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Filed 8/1/24 P. v. Khan CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165941
v.
DAVID KHAN, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 21NF002249A)
Defendant and Appellant.
David Khan appeals a judgment entered following his convictions for
firearm-related offenses that he committed while subject to restraining
orders precluding him from possessing firearms. Khan, who represented
himself at trial, contends he was prevented from presenting a defense; the
trial court committed a prejudicial instructional error; and the prosecutor
committed misconduct. Khan contends further that his convictions violate
the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution. And he seeks a new
sentencing hearing, alleging several sentencing errors. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Criminal Charges and Proceedings
This case arose from a search of Khan’s Daly City residence conducted
on February 11, 2021. In April 2021, the People filed an amended complaint
charging Khan with offenses relating to his unlawful possession of weapons
and ammunition. Both parties waived a preliminary hearing, and Khan was
1
held to answer. Thereafter, Khan filed a motion to replace his appointed
private defender. (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.)
Meanwhile, on April 26, 2021, the San Mateo District Attorney filed an
information charging Khan with five offenses, as follows. Count one:
possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 30605, subd. (a)).1 Count two:
attempt to manufacture an assault weapon (§§ 664/30600, subd. (a)). Count
three: possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from owning or
possessing a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a) (section 30305(a))). Count four:
purchase or receipt of a firearm by a person prohibited from doing so by a
restraining order or protective order (§ 29825, subd. (a) (section 29525(a))).
Count five: possession of a firearm with identification numbers removed
(§ 23920).
Regarding count three, unlawful possession of ammunition, the People
alleged Khan was subject to restraining orders barring him from possessing
firearms and ammunition that were issued against him in multiple cases:
one in San Francisco, one in San Joaquin, and three in San Mateo.
Regarding count four, the People alleged Khan knew he was prohibited from
purchasing, receiving, or attempting to purchase or receive firearms by a
temporary restraining order, an injunction, and a protective order.
Following the appointment of a different private defender, Khan pled
not guilty to all charges. Thereafter, he filed a motion to represent himself,
which was granted on May 19, 2021. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S.
806.)
A jury trial began on May 2, 2022, with the court ruling on multiple
motions. That day, the court granted the People’s request to file an amended
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless we cite a different
statute.
2
information. The amendment did not add to or substantively change the
charged offenses, except that as to count three the People deleted allegations
that restraining orders had been issued against Khan in San Francisco and
San Joaquin Counties, and based this charge solely on restraining orders
issued in three San Mateo cases.2 The evidence phase of trial was held over
multiple court days in May 2022, with some delay when Khan’s advisory
counsel was temporarily unavailable.
Trial Evidence—the Prosecution Case
In January 2021, Khan lived on the top floor of a home in Daly City
that had been divided into three units. Other tenants did not have access to
the floor where Khan lived, which had its own door. Initially, Khan had
rented the unit for himself and his wife and young son, but by early 2020 he
lived there alone. In the spring of 2020, Khan’s landlord, R.W., had noticed
Khan had changed the locks to his unit. Khan told R.W. he changed the locks
for his own security, and he refused to provide R.W. with duplicate keys
despite numerous requests.
One day in late January 2021, R.W. went to the property to collect rent
and mail and found Khan “working in the garage.” There was a hand drill on
the floor, and Khan was filing a metal bracket, attempting to enlarge a hole.
When R.W. asked what Khan was doing, Khan said he was “modifying the
trigger” on the bracket for an “AK-47 gun body.” R.W. observed that the
firearm assembly seemed “messed up,” to which Khan replied that parts were
“ ‘cheap,’ ” and he would get another one.
2Every version of the accusatory pleading contained allegations that
Khan violated restraining orders issued in the same three San Mateo county
matters: case no. 20-CIV-02271, case no. 20-NM-006433, and case no. 21-
NM-001093.
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During this time period, R.W. talked with Khan a few times a month.
They were both Burmese, spoke to each other in that language, and R.W. had
attempted to assist Khan with his court matters. Khan often talked about
guns, and purchasing firearm components online. But, before the encounter
in the garage in January 2021, Khan never mentioned anything about AK-
47s to R.W. In early February, R.W. returned to the property to meet with
Khan, who had called him about a court matter. R.W. found Khan in the
garage, where he also found a “tabletop drill press” he had never seen before.
R.W. thought Khan had been using the tool on metal objects, as “fragments”
were flying around.
The Search of Khan’s Residence
On February 11, 2021, R.W. reported Khan’s activities to the Daly City
Police Department. The report was referred to Detective Ortega, who was
familiar with Khan as a suspect in multiple cases involving “other types of
crimes.” Ortega was also aware Khan had a court appearance in Redwood
City that day. He assigned Officers Shoopman and Poti to go to that location
and take Khan into custody while he arranged for a search warrant of Khan’s
residence. After Khan was taken into custody, officers searched his vehicle,
where they found a pistol holster in the back seat. Officers did not find
firearms or firearm components in the car.
At around 5:30 p.m. on February 11, Detective Ortega executed a
search warrant at Khan’s residence with a team of officers that included
Detectives Collins and Baroni. They found a yellow toolbox in a bedroom
closet that contained approximately 580 rounds of ammunition, which
included ammunition for an AK-47. From various rooms in the unit, officers
collected firearm-related paraphernalia, including a target scope, night-vision
goggles, and rifle handrails. Officers also found a laptop that contained a
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video showing use of an AK-47, and evidence of recently visited websites from
which people could purchase firearm-related merchandise. In an attic crawl
space accessed via a panel in the hallway ceiling, officers found an AK-47-
type rifle, and multiple loaded magazines, several of which were loaded with
AK-47 caliber ammunition. In the garage, officers found a drill-press and a
“lower receiver” for an AK-47.
