CourtListener 10031655•Greisman v. FCA US, LLC
Full text
Filed 8/5/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION ∗
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MIRIAM GREISMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A166919
v.
(Solano County
FCA US, LLC, et al., Super. Ct. No. FCS051933)
Defendants and Respondents.
Miriam Greisman bought a used 2014 Chrysler Town & Country, a
vehicle that soon developed problems. When the problems could not be
successfully addressed by the manufacturer, Greisman filed a lemon law
action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act against the
manufacturer and the dealer. A mandatory settlement conference before the
court was held over Zoom, at the conclusion of which the parties advised the
judge that the case was settled for $100,000, a settlement confirmed on the
record.
An issue arose as to whether the settlement amount was inclusive or
exclusive of attorney fees, resulting in the parties filing competing motions,
Greisman to reset the case on the trial court calendar (and/or other relief),
defendants to enforce the settlement. The trial court ordered an evidentiary
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976(b) and 976.1, only the
∗
Background and Part I and Subheadings thereunder are certified for
publication.
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hearing on the settlement issue, which was held over four days.
Following that hearing, the trial court filed an 11-page order approving
the settlement—and finding that the $100,000 was inclusive of
attorney fees. Greisman appeals. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Setting
In August 2015, Greisman purchased a used 2014 Chrysler Town &
Country from CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC (CarMax). The
vehicle was manufactured by FCA US, LLC (FCA). Greisman paid $22,599,
an amount she financed along with other expenses. In connection with her
purchase, Greisman received a written warranty, including a three-year,
36,000 mile, bumper-to-bumper warranty and a five-year, 60,000 mile
powertrain warranty that covered, among other things, the engine and
transmission. The vehicle developed numerous mechanical issues, including
oil light illumination, check-engine light illumination, loss of power, engine
misfire, and rough running, issues the manufacturer FCA was unable to cure.
The Lawsuit
In November 2018, Greisman filed a complaint under the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790, et seq.) naming two defendants,
FCA and CarMax (collectively, defendants). The complaint alleged five
causes of action, the first four of which were against FCA only, alleging
claims under various Civil Code sections: (1) failure to repair within a
reasonable number of opportunities (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (d)); (2) failure
to commence repairs within a reasonable time and/or to repair the vehicle
within 30 days (id., subd. (b)); (3) failure to make available to authorized
repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts (id., subd.
(a)(3)); and (4) breach of express warranty. The fifth cause of action, alleged
against both FCA and CarMax, was for breach of implied warranty of
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merchantability.
Greisman was represented by Tionna Dolin of Strategic Legal
Practices, APC (Strategic Legal), which firm remained Greisman’s attorneys
throughout the proceedings below, and Ms. Dolin and the firm are listed as
co-counsel on appeal. In May 2022, the firm of Nemecek & Cole, APC
associated in as Greisman’s counsel, and remains so today, being the other
co-counsel on her brief. In the course of the proceedings below at least seven
different individual attorneys appeared on behalf of Greisman in pleadings or
court appearances.
On January 11, 2019, represented by Schlichter & Shonack, LLP,
CarMax filed a demurrer. The demurrer was overruled, and on June 3
CarMax filed its answer.
Meanwhile, on January 17, FCA had filed an answer. FCA was
represented by Universal & Shannon, LLP, specifically Jon D. Universal of
that firm, who remained counsel throughout and is co-counsel on appeal. On
July 12, CarMax substituted Mr. Universal as its attorney in place of
Schlichter & Shonack.
On July 11, Mr. Universal served a Code of Civil Procedure section 998
offer, an offer that stated it was from FCA on behalf of “itself and defendant
CarMax.” Defendants offered to pay Greisman $70,000 “[i]n exchange for the
subject vehicle and a dismissal of this action with prejudice in its entirety”
and, in addition, her “reasonable costs, expenses and attorney’s fees based on
actual time expended pursuant to Civil Code [section] 1794[, subdivision] (d)
as stipulated by the parties, or if the parties cannot agree, upon motion to the
court having jurisdiction over this action.”
On May 27, 2020, Mr. Universal filed an amended answer on behalf of
defendants in which they “admit[ted] [to] each and every allegation in the
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complaint to the extent these answering defendants or its authorized repair
facilities were unable to conform [Greisman’s] vehicle to the applicable
express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts.” The amended
answer further stated that defendants had “offered to reimburse” Greisman:
“[Payment of] her actual damages under the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act in the amount equal to the vehicle payments made by plaintiff,
and including any charges for transportation and manufacturer-installed
options, including any collateral charges such as sales tax, license fees,
registration fees and other official fees, plus any incidental and consequential
damages to which plaintiff is entitled, including but not limited to,
reasonable repair, towing and rental car costs actually incurred by plaintiff,
less that amount directly attributable to use by plaintiff prior to discovery of
the nonconformities, plus the aggregate amount of costs and expenses,
including attorney’s fees, reasonably incurred in connection with the
commencement and prosecution of this action, all pursuant to Civil Code
sections 1793.2[, subdivision] (d) and 1794[, subdivision] (d). Defendants
have also offered two times actual damages.”
Greisman’s opening brief asserts—an assertion apparently made to
demonstrate how she would never accept $100,000 inclusive of her significant
attorney fees—that “[n]otwithstanding the amended answer in which
[defendants] . . . admitted liability . . . , the case went through over 17 months
of additional intense litigation.” Greisman’s brief does not elaborate as to
what that litigation involved—or which side was responsible for it.
Defendants have a different spin on this, asserting—an assertion
apparently made to demonstrate that Greisman’s conduct in the face of
admitted liability was solely to generate attorney fees—that “[r]ather than
joining in defendants’ request for entry of judgment for the plaintiff, plaintiff
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and her counsel chose to prolong the litigation and run up fees, pursuing
discovery, and eventually bringing two motions for summary adjudication.”
As to all that happened in the “17 months of additional intense
litigation,” what we glean from the record is that most of the litigation was
caused by Greisman, a big chunk of which was for two motions for summary
adjudication brought by her. Specifically:
On July 1, 2020, Greisman filed a motion for summary adjudication
that with its supporting papers was almost 100 pages in length. The motion
sought summary adjudication on Greisman’s first cause of action, and by way
of damages sought “$134,407.65 ([a]ctual damages of $37,935.91 + two times
civil penalties of $75,871.82 + prejudgment interest of $20,599.91.)”
Defendants’ opposition argued that Greisman had failed to produce
evidence of her actual out-of-pocket costs, as required to determine her actual
damages. Defendants also contended that the damage request included
categories of damages unavailable as a matter of law.
The trial court denied the motion, finding “a triable issue of material
fact regarding the amount of actual damages suffered by plaintiff.”
