CourtListener 10013449•Sky Lift Aeronautics v. Lockheed Martin CA2/2
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Filed 7/24/24 Sky Lift Aeronautics v. Lockheed Martin CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SKY LIFT AERONAUTICS, B322705
LLC, et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. SC128899)
v.
LOCKHEED MARTIN
CORPORATION et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Tarpey Wix, Daniel W. Tarpey, David Wix; Bendel Law
Group and Jason R. Bendel for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Crowell & Moring, Valerie M. Goo, Andrew Holmer, Uri
Niv and Kenneth R. Taketa for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs and appellants Sky Lift Aeronautics, LLC (Sky
Lift), and Millennium Airship, Inc. (Millennium) (collectively
plaintiffs), appeal from the summary judgment entered in favor
of defendants and respondents Lockheed Martin Corporation
(Lockheed), Robert Binns, and Hybrid Enterprises, LLC (Hybrid)
(collectively defendants) after the trial court ruled that plaintiffs’
claims for violation of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(Civ. Code, § 3426) (CUTSA), breach of contract, and breach of
fiduciary duty were time-barred. Plaintiffs contend triable issues
of fact exist as to when the applicable limitations periods began
to run. Plaintiffs further contend the trial court erred by
granting, without leave to amend, defendants’ demurrers to
certain tort claims asserted in the second amended complaint.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence to controvert undisputed
admissions that they suspected defendants of misappropriating
trade secrets no later than January 3, 2015, and that they
suspected Lockheed of breaching contractual obligations and
Binns of breaching fiduciary duties no later than January 2014,
thereby triggering the applicable statutes of limitation during
those time periods. They accordingly raise no triable issues as to
when the applicable limitations periods began to run and
whether their claims are time-barred. Plaintiffs fail to sustain
their burden of showing a reasonable probability of amending the
defective tort claims they now seek to reassert. We therefore
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties
Millennium and Sky Lift are corporate entities owned and
controlled by Gil Costin and Michael Smith. Costin is
2
Millennium’s chief executive officer (CEO) and testified in
deposition as Millennium’s person most knowledgeable. Smith is
Sky Lift’s managing member and testified in deposition as Sky
Lift’s person most knowledgeable. Both Millennium and Sky Lift
were formed for the purpose of building, operating, marketing,
and selling hybrid airships. A hybrid airship is a prototype
blimp-like vehicle intended to carry large cargo loads over great
distances with take-off and landing capabilities that permit
access to remote and undeveloped areas. Millennium holds a
patent for an Integrated Thrust and Maneuvering Management
System (ITAMMS).
Lockheed is an aerospace company. Hybrid is a limited
liability company formed by Binns and others in July 2014.
Proprietary information agreements (PIA)
2004 PIA
In 2004, Lockheed considered a proposal by Millennium to
incorporate the ITAMMS technology into a bid by Lockheed to
the United States government for a military hybrid airship.
Lockheed and Millennium executed a PIA on May 18, 2004 (the
2004 PIA), which expired on January 1, 2008.1 Lockheed
ultimately concluded that ITAMMS was not well suited for the
needs of the government proposal and did not use ITAMMS in its
government bid or in any of Lockheed’s hybrid airship designs.
In addition to possible military applications for a hybrid
airship, Lockheed explored options for a commercial hybrid
airship. In 2005, Lockheed contracted with Millennium to
conduct a market study for a potential commercial hybrid airship
1 The 2004 PIA is not the subject of any claims against
Lockheed.
3
and paid Millennium $40,000 for the study. Lockheed found
Millennium’s market study to be unhelpful, providing no new
insights or information Lockheed did not already know.
In October 2010, Millennium contacted Lockheed in an
attempt to obtain a contract for the exclusive right to sell and
market a Lockheed commercial hybrid airship. Millennium did
not obtain the exclusive contract rights it sought, and in 2010
Lockheed signed an exclusive contract with Aviation Capital
Enterprises (ACE) to bring Lockheed hybrid airships to the
commercial market. Lockheed’s exclusive relationship with ACE
ended in late 2012.
2012 PIA
Lockheed and Millennium signed a second PIA in May 2012
(the 2012 PIA). The 2012 PIA specified the following confidential
information Millennium sought to protect: “Proprietary
Information relating to Integrated Thrust and Maneuvering
Management System (ITAMMS), ThrustWing Technology,
Airship Catamaran Hull Technology,” and “registered names of
Millennium Airship.”
