In re D.B. CA5

CourtListener 10013468CalctappJul 24, 2024

Full text

Filed 7/24/24 In re D.B. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re D.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN F086914
SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. Nos. JD141953-01,
Plaintiff and Respondent, JD141956-01)

v.
OPINION
S.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales
Norris, Judge.
Laura D. Pedicini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Alexandria M. Ottoman, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and Snauffer, J.
-ooOoo-
Appellant S.B. (mother) is the mother of D.B. and G.Y. (collectively the children),
who are the subjects of this dependency case. Mother challenges the juvenile court’s
order issued at a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 that
resulted in the termination of her family reunification services. Mother contends the
juvenile court and the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) failed to
comply with their duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The
department concedes that it failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the potential Indian
ancestry of the children, and it does not oppose remand for the limited purpose of
conducting further ICWA inquiry.1 We agree with the parties and conditionally reverse
the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s family reunification services and remand
for proceedings to ensure ICWA compliance.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
In April 2022, the department filed dependency petitions alleging the children and
their three siblings were described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The allegations
involved mother’s failure to supervise and provide adequate food, shelter, and medical
treatment for the children and their siblings. The conditions of mother’s home were
described as filthy with a foul odor and roaches crawling throughout the home.
At the detention hearing held on April 6, 2021, mother was present and appointed
counsel. Mother identified Juan R. as the father of D.B., and Harold Y. was identified as
the father of G.Y. The juvenile court inquired of mother regarding potential Indian
ancestry, and she responded, “I was told that I’m part Indian.” She also stated that she

1 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
2 The sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA; therefore, we primarily restrict our facts
to those bearing on that issue.

2.
did not “know anything about what part of India or any of that.” Mother explained that
she would need to follow up with the maternal grandmother, Lisa B., to obtain additional
information on her ancestry. The department was ordered to contact the maternal
grandmother using the phone number provided by mother. The juvenile court reserved
its finding as to ICWA and detained the children from mother’s custody. A combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing was set for April 16, 2021.
In August 2021, the children’s newborn sibling, C.B., was taken into protective
custody shortly after her birth. During the juvenile court’s inquiry at C.B.’s detention
hearing, mother denied that she had any Indian ancestry. The department’s counsel
indicated that there was a previous finding that ICWA was not applicable as to mother in
the children’s case. The court then found that ICWA was not applicable to C.B. as to
mother.
After multiple continuances, the jurisdiction hearing for the children was held on
September 17, 2021. The allegations of the original petition were found true, and the
disposition hearing was continued to address paternity issues. On October 8, 2021, the
juvenile court elevated both Juan and Harold to presumed father status for each of their
children. At the continued disposition hearing on November 4, 2021, the children were
placed with mother under a plan of family maintenance services.
On February 10, 2022, the department filed supplemental petitions pursuant to
section 387 alleging the previous disposition of placement with mother was ineffective in
protecting the children and their siblings. The petitions alleged that mother’s home was
covered in trash, old food, toys, clothing, and dirt. The petition further alleged that the
children consumed an unknown amount of mother’s prescription medication after pill
bottles were left on the floor. The department also filed subsequent petitions pursuant to
section 342 alleging the children were described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1) due to
mother’s untreated mental illness.

3.
Both mother and Juan were present for the detention hearing on the supplemental
and subsequent petitions held on February 17, 2022. The children were detained from
mother’s custody, and a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on the petitions
was scheduled for April 11, 2022.
The department’s jurisdiction report, dated March 23, 2022, recommended that the
allegations in the supplemental and subsequent petitions be found true. The disposition
report, dated March 24, 2022, recommended that the children remain in out-of-home care
with family reunification services provided to mother and Juan. Family reunification
services were not recommended for Harold due to his incarcerated status. The ICWA
section of the report detailed the juvenile court’s previous finding that ICWA was not
applicable, and there was no further information provided on the issue.
A family finding social worker had located four of the children’s relatives, and
three of the relatives were contacted by the department. The maternal grandmother, Lisa
S., was interested in placement of the children. G.Y.’s paternal grandmother and
paternal aunt also requested placement. The juvenile court subsequently ordered
evaluations of the relatives pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Placement of
Children (ICPC) due to the relatives residing in Maryland.
At the jurisdiction hearing on the petitions held on April 11, 2022, the juvenile
court found the allegations in both petitions to be true, and the disposition hearing was
continued to May 24, 2022. A psychological evaluation was ordered for mother, and an
additional continuance was necessary to allow the department to receive the report from
mother’s psychological evaluation. On July 27, 2022, the court proceeded with
disposition, ordered the children removed from mother’s custody, and family
reunification services were provided to mother. Family reunification services were also
provided to D.B.’s father, Juan. G.Y.’s father, Harold, was denied family reunification
services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1). A six-month review hearing was
set for January 26, 2023.

