CourtListener 10032943•People v. Gonzalez
Full text
Filed 8/6/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B329607
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA116490)
v.
ERIC GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James Otto, Judge. Affirmed in part,
sentence vacated, and remanded.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and
8.1110, only the Factual and Procedural Background, part I of
the Discussion, and the Disposition are certified for publication.
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Marc A. Kohm,
and Lauren Guber, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury convicted Eric Gonzalez of two counts of first degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true firearm use
allegations (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)). Gonzalez appeals, arguing:
(1) the prosecutor improperly exercised a peremptory challenge to
a juror in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7;1
(2) he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without the
advisements required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436
(Miranda) and his statements were improperly admitted; (3) the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense; (4) the prosecutor
committed misconduct by stating that the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard is met every day in courts across the
country; and (5) the upper term sentence for the firearm
enhancement must be vacated because the court did not find any
aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude there
was clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable
person would view the rationale for the prosecutor’s peremptory
challenge as unrelated to the prospective juror’s race, and that
the reasons the prosecutor articulated bore on the juror’s ability
to be fair and impartial. We therefore determine the trial court
did not err in overruling the defense objection to the peremptory
challenge. In the remainder of the opinion, we conclude Gonzalez
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
2
was not in police custody during the challenged interrogation,
substantial evidence did not support instructing the jury on
imperfect self-defense, and the prosecutor’s argument concerning
the attainability of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
was not improper or prejudicial. The Attorney General does not
dispute Gonzalez’s final contention regarding the sentence on the
firearm enhancement, and we likewise agree that the court erred.
Accordingly, we vacate Gonzalez’s sentence and remand the
matter for resentencing. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying offenses
In March 2021, Kathy H. found a firearm in her daughter’s
dresser. Upon finding the gun, Kathy H. called her boyfriend,
Alexis Casarez, and asked him to get rid of it. She did not know
how Casarez disposed of the gun, which belonged to Andy Gaeta.
On July 3, 2021, Kathy H. learned that Gaeta had been
threatening her daughter once he found out the gun was gone.
The daughter told Kathy H.: “ ‘[Gaeta] won’t stop. He is really
mad, Mom. He wants the gun.’ ” Casarez overheard this
conversation and asked for Gaeta’s phone number. Casarez
called Gaeta and identified himself as the young woman’s
stepdad. Casarez said Gaeta should not have left the gun with
her, it was gone, and Gaeta should consider it a loss. Gaeta was
not satisfied. He stated that it was not Casarez’s gun to get rid of
and that they needed to meet up. Casarez arranged for them to
meet at his mother’s house that evening. Casarez, Kathy H., and
her brother, Angel Mandac, drove to the house and waited for
Gaeta.
Eventually, Gaeta showed up with Gonzalez. Casarez told
Gaeta that they would talk to him alone and Gonzalez could wait
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outside. Gaeta entered the home and sat on the couch with
Kathy H. and Casarez. Mandac remained in a bedroom so Gaeta
would not feel “ ‘on guard’ ” but told Kathy H. he would come out
and talk if things could not be resolved. Gaeta continued to insist
that it “wasn’t [Kathy H.’s or Casarez’s] gun to get rid of.” He
said he wanted another gun or money. Everyone was talking
calmly, although Casarez was frustrated.
According to Kathy H., neither she nor Casarez threatened
Gaeta. At some point, Mandac joined the conversation. He also
sat on the couch. Mandac shook Gaeta’s hand and explained that
he was Kathy H.’s brother and had heard what was going on. He
told Gaeta that he would help him but told him never to contact
Kathy H.’s daughter again. They exchanged phone numbers.
Mandac then went out on the porch. Kathy H. could hear but not
see what happened there. Mandac said “ ‘he was Striker from
Pedro’ ” and Gonzalez said “he was Troubled from the West Side.”
Kathy H. understood this to mean that Gonzalez was “part of the
gang from Wilmington,” the West Side Wilmas. Mandac’s
statement meant that he was a member of the Rancho San Pedro
gang.
Gonzalez told Mandac, “ ‘The Ranch ain’t wanted here,”
and that Mandac needed to “make something happen” that
evening. Mandac replied that he had discussed the matter with
Gaeta and they had arranged something. Gonzalez replied, “ ‘No,
you’re going [t]o make something happen, and the Ranch ain’t
wanted here.’ ” His tone was loud and he was not calming down.
According to Kathy H., Gonzalez was not trying to be reasonable
like Gaeta but instead repeated, “ ‘the Ranch ain’t wanted here,
motherfucker.’ ” Gaeta was still in the living room. Mandac was
4
calm and “just trying to let [Gonzalez] know that he is not here
for that, for the San Pedro/Wilmington thing . . . .”
After a couple of minutes, Gaeta went outside and his
demeanor changed. He seemed to doubt that Mandac would
follow through. Gonzalez continued to get more aggressive and
stated that Mandac needed to “make something happen.”
Mandac told Gaeta that he would call him and would take care of
him. Gonzalez continued to say, “ ‘The Ranch ain’t wanted
here.’ ” Mandac replied, “ ‘You know, I’m 40-something years old.
I’m not here for that.’ ” During this exchange, Casarez was
standing inside by the door, next to Kathy H.
Kathy H. felt that Gonzalez was escalating the situation.
She told Casarez they needed to leave because she was scared.
Casarez told Gaeta they would call him. It was quiet for a few
seconds before Kathy H. heard gunshots coming from outside the
house. Kathy H. could not see what was going on. Casarez told
her to run. Kathy H. ran through the house to the backyard and
hid behind a shed.
Kathy H. testified that she did not see Casarez or Mandac
with a gun that evening. After a time, Kathy H. left the shed and
went to the other house on the property to call her other brother.
Once she reached him, he told her to go check on Mandac and
Casarez. Kathy H. was still scared and did not check. Police
officers and paramedics arrived on the scene. Kathy H. did not
want to speak with the officers and only wanted to see her
brother and boyfriend. She went to the hospital and was
informed early the next morning that both had died.
The investigation
Detectives Manuel Armenta and Issac Fernandez
responded to the scene of the shooting on July 4. Evidence
5
collected at the crime scene included expended casings located
inside and directly outside the house, blood spatters, two cell
phones, and two firearms. One firearm, a nine-millimeter
semiautomatic, was loaded with 13 live rounds. The other, a .40-
caliber handgun, was also loaded and contained six live rounds.
The nine-millimeter gun was recovered near Casarez’s body,
while the .40 caliber was recovered from Mandac’s body. Crime
scene photographs showed bullet impacts to the inside of the
living room and the exterior of the residence.
Fernandez later obtained video surveillance from several
locations near Casarez’s mother’s house. One of the videos
showed Gonzalez’s brother, Sebastian Gonzalez, driving and
parking a dark vehicle on the street. Two individuals got out of
the vehicle and walked towards the residence.2 Detectives
identified one of the individuals as Gaeta. Another video showed
the dark vehicle backing up and two individuals running towards
it. Fernandez also collected body-worn camera footage from
officers who first responded to the scene. One video showed
Mandac’s body near the threshold of the house and Casarez’s
body inside the house. Another video showed an officer
recovering the .40-caliber handgun from a holster on Mandac’s
body. Armenta also collected video evidence from a hospital,
which showed the dark sedan pull up shortly after midnight on
July 4, 2021.
Armenta and Fernandez conducted a recorded interview of
Gonzalez at the hospital on July 4, 2021. Gonzalez said he had
been shot in the leg and shoulder. When asked who shot him,
2 Because Gonzalez and his brother have the same last
name, we refer to Sebastian Gonzalez by first name only. No
disrespect is intended.
6
Gonzalez replied: “They didn’t say nothing. They just pulled up
on the side of me, and I was walking home.” He claimed his
assailants were in a white car and that he had been walking
home from the house of his friend’s mother.
