeding is usually granted by the court following application by the
prosecution (Pen. Code, § 1324), the same result is achieved where, as here,
the prosecution has obtained testimony under a promise to withhold
prosecution. (Brunner, [at pp.] 914-915 [district attorney’s promise of
immunity from prosecution in return for testimony in murder case].)”
(Griego, at p. 573 [promise of transactional immunity in exchange for
deposition testimony in sexually violent predator proceeding].) In Griego, the

32
prosecutor could not have applied for immunity under section 1324 because
the statute does not apply to the type of proceeding involved, but the “less
formal promise . . . to withhold prosecution” was nevertheless within the
prosecutor’s authority and binding. (Griego, at pp. 574-575.) In Brunner,
although the prosecutor who offered immunity in exchange for the witness’s
testimony in a murder case did not comply with section 1324, when the
witness was later indicted for that murder, the prosecution was estopped
from arguing noncompliance with section 1324. (Brunner, at p. 915 [“It
would be anomalous to permit the People, represented by the district
attorney, to argue that an earlier agreement entered into by the district
attorney was void for lack of compliance with a statute of whose existence the
district attorney must have been aware”]; see People v. Superior Court (Perry)
(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 540 [prosecutor’s offer of immunity without
complying with section 1324 enforceable after accepted or relied upon].)
A similar result may follow where an unauthorized promise of leniency
causes a witness to give up constitutional rights. People v. C.S.A. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 773 discussed federal cases holding that while law
enforcement officers do not have authority to decide whether to dismiss
criminal charges and therefore cannot make an enforceable promise to do so,
a defendant’s reliance on such a promise may be enforceable in the “narrow”
circumstance where the defendant shows “reliance of constitutional
consequence implicating due process—for example, where the defendant
gives up his right to counsel or right to not incriminate himself on the basis of
a promise to dismiss if he cooperates.” (Id. at p. 779 [promise by police
officers enforceable on due process grounds only when the defendant’s
reliance has constitutional consequence].) We are not concerned with an
unauthorized promise, as exhibit 38 was written by the assistant district

33
attorney, not a police officer. But it is reasonable to apply a similar principle
of fundamental fairness where a promise by the authorized governmental
officer, although not statutorily enforceable, causes a witness to forfeit his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
While these cases are not directly on point, they suggest a degree of
flexibility in enforcing due process standards that is not acknowledged in the
People’s arguments or the trial court’s decision. Here, it is difficult not to
view the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity to a witness it has secretly
promised not to prosecute as anything other than gaming the system.
In our view, McCray’s testimony at the preliminary hearing and the
prosecutor’s argument to the trial court at the time of trial were sufficiently
misleading to be considered false and a due process violation within the
meaning of Napue. (See Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 716, 717
[prosecution has “duty to correct the testimony of its own witnesses that it
knows, or should know, is false or misleading”; “[d]ue process also bars a
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false or misleading argument”]; Panah,
supra, 935 F.3d at p. 664 [elements of Napue claim are that “the testimony or
evidence in question must have been false or misleading[,]” “the State must
have known or should have known that it was false or misleading” and “the
testimony or evidence in question must be material”]; but cf. Towery v
Schriro (9th Cir. 2010) 641 F.3d 300, 309 (Towery).) 16 The petition alleged

16 Towery v Schriro noted that not all courts recognize misleading
evidence as false under Napue. (Towery, supra, 641 F.3d at p. 309.) Towery
observed, “There is some support for Towery’s view that accurate testimony
could be delivered in a sufficiently misleading context to make the evidence
false for Napue purposes. Compare United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389,
390 (2d Cir.1997) (recognizing that Napue applied to ‘the use of evidence that
was in part false and otherwise so misleading as to amount to falsity’), and

34
that the prosecutor used McCray’s false or misleading testimony and its own
false or misleading argument to obtain Hill’s conviction.
The trial court dismissed Hill’s petition for failure to state a prima facie
claim. At this stage, Hill was not required to prove his allegations, only to
demonstrate that a claim would be stated if the allegations were true. The
People dismiss Hill’s allegations that McCray testified falsely as conclusory
and therefore insufficient to state a prima facie case. As earlier noted, “
‘[c]onclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the
allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.’
[Citation.]” (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) But Hill did explain the
basis for his allegations that McCray’s testimony was false. Considering the
totality of Hill’s allegations and the documentation the People so belatedly
turned over, the trial court erred in finding Hill failed to establish a prima
facie case on his Napue claim on the basis that he did not show McCray
testified falsely. The remaining question is whether Hill met his burden of
showing materiality.
4. Hill Established a Prima Facie Case of Materiality.
As earlier noted, the Napue materiality standard requires reversal of a
conviction there is any “ ‘reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could

[Barham, supra,] 595 F.2d [at pp.] 240-[2]41 (holding evidence was false
when witnesses testified they had not been offered leniency by ‘any of the
attorneys’ or ‘anybody in the Northern District of Alabama,’ but had in fact
received promises from other authorities), with Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486,
517 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that ‘in order to establish a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct or denial of due process, . . . the defendant must show that the
statement in question was “indisputably false,” rather than merely
misleading.’ (quoting United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 823 (6th
Cir.1989))).”

35
have affected the judgment of the jury.’ ” (Panah, supra, 935 F.3d at p. 664,
quoting Hayes v. Brown, supra, 399 F.3d at p. 985.) This standard is
equivalent to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard for
determining whether constitutional error is prejudicial. (In re Jackson,
supra, 3 Cal.4th 578, 598; Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 680, fn. 9.) “A strict
standard is appropriate because, as the Supreme Court has explained, false
testimony cases involve not only ‘prosecutorial misconduct,’ but also ‘a
corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.’ ” (Barham,
supra, 595 F.2d at p. 242, quoting United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97,
104 (Agurs).) “[A] Napue claim fails if, absent the false testimony or
evidence, the petitioner still ‘received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” (Panah, at p. 664, quoting
Hayes at p. 984.)
a. Disclosure of Exhibit 38 Could Have Affected How the
Case Was Presented to the Jury.
The trial court did not meaningfully address materiality in the context
of Hill’s Napue claim because it concluded McCray’s testimony was not false
and was not presented to the jury. As we have discussed, the former
conclusion was erroneous at the prima facie stage of these proceedings and
the latter was based on an improperly narrow interpretation of Napue error.
Hill argues there is a reasonable likelihood the jury’s verdict could have been
affected if McCray had not falsely denied receiving leniency or the
prosecution had corrected the misimpression that McCray had a valid basis
for refusing to testify. The People, aside from asserting no false evidence was
presented to the jury, maintain that even if exhibit 38 had been disclosed,
there is no reasonable likelihood the prosecution would have granted McCray
immunity and “the trial would have proceeded exactly as it did.”