Apparently undaunted, Greisman filed a second motion for summary
adjudication, again with lengthy moving papers, this on the second cause of
action for failure to effect repairs within 30 days and “including on the issue
of the amount of damages.” The motion contended that defendants’ amended
answer implicitly admitted liability on her second cause of action, and that
defendants’ offer in its answer to pay restitution and two time damages
operated as a concession that Greisman was entitled to recover those
amounts under her second cause of action.
Defendants’ opposition argued among other things that Greisman’s
damages request again included disputed amounts.
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The trial court denied this motion as well, holding that Greisman
had “again” overlooked disputed damages issues and had failed to
“present any evidence pertaining to any damages caused by the delay
in repair.” 1
Shortly after denying the motion, the trial court scheduled a
mandatory settlement conference (MSC) to take place on December 20,
2021 before the Honorable Christine A. Carringer. In advance of that
conference, Greisman and FCA submitted MSC statements detailing
their positions.
Greisman’s statement set forth that she was seeking actual damages in
the amount of $42,052.32 (the approximate total sale price of the vehicle),
plus civil penalties in the amount of $84,104.64 (i.e., two times that amount
of actual damages), for a total of $126,156.96. And separate from those
claimed damages, Greisman’s statement mentioned her entitlement to
attorney fees, costs, and expenses but without indicating an amount. As
Greisman’s brief puts it, “[her] statement did not discuss the specific amount
of the fees and costs she had incurred in the over three years of intense
litigation.”
FCA’s statement, in a section entitled “FCA’s MSC Position,”
stated that, “[w]ith liability and actual (plus civil penalties) damages,
costs, attorney’s fees and legal expenses all generally admitted, the
only remaining issue is the specific amount of those damages.” FCA
disputed Greisman’s calculations of actual damages by arguing that the
1 The only other “litigation” apparent from the record (other than the
case management conferences) is that Greisman filed a motion to compel
further responses to requests for documents. The motion was denied for
failure to meet and confer and also because the discovery was not relevant in
light of the amended answer. Defendants were also awarded sanctions.
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amount she had paid towards the vehicle was subject to deductions “for the
‘negative equity’ and other non-FCA accessories, including all interest which
accrued on those amounts FCA [was] not legally obligated to pay.” And as to
Greisman’s reasonably incurred attorney fees, costs, and expenses, FCA
stated that those were to be determined “by negotiation or motion once FCA
has an opportunity to review the actual billing records.”
The MSC was held as scheduled, via Zoom, with Judge Carringer
presiding. There were five participants: Greisman; her husband Irving
Greisman; Rebecca Neubauer, Greisman’s attorney; Mr. Universal,
defendants’ attorney; and Fred Sherwood, FCA’s corporate representative.
Certified court reporter Reyes F. Hunter was to record the proceedings. The
conference lasted for some three hours, and was largely off the record.
The parties advised Judge Carringer that the case was settled for
$100,000 and then went on the record to announce the terms, which we
discuss in more detail below. This exchange followed:
“[JUDGE CARRINGER:] Am I correct, Mr. Universal, that that is the
offer?
“MR. UNIVERSAL: Yes, in exchange for the vehicle.
“[JUDGE CARRINGER]: In exchange for the vehicle. I’m very sorry, I
forgot this is a repurchase agreement.
“Ms. Neubauer, is that the agreement you reached?
“MS. NEUBAUER: Yes.”
Judge Carringer next asked Greisman to confirm her understanding
“that this is the end of the road as far as you are concerned; the vehicle is
going to be repurchased, bought back by FCA, and whatever terms you have
reached with your own attorneys and the law firm are between you and your
attorney.” Greisman responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
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Judge Carringer then described what would occur following the
settlement: the court would vacate the trial date and FCA would make
payment to Greisman’s counsel in approximately 60 days “assuming all the
conditions are met in terms of the release and dismissal.” And the hearing
ended with Judge Carringer thanking the parties for putting the matter “to
bed.”
The Cross-Motions
After the MSC, court reporter Hunter provided an official transcript of
it, which transcript indicated that Judge Carringer in announcing the
settlement terms stated the following: “I am informed that the parties have
agreed that defendants will pay the sum of $100,000 to Miriam Greisman in
resolution of any and all claims arising from the lawsuit FCS051933; that is
exclusive of all costs and attorney’s fees.” (Italics added.) Afterwards, court
reporter Hunter submitted an errata sheet that corrected the transcript to
reflect that Judge Carringer used the word “inclusive,” not “exclusive,” when
announcing the settlement terms, and a dispute arose between the parties
leading each side to file a motion on the issue.
On January 19, 2022, Greisman filed a motion to reset the trial
and pretrial dates or, alternatively, for relief under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 664.6 (section 664.6) and 473, subdivision (b)
(section 473(b)). Greisman’s motion was accompanied by four
declarations, from: herself; her husband Irving; her attorney, Ms.
Neubauer; and the chief operating officer of Strategic Legal, Shawn
Pauli.
As explained in that motion, while Greisman remained willing to move
forward with the settlement under the terms she agreed to at the MSC—i.e.,
$100,000 in damages, exclusive of attorney fees, costs, and expenses—she
could not seek enforcement of the settlement because, contrary to the strict
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requirements of section 664.6, neither of the two defendants personally
consented to the settlement terms before the trial court and, as a result,
neither party could enforce that settlement. Thus, Greisman argued, good
cause existed for the trial court to reset the trial and pretrial dates.
Alternatively, if the trial court were to determine that the settlement was
enforceable under section 664.6, Greisman requested that the court enforce
the settlement as reflected in the certified transcript without the unsigned
“purported,” errata sheet.
On February 25, defendants filed a motion under section 664.6 to
enforce the settlement, which they contended was for $100,000 inclusive of
attorney fees, costs, and expenses. The motion was supported by the
declarations of Mr. Universal and FCA representative Sherwood, who
clarified that he “was also authorized to represent and bind any settlement
amount on behalf of CarMax . . . .”
Greisman filed opposition, arguing that the settlement was
unenforceable, claiming that defendants’ representative did not orally agree
to it; that the court should enforce the settlement only if it is for payment of
$100,000 exclusive of costs, contending that Judge Carringer used the word
“exclusive” when announcing the settlement terms; and that any settlement
for $100,000 would be void based on mistake of fact or a lack of a meeting of
the minds.
On March 16, Greisman filed an ex parte application that Judge
Carringer recuse herself from further proceedings in the case on the ground,
among others, that Judge Carringer was a witness to the issues relating to
the settlement and defendants’ opposition to Greisman’s motion “improperly
attempted to prejudice Judge Carringer against [Greisman] by arguing that
[she] was [criticizing] the court itself on how it handled the settlement.”