Prior Contacts With Daly City Officers
The defense cross-examined Detectives Collins and Baroni about their
prior contact with Khan. Collins testified that the Daly City Police
Department had numerous prior contacts with Khan and that he was
personally involved in one prior encounter when he assisted in the service of
an emergency protective order that restrained Khan “from a woman.” Baroni
testified that he had been at Khan’s residence on a prior occasion in April
2020 when Khan was arrested in connection with a child endangerment
incident, possibly for violating a restraining order. Baroni confirmed that
after Khan was taken to jail in connection with the April 2020 incident, there
was nobody at Khan’s residence to monitor whether doors were locked, and
security maintained.
Phone Calls From Jail
In February 2021, Khan had telephone conversations with his mother
that were recorded by the jail and subsequently transcribed and translated
from Burmese to English. Excerpts from those conversations were
introduced at trial.
On February 14, Khan told his mother he was arrested for having a
“junk gun” that was “damaged and cannot be fired.” He said that he “told
them” the gun was not “workable,” and if somebody were to get injured, it
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would be “their fault.” Khan told his mom that he could not be charged
because “[t]he moment the gun is cocked, it will fall to pieces.”
On February 16, Khan’s mother asked him why he was arrested, to
which Khan replied: “For disobeying court order. Then they said they found
bullet ammunition in the house which were legally applied for. They were
confiscated.” Khan went on to explain to his mother that “they cannot open a
case according to the law” because the gun was “useless and damaged.”
When Khan’s mother referred to Khan’s “gun craziness,” he assured her that
“they cannot do anything” because the “gun has been done in such a manner
it cannot be fired.”
On February 20, Khan told his mother that he kept telling the police
that the “AK 47 is a piece of junk, incomplete, not functional since 2019.”
Evidence Regarding Firearms and AK-47s
The prosecution presented testimony from two witnesses who examined
the firearm and receiver recovered during the search of Khan’s home. Agent
Smith, from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF), testified about the characteristics of an AK-47. Smith examined the
firearm that was found in Khan’s attic, and identified it as an “AK-47-type
rifle” that had been personally manufactured. Smith also examined the
receiver that was recovered from the garage, which he described as an
unfinished receiver for an AK-47 that could be finished with a drill press by
creating holes for pins that would hold together the trigger assembly.
Daly City Police Officer Hart testified about his experience with
firearms, including the fact that on May 3, 2022 he had test fired the firearm
recovered from Khan’s attic. At the Department’s range, Hart “successfully”
fired the rifle. Both times he shot the firearm, a “dust cover” popped off the
weapon, but he testified that the dust cover does not affect the functionality
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of an AK-47. Video of Hart firing two shots from the weapon was admitted
into evidence at trial.
The Defense Case
During his opening statement and closing argument, Khan did not
articulate a coherent defense to the charges against him. Outside the
presence of the jury, Khan expressed his intention to show that he was the
victim of police harassment. Khan called several witnesses over the course of
three days. On the second day, he elected to testify on his own behalf.
Defense Witnesses Who Testified Before Khan Took the Stand
Khan began his defense by eliciting testimony from two criminalists
employed by the San Mateo Sherriff’s Office, Jack Krimmer and Theresa
Santos. Krimmer testified that in March 2021, he received a request from
the Daly City Police Department to examine an “AK-47-type stripped lower
receiver” and a “AK-47-type semiautomatic rifle.” The receiver was
incomplete and by itself could not be a firearm. The rifle functioned without
any problems. Santos testified that she tested these same items for latent
fingerprints and was unable to recover any. Khan’s next witness was ATF
Agent Smith, who once again testified that he would classify the receiver as
an “AK-style or AK-variant rifle” that was not “completely finished,” but
could be made into a firearm.
Khan’s final witness of the day was Daly City Police Officer Poti who
testified that he and Officer Shoopman took Khan into custody on the
afternoon of February 11, 2021. Khan asked Poti whether he had been at
Khan’s house in January 2021, eliciting a relevancy objection. Khan
responded that he was “[b]uilding the foundation that Daly City Police
Department have been harassing and being prejudice on David Khan for the
whole year.” The court sustained the relevancy objection “for the time being,”
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stating it would address the matter with Khan later. Poti went on to testify
that he did not at “anytime” go to Khan’s residence to participate in executing
a search warrant.
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court returned to the
question whether Khan’s prior interactions with police, including a prior
arrest by Officer Poti, were relevant to the current charges. The court opined
that the fact Khan was arrested previously was not sufficiently probative of
harassment, and explained to Khan that if he presented evidence of prior
arrests that would open the door for the prosecution to offer evidence about
collateral matters, which would be time consuming and prejudicial to Khan.
Khan stated that he did “understand,” but maintained that prior interactions
with law enforcement and the legal system were relevant to his defense. The
only concrete basis for this view was an assertion that Khan’s “family issue”
became an “opportunity” for officers to retaliate against him for filing a
federal racketeering lawsuit against the Police Department and District
Attorney in 2019.
Since Khan had attempted to ask Officer Poti about a January 2021
arrest, the court inquired about the status of Khan’s federal case as of that
time. Khan represented that in January 2021, he was “waiting” for
“summary judgment” in his “RICO” case. The court asked if the defense
would offer evidence about the federal lawsuit, to which Khan responded, “It
will be on if I . . . get on the stand and testify.” The court reiterated a prior
advisement that the decision whether to testify was “completely [Khan’s]
choice,” but without evidence of the federal lawsuit or a representation that
such evidence would be forthcoming, Khan’s prior arrests were irrelevant, the
court found. Khan stated he would testify and explain why the arrests were
relevant facts, but he did not want to say ahead of time. Ultimately, the
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court ruled that Poti would be subject to recall, and once Khan presented
evidence of his defense, the court would revisit whether he could ask Poti and
other officers about prior arrests.
Khan’s Testimony
The following court day, Khan announced in front of the jury that he
would testify on his own behalf. Khan testified that he was married, had a
child, and had lived in Daly City for 15 to 20 years, where he worked from
home as a computer consultant. Then Khan turned to the charges filed
against him in this case, reading or paraphrasing from the original
complaint. When Khan testified that he was charged with possession of “a
50-BMG” rifle the court struck his testimony on the ground that “[t]here is no
50-BMG weapon involved in this case.” The court stated that the charges
had already been read, and although Khan could tell the jury the charges
again, he could only read from admissible evidence. Khan attempted to
continue to read from the complaint, but was admonished to put it away as it
was not the operative document. Then Khan discussed multiple interactions
he has had with the Daly City Police Department. Khan’s testimony was
confusing and disjointed. From it, we recount information that appeared to
be relevant from Khan’s perspective.