36
We disagree. We can assume it is likely McCray would have asserted
his privilege against self-incrimination even if exhibit 38 had been disclosed
and McCray had not denied being promised leniency; as it was, McCray
claimed the privilege under the advice of his attorney, who obviously knew of
exhibit 38 since she was its recipient. Nevertheless, there are multiple ways
the trial and jury’s verdict could have been affected.
As we have said, the People do not explain what appears to us the
obvious inconsistency between the prosecution’s promise not to prosecute
McCray for the crimes in which he incriminated himself and its refusal to
grant him immunity. The prosecution cannot be compelled to grant
immunity to a witness whose testimony is sought by the defense. (In re
Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 609-610.) But McCray was a prosecution
witness at trial, and the result of his assertion of privilege and the
prosecution’s refusal to grant him immunity was to allow the jury to hear his
unsworn statements to the police with no opportunity for the defense to cross
examine him. While “a defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses
against him does not supersede a witness’s constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 521; Hill, supra,
3 Cal.4th at p. 993), such a major intrusion into defense rights calls for some
degree of certainty that the privilege claim is valid. Here, the prosecutor led
the trial court to believe there was no reason to question McCray’s assertion
of privilege or the People’s denial of immunity.
The very fact that exhibit 38 was suppressed causes us to question
whether the People would have denied immunity if the defense and the court
were aware McCray had been assured he would not be prosecuted. If McCray
had been granted immunity or the court had rejected his privilege claim and
McCray testified consistent with his statements to the police, the defense

37
would have been able to challenge his credibility in multiple ways, including
questioning the details of his testimony, his self-interest in testifying for the
prosecution, and matters such as his criminal history and drug use. As we
will explain, there is at least a reasonable likelihood that undermining
McCray’s credibility could have affected the jury’s verdict notwithstanding
the other evidence against Hill.
Of course, the trial court would have upheld McCray’s claim of privilege
despite exhibit 38 if the prosecution had refused to grant immunity and the
court concluded the letter did not fully protect McCray. The trial court’s
authority to reject an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination is
limited: “[A] trial court may deny Fifth Amendment privilege only if it is
‘ “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the
case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly
have such tendency” to incriminate.’ ([Hoffman v. United States (1951)]
341 U.S. [479,] 488, italics omitted.) . . . [T]he Fifth Amendment does not
allow ‘the court to assess the likelihood of an actual prosecution in deciding
whether to permit the privilege.’ ([People v.] Seijas [(2005)] 36 Cal.4th [291,]
305; see Evid. Code, § 404.)” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
Assuming the trial court upheld the privilege despite exhibit 38 and
McCray’s statements to the police were admitted, the trial would not
necessarily have proceeded the same way. As we have said, at the actual
trial, the defense as well as the prosecution sought admission of McCray’s
self-incriminating statements, thus indicating the defense believed McCray’s
statements would “help exculpate” Hill. (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 995-
996.) But defense counsel’s calculation of risks and benefits to admission of
the statements might well have been affected by awareness of exhibit 38. In
argument to the jury, defense counsel commented that although he would

38
have liked to cross examine McCray, McCray had a right to invoke the Fifth
Amendment and that the jury was allowed to hear his statements to the
police because the law considers such self-incriminating statements
sufficiently likely to be true. Counsel questioned why McCray was not
prosecuted despite his admission of complicity as at least an aider and
abettor but told the jury this was the prosecutor’s decision and not something
for the jury to consider; indeed, defense counsel made a point of commending
the prosecutor, saying he had “not lied” or “twisted the facts” and had been
“fair.” It is doubtful counsel would have approached these issues the same
way if he had known the truth: that the district attorney’s office had assured
McCray he would not be prosecuted.
Had the defense opposed admission of McCray’s statements as
unreliable due to his self-interest or violative of Hill’s right to confrontation
in light of the assurance he would not be prosecuted, the trial court would
have been called upon to exercise its discretion as to whether the statements
should be admitted. A statement offered as against the declarant’s penal
interest may properly be excluded as “insufficiently trustworthy and
therefore unreliable.” (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1057; People
v. Smith (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 297, 304 [defendant’s girlfriend’s statement
taking responsibility for car accident long afterward unreliable due to
relationship and inconsistency with statement at time of accident].) “[T]he
rationale underlying the exception is that ‘a person’s interest against being
criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the veracity of his
statement made against that interest,’ thereby mitigating the dangers
usually associated with the admission of out-of-court statements. (People v.
Spriggs (1964) 60 Cal.2d 868, 874.)” (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698,
711.) But circumstances may show that the assumption underlying this

39
hearsay exception is unwarranted. Masters, for example, rejected the
argument that an inmate who incriminated himself in a conspiracy to murder
a correctional officer would not have done so falsely, noting that the inmate
“could have decided to provide false statements to prison officials for various
possible reasons—for example, in exchange for a benefit, to weaken the
prosecutor’s case against his fellow gang members by spreading
disinformation, or because he thought the statements would convince the
prison authorities about his desire to leave the [gang].” (Masters, at p. 1057.)
Here, there was already reason to question the reliability of McCray’s
statements in that although self-incriminatory in acknowledging McCray’s
involvement in criminal conduct, the statements were also exculpatory in
that they assigned primary blame and intent for the robbery and murders to
Hill. People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603 observed that “the entire
rationale underlying the against penal interest hearsay exception ‘breaks
down in a situation where a declarant in police custody seeks to exculpate
himself by implicating another suspect.’ (People v. Campa [(1984)] 36 Cal. 3d
[870,] 882; see also People v. Shipe [(1975)] 49 Cal. App. 3d 343,] 354
[postarrest statement admitting some complicity but ascribing greater
culpability to coparticipant lacks indicia of reliability].)” (Id. at p. 618.) In
that case, the declarant’s post-arrest statements to the police, while self-
incriminatory, “unmistakably also were ‘attempts to shift blame or curry
favor’ (Williamson v. United States [(1994)] 512 U.S. [594,] 603) with the
authorities.” (Duarte, at pp. 614-615.) There, the declarant admitted
participating in a drive-by shooting but “tended sympathetically to describe
[his] participation in the shooting . . . , to minimize his responsibility for the
injuries caused thereby and to imply that others who were or might become
implicated should bear a greater share of the responsibility.” (Id. at pp. 611-