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Judge Carringer did recuse herself, and the case was transferred to the
Honorable E. Bradley Nelson, who scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the
motions for June 24. That hearing began on that day, and took place over
four days, June 24 and 29, and August 10 and 30. Judge Nelson heard from
five witnesses: Greisman; Irving Greisman; court reporter Hunter;
Sherwood; and Pauli of Strategic Legal. Perhaps tellingly, Ms. Neubauer did
not testify.
While the competing motions were pending, the parties learned that
court reporter Hunter’s stenographic software had generated an audio
recording of the proceedings on the record at the MSC. Defendants moved to
obtain the court reporter’s testimony and to introduce the recording into
evidence. Greisman opposed, claiming among other things that the recording
was not relevant and that she would suffer “unfair surprise and undue
prejudice” from the recording’s admission.
On August 10, Judge Nelson ordered the court reporter “to
produce the original audio recording to the court and make copies to
distribute to the parties within [five] business days.” An “[a]udio copy”
was “to be uploaded to DropBox” and the “[p]hysical original to be
delivered to the court.” As she would come to testify, court reporter
Hunter provided a CD-ROM disk to the court and uploaded the audio
recording to Dropbox, which the court shared with the parties’
attorneys. Judge Nelson admitted into evidence the CD-ROM, which
he understood to contain the same recording that had been uploaded to
Dropbox and shared with counsel, concluding that the reporter had
provided adequate foundation for the recording’s admission. 2 However,
2 We previously granted defendants’ unopposed motion to augment the
record to include the audio file that was uploaded to Dropbox. Because it was
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Judge Nelson could not listen to the recording because the CD-ROM turned
out to be blank.
On November 2, Judge Nelson issued an 11-page order holding that the
settlement announced by Judge Carringer was “inclusive” of “Plaintiff[’]s
attorney’s fees and costs,” and that the parties themselves personally agreed
to the settlement, setting forth the evidence supporting that decision.
First, Judge Nelson credited the transcript as corrected by an errata
from court reporter Hunter as reflecting an “inclusive” settlement. The court
reporter had confirmed the errata’s accuracy by consulting her
contemporaneous stenographic notes and a recording, both of which “reflected
that Judge Carringer had used the word ‘inclusive,’ and not the word
‘exclusive.’ ” Judge Nelson emphasized that “both sides acknowledged
listening to [the recording] outside the court’s presence and neither
contended that the word ‘exclusive’ was used by Judge Carringer in that
recording.” Moreover, he reasoned, an “exclusive” settlement would have
been inconsistent with Judge Carringer’s instruction to Greisman that
“whatever terms you have reached with your own attorneys and the law firm
are between you and your attorney.”
Judge Nelson further noted that Greisman and her attorney
Ms. Neubauer offered inconsistent testimony about the settlement terms.
That is, Greisman initially testified that she did not recall whether Judge
lodged with the trial court, the audio recording is a proper component of the
record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) (further “rule”
references are to the California Rules of Court); see Eisenberg, et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Guide 2023) ¶ 5:134;
id., ¶ 5:135 [“the documents sought to be added to the record need not have
been offered or used in the trial proceedings, so long as they were on file or
lodged with the superior court”], citing rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) and People v.
Preslie (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.)
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Carringer used the word exclusive or inclusive, but then claimed to recall the
judge had used the word exclusive. However, Pauli of Strategic Legal
testified that his colleague Ms. Neubauer had informed other attorneys at
their firm that she could not recall whether the court used the word inclusive
or exclusive following the MSC, but Ms. Neubauer’s “later filed declaration . .
. attested that Judge Carringer used the word ‘exclusive.’ ”
Judge Nelson also concluded that the evidence satisfied the statutory
requirements for an enforceable settlement. He first found that Sherwood
represented both FCA and CarMax, and accepted the settlement terms on
behalf of both. He then found that Sherwood had adequately communicated
assent to the agreement on the defense side, and that Sherwood was present,
and did not object, when his attorney confirmed agreement to the terms of
the settlement on the record.
Judge Nelson further noted that an attorney for a represented
party may sign a writing settling pending litigation on his or her
client’s behalf under section 664.6 and that the statute “contains no
limitation restricting that authority to the execution of written
settlement agreements or precluding the exercise of that authority
orally on the record in open court.” The express, on-the-record assent of
defendants’ attorney, Mr. Universal, was thus sufficient to render the
agreement enforceable under section 664.6.
On December 16, Greisman filed an appeal from the “ ‘Order/Judgment’
enforcing purported settlement under . . . section 664.6 . . . .” Judge Nelson
entered final judgment on January 20, 2023. 3
3 We previously granted Greisman’s unopposed motion to augment the
record to include the judgment. Although Greisman’s notice of appeal
identifies the “Order/Judgment enforcing purported settlement,” the notice
was filed before the judgment was entered, making the appeal premature.
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DISCUSSION
Part I: The Trial Court Did Not Err In Entering Judgment,
Pursuant to Section 664.6, Enforcing the Stipulated Settlement
General Legal Principles and the Standard of Review
Section 664.6 states, in relevant part: “If parties to pending litigation
stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the
court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the
court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the
settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2020,
ch. 290, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.)
The purpose of section 664.6 is “to provide a summary procedure for
specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new
lawsuit.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793,
809 (Weddington).) “If the court determines that the parties entered into an
enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal
judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182–1183 (Hines); see Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6,
subd. (a).)
On appeal, “[a] trial court’s factual findings on a motion to enforce a
settlement pursuant to section 664.6 are subject to limited appellate review
and will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.” (Machado v.
Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 790; accord, In re Marriage of Assemi
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 911.)
Regarding the substantial evidence standard, the principles are well
settled: “ ‘[T]he power of an appellate court begins and ends with a
However, we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as filed immediately
after entry of judgment. (Rule 8.104(d)(2); see Saffer v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245, fn. 4.)
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determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must
therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all
conflicts in its favor . . . .” (Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639,
660 (Jessup).) Stated another way, an appellate court does not evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. (Barboni v.
Tuomi (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 340, 349 (Barboni).) Rather, “we defer to the
trier of fact on issues of credibility.” (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968 (Lenk).) “If the trial court’s resolution of the factual
issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed.”
(Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)
“Our job is only to see if substantial evidence exists to support the [decision]
in favor of the prevailing party, not to determine whether substantial
evidence might support the losing party’s version of events.” (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.)
Legal questions, such as the proper interpretation of section 664.6 or
whether the granting of the motion satisfied the strict requirements of the
statute, are reviewed de novo. (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 984 (J.B.B.).)
