Vafaei v. Razavi CA4/3

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Filed 7/30/24 Vafaei v. Razavi CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

HAMID VAFAEI et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, G063011

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-
01208168; consol. with 30-2021-
SARA RAZAVI et al., 01212308)

Defendants and Respondents. OPINION

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Strickroth, Judge. Affirmed in part, as modified; reversed in part.
Appellants’ unopposed motion to augment the record. Granted. Respondents’
motion for sanctions. Denied.
The MVP Trial Lawyers, Pasha Vafaei and Tyler Vance for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Monarch Law Group and Samin Zamanian for Defendants and
Respondents.
* * *
California’s advocate-witness rule, found in rule 3.7 of the Rules
of Professional Conduct (rule 3.7), prohibits a lawyer from acting as an
advocate in a trial in which they are likely to be called as a witness on a
contested matter except under limited circumstances. The trial court granted
defendants’ motion to disqualify both attorney Pasha Vafaei and his law firm,
1
the MVP Law Group, from acting as “counsel of record” for plaintiffs after
plaintiffs’ discovery responses identified Vafaei as a witness to the key
disputed issue in the case—whether plaintiffs and defendants entered into a
purchase and sale agreement relating to the real property at issue. We
conclude the disqualification of Vafaei under rule 3.7 was proper, but find the
court’s disqualification order swept too broadly in two respects.
As to Vafaei, the trial court erred by disqualifying him from
acting as “counsel of record” in any manner. Under controlling authority, his
disqualification properly extends only to acting as counsel at trial and in any
pretrial proceeding that may reveal to the trier of fact his role as plaintiffs’
attorney, including, e.g., taking and defending depositions.
As to the MVP Law Group, the trial court erred by disqualifying
all other lawyers in the firm from representing plaintiffs. Rule 3.7(b)
expressly allows a member of a law firm to act as an advocate in a trial in

1
There are different names in the appellate record for Vafaei’s
law firm, including the MVP Law Group (used in the trial court proceedings),
and the MVP Trial Lawyers (used in the appellate proceedings). For purposes
of this opinion, we refer to the firm as the MVP Law Group. Our conclusions
and holdings are intended to apply to any law firm with which Vafaei is
affiliated, no matter what name it uses.

2
which another member of the firm is likely to be called as a witness unless
precluded from doing so under other enumerated rules of professional
conduct. The record here does not support the disqualification of all other
attorneys at the MVP Law Group from representing plaintiffs.
Accordingly, we affirm the order disqualifying Vafaei, but modify
it to limit the scope of his disqualification to trial and any pretrial
proceedings that may reveal to the trier of fact Vafaei’s dual role, including
any evidentiary hearings and the taking and defending of depositions. We
reverse the disqualification order as to the MVP Law Group.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 30, 2021, Sara Razavi (Sara) initiated an unlawful
detainer action against her tenants, Hamid Vafaei (Hamid) and Sharareh
Bahadini, also known as Sharareh Vafaei (Sharareh), based on non-payment
of rent.2 On July 8, 2021, Hamid and Sharareh filed an answer to the
unlawful detainer complaint.
On July 27, 2021, Hamid and Sharareh filed a complaint against
Sara, Ahmad Razavi (Ahmad), and the Estate of Nadia Razavi for specific
performance of an alleged written agreement that permitted Hamid and
Sharareh to buy the property they were leasing (the alleged agreement).3
Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial.

2
We refer to the parties by their first names to prevent confusion;
no disrespect is intended.

3
Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to augment the record on appeal
with their complaint is granted. The unlimited civil case was consolidated
with the unlawful detainer case, with the unlawful detainer designated the
lead case.