40
613.) Since the declarant was under arrest, knew physical evidence linking
him to the crime had been found at his residence, and had been told
cooperation might help him, he “may have believed . . . he had little to lose
and perhaps something to gain by admitting his role while attempting to
minimize his participation and shift primary responsibility to others.” (Id. at
p. 617.)
Here, with spent shells and what appeared to be stolen jewelry found in
his possession, McCray had every reason to attempt to deflect responsibility
for the offenses onto Hill, thus inherently reducing the reliability of his
statements. Exhibit 38 would have further undermined any inference of
reliability. Additionally, while the letter was written subsequent to McCray’s
statements to the police, the reference in exhibit 38 to “recent discussions”
would have given the defense reason to investigate when the police and/or
district attorney’s office first discussed leniency with McCray and what
expectations he had when he gave the statements to the police on the night of
his arrest.
Moreover, knowledge that the prosecution was declining to give
McCray immunity despite having promised not to prosecute him might well
have caused the trial court to question the fundamental fairness of
permitting the jury to hear McCray’s out-of-court statements when the
defense was unable to challenge McCray’s credibility through cross
examination. In these circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood the
trial court would have exercised its discretion to exclude the statements even
if McCray was unavailable as a witness.
Finally, assuming McCray’s statements were admitted, disclosure of
exhibit 38 would have strengthened the defense’s ability to challenge the
credibility of the statements incriminating Hill as influenced by McCray’s

41
self-interest in assisting the prosecution. (Evid. Code, § 1202 [“Any other
evidence offered to attack or support the credibility of the declarant is
admissible if it would have been admissible had the declarant been a witness
at the hearing”].) McCray’s statements were strong evidence against Hill
because they provided a full narrative and motivation for the offenses; they
were convincing because McCray would not be expected to falsely incriminate
himself. While the jury at the actual trial was aware that McCray had not
been arrested and was not being prosecuted despite his admitted role in the
offenses, and this information suggested McCray must have had some reason
to believe he would be treated favorably by law enforcement, exhibit 38
proved he was in fact promised he would not be prosecuted.
b. Disclosure of Exhibit 38 Could Have Affected the Jury’s
Evaluation of the Evidence.
In the context of Hill’s Brady claim, the trial court concluded there was
not a reasonable probability of a different result if exhibit 38 had been
disclosed (the Brady standard of materiality) because the evidence against
Hill was overwhelming. The People point out that on Hill’s direct appeal, the
Supreme Court found any error in admitting McCray’s statements to the
police was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at
pp. 995-996)17 and argue this means there is no reasonable probability

17 The Supreme Court’s discussion was in the context of a claim that
admission of McCray’s statements at trial violated Hill’s constitutional rights
of confrontation and cross-examination under Bruton v. United States (1968)
391 U.S. 123, 126-127, and People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 528-530,
which concerned the principle that “ ‘[a] nontestifying codefendant’s
extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other
defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that
defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting
instruction is given.’ [Citation.]” (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 994, 995-996.)

42
further impeachment of McCray’s statements would have affected the result
at trial.18
The Supreme Court, of course, considered the question of prejudice in
light of the record at trial, without the subsequently disclosed promise not to
prosecute McCray or other previously undisclosed evidence of assistance and
rewards provided to other witnesses. The trial court considered the potential
effect of exhibit 38 on the evidence as described by the Supreme Court. Hill
argues that the trial court improperly ignored the additional evidence
discovered subsequent to trial that “devastatingly impeach[es]” many of the
prosecution witnesses other than McCray “because they all received
undisclosed monetary rewards from the County of Alameda for their
testimony, received suppressed benefits on pending criminal charges, or had
suppressed impeachment evidence on prior convictions.” The testimony of
these witnesses was critical to corroborate the evidence of McCray’s
statements because McCray was an accomplice. (§ 1111; People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 103; CALCRIM No. 334.) Hill argues the

18 The Supreme Court’s primary reason for finding any error in
admitting McCray’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was
that the defense had sought their admission: “The most telling sign of an
absence of prejudice is that [Hill] himself sought to rely on McCray’s
statements in large part, for the obvious reason that [he] thought they would
help exculpate him.” (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 995-996.) As the People
note, the court also referred to the “extensive” other evidence against Hill,
but this was in reference to finding no prejudice in admission of the two
statements that were admitted over defense objection—which the court
described as “minor exceptions” to defense counsel’s active pursuit or
acquiescence in admission of “much more extensive and arguably more
damaging portions of McCray’s statements.” (Id. at p. 996.) The court did
not comment on whether the other evidence against Hill would have been
sufficient to find admission of all the statements harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

43
trial court was required to take as true his allegations and supporting
documents concerning this impeachment evidence, which “rebrand the
‘overwhelming evidence’ as merely a prosecution predicated on overwhelming
lies involving suppressed enticements, favors, payments, and State deceit
required to bolster McCray’s lies.” The full habeas record, Hill argues,
undermines any confidence in the verdict.
The impeachment evidence related to witnesses other than McCray
was directly relevant to claims rejected in Hill’s previous habeas petitions,
and the People argue Hill has offered no authority requiring the trial court to
“reconsider all evidence in support of successive and procedurally barred
claims in making its materiality determination.” Hill’s 1998 state habeas
petition alleged claims based on the nondisclosure of impeachment evidence
related to the various prosecution witnesses; the Supreme Court denied these
claims on the merits. In the federal habeas proceedings on the amended
petition filed in 2019, the district court found portions of these claims
unexhausted because they added allegations and/or evidence not included in
the 1998 state petition. The trial court in the present case did not consider
these claims on the merits: It found them procedurally barred to the extent
they were presented in Hill’s first state habeas petition (Miller, supra,
17 Cal.2d at pp. 734, 735); to the extent they raised new claims, barred as
successive because Hill did not adequately justify his failure to raise them
earlier (In re Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 741); or, to the extent they were
based on evidence that could not have been presented earlier, barred because
they would not demonstrate actual innocence or ineligibility for the death

