King v. Lalanne CA3

CourtListener 10024677CalctappJul 30, 2024

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Filed 07/30/24 King v. Lalanne CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----

MARK E. KING, C096707

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCV0044158)

v.

CORINNE LALANNE,

Defendant and Appellant.

This appeal concerns a partition action brought by plaintiff Mark E. King against
his former romantic partner, defendant Corinne Lalanne. King requested partition of real
property by sale and sought to prove he and Lalanne owned the property equally as joint
tenants. Lalanne did not object to partition but maintained that the deeds to the property
gave King only a 25 percent interest. Following a bench trial, the trial court agreed with
King and entered an interlocutory judgment ordering partition of the property by sale
with King and Lalanne each holding a 50 percent interest.
Lalanne appeals. She contends the trial court erred for three reasons: (1) the trial
court lacked the authority to resolve King’s contract-based claims in a partition action;

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(2) record title gave King a 25 percent interest in the property and King did not provide
sufficient evidence to show otherwise; and (3) any claim King may have had to the
property is barred by the statute of frauds.
We disagree with Lalanne and affirm the interlocutory judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Pleadings
King filed a complaint against Lalanne for partition by sale of the property. He
alleged that he, Lalanne, and Lalanne’s father agreed to purchase the property as equal
owners. Specifically, they agreed father would make the down payment and King would
cover necessary remodeling to the house.
The property was purchased in 2014 and title was recorded as “ ‘Corinne Lalanne
an unmarried woman and [father], as joint tenants.’ ” King acted in accordance with the
above-described agreement. In April 2016, father deeded his 50 percent interest in the
property to “ ‘Corinne Lalanne and Mark E. King, Joint Tenants with Right of
Survivorship’ ” (the 2016 deed). At the time the 2016 deed was recorded, Lalanne told
King he was now half owner of the property. Father died in 2017.
Lalanne’s answer to King’s complaint denied the existence of any agreement with
King to purchase the property and denied that she ever relinquished her half interest in
the property to King. She asserted that the deeds gave King only 25 percent of the
property.
B. Trial
The matter proceeded to a bench trial, during which Lalanne represented herself.
Below is a summary of the relevant evidence presented, which we derive from the settled
statement.
1. King’s Testimony
King testified that he and Lalanne first met in 2008, but he doesn’t remember
exactly when. A few months after meeting, they moved into a rental unit with father.

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King was not on the unit’s lease and did not pay rent. About two years after meeting,
King and Lalanne began to discuss purchasing a home together. Neither King nor
Lalanne had good credit, so they needed to use father’s credit to purchase the home.
King and Lalanne considered 10 to 15 homes before agreeing to make an offer on the
property.
King and Lalanne orally agreed as follows: (1) King would own a 50 percent
ownership share of the property; (2) Lalanne and father would own the other 50 percent;
(3) father would pay $20,000 for the down payment; and (4) in lieu of contributing funds
toward the down payment, King would complete a remodel of the kitchen before anyone
moved in. King acknowledged there was no signed agreement between himself and
Lalanne. Also, King never had any agreements with father about purchasing the property
and did not understand that father intended to provide for Lalanne.
The property was purchased in July 2014. The court admitted evidence of a grant
deed dated July 28, 2014 (the 2014 deed) that conveyed the property to “Corinne Lalanne
an unmarried woman and [father], as joint tenants.” King was involved in the decision to
purchase the property, but he was not on the original deed because of his poor credit.
There are no documents evidencing an attempt by King to purchase the property.
King completed the kitchen remodel before anyone moved in and continued to
make improvements to the property, including converting a walk-in closet to a guest
bathroom, renovating the master bathroom, updating the master bedroom with new
flooring, and performing landscaping in the front yard. He would not have done this
work if he was not a 50 percent owner of the property. King also paid for the parties’
shared household expenses, including cell phones and service, PG&E, solar electricity,
internet, Direct TV, Netflix, and gym memberships; he provided an exhibit detailing those
expenses, which is not in the appellate record (King’s expense exhibit). And King cared
for father who had health issues. There was no agreement for reimbursement of the
expenses or services King covered or provided.

