CourtListener 10028784•People v. Kapila CA3
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Filed 8/2/24 P. v. Kapila CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sutter)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099098
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
CRF180002397A)
v.
ANKUSH KAPILA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Ankush Kapila, a noncitizen legal resident, appeals the trial court’s
denial of his Penal Code section 1473.7 (further undesignated section references are to
the Penal Code) motion to vacate his plea in one of his three criminal cases. Defendant
challenges the trial court’s exercise of discretion, arguing the court’s misunderstanding of
facts resulted in an abuse of discretion. These arguments fail to acknowledge this court’s
duty to exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the denial of defendant’s motion.
(People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527 (Vivar).) Having done so, we find defendant
has failed to establish he was entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was born in India in August 1995. He immigrated to the United States
in July 2010 and was granted legal permanent resident status.
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A. The Underlying Convictions
In October 2014, defendant pled guilty to assault likely to cause great bodily
injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) in case No. CRF140211 (the assault case), and in exchange,
he was placed on probation and ordered to serve nine days in county jail
Defendant pled no contest to criminal threats (§ 422) in 2019 in case No.
CRF180002397 (the criminal threats case), and in exchange, the remaining count and
several unrelated misdemeanors were dismissed, and defendant was placed on probation.
In pertinent part, his initialed plea form stated that he understood the consequences of his
plea, including that “if I am not a citizen of the United States, I will be deported from the
country, denied citizenship, and denied re-entry into the United States.” It appears he
was still on probation for the assault case at the time of this plea. Defendant admitted
violating this probation in 2019 and his probation was reinstated.
In 2020, defendant admitted violating his probation in the criminal threats case by
committing identity theft (§ 530.5) in case No. CRF202292 (the identity theft case). As
part of this plea deal, defendant was returned to probation.
In January 2022, another probation violation petition was filed against defendant,
this time alleging eight violations, including violations of the Penal and Health and Safety
Codes. Defendant’s probation was summarily revoked, and his request for release on his
own recognizance was denied in light of the court’s “significant concerns about public
safety.”
On March 7, 2022, defendant rejected the People’s offer for two years concurrent
in the criminal threats case, the identity theft case, and a new case for a total aggregate
term of two years. On March 25, 2022, the matter was put over to allow defendant’s
attorney to research some “immigration issues.” The trial on the violations of probation
occurred on April 29, 2022, wherein the People presented three witnesses, and the trial
court found defendant had committed seven of the eight alleged probation violations.
Thereafter, on June 13, 2022, the trial court elected not to reimpose probation and
sentenced defendant to the midterm of two years for the criminal threats case plus a
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concurrent term of two years for the identify theft case, resulting in an aggregate prison
term of two years. Defendant’s other pending case was dismissed in the interests of
justice. Following defendant’s release from prison, he was taken into the custody of
immigration and customs enforcement (ICE) and found to be removable as an aggravated
felon.
B. The Proceedings to Vacate Defendant’s Plea
On April 21, 2023, defendant filed a motion to vacate his plea (§ 1473.7) in the
criminal threats case arguing he did not understand the immigration consequences at the
time of his plea, he was facing those adverse consequences, and had he “understood the
consequences and alternative plea options, he would not have entered a plea to the
charge.” His brief focused on his original plea, claiming no one told him that agreeing to
a one-year suspended sentence would render him “deportable as an offense categorized as
a crime of moral turpitude (CIMT) or aggravated felony under immigration law.” The
brief also inaccurately represented that he had “admitted a subsequent violation of
probation and was resentenced to two years in State Prison on June 22, 2022.”1
Defendant asserted, “The plea in the present case is invalid based upon defendant’s
uninformed plea which left him without a meaningful understanding of the consequences
of his plea and without an understanding of alternative plea options in violation of
defendant’s rights to due process, right to a fair trial, and the corresponding rights under
the state [C]onstitution.” Defendant represented “he would not have accepted the plea
bargain without further negotiations had he known of the potential [crime of moral
turpitude] and immigration consequences resulting from his 2014 plea . . . .” Rather, “he
would have defended against the immigration consequences by negotiating an alternate,
immigration-safe plea bargain that would have avoided a [crime of moral turpitude].”
1 This representation is inaccurate as he was sentenced to two years in prison following
probation violation trial, not an admission.
3
As to prejudice, defendant argued he “did not understand the dire immigration
consequences of his plea deal and subsequent negotiated disposition which would result
in a [crime of moral turpitude] and an aggravated felony.” According to defendant, his
“conviction in the underlying case rendered him deportable without relief despite the fact
that he was a legal permanent resident with strong ties to the U.S. through his [legal
permanent resident] status and his connection to his immediate and extended family --
who are all in the U.S. legally, with the vast majority living here as citizens.” Further,
defendant maintained there were reasonable plea alternatives that would have avoided the
negative immigration consequences that he could have accepted at the time of the plea,
but he failed to negotiate for them because he was unaware of the negative consequences
he was facing. Nonetheless, the brief summarized, “if defendant had meaningfully
understood the certain immigration consequences of his guilty plea versus the potential
risks and rewards of going to trial or negotiating an alternative plea, it is reasonably
probable that he would have not pleaded guilty.”
