In re Kaylen B. CA2/3

CourtListener 10046383CalctappAug 20, 2024

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Filed 8/20/24 In re Kaylen B. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re KAYLEN B. et al., Persons B330192
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. 23CCJP01357A–B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Juvenile Court Referee.
Reversed with direction.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
R.B. (mother) appeals orders of the juvenile court
adjudicating her daughters, Kaylen B. and Heaven B., juvenile
court dependents and removing them from her custody. She
contends insufficient evidence supported the court’s jurisdictional
findings and removal order. We agree that substantial evidence
did not support the jurisdictional findings, and thus we reverse
the jurisdictional findings and disposition orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Prior Proceedings Involving Kaylen and Jaylen
Mother has two minor daughters, Kaylen (born December
2011) and Heaven (born March 2016), and an adult son, Jaylen
H. Genaro B. is Kaylen’s presumed father, and Aaron B. is
Heaven’s alleged father.
In June 2013, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency
petition on behalf of Kaylen and Jaylen, who was at that time a
minor, based on mother’s and Genaro’s violent altercations and
substance abuse. The juvenile court sustained the petition and
removed Kaylen and Jaylen from mother’s care. In December
2015, the court returned Kaylen and Jaylen to mother, granted
her legal and physical custody of them, and terminated
jurisdiction.
II. Current Proceedings Involving Kaylen and Heaven
A. The referral and investigation
In February 2023, an anonymous caller reported that
mother and her girlfriend were engaged in a physical altercation

2
in Kaylen’s and Heaven’s presence. The Department interviewed
the children, who said they had witnessed two incidents of
domestic disputes involving mother. In the most recent incident,
mother and her girlfriend argued in the children’s presence in the
living room. Mother and her girlfriend then moved into their
bedroom, where the children heard slapping noises and the
sounds of things falling and bumping against the wall, but they
did not see a physical altercation. The children also reported a
prior incident, in which mother’s then-boyfriend Joaquin hit
mother in the face, arm, and body. Mother was doing the hair of
one of her daughters during the incident and boiling water spilled
on the child’s chest.
The Department also interviewed the maternal
grandparents, who said mother had dropped off Kaylen and
Heaven with a truckload of their belongings a few weeks earlier.
Mother did not live with the maternal grandparents, but for the
past five or six years had regularly dropped off the children, left
them for days at a time, and then picked them up without
communicating a plan for their care. The maternal grandparents
said mother never had the children in her care for more than a
month at a time. When mother visited, she would become
agitated “over being told ‘how to parent,’ ” and an argument
would usually occur. The maternal grandparents said mother’s
schedule was affecting the children’s schooling because mother
often dropped them off or picked them up “during academic
instruction time . . . .”1 As such, according to maternal

1 According to a February 21, 2023 interview with maternal
grandparents, mother had enrolled the children in online
education “earlier in the year.”

3
grandparents, the children’s attendance, participation, and
grades were declining.
When the social worker met mother and the children at a
restaurant, mother refused to answer any of the social worker’s
questions or to allow the social worker to interview the children
privately. Although she told the children to tell the social worker
they were not abused, the social worker independently observed
that they “did not appear to have any visible marks or bruises.”
In March 2023, a social worker attempted to interview
mother at the maternal grandparents’ home. When confronted
by the social worker about maternal grandparents’ claim that
mother did not reside at the grandparents’ home, but rather only
spent “one night out of the month at their home,” mother began
yelling at the social worker, “stating she sees the children every
day and . . . resides in the home with the children and the
maternal grandparents.” When asked for further clarification,
mother yelled profanities at the maternal grandparents and
accused them of being “liars.” She then told the children to pack
their things and angrily left with them. For the next two weeks,
mother did not communicate with the social worker, but the
maternal grandparents said mother continued to drop the
children off and pick them up without communicating a proper
plan for their care and supervision.
In April 2023, Genaro (Kaylen’s father) reported that he
had just gotten out of prison after serving nearly three years. He
admitted a history of drug use, which had hindered his ability to
care for his daughter, but he wanted to be in her life now that he
was sober and getting his life together. He was currently on
parole, the conditions of which included that he remain sober and
enroll in an outpatient program. He was submitting to drug and