44
penalty. (§ 1509, subd. (d).)19 We denied Hill’s request for a certificate of
appealability as to these claims.
Hill’s claims of Brady violations based on the alleged suppression of
impeachment evidence related to prosecution witnesses other than McCray
thus are not before us. Still, the petition “incorporate[d] by reference each
and every paragraph of this Petition in each and every claim presented as if
fully set forth therein,” making the allegations pertaining to suppression of
other-witness impeachment evidence part of the Napue and Brady claims
based on suppression of exhibit 38. In analyzing the materiality element of
Hill’s Napue claim, if we consider only whether there is any reasonable
likelihood that disclosure of exhibit 38 could have affected the jury’s verdict
in light of the trial record alone, we ignore the possibility that other
suppressed impeachment evidence might have altered the jury’s view of the
evidence supplied by witnesses other than McCray.
Of course, it would not be appropriate to consider this other
impeachment evidence if the Brady claims Hill asserted based on that

19 Section 1509, subdivision (d) provides, as pertinent here: “An initial
petition which is untimely under subdivision (c) or a successive petition
whenever filed shall be dismissed unless the court finds, by the
preponderance of all available evidence, whether or not admissible at trial,
that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was
convicted or is ineligible for the sentence.”
These limitations on successive petitions “do not limit the consideration
of claims that could not reasonably have been raised earlier, such as those
based on newly available evidence or on recent changes in the law . . . .
[H]abeas corpus petitioners must make a showing of actual innocence or
death ineligibility if they seek a second chance to make an argument they
could have made earlier. No such requirement applies to the habeas corpus
petitioner who raises a newly available claim at the first opportunity.” (In re
Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 724.)

45
evidence had previously been denied for failure to establish the evidence was
not subject to Brady or was not suppressed. But this does not appear to be
the case: Since the alleged material was clearly relevant to impeachment,
and Brady applies to impeachment evidence (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at
p. 676), we infer that the Supreme Court’s denial of these claims on the
merits was due to lack of materiality. In other words, we assume the
Supreme Court concluded there was not a reasonable probability that the
additional impeachment of these other witnesses would have resulted in a
more favorable verdict for Hill. However, that conclusion was necessarily
reached on a record that included the evidence of McCray’s statements
incriminating Hill and did not address the subsequently discovered
suppression of exhibit 38. The Supreme Court did not have occasion to
consider the cumulative effect of all the improperly suppressed evidence,
including exhibit 38.

We do not revisit Hill’s Brady claims related to witnesses other than
McCray. The question before us is one of materiality: whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the false or misleading testimony and argument
related to McCray and exhibit 38 could have had an effect on the outcome of
trial. (Panah, supra, 935 F.3d at p. 664.) Materiality “must be judged in the
context of the entire record.” (Brown v. Borg (9th Cir. 1991) 951 F.2d 1011,
1016-1017; Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112.) A fair evaluation of materiality
in this context requires us to consider the effect of the Napue violation in
combination with the effects of other improperly withheld evidence that (as
we will explain) could have significantly undermined the credibility of many
of the prosecution witnesses and, therefore, the overall strength of the case

46
against Hill.”20 We conclude it is appropriate to determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that McCray’s false or misleading preliminary hearing
testimony and its use by the prosecution could have affected the jury’s verdict
in light of all the facts that would have come to light if the People had not
failed to disclose any of the impeachment evidence as Hill asserted in his
current petition.
As discussed, Hill made a prima facie showing that if exhibit 38 had
been disclosed and McCray had not testified falsely at the preliminary
hearing, there is a reasonable likelihood McCray could have testified at trial
or, if he did not, his statements to the police could have been excluded or
their credibility challenged. At minimum, exhibit 38 would have enabled the
defense to argue that McCray’s statements were motivated by extreme self-
interest, namely avoiding prosecution for committing the murder himself. If
McCray had testified, Hill argues, the defense would have been able to fully
cross examine him not only about his cooperation with law enforcement but
also about the details of his account of the charged offenses, including his
possession of the three spent shell casings and jewelry from the robbery, but
also about other matters bearing on his credibility, such as his history of
prior violent criminal acts, convictions, and drug addiction.21 In addition, the
jury would have been able to observe McCray’s “intimidating appearance and

20 The parties have cited no case law addressing this issue, and we are
aware of none.
21 Hill argues that McCray could have been impeached with the
alleged fact that he took two polygraph examinations over the course of his
police interview, failed both, and never passed a polygraph examination. He
cites no supporting documentation. We are aware that one of the transcripts
of a recorded portion of McCray’s interview refers to him having taken a
polygraph, but it says nothing about the results of that examination.

47
demeanor,” which would bear on Hill’s defense that McCray was the actual
killer and that Hill only participated at all out of fear of McCray.22
The jury did receive some evidence bearing on McCray’s credibility.
The parties stipulated that he was in federal custody for felony drug offenses
not related to the present case. The parties also stipulated that he was not
arrested or prosecuted in the present case, meaning the jury knew he had not
faced criminal liability despite telling the police he provided Hill with a gun
knowing it was to be used in a robbery. The trial court informed the jury that
McCray had been called as a witness outside the presence of the jury and, on
the advice of counsel, refused to testify based on his privilege against self-
incrimination. The jury knew that he possessed weapons and ammunition
and was willing to facilitate an armed robbery by providing Hill with a gun
for that purpose, the prosecutor acknowledged that McCray was an
accomplice, and the jury was instructed that an accomplice’s testimony
should be viewed with distrust.
Still, the ability to cross examine McCray would have allowed the
defense to pursue questions it was only able to speculate about at trial, not
least the question why McCray was not prosecuted despite significant
evidence suggesting his involvement. As we have said, while the jury’s
awareness that McCray was not being prosecuted despite the prosecutor’s
assertion that he aided and abetted the robbery and murders provided a basis
for inferring McCray must have had an interest in assisting the prosecution,

22 Hill testified at trial that McCray was about six foot three, was a
“pretty thick guy up top, big arms . . . prison buff,” with a “big chest” and “full
beard.” According to the declaration of a friend of McCray’s that was
submitted with Hill’s 1998 habeas petitions, McCray “had a reputation as a
dangerous man,” weighed 220 to 230 pounds, was over six feet tall and “was a
tough person.”