2013 PIA
In March 2013, Lockheed began negotiations with Sky
Freighter International (SFI),2 another company owned or
controlled in part by Costin and Smith, over the terms of a
potential exclusive contract to sell commercial hybrid aircrafts.
The contract was never finalized, and Lockheed never entered
into any exclusivity arrangement with SFI.
Costin and Smith formed Sky Lift in August 2013 for the
purpose of continuing negotiations with Lockheed for an
2 SFI is not a party to this action.
4
exclusive arrangement to sell or lease commercial hybrid
airships. Sky Lift and Lockheed executed a PIA, effective
September 19, 2013 (the 2013 PIA), that specified the following
confidential information Sky Lift sought to protect: “Proprietary
Information relating to: business plans, project plans, financing
structures, and all personnel and parties involved with [Sky
Lift].” On September 20, 2013, Sky Lift presented to Lockheed a
business plan “to enter into a long-term exclusive contract” with
Lockheed for “exclusive right to sell or lease [the] Hybrid Aircraft
in the worldwide commercial market.”
Sky Lift’s relationship with Binns
In August 2013, Smith retained Korn Ferry, an executive
recruiting company, to search for a CEO for Sky Lift. Korn Ferry
identified Binns as a potential candidate. Smith interviewed
Binns at Korn Ferry’s offices in Los Angeles on October 17, 2013.
Shortly after interviewing Binns in Los Angeles, Smith
took Binns to meet with Lockheed representatives at Lockheed’s
Palmdale facility. Smith testified in deposition that during that
initial meeting in Palmdale, Binns spoke privately with Craig
Johnston, Lockheed’s director of business strategy and
development. Smith testified that Binns was “elusive” and
“vague about the conversation” with Johnston. Smith further
testified that he “first start[ed] having suspicions of Mr. Binns’
intentions to fulfill his role at Sky Lift” at that “very first meeting
with Lockheed.” Smith’s suspicions about Binns “only increased”
into January 2014.
Smith and Binns signed a nonbinding employment term
sheet in November 2013 for Binns to serve as a paid consultant
for Sky Lift in its negotiations with Lockheed. Sky Lift and
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Binns also signed a confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement,
effective October 17, 2013.
Lockheed rejects Sky Lift’s proposals and Binns resigns
Between November 2013 and January 2014, Sky Lift
submitted multiple financing proposals to Lockheed to build and
sell hybrid airships. Lockheed rejected all of these proposals and
on January 10, 2014, advised Sky Lift in writing that Lockheed
could “not see [Sky Lift’s] path to financing as ever closing with
[Lockheed].” Costin admitted that based on Lockheed’s January
2014 rejection of Sky Lift’s proposals, he believed Sky Lift “was
out of the picture” and “the deal with Sky Lift was dead.” Costin
further admitted in deposition that he “wanted to sue” Lockheed
in January 2014.
On January 22, 2014, Smith and Costin received a
resignation letter from Binns via e-mail. Binns stated in the
letter that he “never entered into any” “non-solicitation
covenants” with Sky Lift and could not be bound by the
nondisclosure agreement. Costin testified in deposition
regarding Binns’s January 22, 2014 resignation letter that he
suspected Binns of trying to work with Lockheed directly. Smith
testified in deposition that upon receiving Binns’ January 22,
2014 resignation letter he felt “there was collusion taking place”
and that Binns was using Sky Lift’s confidential information to
Binns’ own advantage with Lockheed. Smith’s suspicions
prompted him to send a “cease-and-desist” letter to Binns.
Between March and September 2014, Lockheed repeatedly
told Smith and Costin that no agreement existed between Sky
Lift and Lockheed and that the entire relationship between the
two companies was over.
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Hybrid and its exclusive agreement with Lockheed
In July 2014, Binns and other individuals formed Hybrid.