4
alcohol testing, wore an ankle monitor, and was living in a
transitional home. He agreed to submit to an on-demand drug
test, and in April 2023, he tested negative for drugs and alcohol.
Genaro said he and mother had not been together since
2013. He had lived with Kaylen at some point but said he had
been an inconsistent father because of his drug addiction. He
had tried to maintain contact with Kaylen, but due to mother’s
lack of stability, he had not always been successful in locating
her. He said he was “never really around” to parent the children.
Heaven, however, called him “Dad,” and he was also close to
Jaylen, whose name Genaro had tattooed on his arm. Genaro
consented to Kaylen’s removal because he could not currently
care for her. He believed Kaylen should be released to the
maternal grandparents.
B. The dependency petition and detention
In April 2023, the Department filed a dependency petition
on behalf of Kaylen and Heaven pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (counts b-1
through b-4) and (j) (counts j-1 and j-2).2 The petition alleged:
(1) mother placed Kaylen and Heaven at risk of serious physical
harm by exposing them to multiple violent verbal and physical
altercations, including one that resulted in one of the children
being burned (counts b-1, j-1); (2) mother left the children in the
maternal grandparents’ care without making an appropriate plan
for their care and supervision (count b-2); (3) Genaro was unable
and unwilling to care for Kaylen and had consented to her
removal from his custody (count b-3); and (4) Genaro had a

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

5
history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine, crack
cocaine, cocaine, phencyclidine, marijuana, and alcohol, which
rendered him incapable of caring for Kaylen (counts b-4, j-2).3
The juvenile court ordered Kaylen and Heaven detained on
April 25, 2023.
C. Jurisdiction and disposition report
A social worker reinterviewed Heaven in May 2023.
Regarding the recent incident with mother’s girlfriend Paula,
Heaven said Paula had been smoking weed and “acting crazy.”
Asked if mother and Paula ever got into a physical altercation,
the child replied, “No. Just argued.” After the argument, mother
and the children stopped living with Paula.
Regarding the incident involving Joaquin, Heaven said she
had been burned with hot water during a fight between mother
and Joaquin. Heaven said she had been four or five years old at
the time. Mother had not let Heaven be around Joaquin since
then. Heaven also said mother used to smoke weed but no longer
did. Heaven could not remember the last time she saw mother
smoking weed. She never witnessed Genaro using drugs or
drinking alcohol.
The social worker also reinterviewed Kaylen. Kaylen said
the incident with Joaquin happened two years earlier. While
mother and Joaquin were arguing at mother’s hair salon, Kaylen
tried to intervene. Kaylen stated, “[Joaquin] was ripping my
shirt and trying to push me away from my mom. My mom had

3 The Department’s April 2023 dependency petition also
alleged other counts (counts b-5 and d-1), including under
section 300, subdivision (d), against Genaro, that were not
sustained by the juvenile court.

