People v. Smith CA1/5

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Filed 8/16/24 P. v. Smith CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168343
v.

ANTOINE SMITH, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No.
142263)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 2003, Antoine Smith was sentenced to 65 years and
eight months to life in prison for a murder and an assault arising
out of a street fight. Smith’s sentence included a number of
enhancements, one of which was based on a prior prison term he
had served. In light of the Legislature’s subsequent invalidation
of that prior prison term enhancement and other intervening
changes in law, and after two decades in prison during which
time he engaged in significant rehabilitation efforts, Smith
received a new sentence of 25 years to life. In this appeal, Smith
contends that the trial court misapprehended the law and abused
its discretion in selecting his new sentence. In addition, Smith
asserts, and the People concur, that the trial court erred in
failing to calculate and credit his actual time served against his
new sentence. We agree that a remand is necessary for the court
to calculate and credit Smith’s actual custody credits. We
otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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BACKGROUND

A.

Until January 1, 2020, Penal Code section 667.5, former
subdivision (b)1, mandated a one-year sentence enhancement for
each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a
prior prison term within the preceding five years. (§ 667.5,
former subd. (b), as amended by Sen. Bill No. 1494 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; People v.
Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379-380 (Burgess).) Effective
January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section 667.5,
subdivision (b) to limit the enhancement to prior prison terms for
sexually violent offenses. (Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg.
Sess.), Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020; Burgess, at pp.
379-380.)

Relatedly, the Legislature amended the Penal Code to
invalidate prior prison term enhancements for non-sexually
violent offenses that were imposed before January 1, 2020, under
section 667.5, former subdivision (b). (See § 1172.75, subd. (a), as
enacted by Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, §§ 1, 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022; Renumbered from section 1171.1
by Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12, eff. June 30, 2022.) Section 1172.75 requires full
resentencing for defendants serving terms that include an invalid
prior prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subds. (c), (d); People
v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 (Monroe); see also
People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.)

Pursuant to section 1172.75, the resentencing “shall result
in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement,” unless the court
concludes by clear and convincing evidence that imposition of a
lesser sentence would threaten public safety. (§ 1172.75, subd.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
(d)(1).) In addition, in conducting the resentencing, “[t]he court
may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to,
the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant's risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).) Further, the court
“shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and
apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd.
(d)(2); see, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.410, 4.421, 4.423.)

One such change in law applicable to Smith’s resentencing
involves section 654. Before 2022, that section provided that
when “[a]n act or omission . . . is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law,” the defendant “shall be punished
under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, former subd.
(a), as amended by Sen. Bill No. 914 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.),
Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1, eff. Sept. 15, 1997.) Effective January 1,
2022, however, the Legislature amended section 654 to grant the
sentencing court discretion to choose which punishment to
impose and execute when the defendant’s act or omission is
potentially punishable under more than one provision of law. (§
654, subd. (a), as amended by Assem. Bill No. 518 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2022; see also
People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379-380 (Mani).)
Section 654, subdivision (a) now provides: “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case

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shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (Italics added.)

Another applicable change in law is section 1385,
subdivision (c), added in 2022, which grants the trial court
discretion to dismiss an enhancement in the interest of justice.
(Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 2022; see People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
709, 723-724.) Under section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), the court
“shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute.” In exercising its discretion whether to
dismiss an enhancement, “the court shall consider and afford
great weight to” the defendant’s evidence of mitigating
circumstances. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Section 1385 instructs that
proof of any of an enumerated list of mitigating circumstances
“weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,” unless
the court concludes that dismissal would threaten public safety.
(Ibid.) The allegation of multiple enhancements in a single case
is one mitigating circumstance; in that event, “all enhancements
beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(B).) Another mitigating circumstance applies when “[t]he
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over
20 years”; such enhancement “shall be dismissed.” (Id., subd.
(c)(2)(C).)

B.

Smith’s convictions arose from his shooting of Kendrick
Dunbar during a street fight between Smith’s sister, Latosha
Stewart, and Dunbar’s girlfriend, Sharika Jefferson, in August
2001. (See People v. Smith (July 8, 2004, A102068) [nonpub.