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King was put on the title to the property in 2016. The court admitted evidence of
the 2016 deed in which father granted his 50 percent share of the property to “Corinne
Lalanne and Mark E. King, Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship” for one dollar and
other good and valuable consideration. King believed the 2016 deed confirmed and
established his 50 percent ownership of the property. Lalanne prepared the deed and told
King he owned and deserved one-half of the property. King denied paying the one-dollar
consideration indicated in the 2016 deed. After father died, King made one-half of the
mortgage payments and would not have done so if he did not believe he owned half the
property.
Following an accident, King ended up in the hospital and had an argument with
Lalanne. King decided not to return to the property. King stopped making payments
toward the mortgage because Lalanne locked him out.
2. Lalanne’s Testimony
Lalanne first met King in 2011. King moved into Lalanne’s and father’s rental
unit a few months later. King paid for some of the utilities and expenses but did not pay
rent. King never acted as a caregiver for father.
Because of father’s declining health, Lalanne and father began exploring the
possibility of purchasing a home together. Lalanne and father decided to purchase the
home equally so that father would have a place to live out his life. Lalanne, father, and
King agreed that King would move into the property. King offered to help update the
kitchen. King and Lalanne liked the idea of eventually having a home together as they
continued to explore the idea of being life partners.
King was not a party to the property purchase, and he never completed any
document connecting him with the purchase. Lalanne believed King was happy to have a
place to live. Lalanne and King shared the labors of the house. King contributed to the
day-to-day living expenses and helped maintain the property. King’s expense exhibit is

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inaccurate, and there was no agreement for expense reimbursement. King also used the
property’s garage to work on vehicles for extra income.
In 2016, father asked King what would happen if Lalanne passed away. King
responded that he would take care of father in Lalanne’s place and that they would
remain on the property since it was father’s home. King assured father that he would
always take care of Lalanne. Father agreed to give King a portion of his share of the
property in exchange for this assurance. Lalanne and King had someone at a business
and tax office fill out the paperwork for the 2016 deed.
King did not contribute to any mortgage payments until the month after father
passed away in January 2018. At that point, King and Lalanne agreed to each contribute
around $1,000 per month, but they did not always equally split the mortgage payments.
A total of 87 mortgage payments were made on the property; of these, King contributed
the equivalent of 9 to 10 payments. King and Lalanne never executed any documents
memorializing their relationship or any agreement regarding their shared expenses.
Lalanne presented three exhibits regarding property-related expenditures and
contributions as well as the value of the property and testified that these exhibits showed
that King owed Lalanne money for his share of contributions to the property as a 25
percent owner.
King was injured in a hit-and-run accident in 2019 and was hospitalized for 36
days, during which Lalanne coordinated the community effort to prepare for his
discharge. King elected not to return to the property. Lalanne did not oust him from the
property.
3. Other Testimony
King’s friend testified that he helped King with certain remodeling projects on the
property in exchange for which King performed repairs on friend’s truck. Friend
observed King was an active participant in all the work performed on the property.
Friend did not have a contract with either King or Lalanne and did not document the time

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friend worked on the property. Friend thought King and Lalanne acted like husband and
wife.
Father’s hired caretaker testified that she helped transition father to the property
and provided care for him at the property until father’s death. King rarely took father to
doctor’s appointments. Caretaker was present when documents were signed to purchase
the property; to her knowledge, King was not a party to the purchase. Caretaker was also
present when father signed the 2016 deed, but King was not present. Father was happy
knowing that King and Lalanne were together and that Lalanne would be in a stable and
happy environment if father passed.
4. Trial Court’s Ruling
The court found clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the
ownership interests in the property were accurately set forth in the 2014 and 2016 deeds.
Specifically, the court found that King and Lalanne believed they were equal joint owners
of the property, based on an agreement they made before the property’s purchase. The
court concluded the parties were joint tenants, each owning a 50 percent share in the
property, and ordered that the property be sold with the proceeds divided in accordance
with those interests. The court reserved ruling on the parties’ rights to offsets or credits
until a second phase of trial.
Lalanne timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The parties do not dispute that according to the 2014 and 2016 deeds, Lalanne
owns a 75 percent interest in the property and King owns a 25 percent interest. The trial
court found that King rebutted those deeds and showed he owns a 50 percent interest in
the property. Lalanne contends the court committed prejudicial error on various grounds.
We address each of those grounds separately below, but we begin with a more