The first incident Khan discussed occurred on April 20, 2020, when
officers came to his home, “claim[ed] that there was a verbal altercation
between families,” and that an emergency protective order was issued
because of the altercation. According to Khan, as many as eight officers
surrounded his home and then Detective Scholes handed him an emergency
protective order “barring” him from his child and wife. Khan questioned the
authenticity of the order, told officers he was “not going to deal with any false
document,” and closed the door. Then he agreed to give Scholes a statement
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in his garage, but when he went downstairs officers had already entered
without a warrant. The police requested that Khan surrender firearms that
he had legally purchased. When Khan refused, invoking his Second and Fifth
Amendment rights, officers forcibly entered his home, arrested him,
conducted a warrantless search, and seized his firearms and ammunition.
Khan testified that “the protective order” that was issued against him
was based on information provided by a person who does not understand or
speak English very well and spoke to the police because she was worried
about getting “in trouble.” Khan believed that the police had used that
information to “manufacture” an “accusation [of] child abuse” and to make up
“all sort of” other accusations.
On May 7, 2020, Khan had another interaction with the police
following his release from jail. He went to the police station to file a
complaint for officer misconduct and use of force causing him injuries, and
spoke to Sergeant Bussalacchi. But “instead” of taking Khan’s complaint, the
officer “confronted” Khan, which led to an argument about legal issues and
Khan telling the officer that a person who is unlawfully assaulted has the
“right to defend themself for their liberty,” and that he would defend himself
by “any mean[s] necessary.”
Khan testified that after he was released from jail, he was not allowed
to return home for several weeks, except for “a few minutes” to gather “money
or whatever,” and that is when he first discovered his property was missing.
On May 12, he filed a missing property report, and two days later received a
call from Sergeant Moala, who said he needed an additional form. When
Khan went to the station to complete the form, Moala served him with an
emergency gun violence restraining order, handcuffed him and transported
him to the hospital by ambulance for a “5150.” After spending a few hours at
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the hospital, Khan was released, as there was “no mental health issue or
physical issue.” Khan testified that when he was finally able to return to his
home on May 29, he could not find “a lot of stuff,” including his firearms and
ammunition. He and his cousin tried to find out what had happened to his
property, but to no avail. Then, on June 11, police officers “spread out
throughout” the city to find him and serve him with the gun violence
restraining order and notice to appear in court, even though he had no
firearms or ammunition.
Khan testified that at the same time he was dealing with issues arising
out of the April 2020 search of his home, he was involved in divorce and child
custody proceedings. He recalled that on May 28, 2020, the district attorney
obtained a “domestic violence restraining order” again him without obtaining
the consent of the “other party.” Subsequently, when he personally served
documents in family law matters, he was charged with violating the
restraining order.
The next police encounter Khan described occurred on July 15, 2020.
Seven or eight officers appeared outside his home, including Detective
Ortega, and Officer Poti. When Khan stepped outside, he was taken to jail
for violating an unspecified restraining order.
On January 7, 2021, Detectives Ortega and Collins served Khan with
another protective order while he was at the federal court building in San
Francisco, Khan testified. According to Khan, in that matter he had
contacted his marriage counselor only to ask for help, but the Police
Department “manufacture[d] the emergency protective order,” claiming that
he was “threatening in nature” and that the counselor was in “fear for her
life.”
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Khan recounted an incident on January 22, 2021, when officers tried to
arrest him for failing to appear in court, and a standoff ensued. Khan was
“frustrated,” and said, “ ‘You guys will not get me alive,’ ” then put a knife to
his throat and threatened to kill himself. The officers left, and the following
week Khan was told not to appear in court, but he later found out another
protective order was issued against him. Then, on January 27, Khan was at
the supermarket when Officer Poti and another officer arrested him again,
and after he was released from jail, Khan stayed “away from Daly City to
avoid any more abuse.”
The next incident in Khan’s narrative was the February 11, 2021,
search that gave rise to the current charges. Khan recalled that after
spending most of the day in court, he was placed under arrest without being
given a reason. Eventually, his court-appointed attorney asked him if he had
firearms, and he reported that he had none, and that anyone could search his
house. Later that night, Detective Ortega “confronted” him after executing
the search warrant and said they found guns, “machines” to make guns, and
ammunition. Khan was surprised and told Ortega, “ ‘You guys already took
everything. I have nothing.’ ” Months later, Khan obtained a copy of the
search warrant and discovered Ortega had submitted an affidavit that
allegedly included false information, stating that one of several restraining
orders against Khan had been issued in March 2020, although Khan believed
the first order against him was not issued until May 2020.
Khan testified that the “main reason” the Daly City Police Department
and the San Mateo County District Attorney “went after” him was because he
had made a “RICO complaint at the federal level.” Khan testified that he
filed that federal case in October 2019, and summary judgment was filed in
March 2020, the month before Daly City Police came and arrested him at his
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home. In June, the case was dismissed with prejudice, but an appeal was
still pending, Khan testified.
Regarding his possession of firearms, Khan testified that he used to be
a collector before the police took his guns, and that he previously purchased a
firearm for his wife to use for her protection. Khan and R.W. used to make
videos about building firearms, but he testified that “we never finish[ed] the
firearm, only just partially how it works.” Khan maintained that the firearm
recovered from his attic in February 2021 could not belong to him because he
is afraid of heights and would not have been able to get on a ladder, and that
the toolbox was not his either. He pointed out there were no prints on the
gun and opined that nobody keeps a toolbox in a bedroom closet. As for
phone conversations he had with his mother while he was in jail, Khan
testified that he “intentionally” made up stories about the firearm having
missing parts because he knew that he was being recorded.
