CourtListener 10025797•People v. Collier CA1/4
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Filed 7/30/24 P. v. Collier CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A167654
v. (Solano County
TORIANO COLLIER, Super. Ct. Nos.
VCR224814, VCR223244,
Defendant and
VCR230488, VCR233426,
Appellant.
VCR231944, VCR230676,
FCR341905, FCR341903)
Toriano Collier appeals from the trial court’s sentence
following Collier’s pleas of no contest to various felonies in eight
separate cases in Solano County. Collier contends the trial court
erred by failing to rule on his Romero1 request to strike his prior
strike convictions and by resentencing him on four cases from
Napa County. Collier fails to demonstrate that the trial court
erred in its treatment of his Romero request. However, the trial
court failed to sentence Collier on one count in one of the Solano
County cases and improperly modified the sentence on the Napa
1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
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County cases when it pronounced a single aggregate term for all
of Collier’s offenses. We must therefore vacate the sentence and
remand for the trial court to impose a proper sentence.
BACKGROUND
Between May 2016 and January 2019, Collier was charged
in eight cases in Solano County with committing various felonies.
The prosecution alleged Collier had one or more prior strike
convictions under Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (d) and
1170.12, subdivision (b).2
In March 2019, Collier filed a Romero request in all eight
cases, asking the court to dismiss the prior strike convictions
under Penal Code section 1385. A few days later, Collier pleaded
no contest to the charges in all eight cases. The trial court
suspended imposition of sentence and placed Collier on formal
probation for five years.
In February 2021, Collier was sentenced in federal court
following a guilty plea to possession of stolen mail. In May 2022,
Napa County Superior Court sentenced Collier in five cases
involving conduct between February and July 2020. (People v.
Collier (Jan. 3, 2024, A165532) [nonpub. opn.].) The Napa
County sentence consisted of the upper term of three years in
prison on one case, doubled to six years because of a prior strike
conviction, and concurrent sentences of the low term of 16
months, doubled to 32 months because of the prior strike, in the
2 All statutory citations are to the Penal Code. All citations
to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
2
other four cases. (Ibid.) Collier appealed and another division of
this court affirmed. (Ibid.)
In December 2022, during proceedings to determine
whether his new federal and Napa County offenses violated the
terms of his probation in the Solano County matters, Collier
renewed his Romero request. The trial court found Collier’s new
offenses violated the probation condition that he obey all laws.
The trial court proceeded to sentence Collier in all eight Solano
County cases. In each case, the trial court imposed the middle
terms or one-third of the middle terms, doubled pursuant to
sections 667.5, subdivision (b) and 1170.12, with some terms
stayed pursuant to section 654, some running concurrently, and
misdemeanor charges dismissed pursuant to section 1385. The
total aggregate term was 12 years, 8 months, with 1137 days of
sentence credits, for an effective sentence of about 9 years, 8
months. The trial court neglected to orally pronounce sentence
on one attempted second degree burglary count (§ 459) charged
as a felony in case No. FCR341905, apparently because of a belief
that it was a misdemeanor and covered by the court’s decision to
dismiss all misdemeanors. The trial court’s minute order
nonetheless shows the trial court imposed a sentence of one year
on that count as a felony, stayed under section 654.
The trial court then announced a sentence on four of
Collier’s Napa County cases. The trial court said it would not
impose a consecutive sentence. Instead, the trial court imposed
the middle term of two years for the felony offenses in four Napa
County cases, doubled because of Collier’s prior strike conviction,
3
but running concurrently with the rest of Collier’s sentence. The
trial court did not address the fifth Napa County case. (See
People v. Collier, supra, A165532.)
DISCUSSION
I. Romero request
Section 1385, subdivision (a) allows a judge, “either on
motion of the court or upon the application of the prosecuting
attorney, and in furtherance of justice, [to] order an action to be
dismissed.” “ ‘In Romero, [the California Supreme Court] held
that a trial court may strike or vacate an allegation or finding
under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously
been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony, on its own
motion, “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to . . . section
1385(a).’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) “A
defendant has no right to make a motion, and the trial court has
no obligation to make a ruling, under section 1385. But he or she
does have the right to ‘invite the court to exercise its power by an
application to strike a count or allegation of an accusatory
pleading, and the court must consider evidence offered by the
defendant in support of his assertion that the dismissal would be
in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 375.) “[A] trial
court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of
discretion.” (Carmony, at p. 375.)