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fundamental issue Lalanne raises concerning the trial court’s authority in a partition
action.
I
Trial Court’s Authority in Partition Action
Lalanne contends the trial court lacked the authority to reach the merits of King’s
claims in his action for partition because King’s action was based on contract and King
failed to plead an action to quiet title based on contract. We see no merit in this
contention.
A co-owner of real or personal property may bring an action for partition. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 872.210.) Partition is a statutorily authorized equitable action that confers
broad discretion on the trial court to fashion relief without being bound by strict rules of
procedure. (Richmond v. Dofflemyer (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 745, 766; Wallace v. Daley
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1035.) It permits a co-owner of real or personal property to
file an action to terminate and sever common interests in the property to avoid the
inconvenience and dissension that can come from sharing joint possession. (Cummings v.
Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 589, 596.) In a suit for partition, “all parties’ interests in
the property may be put in issue regardless of the record title.” (Milian v. De Leon
(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1196; see Demetris v. Demetris (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d
440, 444-445 [in partition suit, “all equities and conflicting claims existing between the
parties and arising out of their relation to the property to be partitioned may be
adjusted”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 872.610.) And determining those interests may involve
ascertaining whether a party has presented evidence to overcome the general presumption
that the deed accurately reflects ownership interests. (See Thomasset v. Thomasset
(1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 133 [property may be found to be other than that indicated
by the deed], overruled on another point, See v. See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 786; see also
Workmon Constr. Co. v. Weirick (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 487, 490 [court of equity can
use parol evidence to show real nature of a transaction behind a deed].) Contrary to

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Lalanne’s position, King was not required to provide a case applying these principles to a
partition-only action involving facts similar to those presented here.
Lalanne’s reliance on Code of Civil Procedure section 872.140 within the partition
statutes as limiting the trial court’s authority in this case is misplaced. That section
allows the trial court to order allowance, accounting, contribution, or other compensatory
adjustment among the parties according to principles of equity. (Cf. Lazzarevich v.
Lazzarevich (1952) 39 Cal.2d 48, 50-51.) It does not negate the power of the court to
determine the ownership interests of the parties in the property.
Having resolved this fundamental issue, we turn to Lalanne’s other challenges to
the trial court’s ruling. We divide those challenges into two: (1) Evidence Code section
662 and (2) the statute of frauds.
II
Evidence Code Section 662
Evidence Code section 662 codifies the common law presumption that title is held
as described in a deed. (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 282.) The
statute applies when “there is no dispute as to where legal title resides but there is
question as to where all or part of the beneficial title should rest.” (Murray v. Murray
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1067.) The presumption can be overcome by evidence of
an agreement or understanding between the parties that the title reflected in the deed is
not what the parties intended. (In re Marriage of Brooks & Robinson (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 176, 189 (Brooks), overruled on another ground in In re Marriage of
Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1405.) The contrary agreement can be oral, but the
evidence of the agreement must be clear and convincing, so clear as to leave no
substantial doubt and sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every
reasonable mind. (Brooks, at p. 190; Evid. Code, § 662.)
Here, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Lalanne and King
believed they were equal joint owners of the property based on an agreement they made