Under cross-examination, Khan was asked about his federal case. He
elaborated that he also sued the Pinole Police Department and another
district attorney, alleging a conspiracy to protect a “felon on probation” who
stole property from him. Khan refused to acknowledge that case was
dismissed in favor of defendants or that his appeal was denied. He insisted
that he filed for summary judgment in March 2020, and after that the case
did not proceed because of the pandemic. He testified his case was later
dismissed because his wife no longer wanted to participate, and he
maintained his appeal was still pending. Later in his testimony, Khan
acknowledged his appeal was dismissed but claimed he did not receive notice,
and then opined that his federal lawsuit was not in “any” way “relevant for
this case.”
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Khan was cross-examined about restraining orders issued against him
in San Mateo County matters. He acknowledged that a domestic violence
restraining order was issued on May 4, 2020, in case no. 20-NM-006433-A.
He claimed not to understand that when the order was terminated, it was
replaced with another restraining order. And he objected on relevancy
grounds when asked if the order was reissued because he had been convicted
of 35 violations of the original restraining order. After his objection was
overruled, Khan acknowledged he had been convicted of 35 counts of
restraining order violations. (See § 166.)
The prosecutor asked Khan about a restraining order issued in case
no. 21-NM-001093, which involved the marriage counselor. Khan
acknowledged he was served with the order in January 2021, but testified
that he did not know an actual case had been filed against him until the
following March. Khan also acknowledged that a gun violence restraining
order was issued against him in case no. 20-CIV-02271, he was served with
the order, and the order was reissued in July 2020.
Khan acknowledged that he was also served with a family violence
restraining order that was issued on October 23, 2020 in his family law case
(case no. 20-FAM-00875). The People relied on this order (as well as the
domestic violence restraining order) to prove the count 4 charge of violating
section 29825, subdivision (a), which prohibits purchasing or receiving a
firearm in violation of a protective order. Although Khan acknowledged this
protective order, he denied that it had been obtained by his ex-wife, testifying
that the district attorney obtained it without her consent.
Other Defense Witnesses
The prosecution’s cross-examination of Khan was interrupted so that
Khan could call three witnesses with timing constraints. First, Khan
14
examined Mr. Leong, the Burmese interpreter who translated the transcribed
phone calls between Khan and his mother. But Leong confirmed the
accuracy of his translation, testifying that Khan had not told his mother the
ammunition was “previously” confiscated.
Then Khan called his cousin, S.K., who testified that he lived with
Khan from February 2020 until May 2021, and that before he moved out,
S.K. did not see a yellow toolbox in Khan’s home, nor did he ever see Khan go
up in the attic.
Khan also re-called R.W., who testified that he had a key to a side door
of the garage that still worked after Khan changed the locks to his residence.
R.W. denied ever going into the attic of the property and testified he provided
Khan with notice before going into Khan’s residence.
At the end of his case, Khan re-called two officers who testified during
the prosecution case. He elicited testimony from Detective Baroni about
weapons and a bag of ammunition police seized from his home in April 2020.
Baroni testified that the April 2020 seizure resulted in issuance of an
emergency protective order that Khan subsequently violated. Khan
examined Detective Collins about R.W.’s February 11, 2021 report about
Khan. Collins testified that R.W. told him where Khan would be that day.
Collins also recalled that R.W. had initially said he was in Khan’s attic on
February 9, but then clarified that he had never been in the attic. Collins
understood R.W. to be saying that he had been in Khan’s top floor unit on
February 9.
The Rebuttal Case
As their rebuttal case, the People offered several exhibits and two
stipulations. First, the parties stipulated that Khan’s federal cases were
appealed and dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in July 2021. Second, in case
15
21-NM-001093-A, which involved contact with the marriage counselor, court
records showed Khan was not present at the protective order hearing, so the
prosecution would not rely on that order “as a basis in this case.”
Jury Verdicts and Sentence
Before the case was submitted to the jury, the charge for possession of a
firearm with identification numbers removed (count five) was dismissed
pursuant to the People’s request, and the charge for attempting to
manufacture a firearm (count two) was dismissed by the court for insufficient
evidence. The jury found Khan guilty of the three remaining charges:
possession of an assault weapon; possessing a firearm in violation of a
protective order; and possessing ammunition in violation of a protective
order. The trial court sentenced Khan to an aggregate term of three years
and eight months in prison.
DISCUSSION
I. Khan’s Opportunity to Present a Defense
Khan’s first claim of error is that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
prevented him from presenting his defense. Khan does not cite any case
authority supportive of this claim of error, and his factual analysis is
unavailing.
The federal constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense. (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476
U.S. 683, 690; People v. Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 144.) A defendant
is denied the right to present a defense if the trial court excludes evidence
that is vital to that defense. (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684.)
“The principle applies, however, only to ‘relevant and material’ evidence.”
(Ibid.) Moreover, “[a]s a general matter, the ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary
rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to
16
present a defense.’ [Citations.] Although completely excluding evidence of an
accused’s defense theoretically could rise to this level, excluding defense
evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due
process right to present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075,
1102–1103.) If the trial court rejects some evidence concerning a defense
without precluding the defendant from presenting a defense, any error “is one
of state law,” which is reviewed under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836. (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203; see Fudge, at p. 1103.)
Applying these principles, we reject Khan’s claim of error. Khan was
not barred from attempting to present a defense. He cross-examined
prosecution witnesses, called multiple witnesses during his defense case, and
described issues and events that he deemed important during his own direct
testimony. Despite the wide latitude afforded to him, Khan failed to prove a
legally recognized defense to the charges in this case.
Khan’s appellate counsel argues that the trial court erred by creating a
“Catch-22 relevance situation” whereby Khan was precluded from presenting
evidence that would have supported his claim that he was “ ‘railroaded.’ ” If
such evidence existed, Khan did not make it known by way of an offer of
proof, nor does he bring it to our attention on appeal. Moreover, to the extent
Khan is contending that erroneous evidence rulings prevented him from
presenting a valid defense, he is mistaken. To highlight the flaws in this
claim of error, we address separately the rulings about which Khan
complains.