6
hot water in her hand because she was finishing Heaven’s hair.
Joaquin pushed my mom and the water poured all over Heaven.
She had bumps all over her and stuff from the hot water. I
grabbed my mom’s phone and went to the bathroom and tried to
call the police but Joaquin busted in and snatched the phone.”
The next day, Joaquin came to the salon again, Joaquin was
arrested, and mother obtained a restraining order against him.
Regarding the incident with Paula, Kaylen said Paula had
come home drunk. Trying to persuade Paula to depart, mother
said, “I have my kids here.” In response, Paula told mother she
had five days to leave. Kaylen said she and Heaven were safe
with mother. Kaylen also said Genaro no longer smoked, and she
denied witnessing Genaro using drugs or drinking alcohol.
Both Kaylen and Heaven said mother left the children with
the maternal grandparents because she had to work. Kaylen said
mother worked three jobs: as a security guard, doing hair, and
taking care of the elderly. The only days the children went
without seeing mother was when the maternal grandfather
kicked mother out of the house.
When mother was reinterviewed May 2023, she said the
children and the maternal grandparents were “holding . . .
against” her that she has been in “different relationships with
horrible people.” Mother also stated the incident with Joaquin
happened five years ago and she obtained a restraining order
against him. The restraining order was issued in May 2021, set
to expire in May 2026, and listed mother and her children as
protected persons.
Mother said she and the children had lived with Paula
until Paula kicked them out. Mother and the children lived with
the maternal grandparents, and mother left the children only

7
when the maternal grandparents kicked her out. When mother
left the maternal grandparents’ home with the children, she
would usually take them back to the maternal grandparents’
home because she knew she needed help with the children.
Mother said Kaylen and Heaven received medical and dental
care. The Department reported the children exhibited age-
appropriate development.
The maternal grandmother told the social worker that
mother “would be gone all day and night and the kids wouldn’t be
able to get a hold of her.” The maternal grandmother said
mother did not make her children a priority and never accepted
responsibility for her “[p]artying lifestyle.” The maternal
grandfather said mother came to the home “this past Friday”
smelling of alcohol. He said he knew mother continued to smoke
marijuana because he could smell it on her.
The maternal grandparents said Genaro was unable to care
for Kaylen because he was in a halfway house. They believed
Genaro would be able to care for Kaylen once he was done with
his classes. Genaro, too, said he could not currently care for
Kaylen, but hoped to be able to do so in the future.
D. The jurisdiction and disposition hearing and
subsequent events
In June 2023, the juvenile court sustained counts b-1
through b-4 and counts j-1 and j-2 of the petition. The court then
declared Kaylen and Heaven court dependents, removed them
from parental custody, and ordered them placed with the
maternal grandparents. The court granted mother monitored

8
visitation and family reunification services. That same day,
mother timely filed a notice of appeal.
While this appeal was pending, on March 14, 2024, the
court terminated its placement order and returned Kaylen and
Heaven to mother’s care.4
DISCUSSION
Mother contends substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and removal orders. As we
discuss, we agree.
I. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the Juvenile
Court’s Findings of Jurisdiction over Heaven and
Kaylen Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)(1)
A. Governing law and standard of review
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides in part that a child
is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” “The Department has the burden
of proving . . . that the children are dependents of the court under
section 300.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) It must
prove three elements for a subdivision (b)(1) jurisdictional
finding: “(1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or
failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and
(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of

4 At mother’s request, we took judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s March 14, 2024 minute orders.

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serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.)
“The relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing
‘ “subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (In re L.B.
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411.) But “ ‘[t]he court need not wait
until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction
and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (In re I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “The court may consider past events
in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.
[Citations.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct
will continue.’ ” (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602;
accord, In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775 [“[e]vidence of
past conduct may be probative of current conditions and may
assist [the Department] in meeting [its burden of proof]”].) “ ‘To
establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there
“must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the
alleged conduct will recur.” ’ ” (In re Cole L., at p. 602.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” ’ ” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; see In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892; In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678,
685.) “ ‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent

10
judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J., at p. 773.)
“However, ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous with any
evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence must be of
ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value.’ ” (In re Cole L., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.)
B. Substantial evidence did not support the court’s
jurisdictional findings under count b-1
Mother contends the count b-1 jurisdictional findings were
not supported by substantial evidence because the domestic
violence incidents alleged did not create a current risk of serious
physical harm to her daughters. We agree.
First, there was insufficient evidence that, at the time of
the June 2023 jurisdiction hearing, the children were at current
risk of harm from Joaquin’s earlier violent altercation with
mother. Although a child had been injured during that incident,
there was no evidence that mother continued to have a
relationship with Joaquin or that Joaquin continued to have
access to the children. To the contrary, mother obtained a
restraining order against him after the incident, and the evidence
showed the children had no further contact with him. (See In re
Jonathan B. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 115, 120 [reversing
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), jurisdiction finding; determining
that “the evidence did not show that mother would fail to protect
the children from father’s violent conduct” in part because mother
obtained a restraining order after father attacked her]; In re
Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 [“[p]hysical violence
between a child’s parents may support the exercise of jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b) but only if there is evidence

