CourtListener 10032570•People v. Greenlee CA2/4
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Filed 8/6/24 P. v. Greenlee CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B316466 consolidated with
B329824
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. KA055428)
CHRISTOPHER ROBERT
GREENLEE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Lori A. Nakaoda, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2002, appellant Christopher Greenlee was convicted of
first degree burglary and other crimes arising from an incident in
which he served as a getaway driver for a companion who
sprayed and bludgeoned a man with a can of chemicals and stole
a safe from appellant’s acquaintance. Due to prior strike
convictions he suffered in 1991 and 1992, appellant was
sentenced to a third strike term of 25 years to life for the first
degree burglary.
As part of his most recent challenge to his sentence,
appellant moved to strike his strike priors under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Appellant also
moved to substitute his appointed counsel under People v.
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The trial court denied
the motions, which appellant contends was an abuse of its
discretion. However, we agree with appellant and respondent
Attorney General that the abstract of judgment must be corrected
to reflect the previous redesignation of one of appellant’s felony
convictions to a misdemeanor. We accordingly direct the trial
court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and send a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
2
BACKGROUND
I. Facts1
On December 21, 2001, a contractor was working at a
house owned by Steve Williams, an acquaintance of appellant’s
through appellant’s wife. The contractor saw appellant driving a
small blue car, which appellant stopped in front of the house. As
appellant spoke to a passerby, a man wearing a hoodie started
walking up the house’s driveway, but then walked away.
Appellant drove away. Soon, the man in the hoodie reappeared
and asked the contractor when he could see Williams. When the
contractor removed his safety glasses, the man sprayed the
contractor’s face with a chemical spray can, pushed him to the
ground, and struck his head and shoulders with the can. The
man took a personal safe owned by Williams and entered the
passenger side of a small blue car, which sped off. The car almost
hit a nearby driver, who wrote down its license plate number and
gave it to the police. The police determined the car was
registered to appellant’s wife.
II. Conviction, Sentence, and Direct Appeal
A jury convicted appellant of first degree burglary (Pen.
Code, § 459)2, assault with a deadly weapon—the metal can—by
means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)), and
petty theft with five prior theft-related convictions (§ 666). The
1 We draw the brief factual summary here from the most
recent appellate opinion in this matter, People v. Greenlee (Oct.
28, 2020, B299345) [nonpub. opn.] (Greenlee VI). A more detailed
summary can be found in the opinion resolving appellant’s direct
appeal, People v. Greenlee (Dec. 3, 2003, B162012) [nonpub. opn.]
(Greenlee I).
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
3
court subsequently found true allegations under sections 667,
subdivisions (a) through (i), and 667.5, subdivision (b) that
appellant sustained first degree burglary convictions in June
1991 and October 1992. The trial court denied appellant’s
Romero motion to strike the strike priors.3 It sentenced appellant
to a third strike term of 25 years to life for the burglary, and
concurrent terms of 25 years to life for the assault and petty theft
with priors; the court stayed the sentence for the petty theft with
priors under section 654. The court explained that it imposed
concurrent sentences in light of “the obvious length of” the
sentence for the first degree burglary and “the nature of the
weapon and the nature of the degree of force [were] substantially
less than other types of weapons that are typically used.” The
court nevertheless ordered the sentences it imposed on the two
five-year prior enhancements and three one-year prior
3 The portion of the reporter’s transcript in the appellate
record does not include the court’s ruling on the Romero motion.
However, the trial court read the following into the record during
the February 27, 2023 hearing, stating that it was quoting the
original sentencing court: “The court recognizes that it has
discretion to strike the enhancements under the Three Strikes
You’re Out law. The discretion is not unfettered, but the court
has to find special or unusual circumstances that warrant the
striking and that the striking would promote the interest of
justice. The defendant is convicted in the most recent matter of
an identical crime for which he has gone to prison on two
separate occasions within the last 10, 11 years. Upon his release
from his most recent incarceration, defendant returned to the
identical type of crime. The residence was occupied at that time.
The crime was deliberate and premeditated. The court finds that
there are no unusual circumstances that warrant the striking of
any strikes.”
4
enhancements to run consecutively, bringing appellant’s total
sentence to 38 years to life.
Appellant challenged his convictions and sentence on direct
appeal. In Greenlee I, a different panel of this court affirmed the
convictions but agreed with appellant that two of the one-year
prior enhancements were improperly imposed. The court struck
those two enhancements and ordered the abstract of judgment
modified to reflect the corrected sentence of 36 years to life. (See
Greenlee I, supra.)