3
On December 10, 2022, Hamid served written discovery
responses in response to requests for admissions and special interrogatories
propounded by Sara. Among other things, Sara had sought discovery
regarding Hamid’s allegation that Ahmad signed the alleged agreement,
including the identity of anyone who witnessed Ahmad’s signature, the
identity of the author of the alleged agreement, and the identity of any
witnesses present during conversations regarding the sale of the subject
property. Hamid’s substantive responses identified Vafaei, who is plaintiffs’
son and their counsel of record in the consolidated action, as a witness to
conversations regarding the sale of the property, a witness to Ahmad’s
execution of the alleged agreement, and an author of the alleged agreement.4
The caption on the discovery responses indicated no trial date had been
scheduled.
Several weeks later, on January 17, 2023, Sara and Ahmad filed
a motion to disqualify Vafaei from representing Hamid and Sharareh based
on rule 3.7. The notice of motion indicated the motion sought only the
disqualification of Vafaei and then, at the end of the notice, requested the
court disqualify Vafaei “along with his firm.” Hamid and Sharareh opposed
the motion. In a declaration filed with the opposition papers, Vafaei admitted
he had “eye-witness knowledge of the facts in dispute in these cases” but
stated he had “committed to not testify in these cases, and the Plaintiffs have

4
Special interrogatory No. 9 asked Hamid the identity of “the
individual(s) who authored” the alleged agreement. In response, Hamid
identified Vafaei as one of several authors. Contrary to Hamid’s response,
Vafaei now (1) denies being the author of the alleged agreement, (2) states
that Hamid was the only author, and (3) accuses the trial court of making a
“false” assumption that Vafaei is the author. Vafaei informed the trial court
at the hearing on the disqualification motion that he signed the alleged
agreement.

4
given their informed consent to my being so limited solely as their advocate,
and not as a witness.” Vafaei also submitted declarations from Hamid and
Sharareh, both of which included an identical statement that Vafaei “will be
serving me solely in the capacity of being my advocate, and not at all in the
capacity of being a witness for me in these cases. I hereby knowingly and
voluntarily give my consent to have [Vafaei] so limit himself in these matters
to being an advocate and not a witness despite [Vafaei] having first-hand
eyewitness knowledge of the facts in dispute in these cases.” (Italics added.)
After hearing argument, the trial court granted defendants’
motion and disqualified both Vafaei and the MVP Law Group from acting “as
counsel of record” for Hamid and Sharareh. The court found Vafaei was a
witness to a critical disputed issue regarding whether there was an
agreement for the sale of the leased property. The court also found the
disqualification motion was not filed as a litigation tactic because (1) the case
was “still in the preliminary stages with [Hamid and Sharareh] not having
even been deposed,” and (2) Sara and Ahmad had “only recently [been] made
aware” of Vafaei’s claimed role in the formation of the alleged agreement.
Although the trial court stated that Hamid and Sharareh’s
declarations gave “informed consent for attorney Vafaei to continue
representing them,” it nevertheless granted the motion based on its analysis
that Vafaei’s “dual role as advocate and witness will prejudice [Sara and
Ahmad] and the integrity of the judicial process by, (1) confusing the jury,
particularly with respect to any argument counsel could make as counsel
regarding his own testimony as a witness; and (2) creating a conflict between
counsel’s duty as a witness to tell the truth, even where the truth might
harm Plaintiffs’ interests, and counsel’s duty to advocate for Plaintiff’s
interests.” The court concluded, “[t]his confusion will necessarily occur

5
because of counsel’s claimed personal knowledge of the alleged facts
underlying this case, coupled with the fact that Plaintiffs are also his
parents, will be indistinguishable from his role as an advocate for Plaintiffs.”
The court acknowledged Hamid and Sharareh have a “strong interest in
having the representation of their choice” and that they had “expressed their
informed consent.” It nevertheless concluded Vafaei had an apparent conflict
of interest given his role as a key witness and that “it will be nearly
impossible for attorney Vafaei to act solely in an advocate capacity.”
At the hearing on the motion, Vafaei advised the trial court there
were other attorneys in his law firm who could competently handle the case
and he was unaware of any ethical rule that would cause his entire firm to be
vicariously disqualified simply because he is likely to be a witness at trial.
The court nevertheless disqualified both Vafaei and his law firm, the MVP
Law Group, from acting “as counsel of record” for Hamid and Sharareh.
Hamid and Sharareh timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT’S DISQUALIFICATION ORDER
An order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is immediately
appealable. (URS Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 872, 880.) “A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
disqualify counsel is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]
‘As to disputed factual issues, a reviewing court’s role is simply to determine
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of fact. . . . As
to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, review is de novo; a
disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion.’
[Citations.] While the trial court’s ‘“application of the law to the facts is