Forensic analyses
Mandac and Casarez were shot a total of 16 times. An
autopsy revealed that Mandac had sustained nine gunshot entry
wounds, including to the back of his head and left upper chest.
Casarez sustained seven gunshot entry wounds, including to the
front part of the top of his head, top right shoulder, and right
chest.
A Los Angeles Police Department criminalist and firearms
analyst testified that he examined the nine-millimeter firearm
that was recovered near Casarez’s body, as well as 20 discharged
cartridge cases. The criminalist testified that the nine-millimeter
firearm fired four of the cartridge cases. Two additional,
unrecovered guns fired the 16 remaining cartridge cases: 11 by
one gun and five by the other. No discharged cartridges located
at the scene were associated with the .40-caliber handgun found
on Mandac’s body.
The underlying proceedings
The People charged Gonzalez by information with the
murders of Casarez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and
Mandac (ibid.; count 2). With respect to both counts, the
information alleged that Gonzalez personally used a firearm
within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5,
subdivision (a).3 It was further alleged that counts 1 and 2
3 The information also charged Sebastian with two counts of
murder and alleged that he committed the crime of accessory
7
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness; Gonzalez had induced others to
participate in the commission of the crime or occupied a position
of leadership or dominance of other participants in its
commission; and the crimes were carried out in a manner that
indicates planning, sophistication, or professionalism. Gonzalez
pleaded not guilty to both counts and denied all special
allegations.
A jury found Gonzalez guilty of the first degree murders of
Mandac and Casarez. As to both counts, the jury also found true
the allegation that Gonzalez personally used a firearm within the
meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The
court sentenced Gonzalez to 25 years to life on count 1, plus 10
years for the firearm enhancement, for a total of 35 years to life.
On count 2, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of 25 years
to life, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement.
Gonzalez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Overruling the
Defense Objection to the Prosecutor’s Peremptory
Challenge
Gonzalez contends the trial court erred in overruling
defense counsel’s objection to a peremptory challenge the
prosecutor exercised to remove a prospective African American
juror. We find no error.
after the fact with knowledge of the crime (Pen. Code, § 32) and
had been previously convicted of a serious or violent felony. The
jury found him not guilty of the murders but guilty of being an
accessory after the fact.
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A. Background
Juror No. 1589
Potential jurors in this case received a questionnaire which
asked for biographical information and posed questions relevant
to the jurors’ ability to be fair and impartial. During voir dire,
the court asked follow-up questions based on the questionnaire,
as well as whether there was any reason the jurors believed they
could not be fair and impartial.
Juror No. 1589’s questionnaire indicated a close family
member had been the victim of a crime, and he had “experiences
with a law enforcement officer which would prevent [him] from
judging a law enforcement witness by the same standard as any
other witness.” Juror No. 1589 told the court that his cousin was
shot and killed in 2005. The police caught the perpetrator, but
Juror No. 1589 was not satisfied with the way law enforcement
handled the case. He explained: “They left my cousin on the
ground for, like, two hours before they came and checked on him.
So that really frustrate[d] the family.” He felt that law
enforcement had improperly delayed in investigating the crime
and tried “to blame us for doing it . . . .” Although the shooting
was gang-related, his cousin was not a gang member. However,
law enforcement “treated [his family] like [they were] gang
members because [they] all lived in the same neighborhood,” “[s]o
it was kind of frustrating dealing with the police.” However,
Juror No. 1589 was satisfied that the perpetrator had been
convicted and sent to prison.
The court asked whether that experience would affect Juror
No. 1589 in this case. Juror No. 1589 replied: “It’s kind of
frustrating. So I’m kind of bearded [sic] with the justice system.
So I don’t know if I will be able to—” The court interjected that,
9
as a juror, Juror No. 1589 would be part of the justice system and
would get to decide the facts of the case and apply them to the
law. It asked whether he thought he could do that. Juror
No. 1589 replied: “I don’t know.” The court asked whether he
would try his best. He replied that he would. He then answered
“yes” to a series of questions the court asked confirming that the
juror would listen to the evidence and “be fair and impartial to
both sides.”
The court then inquired about the juror’s experience with
law enforcement as reported in response to the questionnaire.
Juror No. 1589 explained that when he was 12 or 13 years old, he
was playing basketball with friends when a police car pulled up
and officers told the children to “put [their] hands on the hot
hood” of the police car. The officers beat the children’s hands
with a flashlight when they tried to move them. This experience
“kind of made [him] bitter.” When asked whether he would hold
that experience against any officers that might testify, Juror
No. 1589 replied: “I don’t know. I don’t know.” The court
explained that it would instruct the jury that the law states that
an individual’s status as a law enforcement officer does not
permit a juror to assume that person is more or less credible than
anyone else. The court asked whether Juror No. 1589 would be
able to follow that instruction. He replied: “Yes.”
Counsel for the defendants asked Juror No. 1589 several
questions, but none pertained to his ability to be fair and
impartial based on his experiences with law enforcement. The
prosecutor did not ask Juror No. 1589 any questions individually.
The prosecutor challenged Juror No. 1589 for cause. He
explained that Juror No. 1589 said “he was bitter about the way
that his cousin’s case, his murder case was handled, that he was
10
frustrated by the police. Frustrated by the police, and at one
point the court asked him, Do you think you can be fair to law
enforcement? And he said, I don’t know, and I think he said that
twice. [¶] And I want to also point out—and I think it was
obvious as well—he became visibly emotionally upset during his
discussion to the point where I think he had a hard time
articulating—getting the words out of his mouth because he was
so upset about it, just simply being able to recall it now. He said
. . . his cousin’s case happened—I believe it was in the early two
thousands. We’re roughly 20 years removed from that, and it’s
obvious that he still feels a great deal of emotional angst over the
way his family was treated during that investigation.”
Defense counsel suggested the juror was simply being
honest and answering the questions with “deep introspection,”
while “everybody else just kind of says what they’re supposed to
say, like a quarterback being interviewed after a game.” The
court denied the for cause challenge, stating: “I don’t think it
rises to for cause . . . .”
The prosecutor subsequently exercised a peremptory
challenge against Juror No. 1589. Counsel for defendants jointly
made a Batson/Wheeler objection. The court stated that it would
instead entertain a challenge under section 231.7. All counsel
agreed Juror No. 1589 was an African American male. The
prosecutor argued that the reasons he articulated for removal for
cause were race-neutral and he was continuing to assert those
reasons. Sebastian’s counsel argued that Juror No. 1589’s
distrust of law enforcement was a presumptively invalid reason
under the statute. The prosecutor contended the presumption
was overcome “in that the court specifically asked him, Can you
be fair to law enforcement? [¶] And he said, I don’t know.
11
[¶] . . . [¶] He said it twice.” The court noted Juror No. 1589
eventually said he could be fair to the People. The prosecutor
argued this “strain[ed] credulity,” as Juror No. 1589 had a
“visceral response to this line of questioning” and his subsequent
response “under pressure to say that . . . he can be fair” was not
credible.
Gonzalez’s attorney argued that Juror No. 1589’s response
“could very well be appropriate given what [Juror No. 1589]
endured,” which “probably very likely was because of his
race . . . .” Counsel for both defendants further argued that the
bases for the prosecutor’s challenge—negative experience with
law enforcement and the juror’s feeling that the police treated his
family like gang members—were invalid reasons under the
statute. The court asked the prosecutor to “articulate beyond
those two invalid reasons . . . why you are challenging him.”
The prosecutor reiterated that “the court specifically asked
him . . . [if] despite his bitterness, despite feeling frustrated,
despite all of these negative feelings that he had experienced
going through what he felt was mistreatment by law enforcement
during his cousin’s murder investigation, can he still then be fair
to law enforcement? And the court asked him twice, and he twice
said, I don’t know.” The prosecutor noted that the statute
requires an inquiry into whether a prospective juror can be fair.