The Stipulated Settlement Met the Statutory Requirements
According to Greisman, no oral settlement can be enforced under
section 664.6 unless the parties themselves, not just their attorneys, stipulate
to settle. And because defendants’ attorneys, not defendants themselves,
consented to the oral settlement in this case, Greisman argues the trial court
erred in granting the motion to enforce the settlement under section 664.6.
We disagree.
Greisman’s contention presents a question of statutory interpretation,
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which, as noted, we review de novo. (J.B.B., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
p. 984.) “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental
task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.’ ” (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021)
12 Cal.5th 1, 14.) “ ‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving it
a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘If the statutory language is
unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language
supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to
extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the
legislative history.’ ” (Ibid.) Another relevant principle of interpretation is
that we presume the Legislature is aware of judicial decisions and enacts and
amends statutes in the light of that knowledge. (Leider v. Lewis (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1121, 1135.) Thus, we view the current version of section 664.6
against the statutory and decisional developments preceding it.
Prior to January 1, 2021, section 664.6 provided in its entirety: “If
parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties
outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of
the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment
pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Stats. 1981, ch. 904, § 2, p. 3437,
italics added.)
In Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578 (Levy), our Supreme
Court addressed “whether the Legislature intended the term ‘parties’ as it
appears in section 664.6 . . . to mean only the litigants personally or to
include the attorneys representing the litigants.” (Id. at p. 582.) The court
initially determined the word “ ‘parties’ ” was ambiguous. (Ibid.) After
examining the statutory context, the court interpreted “parties” literally to
mean the litigants themselves, not the litigants’ attorneys of record. (Id. at
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p. 586.) It reasoned that because a settlement of a lawsuit implicates a
substantial right of the litigants, “in providing for an enforcement mechanism
for settlements by ‘parties,’ the Legislature intended the term to literally
mean the litigants personally.” (Id. at p. 584.) Applying that interpretation
to the facts before it—where the litigants’ attorneys, not the litigants
themselves, had executed a purported written settlement agreement—the
court held the agreement was not enforceable under section 664.6. (Levy, at
p. 586.)
Subsequently, Johnson v. Department of Corrections (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 1700, 1707–1708 held that the Levy requirement applied to
oral settlements recited before the court. (See Critzer v. Enos (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1254–1258; Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
707, 716.)
Effective January 1, 2021, before the December 2021 stipulation in this
case, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 2723 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.),
which amended section 664.6. It now states, in relevant part: “(a) If parties
to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of
the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case,
or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the
terms of the settlement. . . .
“(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is
signed by any of the following: [¶] (1) The party. [¶] (2) An attorney who
represents the party. [¶] (3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is
authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer’s behalf.” (Stats.
2020, ch. 290, § 1.) 4
4 Effective January 1, 2024, after the judgment was entered in this
case, Assembly Bill No. 1756 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) amended section 664.6,
16
Here, as Judge Nelson observed, “[section 664.6] was amended effective
January 1, 2021, to expressly allow an attorney for a represented party to
sign a writing settling pending litigation on his or her client’s behalf. It
contains no limitations restricting that authority to the execution of written
settlement agreements or precluding the exercise of that authority orally on
the record in open court.” Based on this construction, he concluded that the
express, on-the-record assent of Greisman, her attorney, and defendants’
attorney to settle the case was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
section 664.6.
In arguing the contrary, Greisman relies on the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, which means “the expression of one thing . . . ordinarily
implies the exclusion of other things.” (In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209.)
Doing so, Greisman argues that “Section 664.6’s recent amendment did not
extend the broader definition of ‘party’ set forth in subdivision (b) to oral
stipulations before the court. Notwithstanding the Legislature’s decision to
make an exception for ‘a writing signed by [a] party,’ the amended statute’s
reference to ‘parties’ still means the litigants themselves as it relates to oral
stipulations before the court.” We are unpersuaded.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius “is not applied in isolation, without
regard to ‘legislative history or other evidence of legislative intent,’ but rather
must be considered with regard to ‘other indicia of legislative intent.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Alaybue (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207, 218, citing In re
J.W., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 209.) Indeed, courts should “ ‘not apply the
subdivision (b)(3) to state: “If an insurer is defending and indemnifying a
party to the action, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to
sign on the party’s behalf. This paragraph does not apply if the party whom
the insurer is defending would be liable under the terms of the settlement for
any amount above the policy limits.” (Stats. 2023, ch. 478, § 12.)
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expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle ‘if its operation would contradict
a discernable and contrary legislative intent.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v.
Alaybue, at p. 218, citing In re J.W., at pp. 209–210.)
“To determine what purpose the Legislature intended [section 664.6] to
serve, we consider its legislative history.” (In re J.W., supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 210.) As defendants point out, the legislative history of section 664.6
includes legislative committee analyses of Assembly Bill No. 2723. 5 And we
agree with defendants that these materials refute Greisman’s interpretation
of the statute.
The analyses from both the Senate Rules Committee and the Senate
Judiciary Committee discuss the Levy decision and state that “[c]urrently,
Section 664.6 requires that the parties must stipulate to the settlement
underlying the motion.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2723 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 20,
2020 (Senate Rules Committee Analysis), p. 5; Sen. Com. on Judiciary,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2723 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4,
2020 (Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis), pp. 4–5.) The analyses then
state: “This bill eliminates the requirement that parties themselves must
personally sign or orally stipulate to these settlements and instead allows
counsel for the parties to so stipulate on their behalf and further authorizes
agents of insurers to stipulate on the insurer’s behalf.” (Senate Rules
Committee Analysis, supra, at p. 5, italics added; Senate Judiciary
Committee Analysis, supra, at pp. 5-6, italics added.)
The analyses from the Senate Rules Committee and the Senate
5 We take judicial notice of these legislative materials on our own
motion. (See In re J.W., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 211 [“To determine the
purpose of legislation, a court may consult contemporary legislative
committee analyses of that legislation, which are subject to judicial notice”].)
18
Judiciary Committee describe the purpose of the legislation in this way:
“Principles of efficiency and economy promote the settlement of civil disputes
by the parties, involving the court and expending its resources only where
absolutely needed. This bill seeks to streamline the procedure provided for in
Section 664.6 by explicitly granting the authority to stipulate to settlements
to attorneys, on behalf of the parties they represent, and to agents of
insurers, where the insurer is a party to the settlement. However, this
removes the existing procedural protection requiring more direct client
involvement.” (Senate Rules Committee Analysis, supra, at p. 4, italics
added; Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis, supra, at p. 4, italics added.)
The analyses further state: “The virtues outlined by the Supreme Court
notwithstanding, the author and the sponsor . . . now seek to streamline this
process in order to meet the goals of efficiency and economy.” (Senate Rules
Committee Analysis, supra, at p. 5, italics added; Senate Judiciary
Committee Analysis, supra, at p. 5, italics added.)