6
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious”’ [Citation], ‘where there are no
material disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s
determination as a question of law.’” (Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 813, 821.)
The issue here is whether the trial court erred by disqualifying
both Vafaei and his law firm as counsel of record for plaintiffs. We hold the
trial court did not err in disqualifying Vafaei, but that the scope of the
disqualification order was too broad in two respects. First, the
disqualification of Vafaei must be limited in scope to trial and certain pretrial
proceedings that might reveal to the trier of fact Vafaei’s dual role. Second,
the court erred in disqualifying Vafaei’s law firm, the MVP Law Group, from
representing plaintiffs.
A. The Disqualification of Vafaei
“A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives from
its inherent power, codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 128,
subdivision (a)(5), to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all
other persons connected with its proceedings in furtherance of justice.
[Citation.] Disqualification may be ordered as a prophylactic measure against
a prospective ethical violation likely to have a substantial continuing effect
on future proceedings.” (Doe v. Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 581.)
The California Supreme Court has approved the adoption by the
State Bar of rules of professional conduct designed to protect the public and
promote respect for and confidence in the legal system. (Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 59,
73–74.) Applicable here, rule 3.7 prohibits an attorney from acting as an

7
advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness, unless one of
the following three exceptions applies:
“(1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or
matter;
“(2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of
legal services rendered in the case; or
“(3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the
client.” (Rule 3.7(a).)
When ruling on a motion to disqualify counsel based on the
advocate-witness rule, the trial court must consider the following three
factors in exercising its discretion: (1) whether the attorney’s testimony is, in
fact, genuinely needed; (2) the possibility opposing counsel is using the
motion for purely tactical reasons; and (3) the burden of retaining new
counsel and paying for the duplication of efforts already undertaken in the
case, combined with the strong interest parties have in representation by
counsel of their choice. (Doe v. Yim, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.) “‘[T]rial
judges must indicate on the record they have considered the appropriate
factors and make specific findings of fact when weighing the conflicting
interests involved in recusal motions.’” (Id at p. 584.)
Contrary to Vafaei’s argument, the trial court did not “fail[] to
consider” or “fail[] to take into consideration” these factors. Quite the
contrary, the court examined each of the three factors in a detailed written
order.
As to the first factor, the trial court found Vafaei is a witness on a
pivotal issue and his testimony is needed. These findings are supported by
substantial evidence. The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that
defendants agreed to sell their residential property to plaintiffs pursuant to

8
the alleged agreement, which was signed by one or more of the defendants.
Defendants deny entering into any agreement for the sale of their property.
Plaintiffs identified Vafaei in their discovery responses as a witness to
conversations regarding the sale of the property, a witness to the execution of
the alleged agreement by the parties, and one of the authors of the alleged
agreement. Vafaei and his clients admitted in their opposition to the
disqualification motion that Vafaei has “first-hand eyewitness knowledge” of
the facts in dispute. Although Vafaei attempted to eliminate the need for his
testimony by agreeing he would not testify and would instead serve only as
plaintiffs’ advocate, we agree with the court’s conclusion this did not preclude
disqualification for the simple reason that defendants are likely to compel
Vafaei to testify.
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that
defendants did not file the disqualification motion as a litigation tactic.
Defendants brought the motion within weeks of receiving Hamid’s discovery
responses and learning of Vafaei’s firsthand knowledge of the key disputed
facts in the case. No trial date had been set as of the filing of the motion, and
the court found the case was still in its early stages. There is no evidence in
the record that defendants’ counsel knew before receiving Hamid’s discovery

9
responses about Vafaei’s purported knowledge on the central issue in the case
5
but delayed bringing the motion.
As to the final factor considered by the trial court—the combined
effects of plaintiffs’ strong interest in being represented by counsel of their
choice and avoiding the duplicate expense and time-consuming effort involved
in replacing counsel already familiar with the case—the court concluded
duplication of fees is unlikely because the case was only in the preliminary
stages and Vafaei’s clients had not yet been deposed. The court also
concluded that, although Vafaei’s clients have a strong interest in having
counsel of their choice, Vafaei had an apparent conflict in his dual role as a
witness to key disputed facts and an advocate. We find no error in these
conclusions. Given our conclusion—discussed further below—that Vafaei’s
disqualification is limited in scope and Vafaei’s firm is not disqualified, the
impact on plaintiffs is further attenuated.
We now turn to Vafaei’s contention that disqualification was
improper under the third exception to rule 3.7 because Hamid and Sharareh