He asserted he challenged Juror No. 1589 because he “specifically
told this court he is not sure whether or not he is capable of being
fair to law enforcement.”
Defense counsel argued the juror’s experiences “seem to be
likely because of race . . . .” The court indicated it heard the juror
answer the court’s questions “of how he can treat the police
officers,” and noted, “I believe, however, that really derives from
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his racial makeup . . . .” The prosecutor countered that “[m]any
people have had negative experiences with law enforcement” but
“are capable of putting it aside.” He argued that Juror No. 1589’s
“emotional response and . . . two [‘]I don’t know if I could be fair
to law enforcement[’] answers . . . crossed that barrier.”
The court ultimately agreed the prosecutor had shown by
clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable
person would view the prosecutor’s rationale as unrelated to
Juror No. 1589’s membership in a cognizable group. It therefore
overruled the defense objection and excused Juror No. 1589.
Further voir dire proceedings
Another juror stated that she and her husband had been
the victims of multiple crimes but her experiences would not
affect her and there was no reason she could not be fair and
impartial. Defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge
against this juror. The prosecutor made a section 231.7 objection
and identified the juror as an African American female. Defense
counsel argued the juror had been the victim of several crimes
but this had nothing to do with her race. The court observed she
was the second African American juror against whom defense
counsel had exercised a peremptory challenge and concluded
defense counsel had failed to identify a valid reason for excusing
the juror when she “didn’t give any indication that she would be
biased.” The court sustained the prosecutor’s objection under
section 231.7. Although no other jurors expressed distrust in law
enforcement like Juror No. 1589, several were dismissed for
cause by stipulation of both parties on the ground that the jurors
expressed a doubt as to whether they could be fair or impartial.
B. Applicable legal principles
“The Legislature enacted section 231.7, effective in criminal
13
trials beginning January 1, 2022, to establish ‘a new process for
identifying unlawful bias in the use of peremptory challenges
during jury selection’ because studies showed that the existing
Batson/Wheeler analysis[4] . . . was inadequate to prevent racial
discrimination.” (People v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534,
539–540 (Jimenez).)
As relevant here, section 231.7, subdivision (a), states that
“[a] party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race . . . .”
The party or court on its own motion may object to the improper
use of a peremptory challenge under subdivision (a). (§ 231.7,
subd. (b).) “The court shall evaluate the reasons given to justify
the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the
circumstances,” considering only the reasons actually given. (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) “If the court determines there is a substantial
likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view
race . . . , as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then
the objection shall be sustained.” (Ibid.)
4 “Claims of unconstitutional challenges of prospective jurors
are governed by a framework established by Batson v. Kentucky
(1986) 476 U.S. 79 . . . and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258
. . . .” (Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.) “Under a three-
step process, a defendant must first ‘ “make out a prima facie
case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise
to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 548.) “Under the second step, ‘ “ . . . the ‘burden shifts to the
State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” ’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Third, ‘. . . the trial court must then decide
. . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful
racial discrimination.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at p. 549.)
14
Under section 231.7, “a ‘substantial likelihood’ means more
than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely
than not.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(2)(B).) “[A]n objectively reasonable
person is aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful
discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential
jurors in the State of California,” and “ ‘unconscious bias’ includes
implicit and institutional biases.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A), (C).)
Section 231.7, subdivision (d)(3), provides a non-exhaustive list of
circumstances the court may consider in the analysis.
Section 231.7, subdivision (e), provides, in part, that certain
reasons given for the use of a peremptory challenge are
“presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the
peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence
that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as
unrelated to a prospective juror’s race . . . , and that the reasons
articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and
impartial in the case.” The presumptively invalid reasons
include “[e]xpressing a distrust of or having a negative experience
with law enforcement or the criminal legal system” and
“[e]xpressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in
racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a
discriminatory manner.” (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(1)–(2).) Clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption exists when the
court, “bearing in mind conscious and unconscious bias,”
determines “that it is highly probable that the reasons given for
the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious
or unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear
on that juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Id.,
subd. (f).)
15
Section 231.7, subdivision (g), further provides that certain
demeanor-based reasons for the exercise of a peremptory
challenge “have historically been associated with improper
discrimination in jury selection,” including the claim that “[t]he
prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make
eye contact”; “exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic
attitude, body language, or demeanor”; or “provided unintelligent
or confused answers.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(1)(A)–(C).) These
reasons are presumptively invalid “unless the trial court is able
to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the
court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the
objecting party” and “the counsel offering the reason shall
explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in
which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the
case to be tried.” (Id., subd. (g)(2).)
Section 231.7 “calls for de novo review of a trial court’s
decision to overrule an objection to a peremptory challenge, ‘with
the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial
evidence.’ ” (People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 795
(Ortiz), quoting § 231.7, subd. (j).) “The statute also limits the
bases upon which an appellate court may affirm the trial court’s
ruling. The appellate court ‘shall not impute to the trial court
any findings, including findings of a prospective juror’s
demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the
record.’ ” (Ortiz, at p. 795, quoting § 231.7, subd. (j).) Further,
“[t]he reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given
under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider
reasons that were not given to explain” the party’s exercise of the
peremptory challenge. (§ 231.7, subd. (j).)
16
C. There was clear and convincing evidence that a
reasonable person would view the prosecutor’s
rationale as unrelated to Juror No. 1589’s race
At present, only two published opinions have discussed the
application of section 231.7, subdivision (e), in any depth. We
examine both before turning to the facts before us.
In Jimenez, a Latina prospective juror expressed the view
that the law was enforced differently based on race. (Jimenez,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 541.) When asked “if she would ‘have
a difficult time being fair and considering only the evidence that
[is] presented’ even if ‘there’s no evidence that’s presented’
regarding how race affects law enforcement,” she stated: “ ‘I think
it would be difficult. I’m not saying I couldn’t do it. I also think
that I—I also think implicit bias is definitely a thing that I could
do without knowing I did it.’ ” (Ibid.) Similarly, when asked
“whether ‘it would be difficult’ to give the testimony of the officers
‘a fair shake,’ she confirmed, . . . ‘I feel like it could be one of those
things where it’s, like, always in the back of my mind as much as
I try to set it aside.’ ” (Ibid.) A White female prospective juror
expressed similar views. (Ibid.)
The prosecutor asserted a for cause challenge to the White
juror. The court granted the request over a defense objection.
(Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 541.) The prosecutor then
exercised a peremptory challenge to the Latina juror. (Id. at
p. 542.) The defense objected under section 231.7. (Ibid.) The
prosecutor offered a number of reasons for the challenge,
including the juror’s beliefs about the racial bias of law
enforcement officers. (Ibid.) The prosecutor conceded this reason
was presumptively invalid. (Ibid.) However, he argued that
“clear and convincing evidence established that this reason was
17
unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and instead ‘bear[s] on
that juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case. . . .’ ”
(Ibid.) The trial court agreed and overruled the objection. (Id. at
pp. 542–543.)
On appeal, the Jimenez court found there was clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of invalidity.
(Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) The prospective
juror’s “repeated acknowledgement that she would have difficulty
setting aside her bias against law enforcement officers to fairly
consider their testimony, despite her initial statements she could
be fair” was an undisputed fact. (Ibid.) “An objectively
reasonable person would view the prosecutor’s challenge of Juror
Number 8 due to her feelings on law enforcement as related to
her ability to be fair based on her repeated acknowledgement
that she would have difficulty setting aside her bias and being
fair.” (Ibid.) The prosecutor had also dismissed a White juror
who expressed similar doubts about her ability to be fair. (Id. at
p. 545.) In a footnote, the court explained, “[a]lthough having
views that impair a prospective juror’s ability to be fair is
typically related to a challenge for cause [citation], by its terms,
section 231.7, subdivision (e), renders the ability to be fair and
impartial relevant to the exercise of a peremptory challenge for a
presumptively invalid reason.” (Id. at p. 544, fn. 3.) “Further,
our Supreme Court also recognized that a basis for cause can be
the same as a basis for a peremptory challenge.” (Ibid., citing
People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 435.)
