J.C. v. T.A. CA2/6

CourtListener 10046381CalctappAug 20, 2024

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Filed 8/20/24 J.C. v. T.A. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

J.C., 2d Civ. No. B332625
(Super. Ct. No. D402650)
Appellant, (Ventura County)

v.

T.A.,

Respondent.

J.C. (Father) appeals from an order granting T.A.’s
(Mother) request to move out of state with their son. He asks us
to consider whether the changed circumstances rule applies to
move-away cases involving parents with a permanent joint
custody order. We conclude it does not. He asserts the trial court
abused its discretion by relying on a biased custody evaluation
and failing to properly weigh the LaMusga1 factors. We have

1 In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072

(LaMusga)
examined the record and there is no abuse of discretion. We will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and Mother are parents to J., born in Hawaii in
2019. Except for six weeks in 2021, Mother and Father have
shared custody of J. since his birth.
The parties have a tumultuous relationship. Both accuse
the other of various inappropriate conduct. Both claimed to have
suffered domestic violence inflicted by the other. In 2020 Father
pleaded no contest to assault against Mother and was placed on
probation. Father has a history of abusing alcohol and alcohol
related arrests and convictions. In July 2020, the parties
obtained custody orders from the State of Hawaii, awarding joint
legal and joint physical custody with a week on / week off
parenting plan.
In June 2021 the parents and son moved to California
where Father’s parents and other paternal relatives reside.
Despite their conflicts, the parties attempted to remain together
but in California their relationship deteriorated. Father
continued to abuse alcohol and the paternal grandparents’
involvement in their relationship made matters worse. In
August, without informing Father, Mother and J. left California
for Mother’s home state of Florida. Two days later Father
registered the Hawaii custody order in California. Mother was
ordered to return J. to California and the court made temporary
custody orders consistent with the Hawaii order pending a
further hearing.
After learning Father had recently been charged with a
DUI, the court made orders prohibiting him from consuming
alcohol during his parenting time, requiring his parents be

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present during his custodial time, and that he attend an alcohol
treatment program for 12 months. The parties stipulated to the
appointment of a child custody evaluator to make non-binding
recommendations regarding a parenting plan in J.’s best
interests if Mother moved to Florida.
At the two-day trial the court considered testimony from
Father, Mother, paternal grandparents, J.’s preschool
administrator, a Ventura County Sheriff’s Deputy, and by
stipulation, the custody evaluation. The court issued a final
Statement of Decision after considering Father’s objections.
The court made detailed factual findings. It concluded that
given Father’s and paternal grandparents’ “extreme restrictive
gatekeeping to disrupt Mother’s relationship with the Child” it
would be “detrimental to the Mother and Child’s continuing bond
and relationship if the Child stayed in California with Father as
the primary custodial parent.” The court found Father has
“continuing and serious issues with substance abuse, his mental
health, or both” and that neither he nor his parents
“acknowledged or addressed the potential negative impacts of
Father’s substance abuse or violence towards Mother or the
Child, on Father’s ability to parent the Child, or to provide the
Child with a safe and healthy environment.” The court noted
Father violated its orders regarding his substance use and has
not “demonstrated any serious intent to address these issues.”
Instead, Father and his parents blame Father’s “abusive
behaviors and substance abuse on Mother and the ‘toxic’
relationship she has with Father.”
The court also detailed its consideration of the relevant
LaMusga factors before concluding it is in J.’s best interest to
allow him to move with Mother to Florida.

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DISCUSSION
Mother did not file a respondent's brief. Regardless, it
remains Father’s “affirmative burden to show error.” (In re
Marriage of Davies (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 851, 854.)
Father first posits the trial court should have applied the
change of circumstances standard, not the best interest of the
child standard to modify the Hawaii order. He contends that
although he did not raise this issue below it is not waived
because it is a pure question of law presented on undisputed
facts. (Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983)
34 Cal.3d 412, 417.) We agree it is a question of law but conclude
the trial court was correct.
Where, as here, parents share joint physical custody under
an existing order and in fact, and one parent seeks to relocate
with the child, the family law court “must determine de novo
what arrangement for primary custody is in the best interest of
the minor children.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th
at p. 40, fn. 12 (Burgess); see also In re Marriage of Williams
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 808, 812; Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 344.) Thus, we conclude the trial court correctly
applied the best interest standard in determining de novo
whether to grant Mother’s move-away request.
Next, Father asserts the trial court abused its discretion
because it relied on a biased custody evaluation. We again
disagree.
“Generally, ‘[o]nce it is established that a witness has
adequate credentials to qualify as an expert, questions as to the
degree of his or her expertise go to weight not admissibility.’
[Citation.] . . . Additionally, lapses in professionalism affect only
the weight of the evidence.” (In re Marriage of Winternitz (2015)

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235 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.) It is the responsibility of the family
court to assess the credibility of all witnesses and experts,
including the evaluator. (Ibid.)
We have considered Father’s specific criticisms purportedly
reflecting bias in the evaluator’s report. He also raised these
concerns below. We will not second guess the family law court’s
determination of the weight to be given to the report. (In re
Marriage of Winternitz, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 653.)
Finally, Father asserts the trial court abused its discretion
as to the weight and consideration it assigned the LaMusga
factors2, improperly weighing the extent to which the parents
have shared custody, J.’s community ties, Mother’s reasons for
moving, the distance of the move, and the harm of disrupting
established patterns of care. Our review of the record establishes
proper weight and consideration were given to each factor. The
court issued a detailed statement of decision in which it expressly
listed and then discussed each relevant LaMusga factor. We
cannot reweigh the evidence. (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 1093.)

2 Among the factors to consider when modifying custody “in

light of the custodial parent’s proposal to change the residence of
the child are . . . the children’s interest in stability and continuity
in the custodial arrangement; the distance of the move; the age of
the children; the children’s relationship with both parents; the
relationship between the parents including, but not limited to,
their ability to communicate and cooperate effectively and their
willingness to put the interests of the children above their
individual interest; the wishes of the children if they are mature
enough for such an inquiry to be appropriate; the reasons for the
proposed move; and the extent to which the parents currently are
sharing custody.” (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101.)

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As directed by our Supreme Court: “[W]e must permit our
superior court judges—guided by statute and the principles we
announced in Burgess and affirm in [LaMusga]—to exercise their
discretion to fashion orders that best serve the interests of the
children in the cases before them.” (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th
at p. 1101.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

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Hon. Charmaine H. Buehner, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Decker Law, James Decker, Griffin Schinder, and Aisling
Gorman, for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.

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