These legislative committee analyses confirm that the Legislature
intended to eliminate the requirement in Levy (and, by extension, its
progeny) that parties must personally sign or orally stipulate to settle a case.
“In the end, a court must adopt the construction most consistent with the
apparent legislative intent and most likely to promote rather than defeat the
legislative purpose and to avoid absurd consequences.” (In re J.W., supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 213.) Here, to promote rather than defeat the legislative
purpose to depart from the Levy decision and to streamline the settlement
process, we hold that, as applied to oral settlements stipulated before the
court, current section 664.6 does not require that the parties themselves
orally stipulate, and instead allows counsel for the parties to orally stipulate
on their behalf.
19
Applying that interpretation to the facts here, there is no dispute that
the attorneys for both parties, in addition to Greisman herself, orally
stipulated to settle the case before Judge Carringer at the MSC. This, as the
trial court found, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the parties
“stipulate . . . orally before the court, for settlement of the case.” (§ 664.6,
subd. (a).)
Part II: There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the
Existence of an Enforceable Settlement Agreement
We next consider Greisman’s arguments that no enforceable settlement
agreement was formed because the parties did not agree upon all material
terms.
“A court ruling on a motion under . . . section 664.6 must determine
whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. [Citations.]
A settlement is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to
all material settlement terms.” (Hines, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182,
fn. omitted.) “[I]n determining whether the parties entered into a binding
settlement of all or part of a case, a trial court should consider whether
(1) the material terms of the settlement were explicitly defined, (2) the
supervising judicial officer questioned the parties regarding their
understanding of those terms, and (3) the parties expressly acknowledged
their understanding of an agreement to be bound by those terms.” (In re
Marriage of Assemi, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 911.) The trial court may consider
declarations of the parties and their counsel, any transcript of the stipulation
orally presented, and recorded by a certified reporter, and any additional oral
testimony. (Hines, at p. 1182.) As mentioned, we review the trial court’s
determination for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Assemi, at p. 911.)
Here, Judge Nelson’s determination that the parties entered into a
binding settlement agreement is supported by substantial evidence. Read
20
together, the minute order for the MSC, the transcript of the MSC, and the
errata thereto plainly establish that the parties agreed to settle this case for
$100,000, inclusive of attorney fees and costs. Those documents show that
the parties, represented by counsel, engaged in settlement negotiations
during the MSC; advised Judge Carringer of their desire to enter into a
settlement disposing of the lawsuit; and that Judge Carringer announced on
the record that defendants were to pay Greisman the sum of $100,000,
“inclusive” of attorney fees and costs. In response to Judge Carringer’s
inquiry, Greisman, her attorney, and defendants’ attorney expressly stated
they understood and agreed to those terms. Additionally, Greisman
confirmed her understanding “that this is the end of the road as far as you
are concerned; the vehicle is going to be repurchased, bought back by FCA,
and whatever terms you have reached with your own attorneys and the law
firm are between you and your attorney.”
In sum, the record establishes that the material terms of the settlement
agreement were clear, specific, and placed on the record, that Greisman, her
attorney, and defendants’ attorney confirmed their understanding of the
terms, and that they unequivocally gave their personal assent thereto.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
parties entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement. (Cf. In re
Marriage of Assemi, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 911 [substantial evidence showed
the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement where “the parties,
represented by counsel, engaged in settlement negotiations over an extended
period of time, advised the retired judge of their desire to enter into a
settlement disposing of all the matters that were to be arbitrated, explicitly
defined and placed on the record the terms of the settlement, and, in response
to [the judge’s] inquiry expressly stated they understood and agreed to those
21
terms”].)
Greisman nonetheless argues that insufficient evidence demonstrates
the parties agreed that the settlement was inclusive of attorney fees and
costs. Among other things, she challenges the veracity of the errata sheet to
the transcript of the MSC and Judge Nelson’s reliance on it. She also asserts
the settlement was void because the parties did not reach “a meeting of the
minds” on all material terms of the settlement.
Initially, we observe that Greisman’s arguments are based on a
recitation of the record that is in disregard of settled principles of appellate
review, ignoring the rule that the evidence must be viewed most favorably to
defendants, the prevailing party, and in support of the judgment.
(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.) As another
leading case would put it, “ ‘It is well established that a reviewing court
starts with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain
every finding of fact.’ [Citations.] . . . A recitation of only [Greisman’s]
evidence is not the ‘demonstration’ contemplated under the above rule.
[Citation.] Accordingly, if, as [Greisman] here contend[s], ‘some particular
issue of fact is not sustained, [she] [is] required to set forth in [her] brief all
the material evidence on the point and not merely [her] own evidence. Unless
this is done the error is deemed to be waived.’ ” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v.
Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) Greisman’s arguments can be deemed
waived.
They also have no merit.
Greisman contends there was no “reasonable” or “credible” evidence
supporting the trial court’s reliance on the errata sheet to the transcript of
the MSC. Greisman attacks the veracity of the errata sheet and Ms. Hunter,
the court reporter who prepared it, in a number of respects. For example,
22
Greisman points out that Ms. Hunter had ex parte emails with defendants’
attorney prior to issuing the errata sheet, accuses Ms. Hunter of lying during
the evidentiary hearing, and complains that the errata sheet “was marred
with flaws.” Such arguments are nothing more than a request we reweigh
the evidence and resolve credibility issues, which, as explained above, is not
our role. Instead, we must defer to the trial court’s resolution of any conflicts
in the evidence and credibility disputes. (See Jessup, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p.
660; Barboni, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 349; Lenk, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th
at p. 968.)
Here, Judge Nelson’s order reflects that he found court reporter Hunter
credible, a credibility determination supported by ample evidence. As Ms.
Hunter testified, she had confirmed the errata’s accuracy by consulting her
contemporaneous stenographic notes and a recording, both of which “reflected
that Judge Carringer had used the word ‘inclusive,’ and not the word
‘exclusive.’ ”
Although Greisman attempts to make much of the fact that Ms. Hunter
and defendants’ attorney, Mr. Universal, had ex parte emails regarding the
transcript, Judge Nelson nonetheless found Ms. Hunter credible. Indeed. In
their emails, Mr. Universal wrote: “[W]hy does the transcript say the
settlement was exclusive of costs, fees and expenses? The settlement was to
be inclusive of costs, fees and expenses? We covered that 3 times at the
settlement conference. Please check with the judge.” (Italics added.) Viewing
the email in context, in combination with evidence that Ms. Hunter
independently reviewed her notes and the audio recording before issuing the
errata sheet, Judge Nelson could reasonably conclude that Ms. Hunter
caught the error without being pressured into correcting the transcript.
Greisman also argues the “court’s inference regarding the content of
23
the audio tape was based on mere speculation and conjecture.”