On December 15, 2014, Hybrid and Lockheed signed an
agreement to have Hybrid serve as the exclusive reseller of
Lockheed commercial hybrid airships. Plaintiffs learned of
Hybrid’s exclusive reseller status on December 15, 2014, in an
e-mail communication from Lockheed vice president Jack
O’Banion. Costin testified he believed that in December 2014
plaintiffs had been “sabotaged” by Binns and Lockheed and that
Lockheed had “kicked [plaintiffs] to the curb” so that Lockheed,
Binns, and Hybrid could make “hundreds of millions” “potentially
using Millennium and Sky Lift’s confidential information.”
On January 2, 2015, Costin received an e-mail from
O’Banion stating: “I do not see another opportunity for your
company in [Lockheed’s] hybrid airship initiative at this time
outside of a possible collaboration with Hybrid Enterprises.” In
response to O’Banion’s e-mail, Smith wrote to Costin stating: “I’d
be curious to hear what Binns has to say but at this time I can
only see legal action going forward.” On January 3, 2015, Costin
e-mailed Smith his belief that Lockheed and Hybrid were
attempting to “to capitalize on our hard work by capturing the
lion’s share of the money on the sales while doing nothing to earn
it.” Costin testified in deposition that at the time he wrote the
January 3, 2015 e-mail to Smith, he was concerned that
Lockheed and Hybrid “were going to use Sky Lift and
Millennium’s confidential information.” Costin further testified
that by January 3, 2015, he believed “[i]t was a lie on the part of
[Lockheed] and . . . Binns” that Sky Lift or Millennium would be
involved in Lockheed’s hybrid airship program.
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Lockheed’s exclusive reseller agreement with Hybrid
expired in April 2018. Lockheed never sold or leased a hybrid
airship. Neither Lockheed nor Hybrid and Binns has ever sold a
hybrid airship to any customer identified by plaintiffs on their
trade secret designation.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Commencement of action and the pleadings
Sky Lift commenced this action on February 26, 2018. Sky
Lift filed a first amended complaint on June 14, 2018, adding
Millennium as a plaintiff and asserting claims for fraud, violation
of the unfair competition law (UCL), civil conspiracy, violation of
the CUTSA, injunctive relief, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and interference with
prospective economic advantage.
Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint on
multiple grounds. The trial court sustained the demurrers, with
leave to amend, to the fraud, civil conspiracy, UCL, and
interference with prospective economic advantage claims, ruling
that each of those claims was preempted by the CUTSA.
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint reasserting
their claims for fraud, violation of the UCL, civil conspiracy,
violation of the CUTSA, breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and
interference with prospective economic advantage. Defendants
again demurred, arguing that the UCL and tort claims were
preempted by the CUTSA and were barred by the statute of
limitations. On June 28, 2019, the trial court sustained the
demurrers in part, ruling that the fraud, UCL, conspiracy, and
8
interference with prospective economic advantage claims were
preempted by the CUTSA. As to those claims, the trial court
denied leave to amend, concluding that even without the CUTSA
claim, each of the preempted claims “would still revolve around
the same nucleus of trade secret facts.”
Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s
June 28, 2019 demurrer ruling and a proposed third amended
complaint reasserting the preempted tort claims. They
subsequently stipulated to withdraw both the motion to
reconsider and the proposed third amended complaint and filed a
fourth amended complaint, the operative pleading in this action.
The fourth amended complaint alleges causes of action for
(1) violation of the CUTSA (against all defendants), (2) breach of
PIA (by Sky Lift against Lockheed), (3) breach of fiduciary duty
(by Sky Lift against Binns), (4) breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (by Sky Lift against Lockheed), (5)
promissory estoppel (by Sky Lift and Millennium against
Lockheed), and (6) breach of PIA (by Millennium against
Lockheed).
Summary judgment
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing,
as relevant here, that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. The
trial court granted the motions, ruling that plaintiffs’
uncontroverted admissions established that their claims were
barred by the applicable statutes of limitation and that plaintiffs
failed to raise any triable issues of material fact in that regard.
Judgment was entered in defendants’ favor, and this appeal
followed.