48
exhibit 38 would have established McCray’s self-interest with solid evidence.
Questioning McCray about his criminal history (including convictions for
violent offenses and major drug offenses) and possession of weapons would
have enhanced the ability of the defense to portray McCray as more likely to
have committed the murders than Hill, who the defense attempted to
characterize as a “hustler,” not a “robber or a killer.”
As the People point out, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the
evidence against Hill was overwhelming even without McCray’s statements.
Two jailhouse informants, Allen and Turner, and to a lesser extent Wilkins
and Bennett, testified that Hill admitted committing the offenses. Other
witnesses heard Hill say he was planning a robbery, saw him with a gun
before or after the offenses, and/or saw him with a large amount of jewelry
and cash afterward.
McCray’s statements, however, provided the only first-hand account of
Hill’s conduct and motivation for the offenses.23 The latter is particularly
significant. Although, the jury could have found Hill guilty of first degree
murder as an aider and abettor of the robbery even if it believed McCray was

23 Houston testified that Hill said he was going to commit the robbery
because he was tired of being broke. This motive, however, fails to account
for McCray’s providing the gun and being found in possession of the spent
shells and jewelry. McCray’s explanation that Hill needed to repay a drug
debt to him appears to better explain the evidence, as well as provide a more
compelling motivation to commit these crimes against Hill’s friend. At the
same time, McCray’s story raises questions such as why he would have
accepted a small amount of cash plus jewelry in payment of the debt when
Hill was in possession of much more cash that could have paid the debt
directly. This is the sort of question that might have raised skepticism in
jurors apprised of the fact that McCray faced no risk of prosecution for his
role in the offenses.

49
the actual killer, evidence of Hill’s intent to kill was critical to proof of the
felony-murder special circumstance that made this a capital case—a point
the defense made clear in closing argument. (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th
400, 408 [prior to 1990 expansion of § 190.2, felony-murder special
circumstance “applied only to the actual killer or to an aider and abettor who
intended to kill”].) Much of the witness testimony and other prosecution
evidence was consistent with Hill intending to participate in the robbery but
not intending that anyone be killed. McCray’s account made the robbery
Hill’s idea, motivated by his need to repay a drug debt to McCray, thereby
increasing the likelihood jurors would conclude Hill harbored an intent to
kill.24 The ability to challenge McCray’s credibility through cross-
examination was thus critical to Hill’s ability to avoid a death sentence.

24 Notably, due to changes in the law since Hill’s trial, he would

potentially be entitled to relief if the jury found he was not the actual killer
and did not intend to kill. (§ 1172.6.) Pursuant to statutory amendments by
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2019,
felony-murder liability is limited to “(1) ‘actual killer[s]’ (§ 189, subd. (e)(1));
(2) those who, ‘with the intent to kill,’ aided or abetted ‘the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree’ (id., subd. (e)(2)); and (3) ‘major
participant[s] in the underlying felony’ who ‘acted with reckless indifference
to human life’ (id., subd. (e)(3)).” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839,
868-869.) In addition, by requiring that, to be convicted of murder, a
principal in a crime must act with malice aforethought and that “[m]alice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
“eliminate[d] natural and probable consequences liability for first and second
degree murder.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849.)
Section 1172.6 provides a procedure for “those convicted of murder under
prior law to seek retroactive relief” (Wilson, at p. 869), “no matter how long
ago they were convicted, if certain conditions are met.” (People v. Duchine
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 809.) This opportunity is not unavailable even
where, as here, the felony-murder special circumstance was found true by a
jury but at a time before our high Court raised the threshold for such findings

50
Hill denied making the confessions and other statements attributed to
him and offered explanations for his possession of the jewelry and cash after
the offenses. His defense may not have been particularly credible, but it was
not inherently less credible than McCray’s account of Hill robbing and killing
a long-time friend and the friend’s young child over a $600 drug debt. Some
of the witnesses’ testimony was consistent with Hill’s story, such as the
several who described McCray coming to the house on the night of the
robbery and murders, looking for Hill saying he “wanted his shit” (Hill,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 978), which could be seen as supporting Hill’s
testimony that McCray gave him the gun and jewelry to keep for him after
the offenses. Importantly, the jury knew the police and prosecutor had
decided to charge and prosecute Hill, not McCray, for these offenses, which
would have tended to bolster McCray’s credibility in jurors’ eyes. The other
witnesses corroborated aspects of McCray’s story, providing further basis for
the jury to believe it.
However, the jury was deprived of impeachment evidence that could
have made a difference. It is true that none of the prosecution witnesses
were particularly credible: All were drug users and had criminal records or
were facing charges; there were inconsistencies between the details of various
witnesses’ accounts,25 and some of the details of the jailhouse informants’

in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522.
25 For example, Dartez did not see Hill at the house at the time
Wilkins and Houston said Hill made the comments they described about
wanting ammunition for a .38 and going to get his gun. Daniels testified
neither she nor McCray left their apartment all day on August 15, and
specifically that she did not go to the house, but Dartez testified that Daniels
came to the house 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. and then left with Hill.

51
accounts of Hill’s statements to them were inconsistent with the police
evidence.26 Defense counsel argued these points at trial and the jury
convicted Hill nonetheless. In particular, defense counsel argued that the jail
house informants’ testimony was entirely lacking in credibility, not only
because of inconsistent details but due to the obvious self-interest of these
witnesses. However, defense counsel was unable to make the same point
with respect to the other prosecution witnesses because counsel did not know
about the monetary and other assistance they had been promised or had
received from the prosecution. If the jury had known McCray avoided
prosecution for the murder through the quid pro quo of testifying against
Hill, it likely would have viewed McCray’s statements with greater
skepticism. Further, to the extent other witnesses corroborated McCray’s
story, the jury would likewise have been more skeptical of their testimony if
it had known they were offered or provided leniency and/or money for their
testimony.
For example, Houston acknowledged at trial that she was at that time
in custody on a violation of probation for a December 1985 conviction of
selling cocaine, and that around the time of the offenses she got high multiple
times a day. According to Hill’s allegations and supporting documentation,
however, the prosecution failed to disclose that prior to Houston testifying at
trial, the prosecutor told her he would “do what he could to help resolve” her

26 As earlier noted, Allen’s testimony that Hill told him “ ‘there was

blood all over the counter’ at the jewelry store” was contradicted by a police
officer’s testimony that no blood was found on the counter. (Hill, supra,
3 Cal.4th at p. 976.) Turner testified that Hill told him he used a .357
magnum in committing the offenses, which was the type of weapon Turner
said Hill had previously tried to sell him, but the evidence showed the
murders were committed with a .38-caliber gun.