III. Subsequent Proceedings
After Proposition 47 took effect in 2014, appellant filed
several petitions to redesignate his previous felony convictions as
misdemeanors. The trial court denied his petitions to
redesignate his 1991 and 1992 strike convictions for first degree
burglary. (See People v. Greenlee (June 28, 2017, E068142)
[nonpub. opn.] (Greenlee III); People v. Greenlee (Aug. 16, 2017,
E068280) [nonpub. opn.] (Greenlee IV).) But the trial court
granted his petition to redesignate his 2002 felony conviction for
petty theft with a prior to a misdemeanor. (See People v.
Greenlee (Feb. 16, 2017, B268860) [nonpub. opn.] (Greenlee II).)
Appellant then filed a petition to strike the remaining one-year
prior enhancement, which was based on the redesignated
conviction. The trial court denied that petition, and a different
panel of this court affirmed. (See id.) The Supreme Court
granted appellant’s petition for review, vacated Greenlee II, and
directed the appellate court to reconsider the matter in light of
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857. (People v. Greenlee (Jan.
23, 2019, B268860) [nonpub. opn.] (Greenlee V).) The appellate
court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to
strike the remaining one-year prior enhancement and exercise its
5
newly granted discretion to determine whether the five-year prior
enhancements should be stricken. (Id.)
On remand, the trial court struck the one-year prior
enhancement but declined to strike the five-year prior
enhancements after finding that doing so would not promote the
interests of justice. (Greenlee VI, supra.) Appellant appealed,
and a different panel of this court conditionally reversed after
finding that the trial court “violated [appellant’s] right to counsel
by resentencing him in the face of his counsel’s repeated and
unequivocal admissions that he was wholly unprepared to assist
appellant,” and proceeded with the hearing “without securing a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel.” (Id.) The
appellate court reversed appellant’s sentence and remanded to
the trial court “with instructions to consider, at a resentencing
hearing at which appellant receives the assistance of counsel
(unless he knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel),
whether to exercise its discretion to strike the two five-year
enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 667.” (Id.) The
remittitur was filed on December 30, 2020. The instant
consolidated appeals arise from the proceedings on remand.
IV. Proceedings on Remand
A. Romero Motion and Initial Hearings
On January 13, 2021, appellant, acting in propria persona,
filed a 42-page Romero motion to which he attached hundreds of
pages of exhibits.4 Appellant requested that the “strike priors be
4 Appellant also filed a request for resentencing under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and a request for preservation of
the exhibits introduced at his 2002 trial. The trial court denied
the request for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision
6
stricken because he has been fighting drug and alcohol addictions
for the past 30 years prior to his original sentencing hearing on
October 4, 2002, addictions his conflicted trial attorney refused to
investigate and/or bring to the trial court [sic] attention; his prior
offenses were not violent and he was only 21 and 22 years old
when he sustained his 1991 and 1992 enhancement strike priors;
and his criminal history consist [sic] of property crimes
committed while he was intoxicated under the influence of
alcohol and drugs.” Appellant asserted that his previous
appointed attorneys “failed to properly investigate the facts
and/or circumstances of his enhancing strike prior cases and
present the mitigating evidence to the court,” the probation
report contained various errors,5 and many records in his case
had been lost. He also claimed that his sister-in-law, who is a
(d)(1) on January 27, 2021 due to appellant’s lack of standing to
bring the motion. It denied the request for preservation of trial
exhibits on February 1, 2021, noting that “there is no substantial
right the defendant is attempting to enforce.”
5 The trial court ordered the People to investigate the alleged
errors, which were addressed over the course of several hearings,
the details of which we omit here. After the People submitted an
eight-page rap sheet, a 90-page certified “969B packet,” a
document summarizing those two items, and a copy of the
original probation report, the court found that the probation
report contained a single error: appellant “was convicted for
receiving stolen property and not for battery against a peace
officer.” It further found that the original sentencing court did
not rely on any erroneous convictions in denying appellant’s
original Romero motion, and that “no reasonable judge would
have relied on the erroneously listed convictions, assuming they
were erroneously listed convictions, in denying the Romero
motion.”
7
court reporter, unduly influenced him to plead guilty to the 1992
offense and falsified transcripts related to both the 1991 and
1992 offenses. The trial court, Judge Juan Carlos Dominguez,6
issued a minute order on January 26, 2021 stating that it had
“received, read, and considered” appellant’s motion and was not
taking action “at this time pending re-sentencing hearing.”
On May 12, 2021, the trial court indicated that its tentative
ruling was to exercise its discretion in favor of striking both five-
year prior enhancements based on the burglary convictions.
When the court invited the parties to address the tentative,
appellant’s newly appointed counsel raised the issue of
appellant’s pending pro per Romero motion to strike the same
burglary convictions from counting as strikes and requested a
continuance to review the motion and other “substantial
information” appellant had provided. The trial court continued
the matter.
