In re I.A. CA2/2

CourtListener 10013467CalctappJul 24, 2024

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Filed 7/24/24 In re I.A. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re I.A., a Person Coming B333428
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 20CCJP01598A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HUGO A.,

Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.

Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Hugo A. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights over his six-year-old daughter
I.A. Because the evidence does not compel application of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the termination
of parental rights, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Exertion of Dependency Jurisdiction
A. Family
Father and D.O. (mother) are the parents of I.A., who was
born in November 2017.
B. Conduct giving rise to jurisdiction
Father engaged in domestic violence. He regularly argued
with mother, and those arguments would erupt into physical
violence. This violence endangered I.A.: Father slammed mother
into a wall while she was pregnant with I.A. and, after I.A.’s
birth, on more than one occasion, slapped mother’s face or
punched her in the upper body with I.A. nearby.

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Father also used drugs. In 2020, he used marijuana daily
and methamphetamine weekly. At first, father freely admitted
his marijuana use, but denied his use of methamphetamine.
C. Initial assertion of dependency jurisdiction
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the
juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over I.A. due to
father’s domestic violence and substance abuse, which placed I.A.
at substantial risk of serious physical harm and rendered
jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).1
On March 20, 2020, I.A. was detained from the parents,
and placed with maternal great-grandmother.
At a June 24, 2020 hearing, the juvenile court sustained
the allegations against father, removed I.A. from her parents’
custody, and continued her placement with the maternal great-
grandmother.
From June 2020 through June 2021, father did not visit
I.A. despite being granted monitored visits three times a week,
claiming that he was “out of town.”
D. Second assertion of dependency jurisdiction
Although father was aware of the initial jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing and elected not to attend, father on August
3, 2021 filed a request for the court to convene a new hearing
because the notice he received did not contain the specific
apartment number of the complex where he lived. The court

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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granted the request, and held a second hearing on December 10,
2021.
At the second jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the
court once again sustained the allegations, ordered I.A. removed
from her parents, and ordered reunification services with the
same case plan for father as before—namely, (1) a 52-week
domestic violence course, (2) a full drug and alcohol program,
with aftercare and weekly testing, (3) a parenting class, and (4)
individual counseling to address case issues. The court granted
father monitored visitation three times a week, for three hours
per visit, and permitted virtual visits if in-person visits could not
be scheduled.
II. Reunification Period
The juvenile court granted father 18 months of
reunification services following the second hearing; this
reunification period ran from December 2021 to June 2023.
During this period, father completed the parenting classes,
but did not complete the domestic violence course, was dropped
from a drug treatment program, and never enrolled in individual
counseling. He continued to test positive for marijuana, but
denied any drug use. In April 2023, father tested positive for
methamphetamine, but specifically denied methamphetamine
use.
I.A. remained with the maternal great-grandmother, and
they developed a close, positive bond. I.A. thrived.
Father visited I.A. once a week during the first six months
of reunification, and the visits were positive. During the second
six months, father visited I.A. twice a week for 90 minutes per
visit. The Department repeatedly offered to alter the visitation
days and times to accommodate father’s work schedule, but

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father declined. During the third six-month period, father would
often visit I.A. twice a week for 90 minutes per visit, but canceled
10 of those visits. During her visits with father, I.A. was excited,
and father and I.A. had a “good” relationship and a “positive” and
affectionate “bond.” I.A. was not upset at the end of father’s
visits.
On June 20, 2023, the juvenile court terminated father’s
reunification services after finding that he had made only
“partially substantial” progress.
III. Termination of Parental Rights
From June 2023 through late August 2023, father’s visits
became more sporadic and he began arriving late for them. I.A.
reached out to father on Facebook, but he ignored her missives.
Father only visited I.A. on two occasions after June 2023, and his
visits stopped altogether after August 27, 2023.
On November 8, 2023, the juvenile court held a
permanency planning hearing. Father asked that his parental
rights not be terminated under the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception. The juvenile court terminated father’s
rights, finding the exception did not apply because (1) father did
not “maintain consistent visitation” with I.A., (2) father did not
“establish” that he had a “strong emotional bond” with I.A.
because he was “more akin to a friendly . . . uncle,” and (3)
termination of father’s parental rights would accordingly not be
“detrimental” to I.A.
IV. Appeal
Father filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Father argues that the juvenile court erred in not applying
the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.