Filing the Amended Information: Khan objected at trial to the
information being amended, arguing that the originally alleged out-of-county
restraining orders were fabricated evidence. The trial court overruled the
objection, reasoning that the amendment benefited Khan by clarifying the
17
prosecution’s trial theory without materially changing the charges. This
ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Short v. Superior Court (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 905, 913), which Khan fails to show. “An information may be
amended ‘for any defect or insufficiency, at any stage of the proceedings,’ so
long as the amended information does not ‘charge an offense not shown by
the evidence taken at the preliminary examination.’ ” (People v. Goolsby
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 360, 367, quoting § 1009.)
Claiming he was prejudiced by the amendment, Khan contends the
trial court used the amended information to preclude him from referring to
the “original complaint,” even though he was claiming that complaint
contained false allegations. The record shows that Khan was precluded from
reading the original complaint because (1) it was not in evidence, and
(2) Khan appeared to be testifying that the complaint contained the charges
he wanted to dispute. We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling. “To be
admissible in evidence, a writing must be relevant and authenticated.”
(People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266, citing Evid. Code, §§ 350,
1401.) This ruling did not prevent Khan from attempting to show that the
charges the jury was actually being asked to decide were false, and a
narrowing amendment is not evidence that evidence against Khan had been
fabricated.
Admitting Redacted Phone Calls: The prosecution offered redacted
versions of the February 2021 phone calls between Khan and his mother.
Initially, Khan objected that he would rather have the entire conversations
admitted because he wanted the jury to hear how many times he had been
arrested over the course of the whole year. The court explained that
redactions could be warranted to prevent the jury from hearing prejudicial
matter, and subsequently found that redactions proposed by the prosecutor
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were appropriately limited to matter that was either inadmissible or
prejudicial to Khan. Specifically, Khan’s remarks to the effect that people
were trying to put him away for five years constituted improper reference to
potential punishment, and discussion of domestic violence matters was
prejudicial to him. The court also required additional redactions to eliminate
references to bail issues. Khan objected that he wanted to include evidence of
his right “not to [have] excessive bail,” but the court overruled the objection,
finding that bail issues had nothing to do with whether Khan was guilty of
the charges. Then the court discussed each phone call and what language to
redact. At the conclusion of that exercise, Khan expressed his approval, and
when the court asked if he was “okay with the redactions,” Khan said “Yeah.”
On appeal, Khan argues the court should not have redacted references
to prior arrests or bail issues, as they were obviously important to the defense
Khan was attempting to present. Tellingly, Khan does not actually articulate
a theory of relevancy. Khan’s statements to his mother about his prior
arrests and current bail issues was not evidence that his arrests were
unlawful. Moreover, Khan overlooks that he expressly approved the
redactions that the court made. (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852
[“As a general rule, only ‘claims properly raised and preserved by the parties
are reviewable on appeal’ ”]; see also People v. Torres (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d
290, 295 [having consented to admission of evidence, appellant may not object
to it on appeal].)
Restrictions on Examining Police Officers: As our background
summary reflects, the trial court ruled that Khan could not examine Officer
Poti or other officers about Kahn’s prior arrests without first establishing
those events were probative of a valid defense to the current charges. Again,
Khan fails to show an error in this ruling. At trial, Khan’s apparent theory
19
was that the simple fact he was arrested so many times was proof of
harassment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting that
argument. (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.) Moreover, Khan’s only concrete theory
for connecting alleged prior harassment to the current charges was that he
had named the Daly City Police Department as a defendant in his 2019
federal lawsuit. Despite representing to the court that he was awaiting
summary judgment when Officer Poti arrested him in January 2021, Khan
later admitted his lawsuit was dismissed in July 2020 and that his federal
case was not even relevant to this case.
Khan intimates that it was unfair for the court to prevent him from
eliciting testimony about his prior arrests when the court had already
prevented him from introducing booking sheets and arrest reports pertaining
to those prior incidents. But Khan does not show, or even contend, that those
documents were admissible evidence.
Khan’s Decision to Testify: Khan contends the trial court “induced”
him to testify at trial, as that was the “only way he could present the defense
issues he wanted to present to the jury.” Khan submits this alleged
inducement was prejudicial error since he incriminated himself when he
testified at trial. Khan fails to support this contention with any legal
analysis, and we consider this argument unsound.
First, it is hardly the trial court’s fault that the only witness Khan was
able to identify with evidence that Kahn was being harassed by the police
was the defendant himself. Kahn never provided an offer of proof to suggest
that any other witness had evidence that would support his theory, so his felt
need to testify cannot be attributed to the trial court having excluded other
evidence.
20
Second, it was not the trial court’s responsibility to warn defendant
away from taking the stand. “[A] ‘defendant who chooses to represent
himself assumes the responsibilities inherent in the role which he has
undertaken.’ ” (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1221–1222.) This
principle extends to decisions whether to testify. “[A] defendant who chooses
to represent himself or herself after knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
forgoing the assistance of counsel assumes the risk of his or her own
ignorance, and cannot compel the trial court to make up for counsel’s
absence. Such a defendant therefore cannot reasonably expect the trial court
to provide an advisement of any right, including the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.” (Id. at p. 1226.)
II. Khan Fails To Show Jury Instruction Error
Khan contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 371, which stated: “If the defendant tried
to create false evidence, that conduct may show that he was aware of his
guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made such an attempt, it is up to
you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence of such an
attempt cannot prove guilt by itself.”
“A trial court in a criminal case is required to give correct jury
instructions on the general principles of law relevant to issues raised by the
evidence.” (People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1183.) “Giving an
instruction that is correct as to the law but irrelevant or inapplicable is error.
[Citation.] Nonetheless, giving an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is
generally ‘ “only a technical error which does not constitute ground for
reversal.” ’ ” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67.) “Such error does not
implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights and is subject to harmless
error review.” (People v. Falaniko (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1247,
21
disapproved on another ground in People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591,
607-608, fn. 5.)
