People v. Fleming CA2/5

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Filed 7/24/24 P. v. Fleming CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B324947

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA363372)
v.

RANDY FLEMING,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kevin P. Stennis, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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This appeal arises from an order denying defendant and
appellant Randy Fleming’s (defendant’s) petition for resentencing
under Health and Safety Code section 11361.8, which was
enacted as part of the Control, Regulate, and Tax Adult Use of
Marijuana Act (Proposition 64).1 The Attorney General correctly
concedes the trial court erred by relying solely on the argument of
counsel, and no evidence, when finding that granting the petition
would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The
parties disagree, however, about what our disposition of the
appeal should be in light of the error. That is the dispute we
resolve.

I. BACKGROUND
In 2010, defendant was charged with a single count of
possession of marijuana for sale. The information alleged the
offense was gang related and it also alleged defendant had
numerous prior convictions.
A trial jury convicted defendant (but found the gang
allegation not true). Prior to sentencing, defendant moved the
trial court to strike all but one of his prior strike offenses—some
28 of them. At the hearing, defendant admitted all the prior
strike convictions, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to
strike any of them, and the court sentenced defendant to 25 years
to life in prison. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence.
(People v. Fleming (May 28, 2013, B241293) [nonpub. opn.].)

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Health and Safety Code.

3
In May 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 11361.8.2 The People opposed the motion and
argued granting the petition would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety given defendant’s criminal history.
The People’s opposition contended that criminal history
included two criminal cases in 1985 in which defendant pled
guilty to 15 counts of robbery, 1 count of attempted murder, 4
counts of rape, 4 counts of lewd acts with a minor, and 4 counts of
assault with a firearm. The opposition described what it asserted
was the factual predicate for the convictions in one of the two
cases: defendant entered two restaurants with his friends,
physically assaulted several patrons, robbed patrons of money
and jewelry at gunpoint, forced multiple female employees and
patrons to orally copulate him and undress, raped female
employees at gunpoint, and sexually assaulted many other
female patrons. The opposition also described the asserted
factual predicate for the convictions in the other case: defendant
robbed and assaulted one off-duty police officer and shot and
paralyzed a second off-duty officer, who later died. The People
did not submit any evidence in support of the claims in the
opposition, nor did the People ask the trial court to take judicial
notice of the court files from either of the prior cases.
The trial court heard argument on the petition. Neither
the court nor the parties mentioned the absence of evidence

2
Section 11361.8 allows a person “serving a sentence for a
conviction, whether by trial or by open or negotiated plea, who
would not have been guilty of an offense, or who would have been
guilty of a lesser offense under [Proposition 64] had that act been
in effect at the time of the offense . . . [to] petition for a recall or
dismissal of sentence . . . .”

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supporting the People’s opposition. The trial court stated it could
consider defendant’s criminal history, including the type of
crimes committed, the extent of injury to the victims, the length
of prior prison commitments, the remoteness of the crimes, and
defendant’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while
incarcerated. As to at least the last two of these, the court
remarked it did not “have any of that” and informed the defense
that “if that exists and it’s very very positive, that might be
something you want to resubmit to the People and see if they
might change their opposition.” Defendant asserted he had “an
excellent record in prison” but presented no evidence to support
the statement. The defense did ask if the court would “feel better
making a decision” if it obtained the prison records. The court
responded, “Well, I’m ready to rule now, but again, I think maybe
as some time passes . . . it might be something to reconsider.”
The court then recited the description of defendant’s convictions
from the People’s opposition, found the People met their burden
to show the defendant poses a danger to public safety, and
declined to resentence defendant.
Defendant subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus
that this court construed as a request for relief from default for
failure to timely file a notice of appeal. We granted the
application, and the appeal is now before us for decision.

II. DISCUSSION
The Attorney General’s concession that the trial court erred
in denying defendant’s petition because there was no evidence
before the trial court that it could rely on to find defendant posed
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is well taken. In
light of the error, defendant asks us to remand the cause with

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instructions to grant his petition for resentencing. The Attorney
General, on the other hand, maintains the appropriate
disposition is a remand for another hearing on the petition. We
follow precedent and hold the Attorney General’s proposed
disposition is the appropriate one. There is no double jeopardy
problem in these circumstances.