52
pending legal problems; she was told, “ ‘if “you help us and we’ll help you,” ’ ”
and, at the time she testified, she “believed that she had been assisted by the
prosecutor” with arrests for “vehicle tampering or vehicle theft” and for
“possession of drug paraphernalia.” Shortly after Houston testified,
misdemeanor theft charges against her were dismissed on the prosecutor’s
motion, and, although the probation department wanted her to serve jail
time, the prosecutor obtained her release from custody and termination of her
probation.
Similarly, Hill alleged that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence of
Dartez’s criminal history and favorable treatment he received from the
prosecutor in Hill’s case. According to Hill’s allegations, on September 14,
1987, two days before testifying at Hill’s trial, Dartez was arrested in San
Francisco on charges of possession of cocaine for sale and felon in possession
of a gun. At that time, Dartez was on probation for a 1986 Alameda County
conviction of possession of a controlled substance and had recently served
about a month in jail on a probation revocation. Hill alleged (based on a
declaration Dartez gave in 1996) that the prosecutor in his case personally
picked Dartez up from the San Francisco Police Department and brought him
back to Alameda County to testify at trial, that Dartez believed at the time
he testified that the prosecutor had intervened to get him out of jail, and that
Dartez was released from custody after he testified. The record reflects that
Dartez was released on his own recognizance on September 16 due to the
subpoena to testify in Hill’s trial, and he testified on that date. His case was
continued to January 1988, at which time the case was dismissed.
Hill also alleged that the prosecution failed to disclose that it dismissed
criminal charges against Smith, Wilkins and Daniels. Smith had been
granted diversion in August 1984. When she testified at the preliminary

53
hearing in April 1986, Smith admitted using cocaine on August 15, 1985, and
heroin on Easter Sunday, which were violations of diversion. In July 1986,
the probation department recommended that diversion be terminated and
criminal proceedings re-initiated due to Smith’s failure to maintain contact
with the probation officer and a new arrest for unlawful use of a controlled
substance. Diversion was terminated and charges reinstated, but in
August 1986 the case was dismissed, apparently in connection with a
negotiated disposition in the new case.
In July 1987 (two months before Hill’s trial), Wilkins was charged with
possession of heroin and released on his own recognizance. Wilkins told
Smith to contact the prosecutor and on July 30 the charges were dismissed on
the prosecutor’s motion. When Wilkins testified at Hill’s trial, he believed he
had been released from jail due to Smith’s contact with the prosecutor and
that the case against him had been dismissed due to his cooperation in the
Hill case. According to a private investigator’s notes regarding an interview
with Wilkins in 1992, Wilkins said he had been arrested days before he was
due to testify and he believed he was released because he could not testify if
he was in jail.
Daniels was arrested for possession of narcotics on August 7, 1987, and
charged on August 11, then on August 12 the charges were dismissed for
insufficient evidence. Hill alleged the dismissal was “suspect” because the
arrest report stated that the arresting officer saw Daniels drop from her
clenched right hand a clear zip-lock plastic bag containing a white rock object
which the officer picked up and suspected to be rock cocaine.
In sum, in addition to the undisclosed promise not to prosecute
McCray, Hill alleged that the prosecution failed to disclose that all of the
witnesses who testified that he referred to plans for a robbery (Houston,

54
Dartez, Daniels) and/or that they saw him with a gun and/or jewelry and
cash on the day of the offenses (Houston, Dartez, Smith, Wilkins) received
some form of lenience from the prosecutor around the time they testified at
the preliminary hearing or at trial, including dismissed criminal charges
(Houston, Dartez, Wilkins, Smith, Daniels) and/or release from custody
(Dartez, Wilkins). Also unbeknownst to the defense or jury, each of these
witnesses received reward money subsequent to trial in amounts based on
information provided by the prosecutor as to their contributions to the case
and, it appears, reflecting the extent and specificity of their incrimination of
Hill.27
Promises or expectations of favorable treatment may give witnesses’ “a
direct, personal stake in [the defendant’s] conviction” and “incentive to testify
falsely in order to secure a conviction.” (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 683;
Napue, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 270 [jury apprised of fact that prosecutor offered
witness consideration for testimony “might well have concluded that [the
witness] had fabricated testimony in order to curry the favor of the
[prosecutor]”].) Just as McCray’s credibility would have been further
undermined by exhibit 38, the previously undisclosed evidence that most of
the prosecution witnesses received some form of leniency or assistance from
the prosecution, as well as monetary rewards for providing information in the
case, would have undermined their credibility beyond the impeachment

27 As earlier indicated, the largest sums went to the witnesses who
most concretely tied Hill to the offenses: $1,500 to Bennett and $500 each to
Allen and Turner, all of whom related Hill having confessed the robbery and
murders; $400 each to Wilkins (who testified that Hill said he had robbed a
jewelry store and killed someone) and Houston (who testified that Hill said
he was going to commit a robbery at the location of Brice’s jewelry store),
$350 to Daniels and $300 each to Smith and Dartez.

55
available to the defense at trial. Even if the effect of exhibit 38 would not
have been sufficient to overcome all the other evidence against Hill as
presented at trial, the combined effect of evidence that almost all of the
prosecution witnesses had personal interests in assisting the prosecution
would have significantly changed the appearance of the prosecution’s case.
In these circumstances, we can only conclude there is a reasonable likelihood
that disclosure of exhibit 38 and the absence of false or misleading testimony
and argument concerning McCray’s treatment by the prosecution could have
affected the jury’s verdict. Hill’s allegations, taken as true, make it
impossible to conclude that despite the People’s use of false evidence, Hill
“still ‘received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy
of confidence.’ ” (Panah, supra, 935 F.3d at p. 664, quoting Hayes, supra,
399 F.3d at p. 984.) Accordingly, Hill established a prima facie case of
materiality.
IV.
Hill Established a Prima Facie Claim Under Brady.
A. Governing Principles
“In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ (Brady, supra,
373 U.S. at p. 87.) The high court has since held that the duty to disclose
such evidence exists even though there has been no request by the accused
([Agurs, supra,] 427 U.S. [at p.] 107), that the duty encompasses
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence ([Bagley, supra,]
473 U.S. [at p.] 676), and that the duty extends even to evidence known only
to police investigators and not to the prosecutor (Kyles v. Whitley (1995)