The parties returned on November 1, 2021. At that
hearing, the court stated that the only thing it could do given the
remittitur was exercise its discretion whether to strike the five-
year prior enhancements based on the previous burglary
convictions; it stated that it “cannot revisit . . . the three strikes
or Romero motion or any of those things.” The court noted that
6 Judge Robert M. Martinez presided over appellant’s 2002
trial and much of the post-trial proceedings. After Judge
Martinez retired, the matter was reassigned to Judge Juan
Carlos Dominguez, who presided over most of the hearings
relevant to this appeal. Judge Martinez returned to the bench
briefly, and the matter returned to him for a January 18, 2022
hearing not relevant here. Judge Martinez subsequently became
unavailable, and Judge Dominguez presided over the remainder
of the proceedings and made the rulings at issue here.
8
appellant had “filed a lot of documents” pertinent to the latter
issues, but the court believed it was constrained by the remittitur
and also its inability to reconsider previous rulings by Judge
Martinez, including his denial of appellant’s 2002 Romero motion.
The court ultimately exercised its discretion to strike the five-
year prior enhancements, noting that the 1991 and 1992
convictions giving rise to those enhancements were also strike
convictions that led to appellant’s third-strike sentence. It
imposed a sentence of 25 years to life and awarded appellant
6,971 days of custody credit; the court documented the updated
sentence and custody credits in a new abstract of judgment.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 12, 2021. He
asserted that the court erred by declining to consider and thus
effectively denying his Romero motion.
Shortly thereafter, the trial court concluded that appellant
“was entitled to a full resentencing hearing which includes the
Romero motion that you’ve been trying to bring.” Appellant’s
appointed appellate counsel notified us of this development, and
we issued an order staying appellant’s appeal and holding the
matter in abeyance “pending the final disposition” of the matter
in the trial court.
B. Subsequent Filings
On December 30, 2022, appellant filed a 69-page Marsden
motion, plus accompanying exhibits. Appellant asserted that his
appointed counsel had not properly responded to the 60 letters
appellant sent him or investigated his background for purposes of
the Romero motion. Although appellant withdrew this motion at
a February 27, 2023 hearing, he “realleges and/or asks the ct. to
respond to the issues” it raised in the subsequent Marsden
motion discussed below.
9
On February 6, 2023, appellant’s counsel filed a Romero
motion. The motion primarily highlighted the probation report
errors alleged by appellant. It also noted that appellant had
served over 20 years “with no violence in his background” and
requested that the court strike appellant’s prior strikes in the
interest of justice. The motion was accompanied by a declaration
from appellant in which he detailed his “exceptional conduct”
during his incarceration, including “giving information regarding
life and death situations.” Appellant also asserted that he had
“been an active participant in self-help and rehabilitative
programming” since 2003 and earned “a significant amount of
certificates and raving work reviews.”7 He further asserted that
he had suffered from Covid-19 and Valley fever while
incarcerated.
Appellant filed a second Marsden motion on March 20,
2023. Appellant asserted that counsel failed to timely file a
motion to disqualify the court and refused to let him review
discovery from the People, provide him with copies of the exhibits
from the Romero motion appellant filed in January 2021, or
conduct any sort of investigation into his background. He also
asserted that counsel made false representations to the court,
was dismissive of appellant’s concerns about lost records and his
request to file a motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act,
and was rude to appellant. On March 21, 2023, the trial court
issued an order stating that it would hear the motion on April 12,
7 Appellant lodged several exhibits containing
documentation of his efforts and achievements in early 2019,
after Greenlee V was filed but before the remittitur issued. (See
Greenlee VI, supra.)
10
2023, at the next scheduled hearing. Appellant filed a
declaration in support of the Marsden motion on April 3, 2023.
On April 11, 2023, appellant’s counsel filed a second
Romero motion. In the motion, counsel argued that the interests
of justice required striking appellant’s strike priors. He
highlighted mitigating factors relating to the 2002 crime,
including appellant’s “minor role,” the lack of serious injury to
the victim, and appellant’s drug addiction. Counsel further
asserted that appellant “voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing at
an early stage of the criminal process,”8 Counsel also highlighted
appellant’s good conduct and rehabilitative efforts while
incarcerated and his acceptance into a long-term housing
program. Additionally, counsel noted a remaining discrepancy in
the probation report and included appellant’s claims that loss and
destruction of his records “resulted in his case being irreparably
damaged and harmed.”