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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
Summary judgment is granted when a moving party
establishes the right to entry of judgment as a matter of law.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for
summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no
merit to a cause of action by showing that one or more elements
of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a
complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 1031, 1037.) Once the defendant has made such a
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable
issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of
action or as to a defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) If the plaintiff
does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the
defendant is appropriate. In order to obtain a summary
judgment, “all that the defendant need do is to show that the
plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of
action . . . . [T]he defendant need not himself conclusively negate
any such element . . . .” (Id. at p. 853, fn. omitted.) We review
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and decide
independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute
warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. (Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348; see Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
II. The discovery rule and commencement of limitations
period
California law sets forth two tests for triggering the
applicable statute of limitations: “(1) a subjective test requiring
10
actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury was caused by
wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test requiring a showing that a
reasonable person would have suspected the injury was caused by
wrongdoing. [Citation.] The first to occur under these two tests
begins the limitations period.” (Kitzig v. Nordquist (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391 (Kitzig).)
III. Summary judgment
Summary judgment was properly granted. The undisputed
evidence shows that plaintiffs’ causes of action for violation of the
CUTSA, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty are
time-barred, and plaintiffs fail to raise any triable issue as to
when the applicable limitations periods began to run.
A. Plaintiffs’ CUTSA claims are barred by the
three-year statute of limitations
An action for misappropriation under the CUTSA “must be
brought within three years after the misappropriation is
discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
been discovered.” (Civ. Code, § 3426.6.) For statute of
limitations purposes, a continuing misappropriation is considered
a single claim. (Ibid.; Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant!
Corp. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 215, 223 (Cadence).) “[A] claim for
misappropriation of a trade secret arises for a given plaintiff
against a given defendant only once, at the time of the initial
misappropriation, subject to the discovery rule provided in [Civil
Code] section 3426.6.” (Cadence, at p. 223.) “[I]t is the first
discovered (or discoverable) misappropriation of a trade secret
which commences the limitation period.” (Glue-Fold, Inc. v.
Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1026.)
The uncontroverted evidence shows that plaintiffs actually
suspected defendants of misappropriating trade secrets as early
11
as 2014 and no later than January 2015. Because plaintiffs did
not commence this action until February 26, 2018, more than
three years after discovering the alleged misappropriation, their
claims under the CUTSA against all defendants are time-barred.
(Civ. Code, § 3426.6; Kitzig, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.)
Costin and Smith both admitted in deposition that they
suspected misappropriation by all three defendants as early as
January 2014 and no later than January 2015. Costin testified
that in January 2014 he believed Binns was a “turncoat” and
“suspected” that “Binns was going to try and go work with
Lockheed . . . directly.” Smith similarly testified that in January
2014 he “felt there was collusion taking place” and that Binns
“might try and take Sky Lift’s confidential information and work
with Lockheed . . . directly.” Costin admitted that in December
2014 he believed he had been “sabotaged” by Lockheed and Binns
and that Binns, Hybrid, and Lockheed were “potentially using
Millennium and Sky Lift’s confidential information” to “make
millions” “without Millennium or Sky Lift.” Costin further
admitted that in January 2015 he was concerned that Hybrid and
Lockheed “were going to use Sky Lift and Millennium’s
confidential information.” Plaintiffs presented no evidence that
raises a triable issue as to when they first suspected defendants
of misappropriating trade secrets.
We reject plaintiffs’ claims that admissions made during
their depositions are taken “out of context” and do not establish
that they suspected collusion among all the defendants.
Plaintiffs cite, for example, Smith’s testimony that upon receiving
Binns’s January 2014 resignation letter he suspected collusion
only between Binns and Korn Ferry. That testimony is
contradicted, however, by Smith’s admission that in January
12
2014 he suspected Binns of conspiring with Lockheed and Korn
Ferry to take advantage of plaintiffs. We are not persuaded that
Costin’s admission that he “wanted to sue” Lockheed in January
2014 merely expressed his frustration at Lockheed’s rejection of
Sky Lift’s financing proposals and is not evidence that he
suspected Lockheed of breaching contractual obligations. There
is ample unambiguous and uncontradicted evidence that Costin
actually suspected defendants of conspiring to use plaintiffs’
confidential information and that this suspicion fueled his desire
to sue Lockheed in January 2014.
Plaintiffs’ contention that they have separate claims
against each defendant, with separate and distinct limitations
periods, is unavailing because their misappropriation claims
against all three defendants are based on the same facts—alleged
“collusion” among defendants to misappropriate plaintiffs’
confidential information. The three-year statutory period
therefore commenced at the same time for all three defendants—
as early as 2014 and no later than January 2015. (Cadence,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 223 [misappropriation claim against a
given defendant arises only once, at time of initial
misappropriation].)