56
514 U.S. 419, 438.) Such evidence is material ‘ “if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” ’ (Id. at p. 433.)” (People v.
Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042.)
“ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence
at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’
(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281-282.) Prejudice, in this context,
focuses on ‘the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.’
([Agurs], supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112, fn. 20; accord, U.S. v. Fallon (7th
Cir.2003) 348 F.3d 248, 252.) Materiality, in turn, requires more than a
showing that the suppressed evidence would have been admissible (cf. Wood
v. Bartholomew (1995) 516 U.S. 1, 2), that the absence of the suppressed
evidence made conviction ‘more likely’ (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 289),
or that using the suppressed evidence to discredit a witness's testimony
‘might have changed the outcome of the trial’ (ibid.). A defendant instead
‘must show a “reasonable probability of a different result.” ’ (Banks v. Dretke
(2004) 540 U.S. 668, 699.)” (People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1043.)
“ ‘The requisite “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to
“undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome” on the part of the reviewing court.’
([Sassounian, supra,] 9 Cal.4th [at p.] 544.)” (Id. at p. 1050.)
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court found that Hill met the first two requirements for a
Brady violation in that exhibit 38 was “clearly impeachment material as to
McCray and therefore ‘favorable to the defense” and “the People do not
appear to contest that the agreement was not disclosed to the defense until

57
2007.” The court found Hill did not establish a prima facie case, however,
because the evidence against him at trial was “so overwhelming that the
failure to disclose the non-prosecution agreement does not undermine this
court’s confidence in the verdict.” The court found there was not “a
‘reasonable probability that, had [the suppressed non-prosecution agreement
of McCray] been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have been
different’ ([Bagley], supra, 473 U.S. at 682)” or “that the withheld evidence
‘put[s] the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in
the verdict.’) (Kyles v. Whitley [(1995)] 514 U.S. [419,] 435.)”
The court additionally stated that it was “hardly clear” disclosure of the
non-prosecution letter “would have altered the course of [Hill’s] trial in any
way.” The court stated, “The prosecution’s express opposition to a grant of
immunity for McCray despite the existence of the non-prosecution agreement
is strong evidence that the agreement did not confer immunity, and it is
difficult to see how disclosure of that document to the defense would have
altered the prosecution’s position in that regard. Put another way, it is
reasonable to conclude that whether or not the document had been disclosed
to the defense, the prosecution would have opposed immunity, McCray would
have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, and the trial would have
proceeded in the same fashion as it did.”
C. Analysis
Hill contends the trial court applied the wrong standard for
determining materiality under Brady and, as with his Napue claim, erred in
evaluating materiality based solely on the trial record and in finding he failed
to make a prima facie case. As our discussion of the Napue claim should
make evident, we agree with Hill that materiality must be assessed based in
light of all the facts alleged as part of Hill’s Brady claim, not limited to the

58
trial record and we disagree with the reasoning the trial court expressed in
finding Hill failed to show that disclosure of exhibit 38 would have affected
the course of Hill’s trial. We are not persuaded by Hill’s argument that the
trial court applied the wrong standard for determining Brady materiality, but
we nonetheless disagree with the court’s conclusion that he failed to make a
prima facie case of materiality.
1. Brady Materiality Standard
Hill contends the trial court erroneously applied the materiality
standard stated in Bagley, asking whether there was a “ ‘ “reasonable
probability” ’ ” the result “ ‘ “would have been different” ’ ” if exhibit 38 had
been disclosed. He maintains the court should have applied the standard set
forth in Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. 97, which Hill describes by quoting the Agurs
court’s statement that “[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant
request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.” (Id.
at p. 106.)
Agurs described three situations involving prosecutors’ nondisclosure of
evidence favorable to the defense, with differing materiality standards:
Materiality is easiest for the defense to demonstrate where the prosecution
knowingly uses perjured testimony or fails to disclose that false evidence was
used to obtain the conviction; most difficult for the defense when the defense
did not request disclosure or made only a general request; and somewhere in
between when the prosecution failed to respond to a specific request. (Agurs,
supra, 427 U.S. at pp. 103-107, 111-113.)28 The Court pointed to Brady as

28 Agurs explained that where a prosecutor knowingly uses perjured
testimony or fails to disclose that false evidence was used to obtain the
conviction, the conviction “ ‘must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the

59
illustrating the “pretrial request for specific evidence” situation. (Agurs, at
p. 104.)
Bagley discussed the three situations described in Agurs and the
Court’s subsequent reformulation of “the Agurs standard for the materiality
of undisclosed evidence” in cases outside the Brady context and held that a
single materiality test is “sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’
‘general request,’ and ‘specific request’ cases of prosecutorial failure to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused.” (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at
pp. 681, 682.) Contrary to the distinctions drawn in Agurs, in all three of
these situations the evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Bagley, at
p. 683.)29

jury.’ ” (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678, quoting Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at
p. 103.) This standard “is equivalent to the Chapman [v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18] harmless-error standard.” (Bagley, at p. 679, fn. 9.) Where
there is no defense request or only a general one, as was the case in Agurs,
the standard of materiality is “stricter than the harmless-error standard but
more lenient to the defense than the newly-discovered-evidence standard.”
(Bagley, at p. 681; Agurs, at pp. 111-112.) Where the prosecution fails to
disclose evidence responsive to a specific request from the defense, the Agurs
court “did not define the standard of materiality” applicable “but suggested
that the standard might be more lenient to the defense than in the situation
in which the defense makes no request or only a general request” and noted
that “ ‘[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the
failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.’ ” (Bagley, at
p. 681, quoting Agurs, at p. 106.)
29 Hill quotes the Bagley court’s discussion of the significance of the

prosecution’s failure to respond to a specific discovery request but fails to
acknowledge the court’s conclusion that this situation does not require a