C. Hearings
1. Marsden Motions
On April 12, 2023, the court began the proceedings by
hearing appellant’s Marsden motions. The court stated that it
had reviewed appellant’s filings and asked him to summarize his
most salient concerns with current counsel. Appellant asserted
that he had provided counsel with the names of “30 or 40 plus”
witnesses who could support his Romero motion claims and
“begged and implored” counsel to investigate, but counsel refused
8 This assertion was based on a statement in the probation
report that appellant “admitted to his part in the crime”
immediately after his arrest. Appellant was found guilty after a
jury trial, and the court found the prior allegations true at a
subsequent bench trial.
11
to do so and one of the witnesses was now deceased. The court
stated that the only issue before it was whether Judge Martinez’s
denial of appellant’s 2002 Romero motion had been influenced by
inaccuracies in the probation report and asked appellant to “stay
focused” on that. The court further stated that appellant
appeared to “want to reopen the whole case,” that appellant’s
counsel agreed to represent him after “two or three declined to
accept the appointment because of your reputation,” and that
counsel had successfully argued for a sentence reduction of 10
years in his case. Appellant then told the court, “You know, from
this point we can probably wrap this up within the next two or
three minutes,” since the court “did indicate that it read the 200
pages plus Marsden motion” and “[w]e don’t need to go back over
everything.”
The court then invited counsel to make his record. Counsel
stated that he had 40 years of experience as a criminal defense
attorney and had “spent many hours” on appellant’s case,
including reviewing the “over 60 letters, that is 6-0, that have
been sent to my office.” He further stated that he “investigated
what I needed to on the Romero motion,” and had filed points and
authorities in support of the motion that included information
about allegedly invalid prior convictions at appellant’s
“insistence.” Appellant responded that various lost or destroyed
records “would have proved that the priors were invalid” due to
his sister-in-law’s involvement and his lack of a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to jury trial.
The court told appellant that he could not relitigate his
convictions. It then found that appellant’s counsel properly
represented him and would continue to do so. The court observed
that appellant had filed numerous Marsden motions throughout
12
the course of the case and seemed to do so “if the attorney does
not do exactly what you want them to do.” The court stated that
an attorney “is not to be a yes man” and instead “is to properly
advise you and to give you guidance and not do to things that are
not appropriate.” It denied the motions.
2. Romero Motions
Upon returning to open court, the trial court acknowledged
its error in failing to allow argument on the Romero motions at
the November 1, 2021 hearing and invited counsel to “argue
whatever you deem appropriate.”
Appellant’s counsel directed the court’s attention to
appellant’s declaration and claims that he had assisted
correctional officers and had done well in college classes while
incarcerated. Counsel also argued that appellant was “an
addicted drug offender who “was suffering from extreme drug
abuse” at the time of the most recent crime, and had tried to get
help but was unable to do so. Pointing to evidence of a mental
status exam conducted in 2002, counsel argued that appellant
“was involving himself in these burglaries and in these theft
cases, receiving stolen property and residential burglaries
because of the extreme drug situation that he had.” Counsel
further asserted that appellant “alleged he was a victim of
childhood abuse and trauma, both physically and mentally,” had
been attacked on multiple occasions while incarcerated, and was
unable to litigate the matter as he wished due to the loss or
destruction of his records. Counsel additionally argued that
appellant suffered his prior strike convictions over 30 years ago
and had served approximately 22 years in prison, and that the
interests of justice required striking the prior strike convictions
and resentencing appellant to a non-third-strike term.
13
The People responded that the Romero motion should be
denied because appellant’s “record shows a pattern of property
offenses which has been continued, unabated despite significant
prior court sanctions being imposed.” They further argued that
appellant’s role as the getaway driver in his third strike offense
was not as minimal as appeared, because appellant knew the
victim and “was the mastermind” of the crime.
After remarking that residential burglaries are severe
because they “invad[e] someone’s home” and “completely shatter[
] their sense of security,” the court made its oral ruling. It stated,
“repeated actions by an individual, notwithstanding his drug
abuse, is just not a motivating factor. Now, we have to realize
that. [¶] We have had a lot of laws that have come through that
have affected 1385 and . . . that applies to enhancements. It does
not apply to a third strike conviction. The third strike legislation
is a separate and distinct sentencing scheme. It is not an
enhancement. [¶] So the court, obviously, when on a
resentencing considering striking a strike, the court, of course,
should take a look at prior drug abuse, youths [sic], and those
types of things in order to make an informed decision, but it
doesn’t fall within the guidelines that are contained in 1385
because that applies to enhancements. But assuming for the
moment that it did apply to a strike conviction, the court does not
find under 1385 any mitigating evidence that the court should
exercise.”
The court continued, citing People v. Beasley (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 495 for the proposition that “the court’s great power
to dismiss a prior strike conviction should only be used in
extraordinary circumstances when the ends of justice demand it.
