CourtListener 10098127•People v. White CA1/5
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Filed 8/28/24 P. v. White CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
A168970
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa Super. Ct.
No.05-981964-0)
JERRY WHITE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jerry White appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition
for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75. White contends
that the court abused its discretion under People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) in declining to dismiss White’s five prior
strike convictions. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History2
In December 1998, the People filed a felony information charging White
with: (1) assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c);
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
2 We grant the People’s unopposed request for judicial notice.
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counts one ― three); (2) taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count
four); (3) evading a police officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2; count five); (4) second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b); count
six); (5) receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count seven); and (6)
possessing ammunition as a convicted felon (former § 12316, subd. (b)(1);
count eight). The information further alleged that White had five prior strike
convictions3 (§ 667, subds. (b)―(i)) and a prior conviction for taking a vehicle
(§ 666.5, subd. (a)), and previously served a prison term (former § 667.5, subd.
(b)).
In June 1999, a jury found White not guilty as to one of the counts of
assault with a deadly weapon but guilty as to all remaining counts. The trial
court found the enhancement allegations to be true. At sentencing, White
asked the court to exercise its discretion under Romero and dismiss his five
prior strike convictions. The court declined to do so with respect to White’s
convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and evading while driving
recklessly (counts one, three, and five) but dismissed four of the five prior
strikes with respect to his convictions for taking a vehicle, burglary, and
receiving stolen property (counts four, six, and seven). The court sentenced
White to 34 years to life in prison, which included a one-year enhancement
for his prior prison term under former section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In August 2023, White petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.75. In his petition, he requested that the trial court strike his one-year
prison prior as required by section 1172.75 and renewed his Romero motion.
White cited to his youth, abusive upbringing, drug addiction, and mental
3 The prior strike convictions were for a series of first degree burglaries
White committed over several weeks in 1992 when he was 18 or 19 years old.
He was 23 years old when he committed the offenses at issue here.
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illness as mitigating factors in support of the dismissal of his prior strikes.
The prosecution conceded that the one-year prison prior should be stricken
but argued that there had been no change in the law or facts since White was
originally sentenced that justified the dismissal of his prior strikes. The
court agreed and denied the Romero motion. It then struck the one-year
prison prior, ran count four concurrent with counts six and seven, and
resentenced White to 25 years to life in prison.
B. Facts
We adopt the pertinent portions of the factual summary from our
unpublished opinion that affirmed White’s convictions on direct appeal.
(People v. White (Feb. 8, 2001, A088555) [nonpub. opn.].) The parties do not
dispute the accuracy of this summary.
“On the evening of June 22, 1997, or the morning of June 23, 1997,
[White] burglarized [a church] by prying open the front door. He stole a
telephone calling card, business cards, and church keys. On the morning of
June 23, 1997 . . . he stole a red Camaro in the church parking lot from Karen
Nilson, who had parked while she was dropping her children off at the school
next to the church. [White] stole $800 in cash, Nilson’s identification and
bank cards, and a cellular phone that were all inside Nilson’s Camaro.
“About 12 hours later . . . Martinez Police Officer Roger Ray sighted the
stolen Camaro . . . Officer Ray activated his lights and siren and pursued the
stolen vehicle. [White], who was driving the stolen car, fled at high speed
through a residential area, with the tires squealing and the body of the car
fishtailing, until he entered a dead end or cul de sac. Ray notified other
officers by radio that [White] had entered a dead end street and that he
would probably try to flee on foot. Ray parked his patrol car so as to block
[White] from leaving, and got out of the car to pursue [White] on foot.
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“[White] suddenly put the Camaro into reverse, turning the vehicle so
that it faced the officer. Making eye contact with Ray, [White] then
accelerated towards the officer at a high rate of speed. The Camaro hit the
door of Ray’s vehicle and then struck Ray himself, throwing him over the
hood and windshield and rolling him down the street. Ray used his police
radio to report his injuries and call for an ambulance. [¶] . . . [¶] Ray’s radio
reports were heard by two other officers, Steven Gaul and Frank Ferrari.
Gaul and Ferrari proceeded toward the scene, and saw the fleeing Camaro
near the intersection of Andrews Drive and Ulfinian. The Camaro headed
straight up Andrews Drive towards the officers’ car, as if [White] intended to
ram them. Suddenly [White] swerved the vehicle away onto Ulfinian,
colliding with a parked car and becoming temporarily stuck or entangled
with the parked car.
“Officer Gaul drove the patrol car up to [White]. Ferrari exited the
vehicle with his gun drawn, and ordered [White] out of the Camaro. [White]
did not obey, but instead continued revving the car’s engine, trying to break
free. As Gaul opened his drivers-side door and began to step out, [White]
succeeded in freeing the Camaro from the parked car with which it had
become entangled. The stolen vehicle then smashed into the officers’ patrol
car, trapping Gaul’s leg between the driver’s door and the car itself. It then
headed straight for Ferrari, but the officer managed to jump out of the way.
Both officers fired shots, but [White] escaped again.
“The chase continued with Gaul in one car, Ray rejoining the pursuit,
and Sergeant Brown pursuing in yet another vehicle. [White] managed to
drive onto Highway 680, where he weaved in and out of traffic at about 90
miles per hour. He then turned onto Highway 4 heading the wrong way,
forcing cars to veer off in both directions to avoid hitting the Camaro.