Section 1385 requires a judge to orally state the reasons for
a dismissal and also to set them forth in an order entered upon
the minutes if requested by a party. (§ 1385, subd. (a).) “While a
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court must explain its reasons for striking a prior [citations], no
similar requirement applies when a court declines to strike a
prior [citation]. ‘The absence of such a requirement merely
reflects the legislative presumption that a court acts properly
whenever it sentences a defendant in accordance with the three
strikes law.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, the three strikes law not only
establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial
court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to
explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates
a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these
sentencing norms is both rational and proper.’ ” (In re Large
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550.)
Collier notes correctly that the trial court never formally
ruled on his Romero request at his sentencing. He argues that
the failure to rule on a motion is a failure to exercise discretion,
which is itself an abuse of discretion, so that his sentence must be
vacated. However, Collier could not make a motion under section
1385, so the trial court was not obligated to make a ruling on his
Romero request. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 375.) Given the presumption that the trial court followed the
law and that a sentence in conformity with sections 667,
subdivision (b) and 1170.12, subdivision (b) is rational and
proper, the trial court’s imposition of doubled sentences based on
his prior strike convictions demonstrates that the trial court
implicitly rejected Collier’s Romero request. (In re Large, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 550.) Collier points to nothing in the record that
would suggest that the trial court was unaware of its Romero
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discretion, so Collier fails to demonstrate any error regarding his
Romero request.3
II. Resentencing in Napa County cases
Collier also contends his sentence must be vacated and the
case remanded because the trial court sentenced him on four of
his Napa County cases, even though Napa County Superior Court
had already imposed sentence in those cases. Collier does not
fully develop his argument and simply points out the trial court
did not explain why it sentenced him again for the Napa County
cases.4 The trial court’s reasoning is readily apparent, however,
because the statutes governing sentencing of defendants
convicted of multiple crimes required it to address the Napa
County cases.
Section 669, subdivision (a) establishes that “[w]hen a
person is convicted of two or more crimes, whether in the same
proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts, and
whether by judgment rendered by the same judge or by different
judges, the second or other subsequent judgment upon which
sentence is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms
of imprisonment or any of them to which he or she is sentenced
3 Because we conclude Collier did not forfeit his Romero
argument and we have addressed it on the merits, we need not
address Collier’s alternative argument that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to insist on a Romero ruling at the final
sentencing hearing.
4 Collier recognized in the trial court that it was
appropriate to resentence him on his Napa County cases. In fact,
he asked the court to do so, partly so that he could obtain
sentence credits for his time served on the Napa County offenses.
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shall run concurrently or consecutively.” Section 1170.1,
subdivision (a) states, “Except as otherwise provided by law, and
subject to Section 654, when any person is convicted of two or
more felonies, whether in the same proceeding or court or in
different proceedings or courts, and whether by judgment
rendered by the same or by a different court, and a consecutive
term of imprisonment is imposed under Sections 669 and 1170,
the aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall
be the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any
additional term imposed for applicable enhancements for prior
convictions, prior prison terms, and Section 12022.1.”
Rule 4.452 elaborates on how a court should comply with
section 1170.1, subdivision (a) when a court is imposing a
sentence consecutive to another sentence imposed by a different
court in a previous proceeding. In such circumstances, rule
4.452(a) states that “the court in the current case must
pronounce a single aggregate term, as defined in section
1170.1(a), stating the result of combining the previous and
current sentences.” “The sentences on all determinately
sentenced counts in all the cases on which a sentence was or is
being imposed must be combined as though they were all counts
in the current case,” including by selecting which of the counts
will represent the principal term. (Rule 4.452(a)(1)–(2).)
“Crucially, the court announcing the aggregate term of
imprisonment does not resentence the defendant in the generally
understood manner, with authority to modify every aspect of the
sentence. [Citation.] The court must instead preserve the
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sentencing choices reflected in the prior judgment.” (In re
Rodriguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 952, 960.) “Discretionary
decisions of courts in previous cases may not be changed by the
court in the current case. Such decisions include the decision to
impose one of the three authorized terms of imprisonment
referred to in section 1170(b), making counts in prior cases
concurrent with or consecutive to each other, or the decision that
circumstances in mitigation or in the furtherance of justice
justified striking the punishment for an enhancement. However,
if a previously designated principal term becomes a subordinate
term after the resentencing, the subordinate term will be limited
to one-third the middle base term as provided in section
1170.1(a).” (Rule 4.452(a)(3).)