In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider whether
14
in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, in [sic] the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme spirit [sic] in whole
or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not been
previously convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies. [¶]
And, of course, the court must remember the Three Strikes law is
not discretionary in nature. Rather, the law must be applied
when the defendant has two or more prior strikes unless the
court concludes an exception to the law should be made because,
for articulable reasons that can withstand scrutiny for abuse, the
defendant lies outside the spirit of the law such that he should be
treated as though he had not been previously convicted of one or
more felonies.”
The court then noted that appellant was “expected to
behave in state prison,” and there was no corroboration of his
claims that he assisted law enforcement while incarcerated. It
then turned its attention to “the time he did these things,
committed this offense.” The court stated that appellant
“targeted a friend, . . . conspired to steal the safe,” and his
coconspirator struck the victim with a can.” It then concluded its
remarks, stating, “based on the forgoing [sic], the court denies the
Romero motion. The sentence issued by the court in response to
the remittitur will stand.” The court did not update appellant’s
custody credits or prepare a new abstract of judgment.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. We lifted the stay
on his previous appeal and consolidated the two appeals for all
purposes.
15
DISCUSSION
I. Romero Motions
A trial court must decide whether to strike a prior strike by
considering factors that are intrinsic to the Three Strikes law's
sentencing scheme. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,
161 (Williams).) These factors include: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the current conviction; (2) the nature and
circumstances of the prior strike conviction; and (3) the
defendant’s “background, character, and prospects.” (Ibid.) If the
defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, the
court may, in furtherance of justice, treat the defendant “as
though he [or she] had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Ibid.; see also Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530; § 1385, subd. (a).) We review a
trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) “[A] trial court
does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at
p. 377.) “We presume the trial court has considered all relevant
factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary,”
and that it “correctly applied the law.” (People v. Edwards (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 523, 529.)
A. Failure to Consider Relevant Factors
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to consider factors relevant to the nature and
circumstances of appellant’s prior strike convictions and his most
recent offense. Those factors include appellant’s youthful age at
the time of the strike priors, his “addicted offender” status at the
time of all three crimes, and his prospects for rehabilitation.
16
1. Youthful Age
In light of “‘scientific evidence that neurological
development, particularly in areas of the brain relevant to
judgment and decision making, continues beyond adolescence
and into the mid-20’s’” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834,
846), a defendant’s youthful age at the time of an offense has
been recognized as a relevant consideration in numerous areas of
criminal law. (See People v. Jimenez (July 22, 2024, D081951)
___ Cal.App.5th ___, WL 17350938, at p. *6.) Indeed, “even if not
dispositive, [youthful age] is plainly relevant to the nature and
circumstances of the strikes and could be a mitigating factor.”
(People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142.) Youthful age
is generally defined as under age 26. (See, e.g., § 1016.7, subd.
(b); § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B); § 3051; § 4801, subd. (c).)
At the time of his strike convictions for first degree
burglary, appellant was 21 and 22 years old. Appellant raised
the issue of his youthful age at the time of these offenses in his
pro per Romero motion, which the court “received, read, and
considered.” The court also specifically recognized that “on a
resentencing considering striking a strike, the court, of course,
should take a look at prior drug abuse, youths [sic], and those
types of things in order to make an informed decision.” The court
nevertheless concluded that, on balance, it “does not find under
[section] 1385 any mitigating evidence that the court should
exercise.” Contrary to appellant’s claim that the court “clearly
did not consider youth as a factor specific to Mr. Greenlee,” and
failed to “genuinely take into consideration a youthful offender’s
differences,” the court’s remarks indicate that it considered
appellant’s age but accorded it less weight than appellant would
prefer. This was not an abuse of discretion.
17
Appellant also asserts that his “youth (and its
accompanying lack of maturity) was plainly relevant to the
nature and circumstances of the burglaries used to greatly inflate
his sentence.” However, nothing in the voluminous record
indicates that “hallmark features of youth,” such as “immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”
(Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477), or an increased
susceptibility to peer pressure (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 991), played an appreciable role in appellant’s
commission of these offenses. Notably, appellant committed the
same crime for a third time at age 31 in 2001.
2. Addicted Offender
A defendant’s drug addiction may be considered a
mitigating factor in the context of a Romero motion. (See People
v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 503; People v. Avila, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1143-1144; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.423(b)(2). ) However, this factor may also cut the other way
“where the problem is long-standing” and unaddressed. (People
v. Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1144.)