4
opn.] (2004 WL 1529164, at p. *1) (Smith).)2 Due to an ongoing
conflict between them, the two women planned to fight one
another, so Stewart asked Smith to come to the fight to support
her. (Ibid.) Smith had a gun in his pocket when he arrived at
the fight. (Ibid.) Smith and Dunbar intervened to separate the
two women during the fight, and at one point, Smith and Dunbar
began shoving one another and exchanging angry words. (Ibid.)
During the altercation, Smith fired two shots at Dunbar, killing
him. (Id., at pp. *1-2.) Several witnesses testified that when
Smith fired the second shot, Dunbar was lying on his back on the
ground. (Id., at p. *1.)

A jury convicted Smith of first degree murder and found
true an allegation that he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm to kill Dunbar. In addition, the jury found
Smith guilty of assaulting Jefferson with a firearm and found
true an allegation that he personally used a firearm in the
assault. The jury also convicted Smith of possession of a firearm
by a felon, based on a 2000 drug conviction.

The trial court sentenced Smith to a total of 65 years and
eight months to life in prison and imposed restitution fines.
Smith’s sentence included a 25 years to life indeterminate term
for the murder conviction and a 25 years to life attendant firearm
enhancement; four years for assault and 10 years for the
attendant firearm enhancement; and eight months for the
firearm possession conviction. The court also imposed a one year
enhancement under section 667.5 based on Smith’s prior prison
term for a 1994 drug possession conviction. The court imposed
but stayed additional enhancements totaling 30 years.

2 Because both parties rely on the summary of facts

provided in the decision issued by this court in Smith’s direct
appeal, we do so as well. (See Smith, supra, A102068.)
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On direct appeal, this Division affirmed the judgment. (See
Smith, supra, A102068.)

C.

Because Smith’s sentence included an invalid prior prison
term enhancement, in 2023 the superior court recalled his
sentence and scheduled a resentencing hearing pursuant to
section 1172.75.

In support of his resentencing, Smith submitted extensive
evidence of his significant rehabilitation efforts during his 20-
plus years in prison, his family support, and his job prospects.
Smith submitted evidence that he participated in numerous self-
help programs, completing personal skills courses, an
alternatives to violence program, a Narcotics Anonymous
program, a paralegal studies program, a vocational cabinetry
program, and several other vocational, re-entry preparation, and
educational courses or programs. In addition, Smith submitted
evidence that he had achieved the lowest security placement
score possible while in prison, expressed remorse for his crimes,
performed volunteer and other work, and helped support his
autistic son. He had developed a re-entry plan and had both a
place to live and a job offer should he be released.

In light of Smith’s postconviction circumstances, the
prosecution offered to stipulate to a sentence of 25 years to life for
the murder conviction, staying the imposition of all other counts
and enhancements.

Contending that circumstances since the time of the
murder have changed such that his continued incarceration is no
longer in the interest of justice, Smith requested that the court
sentence him to 14 years and eight months based on the four year
assault term and the attendant 10-year enhancement, and the 8
month term for the felon in possession count. He proposed
staying the imposition of the sentence for the murder conviction

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and the remaining enhancements. In the alternative, Smith
asserted that the court should accept the prosecution’s stipulated
sentence.

After a hearing, the trial court concluded that a substantial
reduction in Smith’s sentence was appropriate given his
commendable rehabilitation efforts, but in light of the gravity of
the murder offense and considerations of punishment, deterrence,
and uniformity in sentencing, the court rejected Smith’s proposal
to stay the murder sentence. Consistent with the prosecution’s
proposal, the court imposed the 25 years to life sentence for
murder, staying the punishment for assault and possession of a
firearm under section 654 and striking all the enhancements
under section 1385. The court reduced Smith’s restitution fine.
With respect to custody credits, the trial court stated: “Mr.
Smith's credits pre the original judgment were 834 days.
Obviously, all the credits that he’s accumulated since then under
CDCR [California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
custody up until now is a matter of CDCR calculation.”

DISCUSSION

We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for abuse of
discretion and will not set it aside unless it is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could reach the same result.
(See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377
(Carmony); People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182.)
Because the trial court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor
irrational, we affirm.

A.

