CourtListener 10024883•People v. Smyer CA2/8
Full text
Filed 7/30/24 P. v. Smyer CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE B328617
OF CALIFORNIA,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SA079068)
v.
DEREK PAUL SMYER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and John Yang, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Derek Paul Smyer is serving life in prison without the
possibility of parole because of murders he arranged when he was
20 years old. Smyer petitioned the trial court to allow him to
proceed under a statute that offers youth offenders relief from
long prison terms. But the statute excludes those who offended
after the age of 18 and whose sentence is life without the
possibility of parole. (See Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (h).) Smyer
acknowledged this statutory bar but argued it is
unconstitutional. The trial court correctly rejected this
constitutional argument.
In 2001, when he was 20, Smyer solicited a shooter to kill
Crystal T. and the fetus she was carrying. (People v. Smyer (Apr.
4, 2019, B283604) [nonpub. opn.].) Smyer’s relationship with
Crystal T. lasted one month. She said she was pregnant and
wanted to keep the baby. She refused Smyer’s demand that she
get an abortion. “[A] search of Smyer’s computer revealed he
looked at a chat room regarding pregnancy with the statement, ‘I
just got some slut pregnant. Now bitch wants my money. What
should I do?’ ” (Id. at p. 7.) Smyer contacted the shooter, who
was trying to recruit Smyer into his gang “because he needed a
person loyal to him to help sell narcotics at Anderson Park.” (Id.
at p. 8.) The shooter waited in the shadows of the carport. When
Crystal T. came down the stairs, he shot her in the back of the
head, killing her and her fetus. (Id. at p. 9.) The jury convicted
Smyer of the second degree murder of Crystal, of the first degree
murder of the fetus, and of solicitation of murder. The jury found
true the multiple-murder and financial gain special circumstance
allegations. (Id. at p. 20.) The court sentenced Smyer to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus 15 years to
life plus 2 years. (Ibid.) We affirmed the sentence of life
2
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Id. at pp. 22,
73.)
Smyer now makes two constitutional arguments: equal
protection, and cruel or unusual punishment.
Our Supreme Court rejected the equal protection argument
in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 839–840, 842–866
(Hardin). Hardin ruled the Legislature had a rational basis for
excepting youth offenders serving life without possibility of
parole from this statutory scheme. “By excluding persons
sentenced to life without parole from youth offender parole
proceedings, the Legislature exercised its prerogative to define
degrees of culpability and punishment by leaving in place
longstanding judgments about the seriousness of these crimes
and, relatedly, the punishment for them.” (Id. at p. 853.)
Hardin’s counsel also is serving as Smyer’s attorney in this
appeal. In his reply brief, filed just days after the high court’s
Hardin opinion issued, counsel, with exemplary candor, wrote
“appellant will be unable to prevail in the California state courts
on his equal protection violation claim . . . .” Hardin does not
concede his point in the hopes that federal review will produce a
different result. But he acknowledges, as he must, that the
California Supreme Court holding is binding on us.
In a later letter entitled “ERRATUM,” Smyer also argues
“there is no rational basis to distinguish between young adult
offenders sentenced to LWOP and juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP.” The Hardin court held that “special circumstance
murder is a uniquely serious offense.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 839.) As applied in this case, this basis for drawing a
distinction is rational.
3
Smyer also claims his sentence now constitutes cruel or
unusual punishment. He concedes his sentence was not cruel or
unusual when it was originally imposed. Rather, he maintains
this constitutional bar arose later, on account of statutory
amendments that were generally favorable to defendants. In
particular, his claim is the Legislature, by amending sections
3051 and 4801 in 2019 and 2017, recognized that youthful
offenders may be less culpable when they commit offenses before
turning 26. Smyer argues this legislative finding, and its
embrace of this concept, changed constitutional law. Smyer
concludes it is now cruel or unusual to deny him the benefit of
this same awareness, given that he was under 26 when he
offended.
Except under unusual situations not present here,
legislatures have no power to change constitutional law. Smyer
cites no precedent for this argument.
At heart, Smyer’s argument merely puts different clothing
on an equal protection claim. In effect he argues that “others
under 26 years of age benefit from these amendments, and
logically I should benefit too.”
We agree with People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th
1211, 1220-1221 (Abundio).) “The planning in which appellant
engaged, as well as the unprovoked and vicious nature of the
crime, lead us to conclude that appellant’s sentence is not grossly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense or to appellant’s
culpability.” (Id. at p. 1221.) The prosecution relied on Abundio
in its briefing. Smyer omits citation or discussion of that case in
his reply.
///
///
4
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order and grant the request for judicial
notice.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
5
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.