Notably, the defendant’s declaration that purportedly contained the evidence
supporting these claims was not attached to the motion and is not part of the record on
this appeal. Accordingly, none of the brief’s assertions concerning defendant’s
knowledge and intentions are supported by cognizable evidence. (See People v. Carillo
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 7 (Carillo) [attorney’s factual assertions in briefing is not
evidence].)
However, defendant did submit the declaration of an immigration attorney, which
erroneously represented that defendant was sentenced to two years in prison after
admitting probation violations in the criminal threats and identity theft cases. This
declaration further showed defendant’s conviction in the assault case, which the attorney
conceded was also a deportable offense (although it had not been alleged by ICE)
because defendant committed the offense within five years of admission to the United
States and noted it could be punished by a sentence of more than one year. This attorney
then related various ways defendant might have avoided negative immigration
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consequences in all three cases, including serving a two-year sentence on the identity
theft and agreeing to a sentence of up to 364 days for the criminal threats.
The People opposed defendant’s request, arguing the statute applied only to guilty
pleas—not probation violation admissions, that defendant could not establish prejudice,
and there was no failure to seek an immigration neutral disposition as there was no
possible immigration-safe disposition that would also have served the interests of justice.
In support of this opposition, the People filed a declaration from the deputy district
attorney who had negotiated the plea in the criminal threats case. That deputy district
attorney attested to being aware of the immigration consequences of that plea, that he had
advised defendant’s attorney there would be immigration consequences, and the deputy
district attorney would not have changed the offer that defendant ultimately accepted.
Defendant’s reply brief argued in pertinent part that he was entitled to relief under
Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 533.
The trial court continued the May 26, 2023, hearing on defendant’s motion to
allow the court to review the parties’ submissions and the transcripts from defendant’s
plea and sentencing.
Defendant’s motion was heard on June 30, 2023. At that hearing, defendant’s
counsel argued the issue concerning the criminal threats case was “not the plea itself but
rather the sentence.” Defendant’s counsel inaccurately represented that defendant’s
probation violations had been “combined for a global resolution and it’s that global
disposition on a probation violation that in fact was the aggravated felony.” Defendant’s
counsel posited the two-year sentence could have been based solely on the identity threat
count, thereby avoiding the adverse immigration consequences without any adverse
consequences to the People. In response, the People argued that defendant had been
advised of the adverse immigration consequences as per his plea form, had been assisted
by his attorney and an interpreter in entering that plea, and that there was no evidence
that he failed to understand his “pleas could affect his immigration and citizenship
status.”
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The trial court denied the motion. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion based upon a
misunderstanding of the facts and applicable law. Specifically, he faults the trial court for
failing to focus on the June 2022 “negotiated global disposition” to the probation
violations in the criminal threats and identity theft cases, positing a simple restructuring
of the sentence could have avoided the adverse immigration consequences. Defendant
continues that this focus on the earlier proceedings also caused the court to rely on
“erroneous facts” in evaluating the contemporaneous facts supporting a showing of
prejudice. Defendant’s arguments are based upon a misunderstanding of the facts and
applicable law. We find defendant has failed to demonstrate error.
Applicable Law
“Section 1473.7 permits noncitizens to vacate convictions after they are no longer
in criminal custody based on a failure to understand adverse immigration consequences
of their convictions.” (People v. Singh (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 147, 151-152 (Singh).)
“The versions of section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) in effect from January 1, 2019,
through December 31, 2021, stated a person no longer in criminal custody could file a
motion to vacate a conviction or sentence for the following reason: ‘The conviction or
sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.’ (Stats. 2020,
ch. 317, § 5, italics added; Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 2, italics added.)” (Carillo, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.)
“In 2021, the Legislature amended the statute by replacing the phrase ‘plea of
guilty or nolo contendere’ with the broader phrase ‘conviction or sentence.’ (Stats. 2021,
ch. 420, § 1.) The amendment ‘expand[ed] the category of persons able to seek to vacate
a conviction or sentence as legally invalid, whatever way that person was convicted or
sentence[d], including a person who was found guilty after a trial.’ (Sen. Com. on Public
6
Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1259 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 19,
2021; [Singh, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp.] 152-153 [defendants whose convictions
derive from a trial are eligible for relief under [section] 1473.7; amendment created
ameliorative changes].) The amendment became effective on January 1, 2022. (Singh,
supra, at p. 152.)” (Carillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.)