11
that the violence is ongoing or likely to continue . . . .”].) In
addition, the incident with Joaquin occurred at least two years
before the dependency petition was filed. (See In re Daisy H., at
p. 717 [concluding the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding that domestic violence placed the children at a current
risk of physical harm where the physical violence happened at
least two years before the Department filed the petition]; see also
In re L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 411 [relevant inquiry
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at
the time of the jurisdiction hearing subject the minor to the
defined risk of harm].)5
Second, there was insufficient evidence that the children
were at current risk of serious physical harm from the February
2023 incident involving Paula. Although the Department
contends the children’s statements that they heard slapping,
bumping against the wall, and objects falling indicate that
mother’s verbal altercation with Paula had escalated into a
physical one, Kaylen and Heaven were not in the same room as
mother and Paula when they heard those sounds and did not
claim there had been a physical altercation. To the contrary,
they stated that the altercation was verbal, not physical. There
was no evidence that mother and Paula’s verbal arguments
presented a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the

5 There was also no evidence that mother and Joaquin had
previously engaged in any physical altercations or that mother
could have otherwise foreseen that Joaquin would strike her
during their argument. (See In re Jonathan B., supra,
235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 120–121 [reversing jurisdiction finding by
distinguishing the facts of the case from one in which “the
father’s violent conduct was entirely foreseeable”].)

12
children, and there were no witnesses who claimed there had
been any physical altercation. Moreover, as mother points out,
and the Department on appeal does not dispute, the evidence
indicates that, after the incident, mother ended the relationship
with Paula and she and the children moved out of Paula’s house.6
Finally, the Department mentions a host of miscellaneous
issues other than domestic violence, such as mother arriving at
the maternal grandparents’ home smelling of alcohol and having
unscheduled, unmonitored visits with the children in violation of
a juvenile court order for monitored visitation. But the
dependency petition did not allege, and the juvenile court did not

6 The Department also relies on a purported 2018 incident of
domestic violence alleged in a 2021 referral by an unnamed
individual. That referral was closed as “[i]nconclusive,” and thus
we do not consider it. (See In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 606, fn. 12 [the Department acted properly because it did not
contend that the court should consider events described in
referrals determined to be unfounded or inconclusive]; see also In
re Donovan L., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1093 [speculation is
not substantial evidence]; In re Jonathan B., supra, 235
Cal.App.4th at p. 119 [a reviewing court will affirm jurisdictional
findings if “ ‘there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value
to support them’ ”].) To the extent the Department relies on
mother’s altercations with Genaro at issue in the prior
dependency proceedings, we observe that the prior petition had
been filed 10 years before the current jurisdiction hearing, and
the juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction under the prior
petition in December 2015 by granting mother custody of Kaylen
and Jaylen. After the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction in
the prior proceedings, there was no evidence of any further
violent altercations between Genaro and mother.