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I. Pertinent Law
Once a juvenile court has terminated reunification services,
the court “shall terminate parental rights” if it finds, “‘by clear
and convincing evidence[,] that it is likely that the [child] will be
adopted’” within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1);
Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) Thus, a
juvenile court must terminate parental rights and order adoption
unless the parent opposing termination proves that one of six
statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B);
In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527, overruled in part on
other grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)
The exception at issue here is the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception. Because the exception “applies in
situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child,” a court will find the exception
applicable only if the parent “establish[es]” “(1) regular visitation
and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)
In assessing whether a child would benefit from a
continued relationship with the parent (the second element), the
parent must show “that the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent,” where a “significant
attachment” means the parent shows “‘attention to the child’s
needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and
stimulation,’” a “positive attachment” means one that is

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“nurturing and provides the child with a sense of security and
stability,” and an “emotional attachment” means “the child views
the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate and who[se]
interactions with the parent were not ambivalent, detached, or
indifferent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; In re B.D.
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) Several factors are relevant
when examining the attachment; they include (1) “‘[t]he age of
the child, [(2)] the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, [(3)] the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and [(4)] the child’s particular needs.’”
(Caden C., at p. 632.)
In assessing whether the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child “when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home” (the third
element), a court is to examine “how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship” entirely. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 634, 636.) This is necessarily a “subtle, case-
specific inquiry.” (Id. at p. 633.)
We review a juvenile court’s findings regarding the first
two elements (visitation and relationship) for substantial
evidence, and its ruling regarding the third element (balancing of
detriment versus benefit) for an abuse of discretion. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-641.) Because the parent
challenging the termination of parental rights bears the burden
of establishing the exception, the parent (here, father) can prevail
on appeal only if (1) the evidence in the record compels a finding
in the parent’s favor as a matter of law as to the first two
elements of the exception (In re Luis H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
1223, 1227; Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family
Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 967); and

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(2) the juvenile court’s conclusion that the termination of the
parent’s rights would not be detrimental to the child was
irrational and arbitrary (In re M.L. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 210,
227-228). This is a notoriously heavy burden to sustain.
II. Analysis
The juvenile court did not err in declining to apply the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
The evidence does not compel a finding that father had
regular visitation and contact with I.A. The consistency of
visitation is measured against “‘the extent permitted by [the
juvenile] court[’s] orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
632.) Here, father visited I.A. twice a week for 90 minutes
(approximately three hours a week) during the 18-month
reunification period, although he canceled nearly a dozen visits in
the last few months of this period. While regular, this was only
one-third of the nine hours of weekly visits permitted by the
court’s orders, and father could have but did not utilize virtual
visits. In the months after the juvenile court terminated father’s
reunification services, his visits became more sporadic and nearly
stopped altogether. This record does not compel a finding of
regular visitation and contact. Father responds that his failure
to use the full nine hours a week was due to his work schedule,
but ignores the evidence that the Department repeatedly offered
to accommodate that schedule and that father repeatedly
declined to do so.
The evidence also does not compel a finding that I.A. had a
“substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to father. Although
father demonstrated that I.A. had bonded with him, that bond
does not by itself translate into the existence of a “substantial,
positive, emotional attachment” that otherwise “suffices to

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establish the exception overall.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
833, 857, fn. 17; In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185
[“the second element is not, ‘Is there a bond?’”].) Nor does the
evidence compel a finding of this greater level of attachment.
The twice-weekly, 90-minute monitored visits father had with
I.A. did not give father the opportunity to provide I.A. with a
sense of stability and security or to develop a relationship that
was more than that of a “friendly uncle”; what is more, father
demonstrated his “indifference” toward I.A. by ignoring her
Facebook messages after he ceased his visits in the fall of 2023.
An analysis of the pertinent factors leads to the same conclusion:
Although I.A.’s interactions with father were positive, I.A. had
still spent more than half of her young life (from age two to age
six) outside of father’s custody, and father’s continued struggles
with substance abuse (and his failure to acknowledge those
struggles) constitute a “negative effect” on I.A. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 637). Father responds that he was more than a
friendly visitor, but the record does not show the juvenile court’s
characterization of father’s relationship as that of a “friendly
uncle” to be incorrect. Father further responds that he need not
play a parental role for the requisite attachment to exist. That is
true, but ignores that the absence of such a parental role is
relevant to show the absence of a significant attachment. (E.g.,
In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 319-320; In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1155.)
The juvenile court did not act irrationally in determining
that terminating father’s parental rights would not be
detrimental to I.A. “when balanced against the countervailing
benefit of a new, adoptive home.” Given the absence of a strong
attachment between I.A. and father, the absence of any negative

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reactions at the end of I.A.’s visits with father, and the strong
bond I.A. has with the maternal great-grandmother, the court did
not act irrationally in concluding that terminating father’s
parental rights would not have a detrimental effect on I.A.
Father responds that it is inappropriate to compare the relative
bond between I.A. and father on the one hand, and I.A. and the
maternal great-grandmother on the other. Although father is
correct that it is not appropriate to compare whether a parent or
the current caregiver would be a better caregiver (because the
child will not be placed back in the parent’s custody) (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634), the extent of the child’s bond with
the parent and the caregiver is relevant to the second and third
elements (ibid.). In his reply brief, father also represents that
the social worker “acknowledged that severing the relationship
would have a negative impact on [I.A.’s] emotional state”; father’s
representation is misleading because the social worker actually
reported that severance “would have some negative impact”
because it would result in the “los[s] of visits,” but that the
termination of parental rights would not cause I.A. any detriment
“in terms of losing any significant emotional attachment.”
(Italics added.) When properly viewed in context, this passage is
not the silver bullet father suggests it is and does not call into
question the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion.

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DISPOSITION
The order terminating father’s parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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