Plaintiffs claim that they had no reason to suspect
misappropriation in January 2015 because Lockheed continued to
work with them thereafter is unsupported by the record. The
undisputed evidence shows that Lockheed informed plaintiffs on
January 2, 2015, that it saw no opportunity for them to work on
the hybrid airship program apart from a possible collaboration
with Hybrid. Plaintiffs admit they never attempted to
collaborate with Hybrid. Costin testified that by January 3,
2015, he believed “[i]t was a lie on the part of [Lockheed] and
13
Binns” that Sky Lift or Millennium would be involved in
Lockheed’s hybrid airship program.
Plaintiffs contend they had no reason to suspect any
misappropriation that caused them injury until Lockheed
publicly announced its exclusive reseller agreement with Hybrid
in June 2016. They cite no authority, however, to support
distinguishing between misappropriation and injury for purposes
of the statute of limitations. Under California law, the statute of
limitations begins to run “‘“when, under the substantive law, the
wrongful act is done.”’” (Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior
Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 575, 585.) Under the CUTSA, the
wrongful act is the misappropriation of trade secrets. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs’ claim that they did not suspect they had been injured
by the alleged misappropriation until June 2016 is also
contradicted by their own admissions. Costin testified in
deposition that he believed in December 2014 that Binns and
Lockheed had “sabotaged” plaintiffs so that Lockheed, Binns, and
Hybrid could make “hundreds of millions” by “using Millennium
and Sky Lift’s confidential information.” In January 2015, Costin
expressed his belief that Lockheed and Hybrid were attempting
to “to capitalize on our hard work by capturing the lion’s share of
the money on the sales while doing nothing to earn it.”
Plaintiffs’ argument that they had no objective “reason to
suspect” misappropriation is also unavailing given their
admissions that they actually suspected defendants of
misappropriating trade secrets as early as 2014 and no later than
January 2015. Under California law, Costin’s and Smith’s
subjective belief that defendants were misappropriating trade
secrets triggered the three-year statute of limitations under the
CUTSA. (Kitzig, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.) The trial
14
court did not err by concluding that plaintiffs’ claims under the
CUTSA are time-barred.
B. Plaintiffs’ contract claims are barred by the
four-year statute of limitations
Plaintiffs do not dispute that their causes of action against
Lockheed for breach of the 2012 and 2013 PIA’s and for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are subject to
the four-year statute of limitations applicable to claims arising
under a written contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. (a);
Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d
205, 220.)
Lockheed met its initial burden of showing that plaintiffs
discovered their breach of contract claims as early as 2013 and no
later than January 2014, more than four years before they
commenced this action. The undisputed evidence shows that
Smith suspected Lockheed and Binns of conspiring to use
plaintiffs’ confidential information as early as October 2013.
Smith’s suspicions “only increased” through the remainder of
2013 and into January 2014. Smith admitted that upon receiving
Binns’s resignation letter in January 2014, he “felt there was
collusion taking place” to use Sky Lift’s confidential information,
prompting him to send a cease-and-desist letter to Binns. Costin
testified that in January 2014, he suspected Binns had become a
“turncoat” by trying to work directly with Lockheed. Costin
further testified that when Lockheed informed him in January
2014 that a deal with Sky Lift would not go forward, he “wanted
to sue” Lockheed.
Plaintiffs fail to raise any triable issue as to when the
applicable four-year limitations period began to run. Their claim
that suspicion of Binns in January 2014 is not evidence that they
15
suspected Lockheed of breaching the 2012 and 2013 PIA’s is
contradicted by allegations in their complaint that Lockheed and
Binns conspired to misappropriate confidential information, by
Smith’s admission that he believed Lockheed and Binns were
colluding in January 2014 to use Sky Lift’s confidential
information, and by Costin’s admission that he wanted to sue
Lockheed in January 2014. As the trial court noted in its written
ruling, plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy among the defendants
are the basis for all of their claims, including the breach of
contract claims.
Plaintiffs’ arguments that Sky Lift continued to attempt to
work with Lockheed on the hybrid airship project during the
spring and summer of 2014, and that plaintiffs did not learn of
Hybrid’s exclusive reseller agreement with Lockheed until
December 2014 does not place into dispute any of the material
facts regarding plaintiffs’ suspicions in January 2014 of
Lockheed’s alleged wrongdoing. It is these suspicions of
wrongdoing that triggered the statute of limitations. (Kitzig,
supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.)