4.
The department’s report for the six-month review hearing recommended that
family reunification services be continued for mother and Juan. On January 26, 2023, the
six-month review hearing was continued, and the hearing was reset as a combined
six- and 12-month review hearing on April 11, 2023. The 12-month review report, dated
March 30, 2023, included updated information on the department’s ICWA inquiry for
C.B. Several paternal family members of C.B. denied that their family had any Indian
ancestry. At the combined six- and 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court
continued family reunification services for mother, and it set an 18-month review hearing
for August 10, 2023. Juan’s family reunification services were terminated.
The department’s recommendation for the 18-month review hearing was to
terminate family reunification services for mother. D.B. and G.Y. were each placed in a
separate resource family home, and their siblings were placed together in another
resource family home. There was no additional information contained in the ICWA
status section of the report. The ICPC evaluation of the maternal grandmother’s home
was denied, and a social worker was in communication with the maternal grandmother
about her request for placement. The department wanted additional assistance to inspect
the home because mother moved in with the maternal grandmother.
On August 11, 2023, family reunification services were terminated for mother, and
the juvenile court found that plans of adoption and guardianship were not suitable for the
children. The children were ordered to remain in foster care with a permanent plan of
placement with a fit and willing relative. A hearing pursuant to section 366.3 was set for
February 9, 2024.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court and department failed to adequately discharge
their duty of initial inquiry by failing to inquire of the children’s extended family
members regarding possible Indian ancestry. The department concedes this point, and we
accept their concession.

5.
A. Applicable Law
ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum
federal standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow before removing
an Indian child from his or her family. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1
Cal.5th 1, 7–8.) In any “proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s
tribe … have a right to intervene” (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)), and may petition the court to
invalidate any foster care placement of an Indian child made in violation of ICWA (25
U.S.C. § 1914; see § 224, subd. (e)). An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is defined in ICWA as an
unmarried individual under 18 years of age who is either (1) a member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe, or (2) is eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe
and is the biological child of a member of a federally recognized tribe. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4) & (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definitions].)
In every dependency proceeding, the department and the juvenile court have an
“affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian
child .…” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a);3 see § 224.2, subd. (a); In re W.B. (2012)
55 Cal.4th 30, 53; In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165.) The continuing
duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child “can be divided into
three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to
provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)
The initial duty to inquire arises at the referral stage when the reporting party is
asked whether it has “any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,

3 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

6.
subd. (a).) Once a child is received into temporary custody, the initial duty to inquire
includes asking the child, parents, legal guardian, extended family members, and others
who have an interest in the child whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.
(§§ 224.2, subd. (b), 306, subd. (b).) The juvenile court has a duty at the first appearance
of each parent to ask whether he or she “knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The court must also require each parent to complete
form ICWA-020. (Rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).)
Next, a duty of further inquiry arises when the department or the juvenile court has
“reason to believe” the proceedings involve an Indian child but “does not have sufficient
information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e).) As recently clarified by the Legislature, a “reason to believe” exists
when the juvenile court or department “has information suggesting that either the parent
of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe.” (Id., subd. (e)(1).)
If there is a reason to believe an Indian child is involved, the juvenile court or the
department “shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child,
and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Further inquiry
includes, but is not limited to, “[i]nterviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended
family members,” and contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the State Department of
Social Services, and the tribes and any other person who may have information.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)
The final duty component arises when the court or department has “ ‘reason to
know’ ” the child is an Indian child. (In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.) A
“reason to know” exists if one of the following circumstances is present: “(1) A person
having an interest in the child … informs the court that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶]
(2) The residence … of the child [or] the child’s parents … is on a reservation or in an
Alaska Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding … informs the court