Applying these principles, we reject Khan’s claim of error. Khan does
not dispute that the CALCRIM instruction constitutes a correct statement of
the law. He contends only that it does not apply. We disagree. Khan
testified that because he knew his jail phone calls were recorded, he told his
mother, “ ‘I am going to make up this story,’ ” and then he intentionally said
things he had no reason to think were true, namely that the gun police found
in his home was missing parts, not functional, and could not be used to
convict him of a crime. From Khan’s testimony, the jury could have
concluded that he tried to create false evidence, as the trial court found.
On appeal, Khan acknowledges his testimony warranted an instruction
that false or misleading statements by the defendant may be evidence of a
consciousness of guilt. (CALCRIM No. 362.) But he argues that giving
CALCRIM No. 371 was error because there is no evidence that he specifically
intended to fabricate evidence, as opposed to simply being reckless with the
truth. We are unpersuaded by this logic and again Khan fails to cite legal
authority. For CALCRIM No. 371 to be given, the evidence “need not
conclusively establish fabrication.” (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
513, 565.) The instruction applies when there is “some evidence in the record
that, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the suggested
inference.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 921.)
III. Khan Fails to Prove Prosecutorial Misconduct
Khan contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing
argument. “ ‘A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that
22
does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial
misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the
jury.’ ” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 869.) As Khan does not
contend the prosecutor used deceptive or reprehensible methods, the issue is
whether the challenged conduct was so unfair as to deny him due process.
Khan objects to portions of the prosecutor’s closing that discussed
Khan’s admission about lying during the February 2021 phone calls with his
mother. Specifically, the prosecutor argued Khan’s testimony showed that
either he was lying about “the weapon’s operability,” or he “made up false
evidence” in saying that he had a junk gun, which was inconsistent with his
testimony that he had no firearm at all. And later in her argument, the
prosecutor stated that when Khan was confronted with the statements he
made about the gun not being functional, he brushed the admissions off as
“planting this evidence to throw people off track.”
Khan contends the prosecutor committed misconduct because her
assertion that Khan “admitted” planting false evidence is not supported by
evidence. Khan failed to preserve this claim of error by making a timely
objection in the trial court. (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275
[“ ‘ “only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of
misconduct preserved for review” ’ ”].) Further, as we have explained, Khan’s
testimony about how he was “ ‘going to make up this story’ ” provided some
evidence to support the prosecution’s theory. “ ‘ “ ‘[A] prosecutor is given wide
latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it
amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable
inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hill (1998) 17
23
Cal.4th 800, 819.) Here, urging the jury to draw the inference that Khan was
planting false evidence was not misconduct.
IV. Khan Fails To Show Prejudicial Sentencing Error
Khan contends he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing due to
multiple trial court errors. Generally, sentencing decisions are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Ogg (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 173, 185; see
People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847 (Sandoval).) Claims of legal
error in sentencing are reviewed de novo. (People v. Superior Court (Frezier)
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 652, 659.)
A. Additional Background
Khan’s sentencing hearing began on July 22, 2022, but was continued
to August 8 because the parties had only recently received the probation
report.
The Probation Report
On July 13, 2022, the probation department submitted its report and
recommendations to the court. The department reported that Khan denied
responsibility for his current offenses and claimed he was the victim of
judicial abuse and prosecuted due to his race and background, and that
county officials were corrupt. Recommending that the court deny Khan
probation, the department delineated several aggravating factors and
reported there were no mitigating factors.
The report discussed Khan’s prior offenses, which consisted of multiple
misdemeanor convictions that were adjudicated on March 25, 2021, in one of
the San Mateo cases that involved a restraining order. The department
reported that Khan had “prior misdemeanor convictions for cruelty to a child
by endangering their health, battery against a peace officer, for obstructing
or resisting a public officer, and for making annoying telephone calls.” The
24
report also summarized the incidents that resulted in these convictions:
After a verbal altercation with an adult victim, Khan threw two firearms onto
a bed in front of the child victim. Later, he threw ammunition on the floor,
again in front of the child. The adult victim hid the guns and ammunition
from Khan and reported the incidents to a marriage and family therapist,
which led to issuance of a protective order. When officers went to Khan’s
residence, he refused to accept service of the protective order and to
relinquish his firearms, resisted arrest and spat on an officer. Thereafter,
Khan repeatedly violated the no-contact order by calling and emailing the
victim.
First Session of the Sentencing Hearing
On July 22, the trial court flagged several issues for the parties to be
prepared to address at the continued hearing.
The first issue pertained to custody credits. The court stated that the
probation report indicated Khan had been in custody since his arrest in
February 2021, but it did not address how to divide credits between this case
and Khan’s other criminal case, for which he was still serving a sentence.
The court advised the parties that it had requested a calculation and shared
the probation officer’s response that Khan had 368 actual days of custody
credit in the prior case. But that figure conflicted with the prior case file,
which showed that, as of April 29, 2022, Khan had been awarded 442 actual
days of credit time in that case. After confirming the higher number with the
trial judge in Khan’s other case, the court calculated that Khan’s three-year
sentence would be completed on August 13, 2022.3 Thus, the first issue the
3The court explained that the three-year sentence in Khan’s prior case
was 1,095 days, which required 548 actual days (assuming double for good
conduct). “So if he had 442 actual days on April 29, he would need another
25
court asked the parties to consider was whether they agreed with the court’s
calculation because if the court ordered Khan’s sentence in this case to run
consecutively to the prior matter, Khan had zero credits, as he would not
start earning credits toward his sentence in this case until August 14.
The court also flagged other material issues, albeit briefly. It observed
that section 654 was relevant, but also opined that section 654 might not
apply to any of the three convictions because there was more than one
firearm and a large quantity of ammunition was possessed separately. The
court also advised Khan that it was considering imposing an upper term
sentence, and consecutive sentences for the offenses he committed in this
case.