5
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, their complaint did not reveal
Vafaei signed the alleged agreement. Hamid and Sharareh attached two
versions of the alleged agreement to their complaint, one handwritten in a
foreign language and one translated into English and typed. The non-English
version of the alleged agreement contains four separate handwritten
signatures. The English translation showed Hamid and Ahmad as two of the
signatories; it did not indicate the names of the other two signatories, and
Vafaei’s name does not appear on the document.

10
6
gave their informed written consent to his continued representation. Vafaei
appears to misunderstand the rule.
The trial court stated, without analysis, that Hamid and
Sharareh had “expressed their informed consent” to Vafaei continuing to
represent them. On their face, the declarations by Hamid and Sharareh did
not consent to Vafaei acting as both their advocate and witness. They did
exactly the opposite: Hamid and Sharareh each consented that Vafaei could
act for them “solely in the capacity of being my advocate, and not at all in the
capacity of being a witness for me in these cases.” (Italics added.) This is not
informed consent to counsel acting as both advocate and witness within the
meaning of rule 3.7(a)(3).
Vafaei attempts to bolster his clients’ purported “consent” by
insisting in his own declaration that he will not testify at trial on behalf of his
parents. Thus, he effectively argues the threshold test under rule 3.7—that
the attorney is likely to testify on his clients’ behalf—is not met. The problem
with this argument, as noted above, is whether Vafaei is likely to be a
witness at trial is not solely within his (or his clients’) control. The fact that
Vafaei’s clients are willing to forego calling him as a witness does not mean
that defendants will do the same. Indeed, given Vafaei’s pivotal role in
preparing, signing, and witnessing the execution of the alleged agreement,
and his presence during conversations regarding the alleged sale of the
property, it is (as the trial court found) at least likely—if not a near
certainty—defendants will call him as a witness. Vafaei offers no legal or
logical support for his suggestion that, if defendants call him to testify as an

6
The other two exceptions to rule 3.7—the lawyer’s testimony
would relate to an uncontested issue or to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the action—clearly are not applicable here.

11
eyewitness to the key disputed issue in the case, he would be testifying for
them—and not for his clients—and rule 3.7 therefore would be inapplicable.
Rule 3.7’s purpose is to “‘avoid[] fact finder confusion’” (Lopez v. Lopez (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 412, 424 (Lopez)); it therefore makes no distinction between
whether the attorney is likely to be called to testify by its own clients or by
the opposing party.
Given that Vafaei is likely to be called as a witness on a key
disputed issue at trial and failed to obtain his clients’ informed written
consent to his acting in a dual role, the trial court was not required to take
the additional step of analyzing the detriment to defendants or injury to the
integrity of the judicial process arising from Vafaei’s dual role. Such
additional analysis is only required where the attorney is likely to testify and
the client has given its informed written consent to the dual role. (See rule
3.7, com. 3 [“Notwithstanding a client’s informed written consent, courts
retain discretion” to disqualify counsel], citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981)
122 Cal.App.3d 470; Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 424–425 [trial court
failed to find disqualification was necessary “notwithstanding . . . informed
written consent”].)

B. The Scope of the Order as to Vafaei
This brings us to the scope of the disqualification order as to
Vafaei. We conclude it was error for the trial court to disqualify Vafaei as
counsel of record without limitation.7

7
Plaintiffs did not raise on appeal the issue of the scope of the
disqualification order as to Vafaei’s role going forward in the litigation, so we
requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on this issue,
as well as the issue of the applicability of rule 3.7(b) on the disqualification of
the MVP Law Group.

