CourtListener 10045038•People v. Smith CA3
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Filed 8/16/24 P. v. Smith CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Lassen)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099523
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 2021-
CR0023302)
v.
ROBERT KENDALE SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Robert Kendale Smith pleaded no contest to murder. In exchange, the
prosecution promised defendant that he would retain his right to appeal anything that
occurred prior to entering into the plea agreement. Defendant contends he was
improperly induced into his plea by an illusory promise and remand is required to allow
him to withdraw his plea if he so chooses. The People concede the issue. We agree with
defendant and will reverse the judgment.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An information charged defendant with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)
[further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code]) and possession of a
weapon in prison (§ 4502, subd. (a)). It further alleged a use of a deadly weapon
enhancement as to the murder count (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that defendant had a
prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170,12, subds. (c)-(d)).
At trial, defendant testified and admitted the prior strike allegation. Before the
case went to the jury for deliberation, the prosecution offered defendant a plea agreement.
The agreement required defendant to plead no contest to the murder charge and in
exchange the trial court would dismiss the prior strike conviction, lowering defendant’s
sentence from 50 years to life to 25 years to life. Defendant rejected the offer and the
trial court took a brief recess.
After the recess, the trial court gave defendant another opportunity to accept the
plea offer. Defense counsel conferred with defendant and said to the trial court, “[I]f he
pleads no contest, can he still appeal it? I think the answer is yes.” The prosecution
responded, “Yes,” and the trial court said, “I believe so.” Defendant agreed to plead no
contest to the charges as long as he could appeal the conviction because he “want[ed] to
keep [his] appeal rights.” The prosecution offered to put defendant’s request on the
record because there was “no doubt in [his] mind that [defendant’s] appellate rights
[were] preserved” and agreed to “stipulate that [defendant] has not lost any appellate
rights by virtue of his no contest plea.” Defendant then agreed to enter into the plea
agreement.
During the plea colloquy, defendant stopped the trial court and said, “I got a quick
question. Waiving my rights to do all this in my appeal, will I be able to do all this?”
The prosecutor said, “Yes,” and the trial court stated, “You’re not waiving your right to
appeal.” Defendant’s counsel also explained to defendant that admitting he committed
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the murder willfully did not affect his appeal rights in any respect. Defendant then
waived his constitutional rights and entered the plea agreement.
The trial court accepted defendant’s plea and dismissed the prior strike conviction.
The prosecution interjected, “I’d like the [c]ourt to put on the record, the defendant’s
appellate rights are fully intact, he has the right to appeal his plea and the rulings of the
trial court and he has the right to appeal all of the things that occurred in the course of the
trial and anything that occurred pre-trial is appealable.” The trial court acknowledged
that the parties agreed defendant retained “all applicable appellate rights with regard to
his case starting from the initiation of the prosecution to today’s date.”
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life. Defense counsel advised
defendant of his appellate rights and defendant filed a notice of appeal the next day. This
court granted defendant permission to obtain a certificate of probable cause, which
defendant subsequently obtained.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims his plea was improperly induced by an illusory promise that he
would retain the right to appeal any issue occurring from the initiation of his prosecution
to prior to entering the plea agreement. The People concede the issue. Accordingly, we
agree with defendant that reversal is required to allow defendant the opportunity to
withdraw his plea.
The parties and the trial court cannot, by a plea agreement, expand the jurisdiction
of the appellate court and make an issue cognizable on appeal when it has been waived
by a plea of no contest. (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9; People v. DeVaughn
(1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896.) Issues cognizable on an appeal following a guilty plea
are limited to issues based on “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds
going to the legality of the proceedings” resulting in the plea. (§ 1237.5; see also People
v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 60-64.) A defendant waives most preplea issues on appeal
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upon entering into a plea agreement. (See, e.g., DeVaughn, at pp. 893, 896 [following
guilty pleas, issue of denial of motions to suppress extrajudicial statements not
preserved]; People v. Hollins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 567, 571 [§ 995 motion to dismiss];
People v. Haven (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 983, 985-986 [motion to sever].) However, the
claim of improper inducement into a plea agreement challenges the legality of the
proceedings resulting in the plea and is cognizable on an appeal pursuant to section
1237.5. (DeVaughn, at pp. 893, 896.) Reversal is required when a defendant is induced
into entering a plea agreement by an illusory promise that nonappealable issues will be
preserved. (Ibid.)
Several times during trial defendant made it clear he would only enter into the plea
agreement if he retained his appellate rights. Each time the prosecution, trial court, and
defense counsel assured defendant he was not waiving any appellate rights. Notably,
defendant stopped the trial court during the plea colloquy and asked for clarification
regarding the rights he was waiving, and the trial court unequivocally told defendant,
“You’re not waiving your right to appeal.” The repeated assurances given to defendant
were improper. The promises made by the prosecution, trial court, and defense counsel
to defendant that his “appellate rights [would be] fully intact” if he entered into the plea
agreement were misleading.
Defendant points out the trial court denied pretrial motions, denied a motion for
mistrial, and struck defendant’s testimony. Those are potential appellate issues defendant
could have raised but for entering into the plea agreement. Therefore, the promise that
defendant would retain his appellate rights was illusory. (People v. Lee (1980)
100 Cal.App.3d 715, 718 [it “was improper for the trial court to approve the negotiated
plea bargain purporting to provide the otherwise illusory right of appeal”].) Reversal is
required to allow defendant the opportunity to withdraw this plea and proceed to trial,
should he so choose. (DeVaughn, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 896; People v. Hollins, supra,
15 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court. Upon motion
by defendant made within 30 days of the date the remittitur is filed in the trial court, the
court shall vacate defendant’s no contest plea. If defendant does not move to withdraw
his plea, the trial court shall reinstate the judgment.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
KRAUSE, J.
FEINBERG, J.
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