The trial court did not err by summarily adjudicating
plaintiffs’ contract claims.
C. Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim is
barred under either a three-year or four-year
statute of limitations
The trial court ruled that the three-year limitations period
prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision
(d)3 applies to plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
3 Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) imposes
a three-year statute of limitations on “[a]n action for relief on the
16
against Binns because the gravamen of that cause of action is
alleged acts of fraud. Plaintiffs contend the four-year limitations
period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 3434 applies
because their breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on Binns’s
failure to perform his fiduciary obligations as Sky Lift’s CEO and
on “traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty” owed by an agent or
employee to his employer.
We agree with the trial court’s determination that the
three-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
section 338, subdivision (d) applies. A review of the fourth
amended complaint confirms that the gravamen of plaintiffs’
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is fraud, and not Binns’s
failure to perform his duties as Sky Lift’s CEO. (Larson v. UHS
of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 347 [courts
must focus on the gravamen of the claim when determining
which limitations period applies].) Plaintiffs allege in their
fourth amended complaint: “[U]nbeknownst to Millennium and
Sky Lift, Binns was hand selected by Lockheed because it was
Lockheed’s plan at the time that Binns would only temporarily
serve as a ‘straw man’ CEO of Sky Lift until Lockheed’s
agreement with Sky Lift expired and then Binns would become
CEO of the Lockheed-funded new entity (which ultimately
became Hybrid Enterprises). [P]lacing Binns as a temporary
CEO of Sky Lift was also all in furtherance of continuing to lead
ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is
not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved
party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.”
4 Code of Civil Procedure section 343 states: “An action for
relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”
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Plaintiffs to believe that their involvement in the project was real
when the true intent was to prevent Plaintiffs from pursuing
opportunities with Lockheed’s competitors.” Plaintiffs further
allege that after the initial October 2013 meeting among
Lockheed, Smith, and Binns, “there were a series of emails
between Lockheed and Binns, the full content of which was
intentionally kept from Sky Lift’s founders, Smith and Costin”;
Binns became “disengaged” from Sky Lift and “unconcerned”
about Lockheed’s refusal to accept Sky Lift’s proposals, and
“began to have several calls with Lockheed without the
knowledge of Smith and Costin”; and immediately after resigning
from Sky Lift, Binns, at Lockheed’s direction, started Hybrid and
began discussions with Lockheed for Hybrid to become the
exclusive worldwide seller of Lockheed’s hybrid airships and for
Lockheed to abandon all negotiations with Sky Lift. The breach
of fiduciary duty claim against Binns is premised on an alleged
conspiracy with Lockheed to mislead plaintiffs and to install
Hybrid as Lockheed’s exclusive seller of hybrid airships.
Whether a three-year or four-year limitations period
applies, however, is not determinative, as plaintiffs’ breach of
fiduciary duty claim is untimely under either the three-year or
four-year statute of limitations. The undisputed evidence shows
that plaintiffs actually suspected malfeasance by Binns no later
than January 2014. Smith testified that he had “suspicions”
about Binns’s interactions with Lockheed in October 2013, and
that those suspicions “only increased” throughout 2013 and into
January 2014. Costin testified that when Binns informed
plaintiffs in January 2014 that he had no continuing obligations
under the Sky Lift confidentiality agreement, Costin suspected
Binns had become a “turncoat” and was going to work with
18
Lockheed directly. Smith admitted that upon receiving Binns’s
resignation letter in January 2014, he believed Binns and
Lockheed were colluding to use Sky Lift’s confidential
information.
Plaintiffs cite Binns’s assurances in his resignation letter
that he did not plan to share any of Sky Lift’s confidential
information with Lockheed or other third parties as evidence that
they had no reason to believe Binns had breached fiduciary
duties in January 2014. They argue that a jury could reasonably
conclude plaintiffs did not discover Binns’s breach of duty until
February 2014, when Binns submitted a detailed business plan to
Lockheed that purportedly incorporated Sky Lift’s confidential
information, or until June 2015, when Lockheed publicly
announced its exclusive reseller arrangement with Hybrid. The
evidence cited by plaintiffs neither negates nor controverts their
admissions that by January 2014 they actually suspected Binns
of providing Sky Lift’s proprietary information to Lockheed for
his own benefit. Plaintiffs’ actual suspicion of Binns triggered
the applicable limitations period. (Kitzig, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1391.) They raise no triable issue as to when the applicable
statutory period began to run.