60
Hill argues that Bagley “applies to very narrow factual circumstances”
and the “general Brady standard,” as set forth in Wearry v. Cain (2016) 577
U.S. 385 (Wearry), is “the same Brady materiality standard used in
Napue/Mooney/Giglio—is there any reasonable likelihood that it could have
affected the judgment of the jury?”30 He urges that “ ‘[l]ikelihood’ and ‘could
have’ make the threshold for relief near nil, and the threshold for prima facie
case review lesser yet.”
We are aware of no basis for viewing the Bagley standard of materiality
as narrowly applicable only to the facts of that case. To the contrary, Bagley
is commonly cited as stating the proper standard for assessing materiality of
Brady material. (E.g., Turner v. U.S. (2017) 582 U.S. 313, 324 (Turner);
Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 (Kyles).) Although Wearry

different standard of materiality. (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 682-683.)
Responding to the Government’s suggestion “that a materiality standard
more favorable to the defendant reasonably might be adopted in specific
request cases,” Bagley agreed that “an incomplete response to a specific
request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but also has the
effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist,” which
might cause the defense to “abandon lines of independent investigation,
defenses, or trial strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.” (Id. at
p. 682.) But the Court concluded: “This possibility of impairment does not
necessitate a different standard of materiality, however, for under the
Strickland formulation the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse
effect that the prosecutor’s failure to respond might have had on the
preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case. The reviewing court
should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of
the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of
reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the
trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s
incomplete response.” (Id. at p. 683.)
30 Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 U.S. 103, Giglio v. U.S. (1972)
405 U.S. 150.

61
initially recited the Napue formulation to describe when Brady evidence is
“material,” the Court went on to state—consistent with Bagley, supra,
473 U.S. at p. 682—that the defendant “must show only that the new
evidence is sufficient to ‘undermine confidence’ in the verdict.” (Wearry,
supra, 577 U.S. at p. 392.) Since Wearry, the Court has applied the test for
Brady materiality as stated in Bagley. (Turner, at p. 324.) As some federal
courts have observed, Wearry was a per curiam summary reversal decided
without oral argument—an unlikely context for the Court to change the long-
standing materiality standard for Brady evidence. (Juniper v. Davis (4th Cir.
2023) 74 F.4th 196, 212, fn. 14; Prystash v. Davis (5th Cir. 2017) 854 F.3d
830, 838, fn. 6; see U.S. v. Ausby (D.C.Cir. 2019) 916 F.3d 1089, 1093, fn.1
[noting distinction between Napue and Brady materiality after Wearry].)31
Hill’s attempt to lessen the standard of materiality applicable to a Brady
violation by incorporating Napue’s false evidence standard is not persuasive.
2. Hill Made a Sufficient Prima Facie Showing of Materiality.
We concluded above, under the Napue materiality standard, that Hill
made a prima facie case by showing a reasonable likelihood the prosecution’s

31 United States v. Ausby explained that although the Supreme Court in

Wearry “may have implied” that it viewed the Napue and Brady standards as
“equivalent” by “cit[ing] the Napue standard when discussing a Brady claim,”
“Wearry was a per curiam, unargued decision ‘without full briefing’ that
made only a passing reference to the standards in question and did not
provide clear guidance on this point. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 392 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). ‘That procedural posture is not one in which we would expect the
Supreme Court to change the standard for an important issue like Brady
materiality.’ Prystash [v. Davis, supra,] 854 F.3d at [p.] 838[,] n.6. And in
post-Wearry decisions, the Supreme Court . . . [has] continued to describe the
Brady standard in the traditional way. E.g., [Turner, supra,] 582 U.S. [at p.]
324 . . . . Accordingly, we continue to understand the Brady and Napue
standards as distinct.” (Juniper v. Davis, supra, 74 F.4th at p. 212, fn. 14.)

62
failure to disclose exhibit 38 and use of false or misleading evidence and
argument could have affected the way the case was presented to the jury and
the jury’s evaluation of the evidence. Hill’s Brady claim requires us to
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the result at trial
would have been different if exhibit 38 had been disclosed. Although this is a
more difficult standard for Hill to meet, for the same reasons earlier
discussed, we conclude his showing was sufficient to make a prima facie case.
Materiality, for Brady purposes, “does not require demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have
resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal.” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at
p. 434.) “The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than
not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict
worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is
accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression
‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Bagley,
supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678.)
As we have explained, the suppression of exhibit 38 allowed McCray to
deny having received leniency from the prosecution and to exercise his
privilege against incrimination and allowed the prosecution to, in effect,
create McCray’s unavailability by declining to give him immunity and then
present McCray’s statements incriminating Hill with no opportunity for the
defense to cross examine McCray. We will not reiterate our discussion above
of the various ways the trial could have proceeded and potential impact of
undermining McCray’s credibility as well as the credibility of almost all the
other prosecution witnesses with the previously suppressed evidence of
leniency, assistance and rewards they received. Ultimately, taking the

63
allegations of the petition as true, the probability that disclosure of
exhibit 38, considered along with the suppressed evidence of the self-interest
and bias of so many of the other prosecution witnesses, is sufficient to “put
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435.) Accordingly, Hill established a
prima facie case of materiality, and his Brady claim should have been
allowed to proceed.32
DISPOSITION
The order denying subclaims A-G of claim 2 of the petition for habeas
corpus for failure to state a prima facie case for relief is reversed, as is the
denial of claim 16. The matter is remanded with directions to issue an order
to show cause.

32The trial court did not separately address claim 16 of the petition,
cumulative error, because it found no error to cumulate. Given our
determination that Hill stated a prima facie case for relief on his Napue and
Brady claims, we reverse the trial court’s order as to claim 16 as well.

64
STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

In re Hill (A166191)

65
Filed 8/29/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

A166191

(Alameda County
In re MICHAEL S. HILL, Super. Ct. No. HC846751)
on Habeas Corpus.
ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND
CERTIFYING OPINION
FOR PUBLICATION [NO
CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

It is ordered that the opinion filed August 2, 2024, be modified as
follows:
On page 22, delete footnote 12 in its entirety. There is no change in
judgment.

Further, the opinion in the above-entitled matter filed August 2, 2024,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause and
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105, it now appears that the
opinion should be published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

Dated: ________________________ ________________________________

1
Trial Court:Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Morris Jacobson

Counsel:

McBreen & Senior, David A. Senior, Sara M. Cohbra, and Ann K. Tria, for
Petitioner.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorney General, Alice B.
Lustre, Jill M. Thayer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

2

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