Xiong v. Chen CA2/4

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Filed 8/28/24 Xiong v. Chen CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JIAN XIONG, B332644

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV12214)
v.

NING CHEN,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
The Green Firm and Noah Green, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
Plaintiff Jian Xiong appeals from the dismissal of his
action. Plaintiff requested entry of default judgment against
defendant Ning Chen. The trial court denied plaintiff’s request
and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff contends the
dismissal was error, and we agree. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant
alleging that on or about November 9, 2018, plaintiff agreed
verbally and in writing to “lend” money to defendant and another
individual for their business and “thereafter do business as
partners.” Between November 9, 2018, and August 5, 2019,
plaintiff allegedly “invested” a total of approximately
$1,503,030.30 in the business. Plaintiff claimed defendant
guaranteed she would repay plaintiff the “principal on all
investments within four years, plus 7 [percent] to 8 [percent]
interest.” Plaintiff allegedly also made a personal loan to
defendant for approximately $75,757.58. As of the filing of the
complaint, defendant purportedly was “in default, with an
outstanding balance of principal and interest totaling . . .
$1,596,969.70.”
Defendant filed an answer to the complaint in October
2022. After her counsel withdrew, defendant’s answer was
stricken because she failed to appear for multiple hearings and
comply with court orders. Consequently, the trial court entered
defendant’s default in February 2023. The court then ordered
plaintiff to file a default judgment package by April 10, 2023, and
lodge a courtesy copy with the court. An “Order to Show Cause
Re: Default Judgment” (the “OSC”) was set for April 18, 2023.

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On April 10, 2023, plaintiff filed a request for entry of a
default judgment. However, because plaintiff did not lodge a
courtesy copy with the trial court, the OSC was continued to
June 6, 2023.
In early June 2023, plaintiff filed another request for entry
of a default judgment with new declarations and exhibits. At the
continued June 6, 2023, hearing, the trial court conferred with
counsel “regarding the investments and loans.” According to the
court, it “spent quite a bit of time” with counsel “detailing all the
problems” with plaintiff’s evidence. Pursuant to plaintiff’s
request, the OSC was continued to July 12, 2023. The court
stated in its minute order it would be the “LAST AND FINAL
CONTINUANCE” and ordered plaintiff to “file a declaration with
proper competent evidence” by July 6, 2023.
On July 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a supplemental
memorandum of points and authorities and an additional
declaration. Plaintiff did not appear at the July 12, 2023, OSC.
The trial court found “substantial problems” with plaintiff’s
evidence and denied the request for entry of default judgment.
The court indicated it would issue a separate written order to
explain its ruling.
Two days later, the trial court issued the written order.
After identifying numerous defects in plaintiff’s evidence, the
court stated: “[O]n this record, it would not be appropriate to
have a fourth hearing in this case. Had this been a trial or other
contested hearing, plaintiff would have had but one opportunity
to make his case. Yet another hearing would just cause more
delays and congestion in this [c]ourt.” The court ordered the case
dismissed with prejudice.

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Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the order.
Plaintiff’s counsel appeared at the hearing, stated a calendaring
error had caused him to miss the prior hearing, and offered to
have plaintiff testify orally in support of his request for entry of a
default judgment. The trial court stated it was not having an
evidentiary hearing and denied the motion.
Plaintiff timely appealed from the order dismissing the
action with prejudice.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by dismissing the
action with prejudice. We agree.
“In the absence of express statutory authority, a trial court
may, under certain circumstances, invoke its limited, inherent
discretionary power to dismiss claims with prejudice.” (Lyons v.
Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911, 915 (Lyons).) Prior to a court
dismissing a case because of the actions or inactions of litigants,
“[a]t a minimum, such requirements include notice to the
plaintiff of a[n] . . . intent to dismiss and an opportunity for
plaintiff to be heard.” (Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186,
1193 [dismissal order was “clear violation of plaintiffs’ due
process rights” where “plaintiffs were not given notice that their
case would be dismissed if they failed to appear for the status
conference”]; see also Cohen v. Hughes Markets, Inc. (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 1693, 1698 [due process demands notice to the
plaintiff before dismissing a case for lack of prosecution].)
We review an order dismissing an action for abuse of
discretion. (Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 736, 765, disapproved on another point in City of Los
Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (August 22, 2024,