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“[White] abruptly left the highway, eventually crashing into Ray’s
patrol car and the fence of a residence at Beechwood and Elderwood. Ray,
joined by Officer Butler, approached the Camaro with guns drawn and
succeeded in placing [White] in custody, recovering a wallet from his person.”
(People v. White, supra, A088555.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“California’s ‘Three Strikes’ law applies to a criminal defendant who is
currently charged and convicted of a felony and who has previously been
convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies.” (In re Coley (2012) 55
Cal.4th 524, 528.) The trial court may, either on its own motion or on
application of the parties, dismiss a prior felony conviction allegation under
the Three Strikes law “in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.)
“A [trial] court’s discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations
in furtherance of justice is limited.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.)
The court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances
of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions,
and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the [Three Strikes law’s] spirit, in whole
or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
We review the trial court’s failure to dismiss a prior strike conviction
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376
(Carmony).) Because the Three Strikes law “carefully circumscribes the trial
court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly
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justify its decision to do so . . . the law creates a strong presumption that any
sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and
proper.” (Id. at p. 378.) As such, “a trial court will only abuse its discretion
in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances.” (Ibid.) Indeed, “[b]ecause the circumstances must be
‘extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside
the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits
a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of
which the law was meant to attack’ [citation], the circumstances where no
reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of
the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion.
White contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not
dismissing his prior strikes because there were several compelling
mitigating factors. These included White’s youth at the time of the prior
strikes, his mental condition, his childhood trauma, as well as his post-
conviction conduct in prison. There is nothing in the record, however, to
suggest that the court failed to consider these mitigating factors or that it
otherwise abused its discretion.
At White’s sentencing in 1999, the trial court declined to dismiss his
prior strikes with respect to counts one, three, and five, because White “has
five prior convictions for first degree burglary. He has a continuous criminal
record since the age of 16. There was a callous disregard for human life in
committing these crimes.” The court also noted that White had “engineered
an escape and attempted an escape.”
At the resentencing hearing in 2023, the trial court acknowledged that
it was “not bound” by the 1999 decision but that it would still take the
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decision into account in resentencing White. The court emphasized that
White had acquired several strikes simultaneously and that it did not “see
new facts that merit a dismissal of the strikes.” The court acknowledged
that White “has had an incredibly difficult life” but concluded that “there
isn’t enough information that’s come before me of recent changes to adjust
the public safety analysis that was inherent to the original sentence and is
inherent in my decision now.”
The trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the Romero
motion. Although White was 18 or 19 years old at the time of his prior
strikes, they were for five first degree burglaries that he committed in the
span of less than a month. Just four years later, he committed the subject
offenses, which involved assaulting two police officers while driving
recklessly in a stolen vehicle and endangering public safety while he
attempted to flee. The court considered mitigating factors such as White’s
youth, abusive upbringing, history of addiction, and mental illness and
reasonably concluded that these factors did not justify the dismissal of the
prior strikes. This was proper in light of the number of prior strikes as well
as the reckless and violent nature of the subject offense, notwithstanding the
“new scientific evidence” regarding young adult brain development that
White cites.
White’s reliance on People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 is
unavailing. There, the Court of Appeal found an abuse of discretion because
the trial court mistakenly believed that it could not consider certain
mitigating factors that were relevant, including the remoteness of the prior
strikes and the defendant’s youth when he committed the prior strikes. (Id.
at pp. 1141―1142.) That is not the case here, as the trial court considered
relevant mitigating factors such as White’s youth and background at
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resentencing. And in considering these factors, the court had broad
discretion to determine whether extraordinary circumstances exist such that
a “criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme.” (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
White further contends that dismissal is warranted based on his
postconviction conduct in prison, which precluded the trial court from
finding by clear and convincing evidence that a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) He relies on section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(3).4 But that subdivision does not help White.
We initially note that in accordance with section 1172.75, subdivision
(d)(1), resentencing did result in a lesser sentence than the sentence
originally imposed, as White’s sentence was reduced from 34 years to life to
25 years to life. There is no requirement, contrary to White’s argument, that
resentencing under section 1172.75 result in a determinate sentence.
Similarly, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) does not support a lower
sentence. That subdivision provides that the trial court “may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record
and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence
that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if
any, have reduced the defendant’s risk of future violence, and evidence that
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
At resentencing, the trial court expressly considered many of the
postconviction factors identified in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3),
4 To the extent White relies on section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), we do
not consider this argument because as we held in People v. Olay (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 60, 62, “the term ‘enhancement’ in section 1385, subdivision (c)
does not include prior strikes.”
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including White’s current age and his participation in programs and mental
health treatment. Nonetheless, White argues that the court should have
found that he would not be a danger to public safety due to his declining
health and use of a wheelchair. However, in 2021, White fought with
another inmate and punched him in the face. In 2022, he used part of his
bed to break the glass window of his cell door. In 2023, White used parts of
his wheelchair to damage his cell window. Given these recent acts of
violence, the nature of White’s current offenses, and his extensive criminal
history, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there were no
new facts that warranted “adjust[ing] the public safety analysis that was
inherent to the original sentence.”
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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CHOU, J.
WE CONCUR.
JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
People v. White (A168970N)
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