12
By its terms, rule 3.7 prohibits a lawyer from acting as an
advocate “in a trial” in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness. (Rule
3.7(a).) The phrase “in a trial” embraces not just the actual trial proceedings
but any evidentiary hearing and any pretrial proceeding, such as taking and
defending depositions, that poses a risk of revealing the attorney’s dual role
to the trier of fact. (Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 423–424; Doe v. Yim,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.) We therefore modify the disqualification
order to provide that Vafaei is disqualified from representing plaintiffs at
trial, during depositions, and at any other pretrial activities that pose a risk
of revealing to the trier of fact that he is an attorney for plaintiffs.
C. The Disqualification of the MVP Law Group
As for Vafaei’s law firm, the MVP Law Group, the fact that
Vafaei is disqualified to the extent set forth above does not mean that other
lawyers in his firm are vicariously disqualified under the advocate-witness
rule. Rule 3.7(b) provides that “a lawyer may act as an advocate in a trial in
which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness
unless precluded from doing so by [Rules of Professional Conduct,] rule 1.7 or
1.9.”8 (See Wu v. O’Gara Coach Co., LLC (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1084–
1085 [that attorney might testify at trial does not warrant disqualification of
other lawyers at attorney’s firm under the advocate-witness rule].) The sole
basis for Vafaei’s disqualification is his dual role as advocate-witness. This
case does not involve any alleged confidential information in the hands of
Vafaei or other alleged conflict of interest that might properly be imputed to

8
Nothing in the record suggests either rule would apply here.
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest
involving current clients, and rule 1.9 involves an attorney’s duties to former
clients.

13
other attorneys in his law firm. We therefore reverse the order as to the
9
disqualification of the entire firm.
We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred in
refusing to take judicial notice of three published California decisions. As the
court correctly noted in its order denying the disqualification motion, the
court need not take judicial notice of published California authorities to

9
Defendants have suggested other members of the MVP Law
Group might also be percipient witnesses, that Vafaei and the MVP Law
Group are one and the same, and there are no other lawyers from the firm
who could represent plaintiffs. It was defendants’ burden on the
disqualification motion to establish grounds to disqualify the law firm.
Defendants, however, failed to cite any legal authority or evidence showing
the entire law firm or other lawyers in the firm must be disqualified. Nothing
in this opinion prevents further proceedings before the trial court relating to
the potential disqualification of other lawyers with the MVP Law Group,
should the facts and law support such relief.

14
consider them. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19
10
Cal.4th 26, 45–46, fn. 9.)
II.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
Defendants seek monetary sanctions of $6,500 against plaintiffs
and their counsel pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.276, and
section 907 of the Code of Civil Procedure for bringing what defendants
characterize as a meritless appeal. As shown above, the appeal is not without
merit: We reverse the disqualification of the MVP Law Group and narrow the
scope of the disqualification of Vafaei. Moreover, the record does not support
defendants’ assertion that the appeal was brought for an improper purpose.
We deny defendants’ motion for monetary sanctions.

10
Contrary to Vafaei’s argument, the trial court’s refusal to take
judicial notice of published California cases does not demonstrate the court
refused to consider or apply the law. (Indeed, the court’s order specifically
cited Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 412—one of the cases for which Vafaei
requested judicial notice.) Rather, the court declined to take judicial notice
because it was unnecessary to do so in order for the court to consider
published California cases. Citing no authority, Vafaei argues judicial notice
is important “to ensure that judges acknowledge the authority of the law and
their duty to rule in conformity with it.” We know of no authority (and Vafaei
cites none) requiring a court to acknowledge via judicial notice that it has
considered and followed California case law. Vafaei also made serious
accusations against the court, which we address later in this opinion, in
which he (1) characterizes the judge’s ruling that it was unnecessary to take
judicial notice of the cited authorities as an “admission that he is
disregarding the formality of judicially noticing the case law cited [by
plaintiffs and] thereby putting himself above the law, and at odds with the
law,” and (2) accuses the judge of “engaging in the adjudication of a matter
while being un-tethered to the law.”