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S277211) ___ Cal.5th ___ [2024 Cal. LEXIS 4638 at *48, fn. 5];
see Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th
424, 443.) “‘Action that transgresses the confines of the
applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and
we call such action an “abuse” of discretion.’” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55
Cal.4th 747, 773.)
In this case, the court appears to have relied on its inherent
power to dismiss the action.1 When the court continued the OSC
from June 6, 2023, to July 12, 2023, it indicated that would be the
final continuance. But the court did not give plaintiff notice his
case might be dismissed with prejudice on July 12. Plaintiff was
entitled to notice and an opportunity to explain why the court
should not dismiss his case with prejudice. (Reid v. Balter, supra,
14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193; see Cohen v. Hughes Markets, Inc.,
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1698.)
Additionally, trial courts should only exercise their
inherent authority to dismiss actions “in extreme situations, such
as when the conduct was clear and deliberate, where no lesser

1 While plaintiff argues the trial court did not have authority
under various Code of Civil Procedure sections to dismiss the action
(e.g., Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 575.2, 583.310, and 583.420), the court did
not indicate it was dismissing the case pursuant to any of these
provisions. It stated it was dismissing the case with prejudice because
another hearing would “just cause more delays and congestion in this
[c]ourt.” The court cited McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399.
However, McClain addressed whether a trial court abused its
discretion in denying the appellants relief from default under the
discretionary and mandatory provisions of Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (b). (Id. at p. 404.) McClain did not address
under what circumstances a court could sua sponte dismiss an action
with prejudice.

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alternatives would remedy the situation [citation], the fault lies
with the client and not the attorney [citation], and when the
court issues a directive that the party fails to obey.” (Del Junco v.
Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 789, 799.)
In this case, we understand the trial court was frustrated
with the delay and congestion caused by plaintiff’s failed
attempts to have a default judgment entered. The court had
discussed deficiencies in the default judgment package with
counsel in June 2023, and counsel failed to appear at the
continued hearing the next month. However, the court’s order
does not indicate that plaintiff, as opposed to counsel, caused the
deficiencies or counsel’s failure to appear. Rather, the record
indicates the court identified counsel as the source of the
problems, observing that counsel had “poorly presented” the case
and failed to comply with multiple rules of court. Further, the
record does not show the court considered lesser sanctions before
dismissing plaintiff’s case with prejudice. When counsel failed to
appear at the July 2023 hearing, the court could have continued
the hearing and issued an order to show cause why counsel
should not pay monetary sanctions to the court. (See e.g., Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 2.30(b), Code of Civ. Proc., § 575.2; see also
Lyons, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 917 [“‘“sound exercise of discretion
requires the judge to consider and use lesser sanctions”’ unless
the court’s authority cannot possibly be otherwise vindicated”].)
This would have provided counsel with an opportunity to offer his
excuse for failing to appear and plaintiff’s testimony to prove
entitlement to a judgment. Terminating plaintiff’s case without

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considering the client’s lack of fault or lesser sanctions, and with
a lack of sufficient notice, constituted an abuse of discretion.2

DISPOSITION
The order dismissing the case is reversed. The case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Plaintiff to bear his own costs on appeal.

MORI, J.
We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

2 We need not reach plaintiff’s remaining claims of error
concerning the trial court’s reasons for denying his request for entry of
a default judgment. Plaintiff does not affirmatively demonstrate he
was entitled to the requested judgment at the July 12, 2023, OSC. For
example, one reason the court denied plaintiff’s request for entry of a
default judgment was that plaintiff requested interest as part of the
judgment, but plaintiff failed to provide any basis for his interest
calculations. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a)(3) requires
interest computations. Plaintiff does not challenge this basis for the
court’s denial of his request for entry of a default judgment.

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