These provisions explain why the trial court pronounced
sentence on the Napa County cases. The trial court first needed
to clarify under section 669, subdivision (a) whether the
sentences in the eight Solano County cases would be concurrent
with or consecutive to the Napa County cases. Next, although
the trial court did not intend to impose the Solano County
sentence consecutive to the Napa County sentence, it did impose
consecutive sentences for some of the offenses in the eight Solano
County cases. This triggered the trial court’s obligation to
pronounce a single aggregate sentence under section 1170.1,
subdivision (a) containing all of the consecutive offenses.
However, because the trial court did not run the Solano
County sentence consecutive to the Napa County sentence, the
court had no authority under section 1170.1, subdivision (a) to
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change the Napa County sentence in any respect. Besides, even
if it were making the Solano County terms consecutive to the
Napa County offenses, rule 4.452 would only have authorized the
trial court to change a principal term in the Napa County cases
into a subordinate term, not to choose different terms from the
triad for any of the Napa County offenses. (See People v. Allison
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 688, 703–704 [later court could not change
sentence from earlier case to make terms consecutive rather than
concurrent].) The trial court therefore erred in two ways: first,
by changing the Napa County Superior Court’s imposition of one
upper term of six years and three concurrent low terms of 32
months into four middle terms of four years; and second, in
failing to address the fifth Napa County case. (In re Rodriguez,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 960 [rule 4.452(a)’s limitation
preventing a second court from modifying earlier court’s
discretionary sentencing choices “reflects, in part, the common
law rule that a court loses jurisdiction to resentence a defendant
once execution of the sentence has begun”]; see People v. Collier,
supra, A165532 [addressing Napa County case Nos. 21CR000304,
21CR000340, 21CR000382, 21CR000832, and 21CR000871].)
The trial court’s pronouncement of a different and incomplete
sentence in the Napa County cases creates confusion, since
earlier this year a different division of this court affirmed the
longer sentence that the Napa County Superior Court imposed on
all five cases. (People v. Collier, supra, A165532.)
The trial court made another error that also requires
remand. In one of the Solano County cases, case No. FCR341905,
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counts 1 and 2 were felonies and count 3 was a misdemeanor.
The trial court imposed a four-year concurrent term on count 1
and stated its intent to dismiss all misdemeanors, thereby
disposing of count 3. But the court failed to address count 2, an
attempted second degree burglary conviction, apparently because
of a belief that count 2 was a misdemeanor and therefore
dismissed. The trial court’s minute order nonetheless shows that
it imposed a middle term sentence of one year in prison on count
2 as a felony, stayed under section 654.
Both parties here properly acknowledge that the trial court
failed to pronounce a complete sentence in this case. “ ‘Rendition
of judgment is an oral pronouncement.’ ” (People v. Mesa (1975)
14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) The court must orally announce a sentence
on every count of a conviction. (People v. Codinha (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994.) A court cannot remedy the failure to
orally pronounce sentence by recording a sentence in the minutes
or in the abstract of judgment. (People v. Zackery (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388.) “ ‘When the mistake [in failing to
pronounce sentence on a count] is discovered while the
defendant’s appeal is pending, the appellate court should remand
the case for a proper sentence.’ ” (Codinha, at p. 994.)
On remand, the trial court may reconsider all aspects of
Collier’s sentence, including both the omitted count and the
relationship between the sentences for the Solano County and
Napa County offenses. “The general rule is that on remand for
resentencing the trial court is ‘[n]ot limited to merely [correcting]
illegal portions’ and ‘may reconsider all sentencing choices.
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[Citations.] This rule is justified because an aggregate prison
term is not a series of separate independent terms, but one term
made up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one
component infects the entire scheme.’ ” (People v. Codinha,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.) “In other words, ‘[b]ecause
there are multiple counts and discretionary decisions at play, the
trial court may consider the entire sentencing scheme and
reconsider all sentencing choices.’ ” (Id. at p. 995.) We recognize
that the trial court here indicated it was trying to craft a
sentence that gave Collier close to 10 years of actual prison time,
after sentence credits. But the trial court is in the best position
to determine in the first instance exactly how it intends to arrive
at its desired figure between all of Collier’s offenses and all of his
cases.
DISPOSITION
Collier’s conviction is affirmed. His sentence is vacated,
and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Collier (A167654)
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