A court “shall grant the motion to vacate the conviction or sentence if the moving
party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence” that “the conviction or sentence is
legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473, subds. (e)(1),
(a)(1).) Thus, a defendant seeking relief must show he “ ‘did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences’ ” of his sentence and that this
“ ‘misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.’ ” (Carillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 14.) The statute does not define prejudice, but in the context of this type of case, it has
been explained “that a defendant who decides to go to trial, loses, and is sentenced” can
establish prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that (1) [he] would have done
something differently—that is, would [have] taken another ‘path.’ (Vivar, supra, at
p. 529—and (2) the alternate path would have resulted in an immigration neutral
outcome.” (Carillo, at p. 20.) “A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (§ 1473, subd. (a)(1).)
“We exercise our independent judgment in reviewing appeals from section 1473.7
hearings.” (Singh, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 154; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 526-
527.) “When, as here, a trial court’s factual findings are derived entirely from documents
(i.e., a cold record), the trial court and appellate courts are in the same position and
deference to the trial court’s findings is unwarranted. ([Vivar,] at p. 528.)” (Carillo,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.)
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Analysis
Here, in reaching its decision to deny defendant’s motion the trial court focused on
prejudice and determined: (1) defendant had been assisted by an interpreter at his plea
and sentencing hearings; (2) none of the suggested immigration-safe alternative crimes fit
with the circumstances of the case; and (3) there was no substantial contemporaneous
evidence that defendant would have rejected his plea agreement, thus distinguishing the
matter from Vivar. Defendant faults these determinations for focusing on his original
plea in the criminal threats case. Having evaluated his arguments in the context of the
evidence before the trial court and exercising our independent judgment, we conclude
defendant failed to demonstrate he was entitled to relief.
We begin with defendant’s first contention that the trial court erred in not focusing
on his June 2022 “global disposition” of the probation violation cases, positing a simple
restructuring of his prison sentence could have avoided the adverse immigration
consequences. This argument is not supported by the record. Defendant did not
negotiate a global disposition of the probation violations in these cases. Rather, he had a
probation violation trial, was found to have violated his probation, and was sentenced to
prison by a trial court exercising its discretion to select an appropriate sentence. (§ 1170.)
Accordingly, his arguments that he would have altered the global disposition had he been
aware of the immigration consequences are contrary to the record.
Moreover, even if we were to consider the settlement negotiations leading up to
the trial on the probation violations—an argument that defendant did not make and has
forfeited in this appeal2—the appellate record does not contain the specifics of what
2 While previous caselaw had determined admissions of probation violations did not fall
under the purview of section 1473.7 (see People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
212, 220-221), we recognize that at least one case has found the provision does apply
following the 2021 amendments where a defendant failed to “meaningfully understand or
defend against the ‘actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of’ the
additional incarceration imposed for a probation violation.” (See Carillo, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 5.) Nonetheless, defendant’s failure to argue he would have made an
8
defendant understood at this juncture because his declaration in support of his motion
does not appear to have been filed below. Accordingly, there is no evidence that he
would not have gone to trial on his probation violations had he been aware of the
immigration consequences he was facing. (Carillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.)
Further, unlike Vivar, the record does not indicate that defendant would have been
able to negotiate an immigration neutral plea deal. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 531.)
Rather, the record shows the pending settlement offer that was rejected prior to
defendant’s probation violation trial was for two years concurrent in the criminal threats
case, the identity theft case, and a new case for an aggregate term of two years. After
rejecting this offer, the matter was put over to allow defendant’s attorney to research
some “immigration issues.” Thus, the record does not support defendant’s assertion that
the trial court erred in failing to recognize in its prejudice analysis that he could have
negotiated an immigration-safe alternative sentence at the probation violation juncture.
This is true despite the declaration of defendant’s immigration attorney that there were
immigration neutral ways to structure his two-year prison sentence without triggering
mandatory deportation. The possible viability of those alternatives is not supported by
the record.
Finally, the record lacks other contemporaneous evidence establishing the trial
court abused its discretion in determining defendant had not demonstrated prejudice. In
Vivar, the defendant had written numerous contemporaneous letters containing facts
supporting the proposition that he never would have pleaded guilty had he known it
would have resulted in deportation. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530-531.) But here
the record contained no information concerning defendant’s intentions and what he would
have done had he understood the immigration consequences of taking his probation
immigration-neutral plea deal instead of going to trial has forfeited this argument on
appeal. (Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1045, fn. 1.) In fact,
defendant argued in his reply brief that the true procedural posture of the case is
“irrelevant to the present appeal.”
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violations to trial. Moreover, we cannot fault the trial court for failing to consider
contemporaneous evidence to a negotiated global disposition plea deal that never existed.
In light of these shortcomings and our consideration of the totality of the circumstances
as described herein, we find defendant has failed to show he was entitled to relief under
section 1473.7.3
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
Mesiwala, J.
We concur:
/s/
Renner, Acting P. J.
/s/
Krause, J.
3 We note in closing that defendant’s conviction for assault likely to cause great bodily
injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) is a deportable offense—as conceded by his immigration
attorney’s declaration—further suggesting that defendant cannot demonstrate trial court
error that prejudiced him in this appeal. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §13 [“No judgment shall be
set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or
of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of
the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].)
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