13
find, that jurisdiction under count b-1 was proper based on those
issues now identified by the Department. We reject the
Department’s invitation to affirm based on jurisdictional findings
neither alleged in the petition nor made by the juvenile court.
(See In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 606 [“The
Department is thus asking us . . . to make an entirely new
decision based on a factual finding . . . not made by the juvenile
court. That decision and finding were for the juvenile court in
the first instance, not this court”]; In re V.M. (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 245, 253 [“[w]e cannot affirm a jurisdictional
finding that was never alleged or made in the trial court”]; see
also In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833 [“our task is . . .
merely to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to support
the findings of the trial court”].)
C. Substantial evidence did not support the court’s
jurisdictional findings under count b-2
Mother contends the count b-2 jurisdictional findings were
not supported by substantial evidence because the conduct
alleged did not create a substantial risk of serious physical harm
to the children. We agree.
The essence of count b-2 was that mother left the children
with the maternal grandparents for long periods of time without
providing an appropriate plan for the minors’ care. But there
was no evidence that the maternal grandparents were not
appropriate caregivers. Despite having the burden of proof, the
Department points to no evidence that the children’s essential
needs for their physical health and safety were not met when
mother left the children with the maternal grandparents.
Indeed, the juvenile court ordered the children placed with the
maternal grandparents when it removed them from parental

14
custody. Substantial evidence thus did not support the count b-2
jurisdictional findings. (See In re Andrew S. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
536, 542 [section 300, subdivision (b), does not “justif[y] the
juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an otherwise well-
cared-for child simply because an absent parent has not provided
support”]; In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160 [reversing
section 300, subdivision (b), jurisdiction finding based on
allegation that the father failed to provide for his son where “the
child was well cared for in the home of his maternal
grandmother, who helped support the child and provided for his
necessities”; father’s failure to provide neither caused serious
physical harm nor created substantial risk of such harm].)
In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, on which the
Department relies, does not compel a contrary result. In Athena
P., the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over infant Athena
under section 300, subdivision (g), which provides for jurisdiction,
among other grounds, when “ ‘the child’s parent has been
incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care
of the child.’ ” (Athena P., at pp. 621, 626.) Athena’s parents had
been convicted and sentenced to several years in prison. When
Athena was sent to live with the grandparents, Athena’s mother
tried to a create a formal custody arrangement by signing certain
documents but failed to file them. (Id. at pp. 621–622.)
Affirming the juvenile court’s subdivision (g) jurisdictional
finding, the Court of Appeal explained that the juvenile court
could properly conclude that the mother had been unable to
arrange for Athena’s care because the mother tried, but failed, to
make the grandparents Athena’s temporary legal guardians.
(Athena P., at pp. 629–630.)

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Here, the petition did not allege, and the juvenile court did
not exercise, jurisdiction over Kaylen and Heaven under
section 300, subdivision (g). There was no evidence that mother
was incarcerated at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. (See In
re R.M. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [“ ‘ “section 300,
subdivision (g) applies when, at the time of the [jurisdictional]
hearing, a parent has been incarcerated and does not know how
to make, or is physically or mentally incapable of making,
preparations or plans for the care of his or her child” ’ ”].)
Because mother was not incarcerated, there was no need to make
the maternal grandparents the legal guardians of the children.7
In sum, substantial evidence did not support the count b-2
jurisdictional findings that were made by the juvenile court.

7 The Department also argues that jurisdiction under
count b-2 was proper based on mother’s alcohol and marijuana
use and a purported incident (involving mother starting to walk
away from Jaylen when the child was in a parked car) in a 2006
referral. Those jurisdictional allegations were unrelated to the
risk of harm identified in the count—that is, the risk from
leaving the two girls with the maternal grandparents without an
appropriate plan—and were not made in the dependency petition,
argued by the parties, or found by the juvenile court. As
discussed, we cannot affirm based on a jurisdictional finding
neither alleged nor made in the juvenile court. In addition,
because the 2006 referral was by an unnamed caller and had
been closed as “[u]nfounded,” we do not consider it.