Under section 654, the trial court had discretion to impose
and execute the sentence for any one of the offenses for which
Smith was convicted based on the same act or omission—
including the one with the shortest prison term—while staying
the execution of the other sentences. (See Mani, supra, 74

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Cal.App.5th at pp. 379-380.) Smith contends that the trial court
erred because it mistakenly believed, based on the prosecution’s
arguments, that it lacked discretion under section 654 to select
the assault sentence as the principal term and stay the 25 years
to life indeterminate sentence for murder. We disagree.

Although the prosecution suggested at one point that the
district attorney “usually” needed to concur for the court to
impose the lesser sentence, the prosecutor subsequently
acknowledged to the court that it had discretion under section
654 to stay either the murder sentence or the assault sentence;
the prosecutor’s argument was that in considering the two
available alternatives, the 14-year sentence for assault was an
insufficient punishment given “reasonability and fairness
concerns.” The prosecutor recognized that section “654 has
changed, and that . . . does give the Court that discretion,” but
argued that “[w]e’re talking 25 to life versus a determinate term
that means a forthwith release or 14 years on a case that was
originally more than 60 to life.”

Moreover, the record reflects that the court carefully
considered Smith’s proposed sentence before concluding that it
would not serve the interests of justice. The court recognized
that there was “merit” to both sentencing options proposed by the
parties and that its task was “choosing between those” options.
The court understood that under “the law of California as it
stands,” it had authority under section 654 to impose the lesser
sentence, which would “cause[] [Smith] to be released forthwith.”
Further, the court explained that the choice involved “a difficult
weighing process” and reached its decision to impose the murder
sentence only after considering the relevant factors in detail. We
therefore disagree that the court believed it lacked discretion to
stay the murder sentence under section 654.

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B.

Smith next contends that in choosing to impose and execute
his murder sentence, the trial court abused its discretion under
sections 1172.75 and 654 by assigning greater weight to
traditional sentencing considerations such as punishment and
deterrence than to postconviction circumstances. He argues that
under the trial court’s approach, a defendant’s current
circumstances could never outweigh the factors relating to the
offense, “the circumstances at the time” of the conviction, or “a
comparison with other sentences for uniformity.” We conclude
the trial court acted within its discretion in resentencing Smith.

As Smith correctly observes, section 1172.75 constrains the
trial court’s discretion by establishing requirements aimed at
shortening prison terms. For example, trial courts must apply
new laws that “reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion
so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) And section
1172.75 establishes a presumption in favor of a reduced sentence:
resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed” unless the trial court makes the requisite
finding, under a heightened standard of proof, that a reduced
sentence would pose a public safety risk. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)
(Italics added); Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.) These
directives reflect the Legislature’s intent “to ensure equal justice
and address systemic racial bias in sentencing.” (Stats. 2021, ch.
728, § 1; see also People v. Montgomery (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
768, 776-777, review granted May 29, 2024, S284662; People v.
Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 314.)

Section 1172.75 also allows the trial court to take a variety
of considerations into account in resentencing. One important set
of considerations—relied upon by Smith—are postconviction
factors, including whether circumstances postdating the offense
demonstrate “that continued incarceration is no longer in the

9
interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).) The court must also
apply the Judicial Council’s sentencing rules (§ 1172.75, subd.
(d)(2)), which provide that the “[g]eneral objectives of sentencing”
include protection of society, punishment, deterrence, prevention
of recidivism, victim restitution, public safety, and uniformity in
sentencing (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410(a)). In taking these
objectives into account, “the sentencing judge must consider
which objectives are of primary importance in the particular
case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410(b).) The sentencing rules
additionally provide guidance on mitigating and aggravating
factors. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421, 4.423.) Consistent
with the sentencing rules, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4),
provides that the court may consider “circumstances in
aggravation” in determining whether to impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term of imprisonment.

Thus, although section 1172.75 identifies considerations to
guide the trial court’s discretion in service of the Legislature’s
overarching goal of reducing prison sentences in the interest of
justice, it does not specify the weight that the court must give to
any particular factor or set of factors. (Cf. People v. Garcia (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 848, 858 (recognizing that in a resentencing
under section 1172.75, the trial court is not limited to considering
postconviction conduct).) By contrast, section 1385, in granting
discretion to dismiss enhancements, directs the court to “afford
great weight” to evidence of mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).) The absence of similar language in section 1172.75
supports our conclusion that the trial court has discretion to
consider and give weight to all factors referenced in the statute.