Appellant contends that although “addiction provided the
backdrop to all three strike convictions,” the court “failed to
properly consider evidence of Mr. Greenlee’s status as an
addicted offender with mental health issues.” Appellant points to
various evidence in the record, including his 1991 conviction for
possession of drug paraphernalia, exhibits attached to his pro per
Romero motion showing his “disadvantaged” and “dysfunctional”
background, and statements appellant made about his substance
use during a 2002 mental status exam.
Appellant’s counsel expressly called the court’s attention to
appellant’s “extreme” struggles with drug use, both orally and in
18
his written Romero motion. Appellant’s pro per Romero motion
and accompanying exhibits also discussed his alcohol and drug
use. As noted above, the court indicated it reviewed the evidence
appellant submitted, and it directly referenced “prior drug abuse”
when ruling on the Romero motions. It concluded that “repeated
actions by an individual notwithstanding his drug abuse, is just
not a motivating factor.” It is clear from the court’s remarks that
it considered appellant’s substance abuse issues.
Appellant argues that the court also erred to the extent its
comments about his repeated actions “can be construed as a
reference to Mr. Greenlee’s purported failure to address his
addiction problem.” There is no basis to construe the court’s
comments in this fashion. The context of the court’s remarks
indicate that it was referring to appellant’s continuous criminal
history, including repeated first degree burglaries.
Appellant asserts that his “criminal conduct consisted
entirely of theft-related offenses (petty theft, receiving stolen
property, burglaries) committed to f[u]nd and/or finance his
addictions,” and he “was not out committing random acts of
violence such as carjacking or armed robberies.” A crime need
not be random or violent to qualify as a strike offense; the Three
Strikes law applies to “those who commit a felony and have been
previously convicted of one or more serious or violent felony
offenses.” (§ 667, subd. (b); see also § 1170.12, subd. (a).) First
degree burglary is a serious felony by definition (§ 1192.7, subd.
(c)(18)), and the court recognized that “invading someone’s home,
in whatever fashion . . . goes [sic] more than the person missing
their t.v.[;] it completely shatters their sense of security in a place
where you should feel secure.” The court also observed that
during a residential burglary, “the homeowner is probably going
19
to react . . . to protect their family, themselves, or their property,”
and the contractor victim of the current offense was hit in the
head with a can. Appellant dismisses these observations as
“arbitrary speculation” that “bases the severity of punishment on
what could have been, rather than what was.” However, the
third strike sentence was imposed for the most recent offense, in
which the victim was injured.9 Victim vulnerability is a proper
aggravating factor, as is the use of a weapon. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(2), (a)(3).)
3. Prospects for Rehabilitation
Appellant contends the court did not consider his prospects
for or efforts toward rehabilitation, including his good behavior,
educational achievements,10 self-help for mental health issues,
and acquisition of employable skills. He further contends the
court did not consider his lack of violent offenses, the
redesignation of some of his felonies to misdemeanors, and the
relatively minor nature of the can-based assault, which appellant
emphasizes was completed by the other participant in the
offense. He asserts that these facts all demonstrated that his
9 Appellant was sentenced to two years for the 1991 first
degree burglary, and eight years for the 1992 burglary.
10 Appellant asserts that he “took adult education classes and
passed the GED examination,” but the record reflects that
appellant obtained his GED in 1988, prior to the beginning of his
criminal history in late 1989. The record does support appellant’s
assertion that he took and did well in college classes while
incarcerated. He took “Health 140” in 2012 and “Intro to
Addiction Studies” in 2017. The record also indicates that
appellant successfully completed “Vocational Greenhouse and
Nursery Operations” in 2006, “Forklift Operator Certification” in
2018, and was certified as a tractor-trailer driver while he was
out of custody in 2001.
20
“prospects for change were promising,” particularly in light of the
“punitive length” of the third strike sentence, “which is a very
long sentence for a first violent offense given that the nature and
degree of force was substantially less than that typically used.”
As appellant acknowledges, his trial counsel “referenced
some of these records in the Romero motion.” The court referred
to appellant’s behavior while incarcerated, stating, “And his
comportment in state prison, he is expected to behave in state
prison.” The court also specifically cited case law recognizing its
obligation to “consider whether in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, in the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the [Three Strikes] scheme spirit [sic] in whole or in part.”
The court’s statements reveal that it was aware of its
obligation to consider and did consider appellant’s behavior in
prison. The court also had before it various records documenting
appellant’s intermittent participation in self-help and educational
programming, and laudatory statements from his supervisors at
the CAL/PIA General Fabrication facility within his place of
incarceration. We presume the court considered these materials
and did not find them compelling in light of the aggravating
factors.
