CourtListener 10045327•In re P.A. CA2/8
Full text
Filed 8/19/24 In re P.A. CA2/8
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re P.A., a Person Coming B333923
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00900D
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
____________________
A mother appeals the order of the juvenile court that
terminated her parental rights to her daughter P.A, who is now
about two and a half years old and has never lived with the
mother. The mother claims the court erred in finding the
parental-benefit exception did not apply to her relationship with
P.A. (See In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631–632 (Caden
C.).)
To prove the Caden C. exception applies, the mother must
establish that: (1) she visited her child regularly; (2) a
substantial, positive, and emotional attachment existed between
her and the child; and (3) terminating this attachment would be
detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631,
636.)
We review decisions on the first two elements for
substantial evidence. We review the third element for abuse of
discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) Both
standards are deferential. We resolve all conflicts in the evidence
in favor of the dependency court’s ruling, draw all reasonable
inferences from that evidence in favor of the ruling, and do not
reweigh evidence or credibility findings. (Estate of Berger (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 1293, 1307.)
We review the court’s ruling, not its reasoning. If the
ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm. (In re Jonathan B.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875.)
The juvenile court found the mother had not satisfied parts
two or three of the Caden C. test, and the section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception therefore did not apply. Code
citations are to the Welf. & Inst. Code.
2
Substantial evidence supports the first finding, and the
court did not abuse its discretion in making the second.
At the time of P.A.’s birth, the mother tested positive for
alcohol. A security guard at the hospital relayed to a social
worker that he heard mother telling someone on the phone she
had consumed alcohol a few days earlier. The mother told a
hospital social worker that she did not drink alcohol at all.
The mother has a history of inappropriate alcohol use; two
of her older three children have been diagnosed with fetal alcohol
syndrome. P.A. also has a diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome.
P.A. was removed from her parents’ care at the hospital and
placed with her current caregiver, who is also the caregiver for
the mother’s third child. (P.A.’s father is not a party to this
appeal.)
The mother visited regularly; a monitor has attended the
visits throughout the case.
The court ended reunification services in August 2023.
Returning the child to the mother was no longer a possibility.
The court properly ordered adoption; the only question was
whether the mother could show an exception to adoption existed.
At the section 366.26 hearing in December 2023, the court
found the beneficial parental relationship exception under section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply, and no substantially
positive emotional attachment of the children with their parents
outweighed the benefit of permanency.
Having “read and considered the evidence,” the court stated
it “[did] not find an exception to termination of parental rights
exists.” The court stated on the record that continuing the
relationship as to mother and P.A. would not be beneficial.
3
As the court noted at the hearing, the mother was not able
to safely care for P.A. during visits. The court related some
examples of this concern: the mother could not handle more than
one child at a time, could not reliably change diapers or put on
her child’s shoe, and appeared unable to focus on P.A. sufficiently
during a visit to prevent her from wandering near the street. The
court also recalled P.A.’s negative reactions after maternal visits.
We need not detail the other evidence, for this support is
substantial evidence.
The mother offered little to prove P.A. would suffer
detriment should their visits end. At the hearing, and in her
briefing to this court, she argued that she and P.A. had many
positive interactions during their visits. But she must show more
than frequent and loving contact or that her visits were
consistent and positive. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th
1411, 1418; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
We thus lack a basis for second guessing the court’s
determination the child will suffer no detriment from the loss of
visits with her mother.
The trial court need not expressly walk through the Caden
C. analysis step by step. (See In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1131, 1161.) This court clearly stated its conclusion, which was a
sound exercise of discretion enjoying ample support.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J. GRIMES, J.
4
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