Because plaintiffs did not commence this action until
February 2018, more than four years after discovering Binns’s
alleged breach of his duties, their breach of fiduciary duty claim
is barred under either the three-year or four-year statute of
limitations. The trial court accordingly did not err by summarily
adjudicating that claim.
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IV. Demurrer ruling
A. No forfeiture
Defendants incorrectly contend plaintiffs forfeited any
challenge to the June 28, 2019 ruling sustaining, without leave to
amend, demurrers to plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, civil conspiracy,
violation of the UCL, and interference with prospective economic
advantage by withdrawing their motion to reconsider the
demurrer ruling and by filing a fourth amended complaint that
omitted those claims. “The rule that a choice to amend waives
any error can reasonably be applied only on a cause-of-action-by-
cause-of-action basis. If a plaintiff chooses not to amend one
cause of action but files an amended complaint containing the
remaining causes of action or amended versions of the remaining
causes of action, no waiver occurs and the plaintiff may challenge
the intermediate ruling on the demurrer on an appeal from a
subsequent judgment. . . . [¶] Code of Civil Procedure section
472c confirms this analysis. ‘The following orders shall be
deemed open on appeal where an amended pleading is filed after
the court’s order: [¶] (1) An order sustaining a demurrer to a
cause of action within a complaint or cross-complaint where the
order did not sustain the demurrer as to the entire complaint or
cross-complaint.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 472c, subd. (b).)” (County of
Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292,
312 (Santa Clara).)
Here, the trial court’s June 28, 2019 order sustaining,
without leave to amend, defendants’ demurrers to the UCL,
fraud, civil conspiracy, and interference with prospective
economic advantage causes of action but did not sustain the
demurrer as to the entire second amended complaint. The
June 28, 2019 order is therefore appealable notwithstanding
20
plaintiffs’ subsequent filing of an amended pleading omitting
those causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472c, subd. (b); Santa
Clara, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.) We therefore consider
the merits of plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court’s demurrer
ruling.
B. Standard of review
The only aspect of the June 28, 2019 demurrer ruling
challenged by plaintiffs is the trial court’s denial of leave to
amend, which we review under the abuse of discretion standard.
(Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081;
Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13,
23.) An appellant challenging an order sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend bears the burden of identifying specific
facts showing the complaint can be amended to state a viable
cause of action. (Roe, at p. 23.)
C. No abuse of discretion
Plaintiffs fail to sustain their burden of presenting specific
facts that would cure the defect identified by the trial court—that
their tort claims are preempted by the CUTSA. Plaintiffs’
assertion that they could “delete any references to the trade
secrets covered by the CUTSA cause of action” does not meet
their burden. Their claim that they can amend the complaint “to
make clear that the nucleus of the tort claims were the deception-
related, not trade secret, facts” is unsupported by any specific
facts plaintiffs would allege in place of the “trade secret facts.”
The tort claims plaintiffs seek to reassert are based on the
same constellation of facts underlying their misappropriation,
contract, and fraud claims. The reasserted tort claims are
therefore also barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
(See Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967
21
[judgment must be affirmed if any one of several grounds of a
demurrer is well taken].) Plaintiffs’ UCL cause of action is
subject to a four-year statute of limitations (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17208), the fraud and civil conspiracy limitation period is three
years (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d); Maheu v. CBS, Inc. (1998)
201 Cal.App.3d 662, 673 [statute of limitations for civil
conspiracy is determined by the underlying tort]), and a two-year
limitations period governs the interference with prospective
economic advantage claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd. (1).)
The longest of these limitation periods is four years. Undisputed
evidence presented in the summary judgment proceedings show
that plaintiffs actually suspected defendants of malfeasance
(independent of plaintiffs’ CUTSA claims) in January 2014.
Because plaintiffs did not commence this action until February
2018, more than four years after first discovering the tort claims
they now seek to reassert, those claims are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their
costs on appeal.
___________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
_______________________________ ___________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.
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