We further presume, particularly in light of the extensive
focus on alleged errors in appellant’s probation report (see fn. 5,
infra), that the trial court was aware of the nature of his previous
offenses, including those redesignated as misdemeanors. As
discussed above, the lack of violent offenses in appellant’s
criminal history did not remove him from the ambit of the Three
Strikes law, which by its terms applies to serious felonies as well.
21
The court also made no mention of the misdemeanor offenses; it
focused instead on the previous serious felonies, noting that “any
judge would hang their hat on[ ] those two prior convictions.”
Appellant has not shown the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to consider relevant factors.
B. Consideration of Improper Factors
Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
considering factors outside the ambit of the Three Strikes law,
though the substance of this argument appears to be that the
court made factual findings unsupported by the record.
Specifically, appellant states that “the court was particularly
offended by the idea that the homeowner was Mr. Greenlee’s
friend, and that the homeowner was injured by Mr. Greenlee’s
actions. These assumptions are not supported by the record.” He
further asserts that the court’s “misapprehension of the
underlying facts pertaining to Mr. Greenlee’s actual conduct led
to the court’s misapplication of the law by focusing solely on the
current offense to the exclusion of the other Williams factors.”
Appellant also argues that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the court’s “misapprehension of
the facts of the current offense” and its “improper reliance
exclusively on that offense as the basis for denying the Romero
motion.”
Although the court perhaps used the term “friend” loosely,
there is no dispute that the homeowner whose home and safe
were targeted in the offense was appellant’s acquaintance. The
People made that clear to the court during their argument,
stating that the victim “knew the defendant whose wife was a
friend of an old roommate.” As respondent asserts, “[t]his fact
was important because it indicated that this was not a random
22
crime of happenstance, but one that appellant himself
premeditated because of knowledge he had gained from his
contacts with the victim or with people close to the victim. The
point was not that appellant had a close friendship with the
victim, but that his insider knowledge was the linchpin for the
robbery.” Similarly, the court appears to have misspoken when it
stated that the person injured in the burglary was the
homeowner; the person sprayed with chemicals and bludgeoned
with a can was a contractor working in the homeowner’s garage.
Appellant contends this indicates that the court “based its
decision [on] things that did not actually happen,” but the
contractor was indeed physically harmed with a weapon during
the course of the crime. As noted above, use of a weapon during a
crime is a proper aggravating factor, and the court’s concern that
a homeowner would “react to protect their family, themselves, or
their property” encompasses people on the property aside from
the homeowner. We do not find an abuse of discretion in the
court’s minor misstatements.
Nor do we find that appellant’s counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to correct the misstatements or otherwise
object to the court’s handling of the Romero proceedings. To
demonstrate that counsel was ineffective, “the defendant must
first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. Second, the defendant must show resulting
prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. When examining an ineffective assistance claim,
a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions,
and there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range
23
of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57
Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “[D]eciding whether to object is inherently
tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective
assistance.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502.)
This is not one of the rare cases in which it does. Even if the
court had corrected its misstatements—which it demonstrated a
willingness to do when the People clarified that the weapon was a
can instead of a lock—there is no reasonable probability that its
ruling would have been different. As discussed above, the court
took evidence and heard argument regarding factors other than
the current offense. Appellant’s counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object to the court’s discretionary weighing of these
factors.
II. Marsden Motions
A criminal defendant has no absolute right to substitute
appointed counsel. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789,
803, citing Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) “When a
defendant seeks substitution of appointed counsel . . . ‘the trial
court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his
contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate
performance. A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly
shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate
representation or that defendant and counsel have become
embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective
representation is likely to result.’” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48
Cal.4th 574, 599 (Taylor).) To establish inadequate
representation a defendant must show both that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different absent the error. (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p.
24
1009.) To establish an irreconcilable conflict, generally the
defendant must point to actions by the attorney that led to a
breakdown of the relationship. (See People v. Smith (2003) 30
Cal.4th 581, 606 [upholding denial of Marsden motion where
“[d]efendant did not show that defense counsel did anything to
cause any breakdown in their relationship”].) A defendant may
not manufacture a conflict through his or her own conduct or
“effectively veto an appointment of counsel by claiming a lack of
trust in, or inability to get along with, the appointed attorney.”
(Ibid.) We review a trial court’s denial of a Marsden motion for
abuse of discretion. (Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 599.)
Appellant argues that his Marsden motions should have
been granted because his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
He concedes that “several of [his] complaints of deficient
performance were not relevant to the Romero motion, and neither
the court nor counsel can be faulted for failing to pursue those
claims.” However, he maintains that his “claim that trial counsel
was not investigating [his] background or locating and
interviewing potential witnesses was a legitimate concern the
court should not have ignored.” Appellant contends his counsel
“made merely a pretense” of assisting him with the Romero
motion, and the court “shut him down” when he tried to explain
counsel’s investigatory shortcomings. Appellant contends
counsel’s failure to investigate prejudiced him, because
“[c]ommon sense dictates that the absence of supporting evidence
necessarily has an adverse impact on the credibility of the claims
asserted in the written pleading.” In support, he points to the
court’s comment about a lack of evidence corroborating his claims
that he assisted law enforcement while incarcerated.