Because the presumption of invalidity was overcome, the
Jimenez court proceeded to consider the prosecutor’s stated
reasons under the section 231.7, subdivision (d)(3), totality of the
circumstances analysis. (Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
18
pp. 541, 545.) Under the totality of the circumstances, the court
concluded “there is not a substantial likelihood that an
objectively reasonable person would view cognizable group
membership as a factor in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge
of Juror Number 8. Rather, an objectively reasonable person
would determine that the prosecutor exercised the challenge
because of Juror Number 8’s inability to be fair based on her view
of law enforcement racial bias and her employment by a school
district. He consistently sought to excuse or challenge
prospective jurors who expressed a potential inability to be
fair. . . . Finally, the prosecutor did not seek to remove all Latino
prospective jurors.” (Id. at pp. 546–547.)
In People v. Uriostegui (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 271, the
prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against a juror with a
“Spanish surname” based on her lack of life experience, and,
among other reasons, that she was not currently employed. (Id.
at pp. 275, 276.) On appeal, the majority rejected the Attorney
General’s contention that “ ‘lack of life experience’ ” was not a
presumptively invalid reason for excusing the juror, as it was
based in part on the juror’s lack of employment, which is a
presumptively invalid reason under section 231.7,
subdivision (e)(11). (Id. at pp. 279, 280.) The court noted the
prosecutor had failed to make any showing that it was highly
probable that an objectively reasonable person would view this
reason as unrelated to the juror’s perceived ethnicity. (Id. at
p. 280.) The prosecutor further failed to make any showing that
the juror’s lack of employment bore on her ability to be fair and
impartial. (Ibid.)
Here, the prosecutor moved to excuse Juror No. 1589 for
cause because he expressed bitterness towards law enforcement
19
for its handling of his cousin’s murder, was visibly emotional
speaking about the situation to the point that he struggled to get
words out, and indicated multiple times that he did not know
whether he could be impartial towards law enforcement. The
prosecutor argued these were race-neutral reasons that also
justified his peremptory challenge.
It is undisputed that Juror No. 1589’s negative experience
with law enforcement was a presumptively invalid reason for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge under section 231.7,
subdivision (e). Thus, we consider whether the prosecutor
showed by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively
reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to Juror
No. 1589’s race and that the reasons articulated bore on his
ability to be fair and impartial in the case. That is, we consider
whether “it is highly probable that the reasons given for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or
unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on
that juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (§ 231.7,
subd. (f).)
The circumstances here are similar to those of Jimenez,
and we find the case instructive. As the court in Jimenez
observed, “[t]he statute does not limit our ability to consider
undisputed facts in the record that are relevant to the
prosecutor’s reason or the court’s finding during our de novo
review.” (Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) Here, as in
Jimenez, one such undisputed fact is Juror No. 1589’s “repeated
acknowledgement that [he] would have difficulty setting aside
[his] bias against law enforcement officers to fairly consider their
testimony . . . .” (Ibid.)
20
Juror No. 1589 expressed frustration with law
enforcement’s handling of his cousin’s murder case, and doubt as
to whether he could keep that experience from influencing his
decisions as a juror. Specifically, when asked whether he could
decide the facts of the case and apply them to the law, he said, “I
don’t know.” After further questioning from the court, he stated
that he would try his best. Similarly, in connection with his
childhood experience of being stopped and mistreated by police
officers, Juror No. 1589 stated that the experience “kind of made
[him] bitter” and twice replied “I don’t know” when asked
whether he would hold that experience against any officers that
might testify. Only after the court told him that he would be
instructed not to give law enforcement officers “more or less
credibility” than anyone else did he agree that he could follow the
instruction.
We acknowledge that in Jimenez, the reason for the juror’s
views regarding law enforcement racial bias were not expressly
stated (see Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 541), whereas
Juror No. 1589’s views appeared to be the direct result of how law
enforcement had treated him personally, both in connection with
his cousin’s murder and when officers stopped him as a child.
There was thus reason to believe Juror No. 1589’s views arising
from his past experiences were related to his race.
We nevertheless conclude that “[a]n objectively reasonable
person would view the prosecutor’s challenge of Juror Number
[1589] due to [his] feelings on law enforcement as related to [his]
ability to be fair based on [his] repeated acknowledgement that
[he] would have difficulty setting aside [his] bias and being fair.”
(Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) While a prospective
juror’s negative experience with law enforcement may be
21
inextricably related to that juror’s race, the focus of section 231.7
is on race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. In
view of his multiple uncertain and noncommittal responses
regarding impartiality, the trial court properly found it highly
probable the prosecutor’s challenge was unrelated to conscious or
unconscious bias and was instead specific to Juror No. 1589 and
bore on his ability to be fair and impartial. In other words, the
clear and convincing standard was satisfied.
Gonzalez contends that we must also analyze the
prosecutor’s challenge under section 231.7, subdivision (g). We
disagree. It is clear from the record that the prosecutor’s
comments on Juror No. 1589’s demeanor did not constitute an
independent justification for his peremptory challenge but were
intended to support his challenge on the ground that Juror
No. 1589 expressed doubt about remaining impartial in light of
his negative interactions with law enforcement. Specifically, the
prosecutor argued that Juror No. 1589 was “visibly emotionally
upset during his discussion” of what his family experienced, to
the point that he had difficulty “articulating—getting the words
out of his mouth,” which suggested “he still feels a great deal of
emotional angst over the way his family was treated during that
investigation.” The prosecutor did not suggest that Juror
No. 1589’s emotion was a “problematic attitude, body language,
or demeanor” in the abstract, or that he provided “unintelligent
or confused answers.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(1)(B)–(C).) The
prosecutor further did not indicate the juror’s difficulty in
responding to questions was a concern beyond the extent to
which it reflected his negative feelings towards law enforcement
and called into question his ability to be impartial. (Id.,
subd. (g)(1)(B).)
22
Gonzalez contends Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 768,
compels the conclusion that the prosecutor’s rationale was
presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (g), since
the trial court did not confirm his observations or require further
explanation. Ortiz provides a helpful contrast, but does not
mandate a particular result in this case.
In Ortiz, the prospective jurors were asked to complete a
four-page questionnaire. S.H., an African American prospective
juror, left an entire page blank, even though “the trial court
emphasized that all four pages must be completed.” (Ortiz,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 784.) After questioning by the court
and counsel, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge
against S.H. (Id. at p. 788.) She argued S.H. “ ‘was not able to
answer or understand some very basic questions,’ ” “ ‘seemed
easily confused or unable to answer questions,’ ” left a
questionnaire page blank, and was “ ‘soft-spoken, reluctant and
timid . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 789.) The trial court confirmed the
prosecutor’s observations regarding demeanor and asked the
prosecutor “to ‘explain why the evasiveness matters.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 790, 789.) The prosecutor cited her inability to ascertain
whether S.H. was being truthful or hiding bias. (Id. at p. 790.)
The trial court granted the peremptory challenge. (Id. at p. 791.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s findings in the confirmation stage (id.
at pp. 801–803) and the prosecutor’s reasons fulfilled the
explanation requirement of section 231.7, subdivision (g)(2). (Id.
at pp. 804–805.)