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before the property was purchased. Lalanne challenges this finding on five grounds, each
of which we address below.
A. Title Taken to Obtain a Loan
Lalanne contends the trial court erroneously allowed King to refute the title
presumption through evidence that title was taken in a particular manner merely to obtain
a loan. Lalanne asserts such a showing cannot overcome the title presumption according
to Brooks, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at page 190.
Lalanne misinterprets the trial court’s ruling. While the court did recount King’s
testimony that he and Lalanne agreed he would not be named as a buyer so his poor
credit would not impact the property’s purchase, the court did not indicate it relied on this
fact in reaching its conclusion. Instead, the court stated it found King’s testimony
regarding the parties’ agreement for ownership of the property more credible. As to such
an agreement, King testified that the parties agreed he would own a 50 percent share of
the property. The court also credited King’s testimony regarding his involvement in the
purchase, his contribution to shared expenses, and the work he performed to renovate the
property, including his claim that he remodeled the kitchen in lieu of a monetary
contribution to the down payment. To the extent the trial court’s ruling is unclear, we
resolve that ambiguity in favor of the trial court’s judgment. (Winograd v. American
Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631.) Because Lalanne misrepresents the
trial court’s ruling, we need not decide whether Lalanne or Brooks present an accurate
statement of the law on rebutting title presumption.
B. Evidence of Bargained-For Promise
Lalanne contends there was no evidence of a bargained-for promise between King
and Lalanne. In Lalanne’s view, King needed to present testimony of an explicit
exchange between the parties to give King an interest in the property. Not so. “[A]
court[] may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct
demonstrates an implied contract . . . or some other tacit understanding between the

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parties.” (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684.) Evidence of an explicit bargain
is not required. Lalanne also makes the related assertion that King’s testimony regarding
his renovations to the property supported only the parties’ understanding of how King
would contribute to the property. But this assertion reflects merely Lalanne’s
interpretation of the evidence, an interpretation the trial court rejected in favor of King’s.
We next evaluate whether King’s interpretation was supported by substantial evidence.
C. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Lalanne contends King failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
overcome title presumption. The applicable standard of review requires us to reject this
contention.
In reviewing a finding proved by clear and convincing evidence, the appellate
court must account for the level of confidence that this standard commands.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) The question before the court is
“whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at p. 1011)
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘of ponderable legal significance,’ ‘reasonable in
nature, credible, and of solid value . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1006.) The testimony of
a single witness may constitute substantial evidence provided it is not physically
impossible or inherently improbable. (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 281.)
And, importantly, the appellate court must “view the record in the light most favorable to
the judgment below; it must indulge reasonable inferences that the trier of fact might
have drawn from the evidence; it must accept the fact finder’s resolution of conflicting
evidence; and it may not insert its own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in
place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment.” (Conservatorship of O.B., at
p. 1008.)
Here, Lalanne contends the trial court erroneously credited King’s allegations of
an agreement. Lalanne also contends the trial court erred in relying on King’s version of

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the facts because (1) there were inconsistencies in that version; (2) King’s version
represented merely his uncorroborated belief that he shared ownership of the property
with Lalanne; and (3) King’s conduct was consistent with the acts of a live-in romantic
partner not an equal property owner. As explained below, we reject these contentions.
Lalanne misrepresents the trial court’s ruling because the trial court in fact
credited King’s testimony at trial, not just King’s allegations in his pleading. The parties’
precise testimony at trial was not recorded, so our review is limited to the settled
statement, which contains “a concise factual summary of the evidence and the testimony
of each witness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(d)(2)(A); see People ex rel.
Department of Public Works v. Bond (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 435, 437 [reviewing court
must assume enough appears in settled statement to enable it to decide whether reversible
error was committed].) The settled statement includes the following evidence that
Lalanne and King agreed to equally own the property: King’s testimony that he and
Lalanne agreed he would own a 50 percent share of the property; King’s testimony that
he was involved in the decision to purchase the property; King’s testimony that the
parties agreed he would remodel the kitchen in lieu of contributing to the down payment;
King’s evidence of his renovations to the property and his testimony that he would not
have made those renovations if he was not a 50 percent owner of the property; King’s
payment of various household expenses; the evidence of King and Lalanne’s 8-year
cohabitation; and testimony from friend that King and Lalanne acted like husband and
wife. These are relevant factors evidencing that “the parties impliedly agreed to share
equally in their acquisitions.” (Alderson v. Alderson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 450, 461;
see also Milian v. De Leon, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1197.) And King testified to
more than an undisclosed belief in his ownership interest in the property. He testified
that he and Lalanne agreed to that interest. The “uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness may constitute substantial evidence.” (Casella v. SouthWest Dealer Services,
Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1144.)