Here, the trial court carefully weighed the applicable
factors and considered the relevant circumstances in detail. The
court recognized that in determining a new sentence, section
1172.75 authorizes consideration of postconviction conduct, the
typical sentencing factors under the sentencing rules, and the

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impacts of the defendant’s conduct on the victim’s family as well
as his own. (See § 1172.75, subds. (d)(2)-(3).) Consistent with
section 1172.75 and the sentencing rules, the court considered
aggravating factors, reasoning that Smith’s offense was “a crime
of great violence and great bodily harm,” that it “involved a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness,” that a weapon
was used, and that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable
position when Smith shot him. With respect to aggravating
factors concerning Smith personally, the court noted that he
engaged in violent conduct and, at the time of the offense, posed
“a serious danger to society, although [given] all of the things
that Mr. Smith has done since then, . . . [that has] lessened . . .
quite a bit.” In terms of mitigating factors, the court noted that
Smith was unlikely to engage in violent conduct again, he had an
insignificant or nonviolent prior record, he was fairly young (26)
at the time of the crime, and he self-surrendered to law
enforcement after the crime. The court also recognized that there
were several enhancements that added over 20 years to Smith’s
sentence.

The court also carefully considered Smith’s postconviction
circumstances. The court noted that Smith’s prison disciplinary
record “has been very good,” his security classification is the
lowest possible category given his offenses, and he has had no
violent interactions in prison. The court observed that Smith’s
rehabilitation record is “excellent,” commending him for his
participation in education, vocational training, work programs,
volunteering, and substance abuse counselling. In addition, the
court acknowledged that Smith has accepted responsibility for his
crimes and expressed remorse. The court recognized that Smith
had “good family support,” a job offer, and a place to reside if
released. And the court recognized that given that Smith has a
son, he has “a motive to succeed” and “doesn’t want to be re-
incarcerated.”

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The trial court explained that all of Smith’s post-conviction
factors “are factors that in the interest of justice should positively
[a]ffect Mr. Smith's sentence, but there are other interest of
justice factors as well.” The court discussed deterrence,
punishment, the continuing impact on the victim’s family, and
uniformity in sentencing.

The court ultimately concluded that Smith’s proposed
sentence for assault, a term of 14 years and 8 months, “is just too
extreme [of] a departure from the offense conduct and the
relevant factors under 1172.75 and the [Rules of Court], and I
cannot find in good conscience that the interest of justice would
be served by staying a sentence for premeditated murder and
effectively” treating Smith’s case as an assault case. The court
reasoned that imposing the 25 years to life sentence for murder,
staying the sentences on the remaining counts, and striking all of
the enhancements under section 1385—resulting in a 40-year
reduction in Smith’s sentence—met “the objectives of
resentencing . . . under 1172.75.” The court explained that the
sentence it chose to impose provided “a substantial reduction in
the sentence” based on Smith’s postconviction conduct and at the
same time “accommodate[d] and acknowledge[d] the severity of
this violent, cruel crime” of premeditated murder, general
deterrence, uniformity in sentencing, and victim’s rights.

The trial court gave thoughtful consideration to the party’s
proposed sentences, thoroughly addressed the relevant factors,
and arrived at a sentence that resulted in a significant sentence
reduction—consistent with the goals of section 1172.75 as well as
traditional sentencing factors. Where, as here, the sentencing
court balanced the relevant circumstances and reached a neutral
decision consistent with the law, we must affirm even if we might
have arrived at a different determination in the first instance.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)

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C.

Finally, the parties agree that the case must be remanded
for the trial court to calculate Smith’s actual custody credits at
the time of resentencing. In conducting a resentencing, the trial
court must calculate the actual time in custody served by the
defendant before the resentencing and credit that time against
the new sentence. (See § 2900.1; see also People v. Buckhalter
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 40-41.) We therefore remand the case
with instructions for the trial court to calculate and credit
Smith’s total time in custody.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded for the trial court to determine and
award Smith the custody credits to which he is entitled. The
court shall order the clerk of the superior court to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment memorializing this change and
transmit a copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.

People v. Smith (A168343)

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