Thus, in Ortiz, the justification for the prosecutor’s
peremptory challenge was the manner in which S.H. responded
(or failed to respond) to questions. The content of S.H.’s answers
23
did not cause the prosecutor to believe he lacked impartiality;
instead, his confusion and evasiveness left her unable to make an
assessment. The prospective juror’s demeanor and inability or
unwillingness to answer questions were, standing alone, the
prosecutor’s reasons for exercising the challenge. In contrast, the
prosecutor here described Juror No. 1589’s expression of emotion
to contextualize a challenge based on the substance of Juror
No. 1589’s responses, namely his express doubts about his ability
to be fair. Under these circumstances, we disagree that the
prosecutor’s reference to Juror No. 1589’s emotion when
answering a question must be construed as an independent,
presumptively invalid, demeanor-based reason for the challenge
under section 231.7, subdivision (g).5
5 After this matter was submitted, People v. Caparrotta (July
16, 2024, D083314) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2024 Cal.App. Lexis
456] was certified for publication. Caparrotta also does not
compel the conclusion that the prosecutor’s statements should be
construed as a demeanor-based reason for his challenge. In
Caparrotta, defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges to
two White, female jurors based on the first juror’s body language
and “ ‘law enforcement connections’ ” and the second juror’s
“inability to pay attention, . . . to be seated, and to impartially
listen to the evidence . . . .” (Id. at ___ [pp. *13, 15, 12–16].) The
trial court disagreed with defense counsel’s observations and
sustained the section 231.7 challenges. (Id. at ___ [pp. *12–16].)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding, inter alia, defense
counsel’s reasons were conclusively invalid under section 231.7,
subdivision (g), because the court did not confirm the behaviors
used to justify the challenges. (Id. at pp. ___ [pp. *21–22, 34].)
As in Ortiz, claims about the jurors’ demeanors were the primary
grounds for the challenges. Further, defense counsel in
Caparrotta did not claim that the first juror’s body language bore
24
Further considering the prosecutor’s challenge in light of
section 231.7, subdivision (d)(3)(A) through (G), we find no error
in the court’s order overruling the objection. Juror No. 1589 is
not a member of the same cognizable group as Gonzalez.
(§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)(i).) Gonzalez, Sebastian, Gaeta, Kathy
H., and Detectives Armenta and Fernandez have Spanish
surnames and may be perceived as Latino or Latina. There is no
indication in the record that any person involved in the case was
African American. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(A)(ii)–(iii).) It does not
appear race or ethnicity bore on the facts of the case. (Id.,
subd. (d)(3)(B).) Although the prosecutor did not question Juror
No. 1589 about his feelings towards law enforcement, the court
did so at some length, and the prosecutor did not question any
juror on this subject. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(C)(i), (iii).) No other juror
provided the same response as Juror No. 1589 regarding law
enforcement (id., subd. (d)(3)(D)), but other jurors who expressed
doubts as to their ability to remain fair and impartial were
dismissed for cause with the prosecutor’s agreement.
We conclude, as did the court in Jimenez, that we need not
consider again here whether the prosecutor’s challenge “might be
disproportionately associated with” a cognizable group. (§ 231.7,
subd. (d)(3)(E).) The court in Jimenez observed that, although
“[i]t is true that Juror Number 8’s belief that race affects how the
law applies ‘might be disproportionately associated with’ a
cognizable group . . . the Legislature placed this reason into the
category of presumptively invalid reasons because it was
disproportionately associated with protected groups. [Citation.]”
(Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.) Because the court
any relationship to the justification based on her law-
enforcement connections.
25
“already determined that . . . there was clear and convincing
evidence that this reason bore on Juror Number 8’s ability to be
fair and impartial,” it declined to consider this circumstance
again. (Ibid.) We decline to consider the circumstance again for
the same reasons. Our prior conclusion also demonstrates that
the prosecutor’s challenge was supported by the record. (§ 231.7,
subd. (d)(3)(F).) Finally, there is no indication in the record that
the prosecutor used peremptory challenges disproportionately
against African American jurors in this or prior cases. (Id.,
subd. (d)(3)(G).) The record does not indicate that the prosecutor
used a peremptory challenge against any other African American
juror, and he objected to defense counsel’s peremptory challenge
to a prospective juror he and the court perceived as African
American, who had expressed no hesitation regarding her ability
to be impartial.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude there
is no substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person
would view cognizable group membership as a factor in the
prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove Juror
No. 1589. Rather, an objectively reasonable person would
determine that the prosecutor exercised the challenge because of
the prospective juror’s inability to be fair and impartial, as
suggested by his own acknowledgement that he did not know if
he could evaluate all testimony fairly. (Jimenez, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 546.) The trial court did not err in overruling
the section 231.7 objection.
[[Begin nonpublished portion.]]
26
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Portions of
the Law Enforcement Interview of Gonzalez
Gonzalez contends the trial court violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process by allowing the prosecution to
introduce recorded statements he made to law enforcement
without receiving Miranda advisements. We conclude that
Gonzalez was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda
when he spoke with law enforcement.
A. Background
Before trial, Gonzalez filed a motion in limine to exclude a
recorded statement he made to detectives at the hospital. He
argued the interview violated his expectation of privacy and the
statements were the product of custodial interrogation obtained
without a Miranda waiver.
During a pretrial hearing, Detective Armenta testified
about the circumstances of Gonzalez’s statements. Armenta was
assigned to the murders of Mandac and Casarez. He spoke with
Gonzalez at the hospital on July 4, 2021. Gonzalez was not under
arrest at the time and was not arrested that day. Armenta
questioned Gonzalez in a patient room at the hospital and
recorded the interview.
On cross-examination, Armenta testified that he stood near
the foot of the bed when questioning Gonzalez. He did not get a
warrant to enter the room nor did he ask Gonzalez’s permission
to do so. He also did not ask Gonzalez for permission to record
their conversation. Armenta did not ask doctors about Gonzalez’s
condition or what medications he might be on. Gonzalez
remained in bed when the officers questioned him. Armenta
testified that he and Gonzalez were the same distance from the
27
door. Armenta’s partner, Detective Fernandez, was the only
other law enforcement officer present with him. Armenta wore a
suit and identified himself as a detective. He had a firearm
concealed under his suit jacket.
Armenta and his partner went to the hospital because he
had been informed that another victim had been shot. Armenta
and Fernandez asked for and received permission from hospital
staff to enter the patient room. There were nurses and doctors
around the room while Armenta and Fernandez questioned
Gonzalez. Gonzalez was arrested four days after the hospital
interview.
Gonzalez’s counsel argued that the questioning in the
hospital room violated Gonzalez’s right to privacy and violated
both his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court
disagreed, noting that people enter hospital rooms all the time,
and there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital
room when someone enters with the permission of hospital staff.
The court concluded that Gonzalez was not under arrest or in
custody, the detectives were not required to give him a Miranda
warning, and there was no expectation of privacy since hospital
staff gave the detectives permission to enter.
B. Applicable legal principles
“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269,
338.) “To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination from the ‘inherently compelling
pressures’ of custodial interrogation,” law enforcement officers
must “advise an accused of his right to remain silent and to have
28
counsel present prior to any custodial interrogation . . . .” (Id. at
pp. 338–339, quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.)
However, a Miranda advisement “is only required when a
person is subjected to custodial interrogation. [Citation.]
Custodial interrogation has two components. First, it requires
that the person being questioned be in custody. . . . The second
component of custodial interrogation is obviously interrogation.
For Miranda purposes, interrogation is defined as any words or
actions on the part of the police that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” (People v.
Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088, 1089 (Mosley).)