25
We find no ineffective assistance of counsel or abuse of the
court’s discretion. At the Marsden hearing, appellant told the
court he had given counsel “several names of witnesses” to
investigate. He then identified one of those witnesses by name
and explained the witness could corroborate his claim that he
tried to seek help for his substance abuse but his “parole officer
wouldn’t allow me to go into the program.” Appellant told the
court that counsel “contacted [the witness] and said he would like
[the witness] to put [his testimony] in email format.” The witness
died before he was able to do so. The record thus reflects that
counsel investigated at least one of the witnesses appellant
deemed crucial to his motion. Appellant told the court that he
gave counsel “probably the better part of 30 or 40 plus additional
witnesses” to investigate, and his pro per Romero motion includes
an exhibit that appears to identify many of these witnesses and
highlight various aspects of appellant’s difficult upbringing and
substance abuse about which they could provide further
information. However, “[d]efense counsel is not required to
investigate all potential witnesses.” (People v. Vera (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 970, 979.) Counsel represented that he had
reviewed the dozens of letters appellant sent him and
“investigated what I needed to on the Romero motion,” and he
presented arguments both in orally and in writing that appellant
suffered from childhood abuse and trauma, “was an addicted
drug offender,” and “tried to get help but was unable to do so.”
There is no indication that the court discredited the substance of
these arguments due to the lack of witness testimony or other
26
corroborating evidence.11 Instead, the court found appellant’s
drug abuse was “not a motivating factor” warranting the striking
of his strike priors for “repeated” residential burglaries. The
court’s adverse discretionary ruling does not render counsel
ineffective.
Appellant does not argue any other bases for finding
prejudice here, such as identifying specific witnesses who could
have provided mitigating evidence counsel did not argue or the
court did not consider. He asserts that the court could have
appointed new counsel and continued the matter because delay
for further investigation would not prejudice either side, but that
is not a pertinent consideration in assessing counsel’s
performance.
III. Abstract of Judgment
The trial court did not issue a new abstract of judgment
after it denied appellant’s Romero and Marsden motions at the
April 12, 2023 hearing. Appellant contends the trial court must
issue a new abstract of judgment for two reasons. First, he
asserts that the most recent abstract, prepared after the
November 1, 2021 hearing, does not fully reflect the actual
number of days he served between his initial date of
incarceration and the date of his most recent resentencing, April
12, 2023. Second, he asserts that the most recent abstract does
11 The record includes a letter documenting appellant’s
“vigorous attempt . . . to enroll” in a “long term alcohol recovery
program” in September 1992, and appellant’s parole officer’s
rejection of his entry because the officer “preferred his own
random testing and all the difficulties involved in allowing Mr.
Greenlee to report to [the officer] weekly.” The letter
corroborates appellant’s claims that he suffered from and sought
help for substance abuse.
27
not reflect the redesignation of his conviction for petty theft with
a prior from a felony to a misdemeanor. Respondent agrees that
the abstract should be modified to reflect the redesignation. We
concur.
“An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction;
it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment
and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest
or summarize.” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
(Mitchell).) Here, the trial court orally redesignated appellant’s
conviction for petty theft with a prior to a misdemeanor on
December 1, 2015, a change recognized in Greenlee II. (See
Greenlee II, supra.) Appellant’s overall sentence remained the
same, because the sentence on that count had been imposed
concurrently and stayed pursuant to section 654. Nevertheless,
the abstract of judgment should accurately reflect the current
status of appellant’s convictions and sentence. (Mitchell, at pp.
185, 188 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time; appellate
court may order trial court to make correction to abstract of
judgment].)
The most recent abstract of judgment, prepared after the
November 1, 2021 hearing, already reflects the custody credits
appellant accrued to that point. And because the trial court did
not make any changes to appellant’s sentence on April 12, 2023,
it was not required to recalculate those credits or issue a new
abstract. (See People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29
[holding that a trial court must recalculate a defendant’s custody
credits when “a prison term already in progress is modified”].)
DISPOSITION
The abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect the
previous redesignation of appellant’s 2002 conviction for petty
28
theft with a prior from a felony to a misdemeanor. The judgment
is otherwise affirmed as modified. The trial court is directed to
prepare and forward an amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P.J.
ZUKIN, J.
29
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