(Capitalization and emphasis omitted.) Greisman argues that court reporter
Hunter’s testimony “was vague and confusing” as to the software used to
record the MSC and the manner in which she maintained the recording.
Greisman also points to the fact that the CD-ROM, which purportedly
contained the audio recording of the MSC and was admitted into evidence,
turned out to be blank, preventing Judge Nelson from listening to the audio
recording. Greisman concludes that it was thus speculative for him to infer
“that the purported audio must have captured Judge Carringer using the
word ‘inclusive.’ ”
Greisman’s argument appears to challenge the foundation of the
recording, which argument Judge Nelson rejected when he denied her motion
to strike the recording for lack of foundation. Greisman fails to show this was
an abuse of discretion, and we perceive none. (See Marin v. Department of
Transportation (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 529, 536 [evidentiary rulings are
reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Court reporter Hunter testified that her
recording device contains software that captured audio, though she did not
know precisely how the software operated. She also testified that the
software generated an audio recording of the MSC proceedings, that she
listened to the recording, and that the recording matched her stenographic
notes. Based on this, Judge Nelson reasonably concluded that the recording
was a “fair and accurate depiction of the proceedings” and appropriately
denied Greisman’s motion to strike.
Moreover, although Judge Nelson could not listen to the audio
recording, for the reasons stated above, he was entitled to accept court
reporter Hunter’s testimony about the contents of the recording. Indeed, as
he found, “both sides acknowledged listening to it outside the court’s presence
24
and neither contended that the word ‘exclusive’ was used by Judge Carringer
in that recording.” 6
We turn to Greisman’s claim there was “no meeting of the minds”
concerning all of the material terms of the settlement. As we understand it,
Greisman is presumably renewing this argument she made below: “[I]f the
Court were to determine that the settlement met the requirements of section
664.6 and that the $100,000 settlement amount was ‘inclusive’ of the fees,
costs and expenses, [Greisman] requests that the Court set aside that
purported agreement as void ab initio because there was no ‘meeting of the
minds’ to form an enforceable agreement and [she] never consented to settle
her claims for $100,000, inclusive of . . . $100,000 in fees, costs and
expenses . . . .”
There are several problems with Greisman’s argument. For one, the
argument is hard to follow, perhaps because it is inherently inconsistent on
its face. If the argument accepts the existence of a settlement that is
inclusive of attorney fees and costs and complies with section 664.6, then it
would be logically contradictory to argue at the same time there was no
settlement formed due to a lack of mutual consent. Either a settlement
agreement existed or it did not. (See Weddington, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at
p. 797 [“If no meeting of the minds has occurred on the material terms of a
contract,” then “no contract formation has occurred”].)
Second, Greisman’s argument is based on facts from which we are
asked to draw inferences contrary to those drawn by Judge Nelson. In
particular, she asks us to infer, based on certain evidence of the “objective
6 Although not necessary to our decision, we note that our own review
of a copy of the audio recording (which we have augmented the record to
include) additionally confirms that Judge Carringer used the word
“inclusive,” not “exclusive,” when announcing the terms of the settlement.
25
manifestations” of the parties’ intent, that they “intended to settle the case
for $100,000 in damages in exchange for [the] return of the vehicle, with the
amount of Greisman’s attorney’s fees and costs to be determined separately
through stipulation or motion for fees.” Among other things, she relies on the
parties’ MSC statements, which she claims focused on damages and left the
amount of attorney fees for future negotiations or motions, as well as FCA’s
2019 section 998 offer to settle for $70,000 in damages and Greisman’s
rejection thereof.
Even if we were to draw some inferences favorable to Greisman, this
would at best create a conflict in the evidence. However, “[t]he fact that it is
possible to draw some inference other than that drawn by the trier of fact is
of no consequence.” (Jessup, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 660.) As stated above, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, giving it
the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its
favor. (Ibid.) Doing so, we conclude substantial evidence shows the parties
mutually assented to settle the case for $100,000 inclusive of attorney fees
and costs. We have already concluded that Judge Nelson was entitled to find
that the settlement announced by Judge Carringer on the record was
inclusive of attorney fees and costs. And it is undisputed that defendants’
attorney, Greisman’s attorney, and Greisman verbally assented to the
settlement terms as announced by Judge Carringer. The parties’ clear,
unequivocal, and on-the-record expressions of assent to the settlement terms
as recited by Judge Carringer supply substantial evidence of the requisite
mutual assent.
Finally, we briefly address Greisman’s repeated assertion that “[i]t
would have made no sense” for her to agree to settle her case for $100,000,
inclusive of attorney fees, costs, and expenses, when the amount of the fees
26
“alone exceeds $100,000.” Passing over whether this claim is factually
supported, 7 Greisman in essence asserts that the settlement was not
sufficiently favorable to her, which indicates she would not have agreed to it.
Regardless of whether it “made sense” or was in Greisman’s best interest to
enter into the agreement, the record supports that she in fact did. If in
hindsight she feels she made a bad bargain, we cannot save her from it: “No
matter how toothless the agreement may seem in retrospect, it is not the
province of the trial court to rewrite it and put in the teeth the complaining
side now thinks it should have had.” (Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217
Cal.App.3d 200, 207; see Apra v. Aureguy (1961) 55 Cal.2d 827, 830–831.)
For all these reasons, Judge Nelson did not err in entering judgment
pursuant to section 664.6 enforcing the stipulated settlement.
Part III: Greisman’s Other Arguments Fail to Establish
Reversible Error
As alternative arguments, Greisman claims she is entitled to relief
under section 473(b), that the settlement should be rescinded based on
mistake of fact, and that the settlement violates Civil Code section 1790.1.
We reject all of these arguments.
Civil Code Section 1790.1
We start with Greisman’s claim under Civil Code section 1790.1. That
section states: “Any waiver by the buyer of consumer goods of the provisions
of this chapter, except as expressly provided in this chapter, shall be deemed
7 In support of her claim, Greisman cites to the declaration of attorney
Neubauer, who stated: “the amount of the attorney’s fees, costs and expenses
that [Strategic Legal] has incurred to date alone exceeds $100,000.” Ms.
Neubauer’s declaration, however, failed to mention any work that was
performed by her law firm, much less elaborate whether the work was
reasonable. Nor did she substantiate her statement with billing records
evidencing the nature or extent of the legal work.
27
contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.” Greisman
then cites to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), which states: “If the
buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by
the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate
amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time
expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the
buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”
Greisman asserts—without citation to the record—that “[t]he settlement
agreement enforced by the [trial] court deprived [her] of her statutory right to
seek mandatory attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses that her attorneys
reasonably incurred in the over 3 years of intense litigation.”