“An interrogation is custodial when ‘a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.’ [Citation.] Whether a person is in
custody is an objective test; the pertinent inquiry is whether
there was ‘ “ ‘a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400
(Leonard).) “As the United States Supreme Court has instructed,
‘the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect’s shoes would have understood his situation’ ”—that is,
“whether a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have
felt he or she was in custody.” (People v. Stansbury (1995)
9 Cal.4th 824, 830.)
“To determine whether an interrogation is custodial we
consider a number of circumstances, including: ‘whether contact
with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person
interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily
agreed to an interview; whether the express purpose of the
interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect;
29
where the interview took place; whether police informed the
person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; whether
they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the
interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person’s
conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there
were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the
interview; how long the interrogation lasted; how many police
officers participated; whether they dominated and controlled the
course of the interrogation; whether they manifested a belief that
the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it;
whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or
accusatory; whether the police used interrogation techniques to
pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested at the
end of the interrogation.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Torres (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 162, 172–173.) No single factor is dispositive. (Id. at
p. 173.)
“Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes
is a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] When reviewing
a trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo
custodial interrogation, an appellate court must ‘apply a
deferential substantial evidence standard’ [citation] to the trial
court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether,
given those circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the]
defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning
and leave’ [citation].” (Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.)
C. The interrogation was not custodial
Gonzalez argues he was subjected to an unlawful custodial
interrogation. We conclude that the interview was not custodial
30
and Gonzalez’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.6
We are guided by several cases that have assessed whether
interrogations occurring in medical environments were custodial.
For example, in Mosley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, the court
considered “whether a person who is in the physical custody and
care of medical personnel such as paramedics and who is being
treated in an ambulance for a gunshot wound at the time of an
interview with a police officer should be considered to also be ‘in
custody’ for purposes of triggering the requirements of the
Miranda decision.” (Id. at p. 1089.) A law enforcement officer
questioned the defendant about how he had come to be shot while
the defendant was being treated in an ambulance at the scene of
the crime. (Id. at p. 1085.)
Division Five of this District concluded the defendant was
not in custody within the meaning of Miranda when he was
questioned. (Mosley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090–1091.)
The court observed that “[a]ny restraint of defendant’s freedom of
action was caused by the need to treat his gunshot wound, which
was still bleeding and was actively being treated during the
interview”; “[h]e had not been placed under arrest because the
police did not know what had happened that caused him to be
shot”; “the interview was in view of and in the presence of
medical personnel who continued to treat defendant during the
brief interview”; and “the questioning was not accusatory or
threatening, [the] defendant was not handcuffed, . . . no guns
were drawn, and [the] defendant was about to be transported to a
hospital and not to a police station or jail.” (Id. at p. 1091.) The
court therefore concluded that, under the totality of the
6 The Attorney General does not dispute that the questioning
at the hospital was an interrogation.
31
circumstances, “a reasonable person in defendant’s position
would not have believed he was in police custody and that no
Miranda rights were required prior to questioning.” (Ibid.)
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same
conclusion under similar facts. In U.S. v. Berres (10th Cir. 2015)
777 F.3d 1083, 1092 (Berres), the defendant identified a number
of factors that he argued indicated he was in custody during
questioning at a hospital, including that “[h]e was apparently not
made aware that he was free to leave,” “[t]he questioning related
to a potential crime committed by him,” and the “the questioning
took place in a ‘police[-]dominated’ atmosphere.” The court
disagreed. (Ibid.) It observed that the defendant “was at the
hospital on his own request”; “was not told he was in custody, nor
was he physically restrained in any way”; “appeared calm, was
completely willing to discuss the contents of his bag, and never
sought to end the interview”; and the officer “was not aggressive
or confrontational during his questioning . . . .” (Ibid.) The court
also disputed the defendant’s characterization of the room as
police-dominated. (Ibid.) Even though three officers introduced
themselves to the defendant, only one was present for the vast
majority of the interview, and all officers were in plain clothes
with no weapons displayed. (Ibid.)
Similarly, in U.S. v. Infante (1st Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 386,
396–397, the court concluded that a hospital interrogation was
not custodial where the detective “repeated to [the defendant]
several times that the interview was voluntary . . . and that [the
defendant] was not under arrest or in custody”; “[t]he officers who
were present did not make physical contact with [the defendant],
nor did they impede hospital personnel from coming and going
freely”; “[t]he interviews were relatively short”; the officers “were
32
in plainclothes and their weapons remained in their holsters”;
“[t]he atmosphere was non-confrontational”; and, the defendant
“was coherent and responsive, showing no sign of mental
impairment.”
Here, although Gonzalez’s gunshot injuries restricted his
freedom of movement, the detectives did nothing to further
restrain him. They stood at the foot of his bed and were the same
distance from the door as Gonzalez. They wore plain clothes and
did not display their weapons. Doctors and nurses were present
during the questioning. The interview was brief. The detectives
did not mention the deaths of Mandac and Casarez and inquired
exclusively about how Gonzalez had been shot. Their questioning
was not aggressive. Gonzalez responded coherently. While there
is no evidence that the detectives informed Gonzalez that he was
free to terminate the interview, there was also no evidence that
he expressed any unwillingness to speak with the detectives or
sought to end the interview. The detectives did not arrest
Gonzalez at the conclusion of the interview.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude a
reasonable person in Gonzalez’s position would have felt free to
end the questioning. The circumstances here are similar to those
present in Mosley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 1081 and Berres, supra,
777 F.3d 1083, which Gonzalez does not meaningfully
distinguish. He instead argues that these decisions “have
shortchanged the inherent coerciveness in being confined to a
hospital bed where the person cannot physically leave.” We
disagree.
Gonzalez also cites People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463
(Caro) for the proposition that our Supreme Court “has
recognized the potential for coerciveness in a situation where the
33
suspect is confined to a hospital bed.” Caro does not support
Gonzalez’s argument here. As an initial matter, in Caro, the
court declined to determine whether the law enforcement
questioning at issue violated the defendant’s constitutional
rights, concluding instead that any error in admitting the
challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Id. at p. 493.) At most, the court suggested the detective “tread
on perilous ground” by intermittently questioning the
hospitalized defendant for two and a half hours before
administering Miranda warnings. (Id. at p. 492.) The defendant
was in an intensive care unit and had just undergone brain
surgery hours before; she was in significant pain; there was
constant law enforcement presence in the room; hospital staff
appeared to believe they could not interfere with the interview;
and the defendant was isolated from friends and family. (Id. at
pp. 492–493.)
In contrast, here, the record indicates the detectives
questioned Gonzalez for under 10 minutes. There is no evidence
that Gonzalez’s mental faculties were in any way impaired when
he spoke with the detectives. Medical personnel were in
Gonzalez’s hospital room during the questioning. There was no
evidence that the detectives prevented Gonzalez’s family from
accessing him. At no point did the detectives question Gonzalez
about the murders of Mandac and Casarez. Thus, Caro does not
compel the conclusion that the interrogation in this case was
custodial.7
7 The Attorney General contends that Gonzalez’s claim that
his right to privacy was violated is meritless. Gonzalez appears
to have abandoned this argument on appeal, as he mentions the
34
III. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support an Imperfect
Self-Defense Instruction
Gonzalez contends the court committed reversible error in
failing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. We
disagree. Substantial evidence did not support the instruction.
A. Background
In his opening arguments, counsel for Gonzalez argued the
evidence would show that Gonzalez and Gaeta had been “set up
to die” by Mandac and Casarez and that they only survived
thanks to “quick thinking” and Gaeta “being able to sniff out the
setup.” Counsel for Sebastian similarly argued that Gonzalez
acted in self-defense and that Gonzalez and Gaeta were victims of
a setup. Gonzalez and Sebastian did not testify at trial.
At the close of evidence, Gonzalez’s counsel requested
instructions on voluntary manslaughter, self-defense, imperfect
self-defense, and heat of passion. The court expressed doubt that
there was evidence to support the self-defense instruction,
especially as the defendants did not testify. Eventually, the court
agreed to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense but denied the
request for an imperfect self-defense instruction. Defense counsel
did not object to this ruling. The court also instructed the jury on
voluntary manslaughter under the sudden quarrel or heat of
passion theory (CALCRIM No. 570) and provocation (CALCRIM
No. 522).
expectation of privacy only in the background section of his
opening brief. In any event, we agree that the contention is
without merit. (See In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177, 1187
[“ ‘[N]o Fourth Amendment violation occurs when a nurse
permits an officer to enter a sentient patient’s hospital room for
purposes unrelated to a search, [and] the patient does not object
to the visit.’ [Citation.]”].)