7.
that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The
child … gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The
court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[; or] [¶] (6) The
court is informed that either parent or the child possess[es] an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)–(6).)
If the juvenile court makes a finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and
due diligence have been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that the ICWA does not apply, subject to
reversal if the court subsequently receives information providing reason to believe the
child is an Indian child. If the court receives such information, it must direct the social
worker or probation officer to conduct further inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
B. Standard of Review
Where the juvenile court finds ICWA does not apply to a child after completion of
an initial inquiry, “[t]he finding implies that … social workers and the court did not know
or have a reason to know the children were Indian children and that social workers had
fulfilled their duty of inquiry.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885.) We
review the court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re Hunter W. (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 1454, 1467.) We must uphold the court’s orders and findings if any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all
conflicts in favor of affirmance. (In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.)
The appellant “has the burden to show that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
findings and orders.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Pursuant to its duty under section 224.2, the department asked mother whether she
had any Indian heritage. Mother indicated that she had been told that she was part Indian
by the maternal grandmother. The department had contact with the children’s maternal
grandmother and two paternal relatives of G.Y. during the proceedings, but there was no

8.
documentation of an inquiry directed toward any of them. There was also no indication
that either of the children’s fathers were asked about potential Indian ancestry. Based
upon this information, the juvenile court found ICWA was not applicable.
The department was required under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to ask available
parents and extended family members about the children’s possible Indian ancestry.
Extended family members include adults who are the child’s stepparents, grandparents,
siblings, brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first or
second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) There were at least
three extended family members, the maternal grandmother, paternal grandmother, and
paternal aunt, who were in contact with the department during the proceedings. The
department either failed to ask these extended family members about Indian ancestry or
did not document it. Furthermore, the department failed to document any inquiry of the
children’s respective fathers.
Under the circumstances, we conclude the department did not fulfill its statutory
duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) As a result, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA
did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence that the department conducted an
adequate, proper, and duly diligent inquiry, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of
discretion. Because the failure in this case concerned the department’s duty of initial
inquiry, only state law is involved. “Where a violation is of only state law, we may not
reverse unless we find that the error was prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [‘No
judgment shall be set aside … unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice’].)” (In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)
“ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must
clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of
justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage
of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it

9.
reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but
for the error.’ ” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 606–607 (K.H.).)
However, in In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, the Supreme Court “recognized that
while we generally apply a Watson[4] likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a
merits-based outcome-focused test is not always appropriate because it cannot always
adequately measure the relevant harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury
caused by the error is unrelated to an outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of
prejudice to such an outcome misplaces the measure, at the expense of the rights the law
in question was designed to protect.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics
omitted.)
As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation .…’ ”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or
protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of
ICWA and related California statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it
to determine whether the child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to
intervene in the proceedings’ [citation], and an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the
information gathering upon which the court’s ICWA determination will rest.” (Id. at
p. 608.) Yet, “while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the
burden of gathering information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may
raise the claim of error for the first time on appeal.” (Ibid.) Further, the ultimate
determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, not with a parent, the
department, or the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 596.)
“[I]f the inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the likelihood that the opportunity to
gather relevant information will present itself later in the proceeding declines
precipitously.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.) Thus, “the relevant injury under

4 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 820.

10.
ICWA is not tied to whether the appealing parent can demonstrate to the juvenile court or
a reviewing court a likelihood of success on the merits of whether a child is an Indian
child[, under a standard Watson analysis]. The relevant rights under ICWA belong to
Indian tribes and they have a statutory right to receive notice where an Indian child may
be involved so that they may make that determination. It necessarily follows that [in the
context of ICWA and consistent with In re A.R.,] the prejudice to those rights lies in the
failure to gather and record the very information the juvenile court needs to ensure
accuracy in determining whether further inquiry or notice is required, and whether ICWA
does or does not apply. Many cases do not proceed beyond the inquiry at the first stage
in the compliance process and, therefore, ensuring adequacy and accuracy at this step is
critical if the rights of tribes under ICWA and California law are to be meaningfully
safeguarded, as was intended by Congress and our state Legislature.” (K.H., at p. 591.)
As we explained in K.H., “where the opportunity to gather the relevant
information critical to determining whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost
because there has not been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is
generally the only effective safeguard.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.) Here,
the department’s inquiry “fell well short of that required to gather the information needed
to meaningfully safeguard the rights of the tribes, as intended under ICWA and California
law.” (Id. at p. 620.) “Where a record is silent or nearly silent with respect to an ICWA
inquiry at the first step, a finding of harmlessness necessarily rests on speculation” and
“is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California law intend to afford
Indian children and Indian tribes.” (Id. at p. 611.) Therefore, the error is prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the department to
comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2,
subdivisions (b) and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate

11.
inquiry was made consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA
applies, the court shall proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If
the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate its ICWA
finding. In all other respects, the court’s order terminating mother’s family reunification
services is affirmed.

12.

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