The Continued Hearing
The court addressed two issues Khan had raised before announcing
Khan’s sentence. First, Khan accused the court of racially motivated
hostility, which the court denied. The court stated that it based its
sentencing decisions solely on the facts of the case, Khan’s history, the
probation report, and sentencing memos. The court also made clear that it
had significant concerns about Khan that had nothing to do with his race, but
pertained to his “volatile temper with no regard for the rules or the laws that
apply just to society in general,” and to the fact that Khan was in possession
of “an assault weapon with hundreds of rounds of ammunition,” which was “a
recipe for disaster in the community.”
The second issue Khan raised was an allegation of improper ex parte
communication between the trial judge in this case and the trial judge in
Khan’s prior case. The court explained again that there was a discrepancy
106 [days] to get to that 548 number and be done with his sentence on the
[other] matter.”
26
regarding custody credits and that the court contacted the trial judge in
Khan’s other case only to confirm the number of credits that were awarded in
that other case.
Turning to Khan’s sentence for his current offenses, the court imposed
an upper term for purchasing or receiving a firearm by a person subject to a
restraining order or protective order (count four). The court based this
decision on the circumstances of Khan’s prior convictions. While those
convictions were all adjudicated in a single case, Khan was charged with “40-
plus counts.” And although his crimes were misdemeanors, his convictions
were for violating a protective order on multiple occasions over multiple
dates, and resulted in a sentence of three years in custody. Moreover, the
charges in the prior case were pending when Khan committed the felonies in
this case. Under these circumstances, the court opined that “to give him a
lower sentence here than he received on that misdemeanor case for more
serious conduct while that case was pending is just illogical and not
warranted.”
The court next found that it would impose a consecutive sentence for
unlawful possession of ammunition (count three), finding no mitigating
factors, and relying on aggravating factors other than Khan’s prior
convictions. Specifically, the court relied on the serious nature of Khan’s
conduct underlying the current offenses, including that he hid the assault
weapon in an attic and then denied doing so, which indicated a “nefarious
intent.” Moreover, he had “600-plus rounds of ammunition,” and there was
evidence of a plan to build a second AK-47 style weapon. The court also
found that Khan was a danger to society, and showed “absolutely zero
remorse” or insight about his own behavior. In addition, the court found it
“significant” that Khan had perjured himself a trial. The court provided a
27
non-exhaustive list of examples to support this perjury finding: Khan
testified that he did not put the firearm in the attic because he never went in
the attic; Khan denied the yellow toolbox was his, testifying that his toolbox
was red; he made up the story about the gun not working; and he denied
having any ammunition.
Ultimately, the court imposed an aggregate prison sentence of three
years and eight months: a three-year upper term for possession of a firearm
in violation of a restraining order; a consecutive term of eight months for
possession of ammunition (one-third of the midterm); and a three-year upper
term for possession of an assault weapon, which was stayed under section
654.
B. Consecutive Sentences
Khan contends the decision to impose a consecutive sentence for
possession of ammunition was error because the court relied on the fact that
Khan committed perjury. A court may enhance a defendant’s sentence upon
finding that he or she committed perjury. (People v. Howard (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 999, 1004.) “[W]hen imposing an aggravated sentence because of
perjury at trial, the sentencing judge is constitutionally required to make on-
the-record findings encompassing all the elements of a perjury violation. In
California, those elements are a willful statement, under oath, of any
material matter which the witness knows to be false. (Pen. Code, § 118.)”
(Howard, at p. 1004.)
Here, the record shows that the trial court followed Howard and made
findings encompassing all the elements of a perjury violation. Khan does not
argue otherwise. Instead, he contends that the finding that he committed
perjury by telling his mother the story about nonfunctioning firearms was an
error of law. We agree with Khan that lies he told his mother during their
28
recorded phone calls did not constitute perjury because those statements
were not made under oath. And we concede for purposes of argument that
the court’s statement Khan “made up a story to the police department
regarding the gun not working,” may have been a reference to Khan’s lies on
the call to his mother, although the court may instead have been referring to
Khan’s sworn testimony that he made these statements in an intentional
effort to have them recorded by law enforcement. But we reject Khan’s
contention that relying on perjury as an aggravating factor was error. As
Khan concedes, the court cited several instances when Khan perjured
himself, and said the examples it cited were “not meant to be exhaustive.”
Khan does not dispute the other statements were made under oath or that
they support the court’s finding that Khan committed perjury.
Khan contends he is entitled to resentencing because the record does
not “clearly indicate” that the court would have imposed a consecutive
sentence had it understood that the lie he told his mother was not perjury.
(Citing People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 468.) Under Lopez a
resentencing hearing is warranted when “it is reasonably probable that a
more favorable sentence would have otherwise been imposed absent the trial
court’s improper reliance” on a sentencing factor. (Id. at p. 467.) Here, the
court did not improperly rely on the perjury aggravating factor, although it
cited one arguably erroneous example in its nonexhaustive list of Khan’s lies
under oath, and it relied on several other valid aggravating factors, as
discussed above. Khan acknowledges that the erroneous perjury example
was only part of a “cumulative” list of factors, but he believes that it
disproportionally weighed in the court’s sentencing decision, thus warranting
a new hearing. We disagree. On this record, we find no probability that the
29
court would exercise its discretion differently if it had not considered
statements Khan made to his mother as evidence of perjury.
C. The Upper-Term Sentence
Khan argues the trial court erred by imposing an upper term based
solely on the fact that Khan suffered one prior misdemeanor conviction. To
support this claim of error, Khan relies on the language of rule 4.421(b)(2) of
the California Rules of Court, which counts as a factor in aggravation that
the “defendant’s prior convictions as an adult . . . are numerous or of
increasing seriousness.” Khan posits that since this rule refers specifically to
prior convictions in the plural, his single prior conviction does not constitute
an aggravating factor.