A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion
Section 11361.8 provides that upon receipt of a petition for
recall or dismissal of a sentence under that section, “the court
shall presume the petitioner satisfies the criteria . . . unless the
party opposing the petition proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the petitioner does not satisfy the criteria. If the
petitioner satisfies the criteria . . . , the court shall grant the
petition to recall the sentence or dismiss the sentence because it
is legally invalid unless the court determines that granting the
petition would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.” (§ 11361.8, subd. (b).)
“In exercising its discretion, the court may consider, but
shall not be limited to evidence provided for in subdivision (b) of
Section 1170.18 of the Penal Code.” (§ 11361.8, subd. (b)(1).)
Penal Code section 1170.18 subdivision (b), in turn, provides the
court may consider: (1) “[t]he petitioner’s criminal conviction
history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of
injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the
remoteness of the crimes[;]” (2) “[t]he petitioner’s disciplinary
record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated[;]” and (3)
“[a]ny other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines
to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in

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an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (Pen. Code
§ 1170.18, subd. (b)(1)-(3).)
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s
determination that granting a petition would result in an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (People v. Saelee
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 744, 748-749.) A trial court abuses its
discretion when it “bases its decision on express or implied
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.”
(People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)
That is the circumstance presented here: the trial court had
no evidence to support the criminal history representations made
by the People in their opposition. That is error. (Saelee, supra,
28 Cal.App.5th at 748, 754 [the prosecution must admit, and the
trial court must rely on, “actual evidence” to make a
dangerousness finding under section 11361.8, subdivision (b)].)

B. Remand for Rehearing Does Not Violate Double
Jeopardy Principles
The Attorney General argues we should order the same
remedy as did the court of appeal in Saelee: a remand for further
proceedings in which “the parties will be allowed to present
evidence to support their respective positions on the question of
whether defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to the
public.” (Saelee, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at 756-757.) Defendant
believes such a remand would be improper because the trial
court’s dangerousness finding is akin to a finding of innocence or
guilt on a substantive charge, that a reversal of the ruling for
insufficient evidence is akin to an acquittal, and that allowing the
People another opportunity to admit evidence of his
dangerousness would violate double jeopardy principles. In

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defendant’s view, the People squandered their one opportunity to
present evidence and we should remand the matter to the trial
court with directions to grant defendant’s request for
resentencing.
Contrary to defendant’s contention, allowing the trial court
to conduct a new hearing would not violate the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. “The constitutional
prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’ was designed to protect an
individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and
possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” (Green
v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187.) Thus, double jeopardy
principles generally do not apply to sentencing decisions.3 (See
Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721, 734; People v. Barragan
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239, 245 [authorizing retrial of a strike
crime allegation found on appeal to be unsupported by
substantial evidence]; People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826,
843-844.) Here, a remand will not subject defendant to the
possibility of being convicted more than once for an offense. We
also see no adequate analogy between the posture of this
resentencing case (in which defendant’s sentence cannot increase)

3
Defendant nonetheless contends double jeopardy principles
should apply to the dangerousness finding, relying primarily on a
concurring opinion in People v. Monge that asserted that
“application of double jeopardy does not depend on the
mechanical application of a formula. It depends instead on the
nature of the determination to be made and its relationship to the
underlying offense.” (People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 847
[conc. opn. of Brown, J.) The concurrence is, of course, not
binding law, and regardless, we are not persuaded that a
dangerousness finding is akin to a finding on a substantive
charge.

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and a trial on a criminal charge that would justify stretching
double jeopardy principles (if they could stretch so far) to bar a
remand with instructions to hold a new hearing.
Concluding a remand for another hearing is the correct
disposition, however, does not mean we thereby adopt the
position that defendant must, as he says, “endure as many
remands as it may take for a determined prosecutor to muster
the necessary evidence” to prove dangerousness. Our decision is
limited to the facts and legal argument here: a situation where
the People presented no evidence at all (indicating an error of
inadvertence or a “technical defect[ ] in . . . proof” (People v.
Morton (1953) 41 Cal.2d 536, 545)), defendant did not object or
otherwise alert the trial court to the absence of any evidentiary
support for the criminal history representations made by the
People,4 and defendant’s contention is solely that a remand for a
new hearing would violate double jeopardy principles. The
disposition we shall adopt, however, works both ways: just as the
People will have an opportunity to introduce evidence of
defendant’s prior criminal conduct, defendant will have the
opportunity to submit any mitigating evidence of the type
mentioned by the trial court during the hearing from which this
appeal is taken (e.g., his disciplinary history during the 30-plus
years he has been in custody).

4
Though forfeiture principles do not foreclose defendant’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the trial court’s
order (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 596), we do
believe forfeiture concepts can inform our view of the appropriate
disposition of this appeal.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing is reversed,
and the matter is remanded to hold another hearing on
defendant’s resentencing petition consistent with the views
expressed in this opinion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM, J.

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