15
III.
MISCONDUCT BY PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL, PASHA VAFAEI
Finally, we address Vafaei’s unsupported attacks in his appellate
briefing on the integrity of the trial court.
It is one thing to assert on appeal that the trial court committed
reversible error; that is within the bounds of appropriate and acceptable
advocacy. It is quite another thing to level serious, unsupported attacks on
the integrity of the court, as Vafaei did here. Vafaei did not simply argue the
court erred by granting the disqualification motion. Instead, Vafaei accused
the court of “participating with the defense counsel” to commit a “fraud” on
the judicial institutions of this state, “turn[ing] a blind eye” to defendants’
bad faith conduct and to the governing law, “putting himself above the law,”
and acting in “knowing and willful disregard, and outright defiance, of the
governing law.” Vafaei asserts the court’s ruling amounts to “whimsical
tyranny.” 11

11
According to California State Bar records, attorney Pasha
Vafaei was admitted to the bar on December 5, 2017, long after the 2014
adoption of rule 9.4 of the California Rules of Court (renumbered rule 9.7,
effective Jan. 1, 2018). Rule 9.7 requires the oath taken by every person on
admission to practice law to include the following promise: “‘As an officer of
the court, I will strive to conduct myself at all times with dignity, courtesy
and integrity.’” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.7.) It is difficult to imagine how
Vafaei could have thought his unfounded attacks on the integrity of the trial
court comported with the oath he took when he was granted the privilege of
practicing law in this state.

16
We cannot overstate how clearly this exceeds the bounds of
acceptable, zealous advocacy and contravenes Vafaei’s ethical obligations as a
member of the bar. “Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision
(b) provides that it is the duty of an attorney to ‘maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers.’ Disrespectful statements made in
court papers are grounds for attorney discipline and/or contempt.” (Martinez
v. O’Hara (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 853, 856; see Ramirez v. State Bar (1980) 28
Cal.3d 402, 406-407 [attorney suspended for falsely accusing state appellate
justices in brief filed with the Ninth Circuit of acting illegally and being
induced to rule a certain way in favor of financially strong opposing party]; In
re Koven (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 262, 264–265 [attorney’s brief falsely
accusing appellate court of “‘deliberate judicial dishonesty’” resulted in
contempt proceedings, monetary fine, and referral to the California State
Bar].)
Accusations of judicial wrongdoing “are serious, and we treat
them as such.” (People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539,
1557.) However, “serious accusations against a trial judge . . . had better be
supported by concrete evidence.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v.
Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 793.) There is
nothing in the record to support or justify Vafaei’s attacks on the honesty and
integrity of the trial court. His accusations are all based on the trial judge’s
ruling on the disqualification motion. “[A] judge’s ‘rulings against a party—
even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially
when they are subject to review.’” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735,
798.) Nor do they support an accusation the court has colluded with an
opposing party to knowingly violate or disregard the law and commit a fraud
on the judicial system.

17
Canon 3D(2) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics (canon
3D(2)) provides: “Whenever a judge has personal knowledge, or concludes in a
judicial decision, that a lawyer has committed misconduct or has violated any
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the judge shall take
appropriate corrective action, which may include reporting the violation to
the appropriate authority.” “The advisory committee commentary
accompanying canon 3D(2) instructs that California law imposes on judges
mandatory reporting requirements to the State Bar regarding lawyer
misconduct.” (Martinez v. O’Hara, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 856.).
Pursuant to our ethical obligations under canon 3D(2), we will
report attorney Pasha Vafaei, counsel for plaintiffs, to the State Bar of
California for his misconduct as described in this opinion.
DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed as to the disqualification of
Vafaei, as modified to limit the disqualification to representation of plaintiffs
at trial, to the taking and defending of depositions, and to any other
involvement in pretrial proceedings that may reveal to the trier of fact
Vafaei’s dual role as attorney and witness. The order is reversed as to the
MVP Law Group.
Pursuant to canon 3D(2) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics,
we hereby report attorney Pasha Vafaei, counsel for plaintiffs, to the State
Bar of California for his misconduct as detailed in part III of this opinion’s
discussion. The clerk of this court is directed to send copies of this opinion,
along with plaintiffs’ opening brief on appeal, to the State Bar of California.
The clerk is further directed to send a copy of this opinion to attorney Pasha
Vafaei, State Bar No. 318823, at his address reflected in the California State
Bar records.

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The parties shall bear their own costs and fees on appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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