35
During closing arguments, Gonzalez’s counsel argued that
self-defense did not require that Casarez fired first and that
Gonzalez had the right to shoot in self-defense as soon as Mandac
emerged from the bedroom, as his presence indicated a setup.
B. Applicable legal principles
“An instance of imperfect self-defense occurs when a
defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or
she is in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.
[Citation.] Imperfect self-defense differs from complete self-
defense, which requires not only an honest but also a reasonable
belief of the need to defend oneself. [Citation.] It is well
established that imperfect self-defense is not an affirmative
defense. [Citation.] It is instead a shorthand way of describing
one form of voluntary manslaughter. [Citation.] Because
imperfect self-defense reduces an intentional, unlawful killing
from murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating the element
of malice, this form of voluntary manslaughter is considered a
lesser and necessarily included offense of murder.” (People v.
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132 (Simon).)
“A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on
a lesser included uncharged offense if there is substantial
evidence that would absolve the defendant from guilt of the
greater, but not the lesser, offense. [Citation.] Substantial
evidence is evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the lesser offense was committed.
[Citations.] Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is
insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense.
[Citations.] [¶] We review de novo a trial court’s decision not to
give an imperfect self-defense instruction.” (Simon, supra, 1
Cal.5th at pp. 132–133.)
36
Neither perfect nor imperfect self-defense may “be invoked
by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the
initiation of a physical attack or the commission of a felony), has
created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or
pursuit is legally justified.” (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th
268, 288.)
C. Discussion
In this case, there was no evidence from which a jury
composed of reasonable persons could find Gonzalez acted in
imperfect self-defense. (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237,
262.) Kathy H. provided the only testimony about the events
leading to the shooting. Her testimony indicated that Casarez,
Mandac, and Gaeta had reached an understanding while
Gonzalez remained outside. As soon as Gonzalez met Mandac
and learned he was a member of the Rancho San Pedro gang,
Gonzalez grew angry, rejected the agreement reached by the
other men, and repeatedly told Mandac he was not wanted there,
even as Mandac attempted to de-escalate the situation. Kathy
H.’s testimony established that the shooting began outside, while
Casarez remained inside next to Kathy H.
The physical evidence was consistent with Kathy H.’s
testimony. Mandac’s body was located near the entrance of the
house. Although he was armed, he had no opportunity to draw
his gun from its holster before he was shot multiple times. Four
of the casings recovered from the scene came from Casarez’s gun,
meaning that Casarez had the opportunity to draw his gun and
fire before he was killed. This is consistent with testimony that
he had remained inside the house and was further from Gonzalez
and Gaeta than Mandac, as well as body-worn camera footage
showing that Casarez’s body was located behind a couch in the
37
living room. The remaining 16 casings located at the scene came
from two different guns that were not recovered by law
enforcement. Mandac and Casarez were shot 16 times in total.
Thus, as the Attorney General points out, every single bullet
Gonzalez and Gaeta fired struck the victims.
There was no evidence that Gonzalez acted out of actual
but unreasonable fear in this case. The prosecution’s evidence
did not create any such inference and the defense offered no
evidence. The circumstances here are thus similar to those in
Simon. In Simon, the victim and his fiancée were visiting the
victim’s cousin and her boyfriend, Curtis Williams, when the
defendant arrived at the cousin’s house. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 108.) When the defendant learned that the victim was a
member of a rival gang, the defendant grew angry and started
cursing at the victim, who tried to de-escalate the situation.
(Ibid.) Two witnesses stated that the defendant told his friends
to go get his gun. (Ibid.) The victim’s cousin asked the defendant
to leave and Williams tried to usher the defendant outside.
(Ibid.) The defendant then asked to use the restroom and when
he came out, appeared to have calmed down. (Id. at pp. 108–
109.) The defendant and Williams later exited the apartment.
(Id. at p. 109.) The victim followed to check on Williams. (Ibid.)
Witnesses then heard three gunshots. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court concluded there was not substantial
evidence to support an imperfect self-defense instruction.
(Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 133.) It observed that the
evidence, “though hardly pellucid,” suggested the defendant was
the aggressor. (Ibid.) The record was also devoid of any evidence
concerning the defendant’s subjective fear. (Id. at pp. 133–134.)
The defendant “did not testify, and there is no evidence he ever
38
told anyone that he had acted out of fear.” (Id. at p. 134.) The
court rejected the argument that the trial court was required to
instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense because it had
instructed the jury on perfect self-defense. (Ibid.)
Unlike the victim in Simon, the evidence here was that
Mandac and Casarez were armed. However, there was no
evidence that Gonzalez was aware of this before he instigated the
conflict. Mandac’s gun was still in its holster when his body was
located by officers. Kathy H. also testified that Casarez remained
inside the house, next to her, she could not see what was
happening outside from where she stood, and she did not see
Casarez with a gun that evening. As Gonzalez did not participate
in the conversation that took place inside, the jury could not
reasonably infer that he would have known whether Casarez was
armed.8
The evidence further indicated that Mandac tried to de-
escalate the situation like the victim in Simon. There was no
evidence that either Mandac or Casarez threatened Gonzalez or
Gaeta. Gonzalez did not testify and there was no testimony from
any other person to support the theory that Gonzalez harbored a
subjective fear of Mandac or Casarez. Indeed, when asked about
his injuries in the hospital, Gonzalez did not describe being in
imminent danger from Mandac or Casarez, but instead told
detectives he was the victim of an entirely different shooting.
8 For similar reasons, we agree with the Attorney General
that the presence of a gun cleaning kit on one of the couches
inside the home is not substantial evidence supporting the
imperfect self-defense instruction. There is no evidence to
support that Gonzalez saw the kit before shooting Mandac
outside of the house.
39
Gonzalez contends that we should ignore Kathy H.’s
testimony because we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to him. While “ ‘ “[d]oubts as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of
the accused” ’ ” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 345
(Steskal)), this general principle does not permit us to ignore
uncontradicted evidence that is unfavorable to the defendant, or
to substitute speculation for evidence. (See Simon, supra, 1
Cal.5th at pp. 108–109, 133 [court’s conclusions based on
eyewitness testimony, despite contradictions and the absence of a
“pellucid” narrative of what occurred].) Here, the only evidence of
what occurred was uncontradicted.
Gonzalez further contends that he “is not aware of any rule
requiring the defendant to testify as a prerequisite to an
instruction on self-defense or imperfect self-defense.” The issue,
however, is not whether the defendant testifies, but is instead
whether there is evidence, in any form, from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the defendant perceived the victim
“posed a risk of imminent peril.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 133.) Thus, decisions issued by our high court, including
Simon, have considered the lack of a defendant’s testimony
concerning subjective fear in concluding substantial evidence did
not support an imperfect self-defense instruction. (See Steskal,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 346–347 [no evidence requiring imperfect
self-defense instruction where defendant did not testify, no
evidence he told anyone he acted out of fear, there was evidence
defendant was aggressor, and defendant fired on law enforcement
officer before he could access his weapon].)
In People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, for example,
our high court concluded the record was “devoid of evidence
40
suggesting that . . . [the defendant] harbored an actual belief in
the need for self-defense against an imminent danger to life or
great bodily injury” where he “made no claim of ever having seen
[the victim] armed with any weapon, said nothing about believing
[the victim] was armed, and never indicated he felt he was under
any imminent threat of death or great bodily injury when he
drew the firearm from his waistband.” (Id. at pp. 581, 582; see
also Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 133 [evidence that defendant
was the aggressor, defendant did not testify, record was devoid of
evidence tending to show his subjective fear of victim].)