Defendants argue Greisman has forfeited this claim because she never
raised Civil Code section 1790.1 below. In her reply brief, Greisman does not
dispute she did not raise the argument, but claims she may do so for the first
time on appeal because it “presents a pure question of law.” We agree that
Greisman’s claim has been forfeited.
“ ‘ “As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be
asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the
theory (or theories) on which their cases were tried. This rule is based on
fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing
litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.” ’ [Citation.]” (Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.) Therefore, a
party who fails to raise a claim in the trial court waives such claim on appeal.
(Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 739, 767 (Greenwich).)
Although Greisman invokes the rule that appellate courts have discretion to
consider a theory or issue raised for the first time on an appeal where it
presents a pure question of law (ibid.), that rule does not apply here.
28
Greisman’s argument under Civil Code section 1790.1 is that she has been
denied her statutory right to recover attorney fees and costs “based on actual
time expended” and “determined by the court to have been reasonably
incurred.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Whether the claimed fees and costs
were based on actual time expended and whether they were reasonably
incurred are highly factual questions that are more appropriately left to the
trial court in the first instance.
Section 473(b)
Section 473(b) provides, in relevant part: “The court may, upon any
terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a
judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her
through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
The extent of Greisman’s argument based on this section is this one sentence:
“Greisman is also entitled to relief under . . . section 473(b) because her
‘consent’ to the purported settlement resulted from an excusable mistake—
i.e., an apparent confusion regarding the terms ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’
while attending a court proceeding via Zoom.”
This argument violates several rules of appellate procedure. First, this
argument is not presented under a separate heading in Greisman’s opening
brief. Rather, it is presented under the heading entitled, “The Trial Court
Ignored Objective Evidence Of the Lack of a Meeting Of the Minds,” an issue
legally distinct from whether section 473(b) relief was available. The failure
of Greisman to confine her arguments to the point raised in the heading
violates rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). (See Provost v. Regents of University of
California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294.)
Second, Greisman fails to provide any citations to facts in the record to
support her argument. Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires that any reference to a
matter in the record, whether factual or procedural, be supported by a
29
citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears. Failure to do so allows us to disregard the contention. (Professional
Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970; Myers v.
Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745.)
Third, Greisman’s argument is devoid of any meaningful legal analysis.
“ ‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the
positions taken. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but
fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we
treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) Although Greisman develops her argument in her
reply brief, it comes “too late.” (Aviel v. Ng (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 809, 821
[“[Appellants] attempt, in their reply brief, to develop the argument, but it is
too late. We disregard issues not properly addressed in the appellant’s
opening brief”].)
In any event, Greisman’s argument under section 473(b) fails on the
merits.
Initially, although Judge Nelson did not expressly address Greisman’s
section 473(b) argument in his order, we presume he considered and rejected
it. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘A judgment or
order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is
silent . . .’ ”].) The question, then, is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in doing so. (See Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc.
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 257 [ruling on a motion for discretionary relief under
section 473 is reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
Greisman does not argue that Judge Nelson abused his discretion in
denying her relief. Nor could she demonstrate he did. A moving party
30
seeking relief under section 473(b) has the burden “to demonstrate ‘that due
to some mistake, either of fact or of law, of [her]self or of [her] counsel, or
through some inadvertence, surprise or neglect which may properly be
considered excusable, the judgment or order from which [s]he seeks relief
should be reversed.’ [Citation.]” (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.) It is simply not enough to assert a general
state of mistake; the moving party must specify the actual cause of the
mistake and explain why it should be excused. (See ibid.) Greisman failed to
make these showings. Not only are her contentions in her opening brief
based on general and vague claims of mistake, but also, she provides no
reasonable excuse for it. Although she belatedly argues in her reply brief
that she “was having technical difficulties . . . that may have interfered with
her ability to hear Judge Carringer,” the portion of the transcript she cites
indicates that while at some point during the MSC Greisman apparently had
some difficulty entering the Zoom conference, she did not experience further
issues once she did connect, including during the time that Judge Carringer
announced the settlement terms.
Mistake of Fact
Greisman argues that the settlement agreement should be rescinded
under the common law contract principle of mistake of fact. Initially, while
Greisman below sought relief under section 473(b) based on mistake, she did
not also seek to rescind the settlement on a theory of mistake pursuant to
general contract principles. Thus, we question whether the latter argument
is properly before us. Even if it were, it lacks merit.
“A party may rescind a contract if his or her consent was given by
mistake. (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b)(1).) A factual mistake by one party to
a contract, or unilateral mistake, affords a ground for rescission in some
circumstances. Civil Code section 1577 states in relevant part: ‘Mistake of
31
fact is a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the
person making the mistake, and consisting in: [¶] 1. An unconscious
ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or present, material to the
contract . . . .’ ” (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 278
(Donovan).) To obtain rescission of the contract, Greisman must establish
the following facts: “(1) [she] made a mistake regarding a basic assumption
upon which [she] made the contract; (2) the mistake has a material effect
upon the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to [her]; (3) [she]
does not bear the risk of the mistake; and (4) the effect of the mistake is such
that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable.” (Donovan, supra,
at p. 282.)
Referring generally to the arguments set forth previously in
“Sections IV(C)—(D)” of her opening brief, Greisman claims she “already has
established the first and second elements” for mistake of fact. However, the
only argument she presents regarding mistake in those sections of her brief is
her claim for relief under section 473, subdivision (b). As recited above, that
argument stated—in conclusory fashion and without citation to the record—
that Greisman had “apparent confusion regarding the terms ‘inclusive’ and
‘exclusive’ while attending a court proceeding via Zoom.” Greisman fails to
articulate how this argument satisfies the two elements for rescission due to
mistake.
Regarding the third element—that the mistaken party did not bear the
risk of mistake—a contracting party bears the risk of a mistake when the
agreement so provides, when the party is aware of having only limited
knowledge of the facts relating to the mistake but treats this limited
knowledge as sufficient, or when the risk is allocated to the party by the court
on the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so. (Donovan,
32
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 283, citing Rest.2d. Contracts, § 154.) Greisman does
not argue that any of these factors applies.
Finally, as to the fourth element—whether the effect of the mistake is
such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable—Greisman
argues “the enforcement of the settlement agreement was unconscionable
because it deprived [her] of her statutory right to collect the mandatory
attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses under the Song-Beverly Act.” This is a
rehash of her argument that the settlement violated Civil Code section
1790.1, an argument that we have deemed forfeited.