We need not decide whether a single prior misdemeanor can constitute
an aggravating sentencing factor because Khan had multiple prior
convictions. According to the probation report, Khan’s prior convictions
included cruelty to a child by endangering the child’s health (§ 273a,
subd. (b)), battery against a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b)); four counts of
obstructing or resisting a public officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)); 25 counts of
contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)); and making annoying phone calls
(§ 653m, subd. (b)). The probation officer reported that although Khan’s
convictions were for “misdemeanors, his criminal behavior, past and present,
are serious in nature and of concern.”
Khan acknowledges he was convicted of multiple counts in his prior
case, but he insists that he suffered only a single misdemeanor conviction.
Khan does not cite authority for his definition of a conviction, or explain why
he believes that being convicted of multiple counts for crimes committed over
multiple days qualifies as only one conviction. Although the term may have
more than one meaning, generally “where the existence of a prior conviction
30
triggers increased punishments, courts interpret ‘conviction’ to mean the
factual ascertainment of guilt by verdict or plea.” (People v. Williams (1996)
49 Cal.App.4th 1632, 1637.) Moreover, in “charging an offense,” each count of
an accusatory pleading “shall be sufficient if it contains in substance, a
statement that the accused has committed some public offense therein
specified.” (§ 952.) Here, the record shows that Khan was convicted of
multiple criminal offenses, which is sufficient proof of his multiple prior
convictions.
In another argument, Khan contends the court erred by basing its
sentencing choice on a general principle of logic; he claims that the only
reason the court imposed an upper term was because it believed the current
sentence in a felony case had to be longer than the sentence imposed in
Khan’s prior misdemeanor case. Khan posits that the court’s alleged reliance
on this logic violated its obligation to make “an ‘individualized consideration
of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.’ ” (Quoting Sandoval,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 847.) We disagree with Khan’s interpretation of the
court’s ruling. At the hearing, the court expressly relied on the probation
report, which contained a detailed summary of the prior case. The court
highlighted some of these details: that Khan’s prior convictions were
numerous and serious even though they were misdemeanors; and that Khan
had already been charged with those prior crimes when he committed the
current felonies, which were more serious crimes. This was an individualized
assessment, not rote application of an abstract principle.
D. Custody Credits
When the court announced Khan’s sentence, it repeated its earlier
finding that Khan had not earned custody credits in this case because he had
been in custody for another matter and his sentence on that matter would not
31
be completed until August 13, 2022. Khan objected, contending his sentence
was “already done on July 14, 2022.” Khan agreed with the court that his
sentence was for 1,085 days and that he needed 548 days of actual time to
complete it. But by his calculation, his sentence was completed on July 14,
2022. The court stated that it explained its calculation “in great detail” at
the prior hearing and would not go over it again. The court also reminded
the parties that it had requested that any alternative calculation be
submitted in writing. “So, again,” the court ruled, “the credits in this case
are none. You will begin earning credits in this case on August 14 of 2022.”
On appeal, Khan contends the trial court erred by basing its calculation
on “an out-of-court communication” with another trial judge, when it should
have calculated and awarded custody credits based on the “official probation
report.” First, the court did not simply rely on its conversation with the other
judge, but used court records to perform its calculation. Second, Khan was
not requesting custody credits based on information in the probation report,
as that report had overlooked that Khan was serving his sentence for the
prior misdemeanor offenses while awaiting trial in the current case. At the
sentencing hearing, Khan sought custody credits based on his representation
and belief that his misdemeanor sentence was complete on July 14, 2022.
The court rejected the request because Khan provided no evidence to support
it, despite the fact that the court had flagged the issue at the prior hearing.
In his reply brief, Khan argues the trial court erred because it relied
“entirely on non-publicly disclosed information” in Khan’s prior case file, and
“never shared those records” with Khan. This distinct claim of error is
forfeited. (People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29 [point raised for
the first time in reply brief may be deemed waived].) Moreover, the
allegation that Khan did not have access to his other case file is difficult to
32
reconcile with the record, which shows that his advisory counsel questioned
the court’s calculation of custody credits at the first session of the sentencing
hearing, and that Khan himself argued that his own calculation established
that he completed his prior sentence on July 14, 2022.
Khan points to no evidence in this record to support his contention that
he completed his prior sentence in July 2022. Thus, he fails to show error in
the court’s determination that Khan did not earn any custody credits as of
the time of sentencing in this matter. (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 524, 549 [defendant’s burden to provide record on appeal that
“affirmatively shows” error, and “uncertainty in the record must be resolved
against the defendant”]; accord, People v. $17,522.08 United States Currency
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084 [“Error will never be presumed and must
be affirmatively shown”].)
V. Khan’s Second Amendment Challenge Fails
Khan challenges the constitutionality of his conviction for violating
section 29825(a) by purchasing or receiving a firearm while subject to a
restraining order or protective order, and his conviction for violating section
30305(a) by owning or possessing ammunition in violation of a protective
order. Khan contends these California statutes violate the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as construed in New York
State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1.
Khan’s appellate briefs contain no analysis to support his claim that
Bruen renders sections 29825(a) and 30305(a) unconstitutional, but instead
adopt the analysis in United States v. Rahimi (5th Cir. 2023) 61 F.4th 443, a
decision that was recently reversed by the United States Supreme Court.
(United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. __ [144 S. Ct. 1889, 219 L.Ed.2d
351] (Rahimi).) Notwithstanding Khan’s acknowledgment that his entire
33
Second Amendment claim “stands or falls” with Rahimi, we granted both
parties leave to file supplemental briefs after issuance of the Supreme Court’s
decision. In a three sentence response, Khan concedes that Rahimi is
“controlling authority” and “submits” his claim.
Rahimi was a facial challenge to a federal statute that bars an
individual who is subject to a restraining order from possessing a firearm
under specified circumstances. (Rahimi, supra, 144 S. Ct. at p. 1898.)
Rejecting the challenge, the Court found “ample evidence that the Second
Amendment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a credible
threat to the physical safety of others.” (Id. at pp. 1898-1899.) Accepting
Khan’s concession that Rahimi applies here, we summarily reject his Second
Amendment challenge, as he provides no analysis to support concluding
otherwise. (See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1029; People v.
Murray (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1143.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
People v. Kahn (A165941)
34
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