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in
denying Gonzalez’s request for an imperfect self-defense
instruction.
IV. The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct by
Commenting on the Attainability of the Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard
Although his trial counsel failed to object, Gonzalez
contends that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s statement
that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is satisfied
every day in courts across the country. We conclude that the
prosecutor’s statements were not improper and, in the
alternative, any error was harmless.
A. Background
At the opening and conclusion of trial, the court instructed
the jury on the burden of proof, explaining that a defendant in a
criminal case is presumed to be innocent and this presumption
requires the People to prove a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
circumstantial evidence “means you take two pieces of
41
information, direct pieces, direct evidence . . . and you make a
reasonable conclusion about what those things mean.” He stated:
“[T]his is stuff all of us do on a daily basis. This is common sense
stuff.” He did not discuss the reasonable doubt standard but
urged that there was only one reasonable conclusion that could
be reached in light of all of the evidence: “that’s [sic] Sebastian
Gonzalez and Eric Gonzalez planned a murder.”
Counsel for Gonzalez discussed the reasonable doubt
standard at length during closing argument. He stated: “This is
unlike the decisions we make every day. We cannot just go with
what seems likely or even very likely. It must leave you with an
abiding lasting conviction that the charges were true beyond all
reasonable doubt. We very, very rarely make such decisions.”
During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated that
he had proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is
“nothing mythical about this standard of proof,” and that, despite
being “the highest standard of proof in this—in our system of
justice,” it “is met every day in courts throughout this country,
hundreds of times, thousands of times on a daily basis.” Defense
counsel did not object.
B. Applicable legal principles
“Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible
misconduct if he or she makes use of ‘deceptive or reprehensible
methods’ when attempting to persuade either the trial court or
the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such
misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would
have resulted. [Citation.] Under the federal Constitution,
conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the
defendant’s specific constitutional rights—such as a comment
upon the defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent—but
42
is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional
violation unless the challenged action ‘ “so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248,
298 (Riggs).)
C. The prosecutor’s statements were not improper
Gonzalez acknowledges that his attorney failed to object to
the prosecutor’s reasonable doubt argument. (People v. Seumanu
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 [timely and specific objection is
required to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for
appeal].) However, he argues that if the argument is forfeited, he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We exercise our
discretion to address the claim on the merits to eliminate the
need to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014.)
Gonzalez points out that no published California decision
has addressed the propriety of an argument that the burden of
proof in criminal cases is met every day in courts around the
country. Yet he concedes that the only published decisions
addressing this argument have rejected his contention that this
prosecution argument is improper. In People v. Laugharn
(Ill.Ct.App. 1998) 698 N.E.2d 219, 222, the court concluded the
statement that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
neither a mythical nor unattainable standard was not erroneous,
as “[t]he average jury understands the concept of reasonable
doubt and is not contaminated when it hears the prosecutor say
that reasonable doubt has reason behind it, and is an attainable
standard, which incidentally, are accurate statements.” (See also
People v. Kidd (Ill. 1996) 675 N.E.2d 910, 929 [challenge to
argument “that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt ‘is
43
a burden of proof that is met in courtrooms across this county and
in this building each and every day’ ” had been waived and,
alternatively, was meritless].)
Gonzalez contends that the United States Supreme Court
reached a different conclusion in Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436
U.S. 478 (Taylor). We disagree with this characterization of
Taylor. There, “the trial court instructed the jury as to the
prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but
refused petitioner’s timely request for instructions on the
presumption of innocence and the indictment’s lack of evidentiary
value.” (Id. at p. 479.) The United States Supreme Court
reversed an order affirming the judgment. (Id. at p. 483.) It
observed that the trial court’s instructions were “Spartan” and
the prosecutor asked the jury to draw inferences about the
defendant’s conduct from facts not in evidence. (Id. at p. 486.)
Among other things, the prosecutor “described the reasonable-
doubt standard by declaring that [the defendant], ‘like every other
defendant who’s ever been tried who’s in the penitentiary or in
the reformatory today, has this presumption of innocence until
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Ibid.) The
prosecutor thereby “linked [the defendant] to every defendant
who turned out to be guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment.”
(Id. at pp. 486–487.) In this context, “the trial court’s refusal to
give [the defendant’s] requested instruction on the presumption
of innocence resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial as
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (Id. at p. 490.)
Unlike the trial court in Taylor, the court here properly
instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence on both
occasions it instructed the jury on the burden of proof. Gonzalez
44
does not contend that the jury instructions here were skeletal or
otherwise insufficient, nor does he assert the prosecutor’s
argument was in other ways misleading or improper, as was the
case in Taylor. Moreover, the prosecutor’s statement about the
attainability of the standard of proof in this case did not “link[ ]
[Gonzalez] to every defendant who turned out to be guilty and
was sentenced to imprisonment.” (Taylor, supra, 436 U.S. at
pp. 486–487.)
We conclude the prosecutor’s statement did not constitute
misconduct. The prosecutor argued that people make decisions
about circumstantial evidence in their daily lives but did not
argue that people apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
every day to make trivial decisions. (Cf. People v. Nguyen (1995)
40 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 (Nguyen).) Rather, he acknowledged that
it is the highest standard of proof in our judicial system, while
also arguing the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
applied daily in courts and many defendants are convicted.
These statements were not inaccurate and did not trivialize the
standard. They further did not encourage the jury to disregard
the presumption of innocence.
Finally, even if the statements were improper, we would
conclude any error was harmless and Gonzalez suffered no
prejudice. The prosecutor’s statement was brief. As noted above,
the court correctly instructed the jury on the standard on
multiple occasions. We presume the jury followed the court’s
instruction. (Nguyen, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) Moreover,
counsel for Gonzalez argued to the jury at length that the
standard was not one they employed in their day-to-day lives.
We cannot conclude either the fairness or outcome of the trial
45
“was affected to any significant degree.” (Riggs, supra, 44
Cal.4th at p. 301.)
V. The Court Erred in Imposing the Upper Term for the
Firearm Enhancements Without Making the
Requisite Findings
Gonzalez contends, and the Attorney General concedes,
that the trial court failed to find the aggravating factors alleged
in the information true beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore
erred in imposing the upper term sentence of 10 years for the
firearm enhancements. We agree that the sentence must be
vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.
A. Background
Gonzalez waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating
factors alleged in the information concerning the crime. At the
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that he believed the
defendants had previously admitted the aggravating factors.
Counsel for Sebastian disputed this point, but Gonzalez’s counsel
did not. The court stated: “However, factors in aggravation as to
Eric Gonzalez are not relevant.” The prosecutor agreed. The
court stated that it had considered all circumstances and cited
several mitigating factors, including Gonzalez’s lack of criminal
history and youth. The court did not mention the aggravating
factors. It sentenced Gonzalez to 25 years to life plus 10 years for
the gun enhancement, or 35 years to life, for counts 1 and 2,
respectively, but ordered that the terms be served concurrently
based on the mitigating factors.
B. The sentence must be vacated and the matter
remanded for resentencing
“[A]ny person who personally uses a firearm in the
commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by
46
an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state
prison for 3, 4, or 10 years, unless use of a firearm is an element
of that offense.” (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a).)
Under Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (d)(2), a trial
court may impose the upper term for a sentencing enhancement
“only when there are circumstances in aggravation that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.”
It is undisputed that the trial court failed to make true
findings as to the aggravating factors and therefore erred in
imposing the upper term sentence for the firearm enhancements.
We remand for resentencing consistent with Penal Code
section 1170.1, subdivision (d)(2). We express no opinion on how
the court should exercise its discretion.
[[End nonpublished portion.]]
47
DISPOSITION
Gonzalez’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded
for resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
48
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