16
D. There was not substantial evidence to support
the court’s jurisdictional findings under
counts b-3 and b-4, and mother neither lacked
standing nor forfeited her right to challenge
them
Mother contends counts b-3 and b-4 of the petition were not
supported by substantial evidence because Genaro’s alleged drug
use and inability to care for Kaylen did not put the child at risk of
harm. We agree.
Although Genaro could not care for Kaylen because of his
drug use and incarceration, Kaylen’s other parent—mother—was
able to ensure the child’s care. Genaro’s inability to care for
Kaylen thus did not put her at risk of harm.
The Department does not contend counts b-3 and b-4 were
supported by substantial evidence, but instead urges mother
lacks standing to challenge those findings and forfeited her right
to do so by failing to challenge them below. We do not agree.
“[A] person aggrieved by a decision” has standing to appeal
it. (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.) “ ‘To be aggrieved, a
party must have a legally cognizable interest that is injuriously
affected by the court’s decision.’ ” (In re Valerie A. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 987, 999.) Because “ ‘ “[a] jurisdictional finding
good against one parent is good against both” ’ ” and “ ‘ “the minor
is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [the minor]
within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent” ’ ” (In re
A.J. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 7, 14), a jurisdictional finding based
on Genaro’s conduct subjects Kaylen to juvenile court
jurisdiction. This detrimentally affects mother’s legally
cognizable interest in her daughter’s companionship, custody,
and care. (See In re K.C., at p. 236 [“[a]ll parents, unless and

17
until their parental rights are terminated, have an interest in
their children’s ‘companionship, care, custody and
management . . . .’ ”]; In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 692
[a parent in a dependency case is aggrieved if “ ‘a juvenile court
order . . . injuriously affects the parent-child relationship’ ”].) To
the extent mother seeks to reunify with Kaylen and not have her
parental rights terminated, the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the child directly subjects mother to the court’s
orders. Mother is aggrieved whether jurisdiction had been
exercised based on her or Genaro’s conduct.
Mother also did not forfeit her right to challenge the
juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Kaylen based on
Genaro’s conduct. At the jurisdictional hearing, mother asked
the juvenile court to dismiss the entire petition, which
necessarily included the b-3 and b-4 counts. Mother also
specifically requested dismissal of the petition for insufficiency of
the evidence of a current risk of harm. And, although mother did
not expressly address counts b-3 and b-4, father did: He
specifically argued there was insufficient evidence of a current
risk of harm to sustain counts b-3, b-4, and j-2. Mother thus did
not forfeit her right to argue that substantial evidence did not
support the court’s count b-3 and b-4 jurisdictional findings. (See
In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464 [determining
mother did not forfeit an issue in part because “the older
brothers’ attorney squarely raised the issue at trial”].)
II. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the Juvenile
Court’s Findings of Jurisdiction over Heaven and
Kaylen Under Section 300, Subdivision (j)
Section 300, subdivision (j), authorizes dependency
jurisdiction when “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or

18
neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and
there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or
neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” Count j-1 alleged
dependency jurisdiction based on the underlying allegations of
count b-1, and count j-2 based jurisdiction on those of count b-4.
Because we conclude substantial evidence did not support the
count b-1 and b-4 jurisdictional findings, the same holds true, on
this record, for the jurisdiction findings under counts j-1 and j-2.
(See In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391–392 [because
“we conclude the allegations of the petition sustained under
section 300, subdivision (b) are not sufficient to support
jurisdiction,” “[i]t necessarily follows the sustained allegation of
sibling abuse alleged under section 300, subdivision (j) must fail
as well”; validity of subdivision (j) jurisdictional finding “was
dependent on a sustained finding of a substantial risk of serious
physical harm or illness under subdivision (b)”].)
III. The Disposition Orders Must Be Reversed
In conclusion, we reverse the jurisdictional findings under
all sustained counts for lack of substantial evidence. Accordingly,
the juvenile court’s disposition orders must also be reversed. (In
re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583 [“[b]ecause there was
no basis for dependency jurisdiction, we also reverse the
disposition order and the custody order the juvenile court
issued”].)

19
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition
orders are reversed. The juvenile court is directed to dismiss the
dependency petition.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BERSHON, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.


Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

20

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