Part IV: Greisman Is Barred From Challenging the Orders
Denying Her Motions for Summary Adjudication
Greisman additionally seeks reversal of the orders denying her two
motions for summary adjudication. 8 As discussed above, Greisman’s first
motion sought “summary adjudication in his [sic] favor and against
Defendant of his [sic] first cause of action in the amount of $134,407.64.” Her
8 Defendants argue we lack jurisdiction to review the orders denying
her summary adjudication motions because Greisman did not mention them
in her notice of appeal. However, as explained, Greisman did identify
(prematurely) the judgment in her notice of appeal, we construed her
premature appeal as immediately filed after entry of judgment, and an order
on a summary adjudication motion is reviewable in an appeal from the
judgment. (See Islander Yachts, Inc. v. One Freeport 36-Foot Vessel (1985)
173 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086, fn. 6.) Defendants also cite the rule that a party
who consents or stipulates to a judgment is not “aggrieved” by the judgment,
thus waives any errors, and therefore may not appeal from the judgment.
(See Papadakis v. Zelis (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1385, 1387, citing Reed v.
Murphy (1925) 196 Cal. 395, 401 (Reed).) However, a stipulation does not
preclude an appeal to determine whether the judgment was authorized by the
stipulation. (Steinman v. Malamed (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1555;
accord, Reed, supra, at p. 399.) Here, as discussed, Greisman claims that the
order granting the section 664.6 motion is different from, or goes beyond, the
terms of the parties’ stipulation. Under these authorities, Greisman may
seek review of the denial of her summary adjudication motions.
33
second motion sought “summary adjudication in her favor and against FCA
on her second cause of action, including on the issue of the amount of
damages,” which she identified as $126,529.23. The court denied both
motions, finding there were triable issues of fact as to damages.
Greisman contends the trial court’s rulings were erroneous because
damages is “not an element” of either her first cause of action for failure to
repair within a reasonable number of opportunities (Civ. Code, § 1793.2,
subd. (d)), or her second cause of action for failure to commence repairs
within a reasonable time and/or to repair the vehicle within 30 days (Civ.
Code, § 1793.2, subd. (b)).
Greisman relies on People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior Court (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 1360 (People ex. rel. Feuer), which involved a claim under
the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) that sought civil penalties. The trial
court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or, alternatively,
summary adjudication as to the UCL cause of action. (Id. at pp. 1365–1367.)
It relied on section Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(1),
which states that For purposes of motions for summary judgment and
summary adjudication “ ‘ “(1) A plaintiff . . . has met his or her burden of
showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved
each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that
cause of action.” ’ ” (People ex. rel. Feuer, supra, at pp. 1366–1367.) In
denying the motion, the trial court found that penalties were an element of
the plaintiff’s UCL cause of action, and that the plaintiff did not present
argument and evidence to support its claim for civil penalties. (Id. at
p. 1367.) The appellate court reversed, holding that penalties were not an
element of the cause of action, but rather a remedy. (Id. at pp. 1381–1384.)
In a footnote, Greisman also cites Paramount Petroleum Corp. v.
34
Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, which examined the propriety of
an order granting summary adjudication of a breach of contract claim. The
court concluded that since a moving party must prove each element to obtain
summary adjudication of a cause of action, and since damages are an element
of a breach of contract claim, summary adjudication on only the issue of
liability for breach of contract, with the amount of damages to be determined
later, was improperly granted. (Id. at pp. 241, 244.)
Greisman argues her case is similar to People ex. rel. Feuer and unlike
Paramount in that damages are not an element of her first or second causes
of action. Then, without elaborating why, Greisman asserts the trial court
here “should have granted summary adjudication as to the first and second
causes of action, with the determination regarding the type and amount of
damages to be determined later through trial.”
Defendants argue “the trial court could not have erred in failing to
grant relief that was not requested in the motions, and raised now for the
first time on appeal.” We agree that Greisman has forfeited her claim by
failing to raise it in the trial court. (Greenwich, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at
p. 767.) While forfeiture is reason alone to disregard her claim (ibid.), we find
the claim also barred by the doctrine of invited error.
Under that doctrine, “an appellant ‘cannot complain of error [she]
personally “invited.” In other words, one whose conduct induces or invites
the commission or error by the trial court is estopped from asserting it as a
ground for reversal on appeal.’ [Citations.]” (Transport Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins.
Co. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 984, 1000.) “ ‘ “[T]he doctrine rests on the
purpose of the [estoppel] principle, which is to prevent a party from
misleading the trial court and then profiting therefrom in the appellate court.
[Citations.]” ’ ” (Ibid.) In both of her motions, Greisman argued she was
35
entitled to summary adjudication as to her first and second causes of action,
“including on the issue of the amount of damages.” By definition, “[o]nce
summary adjudication has been granted as to an issue, that issue shall be
deemed established and the action shall proceed as to the issues remaining.”
(Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Tower Industries, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th
1881, 1887; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n)(1); 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(6th ed. 2024) Proceedings Without Trial, §§ 317, 324.) Clearly, then, in filing
her motions, Greisman was asking that the court deem the issue of damages
established in her favor, and eliminate the need for her to prove the issue at a
subsequent trial—the opposite of what she now claims on appeal.
Furthermore, although Greisman now argues that damages are not an
element of her first and second and causes of action, she appeared to take a
different position in her motions. 9 Thus, if it was error for the trial court to
rule on Greisman’s summary adjudication motions as to the issue of
damages, rather than leaving the determination of damages for trial,
Greisman invited the error, and cannot be heard to complain about it on
appeal.
9 For example, in her first motion for summary adjudication, she
argued “Defendant has either admitted to the elements of [her first] cause of
action or there are no genuine disputes of material facts as to the remaining
elements,” before providing a chart consisting of two columns—the first
stating “ELEMENT” and the second stating “EVIDENCE.” “Elements”
numbers 1 through 6 address the elements identified in CACI No. 3201, the
pattern instruction for a violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision
(d). “Elements” numbers 7 through 12, itemize various types and amounts of
damages and civil penalties that Greisman claimed she was entitled to. For
example, item numbers 7 and 9 state, respectively, “Plaintiff Miriam
Greisman has $3,890.79 in Incidental Damages” and “Plaintiff’s actual
damages are $37,935.91.”
36
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs on appeal.
(Rule 8.278(a)(2).)
37
_________________________
Richman, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Stewart, P.J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (A166919)
38
Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court;
Trial Judge: Honorable E. Bradley Nelson;
Attorney for Plaintiff and Nemecek & Cole, APC, Vikram
Appellant, Miriam Greisman: Sohal, Marshall Cole; Strategic
Legal Practices, APC, Tionna G.
Carvalho;
Attorney for Defendant and Horovitz & Levy LLP, John B.
Respondent, FCA US, LLC: Sprangers, Lisa Perrochet, Rebecca
G. Powell; Gordon Rees Scully
Mansukhani, LLP, Spencer P.
Hugret, James P. Mayo; Universal
& Shannon, LLP, Jon D. Universal.
39
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