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It was for the trial court to determine King’s and Lalanne’s credibility, to weigh
any contradictions within their allegations and testimonies, and to decide between their
competing accounts. The trial court made those judgments in favor of King, and we
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (See People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 357 [“Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends”].)
D. Father’s Interest
Lalanne contends the trial court’s ruling erroneously divested father of his original
interest in the property based on an oral agreement to which father was not a party. This
contention and Lalanne’s analysis in support fail to show prejudicial error.
A trial court’s order is presumed correct, and the burden is on the appellant to
demonstrate prejudicial error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) An
error is prejudicial if the reviewing court concludes, based on its review of the entire
record, that it is reasonably probable the trial court would have reached a result more
favorable to the appellant absent the error. (Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 986, 999.) “Reasonable probability” means a reasonable chance, more
than an abstract possibility, or a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. (Haytasingh v. City of San Diego (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 429, 468.) Even a
significant error will not supply cause for reversal if the record demonstrates no other
judgment could have been rendered. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 533.)
Here, the trial court found that, prior to purchasing the property, Lalanne and King
orally agreed to equally share ownership interest in the property. While King admitted
that father was not a party to that agreement, Lalanne’s oral agreement with King that the
trial court credited gave King half of her interest in the property. Father’s subsequent
undisputed conveyance of his interest in the property via the 2016 deed increased King’s

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interest in the property to 50 percent. Thus, there was no reasonable probability the court
would have reached a more favorable result to Lalanne.
E. Joint Tenancy
Lalanne contends the trial court had no evidentiary basis to find that she and King
held title to the entire property as joint tenants. Lalanne contends they at most held title
to half of the property as joint tenants based on the 2016 deed and as tenants in common
as to the rest. But Lalanne never developed this contention in her opening brief. For
fairness reasons, we refuse to consider her belated attempt to do so in reply. (People v.
Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 255.)
III
Statute of Frauds
Lalanne contends the statute of frauds bars King’s claim to more than 25 percent
of the property and the trial court erred by concluding otherwise. We find no merit in this
contention.
Lalanne correctly states the general rule of the statute of frauds that a transfer of
any interest in real property must be in writing. (Civ. Code, §§ 1091, 1624.) But, as the
trial court noted, the statute of frauds is not absolute. For example, under the doctrine of
part performance, the oral agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property is
enforced when the buyer takes possession of the property and, in reliance on and pursuant
to the terms of the oral agreement, makes valuable and substantial improvements to the
property such that application of the statute of frauds would result in unjust or
unconscionable loss. (Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415, 422.) A similar,
broader exception is provided under the equitable estoppel doctrine that applies when an
unconscionable injury would result from denying enforcement of a contract after one
party has been induced to make a serious change of position in reliance on the contract.
(Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1068, 1072.) Unlike the doctrine of part
performance, the equitable estoppel doctrine does not require the party’s change of

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position to specifically refer to the agreement to be enforced. (Id. at pp. 1071-1072 [also
noting this requirement has not been consistently applied in part performance cases].)
Whether a party is precluded from using the statute of frauds defense is generally
a question of fact. (Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052,
1058.)
Here, Lalanne contends the record does not show a bargained-for promise under
which King provided renovations. We disagree. As discussed, King testified that he and
Lalanne agreed King would own half of the property and King would complete a kitchen
remodel in lieu of contributing to the down payment. The trial court could reasonably
have concluded that King seriously changed his position in reliance on Lalanne’s
agreement. (See, e.g., Baggesi v. Baggesi (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 828, 835.) He made
substantial improvements to the property without compensation, and Lalanne does not
contend that those improvements could be adequately compensated with money (see
Maddox v. Rainoldi (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 384, 389) or that King’s injury did not rise to
the requisite level (see Andreotti v. Andreotti (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 533, 540). We
conclude King’s showing was sufficient, at a minimum, under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel and reject Lalanne’s reliance on the statute of frauds.

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DISPOSITION
The interlocutory judgment is affirmed. King shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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