CourtListener 10013195•People v. Ayala CA4/3
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Filed 7/24/24 P. v. Ayala CA4/3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G059900
v. (Super. Ct. No. 09CF2225)
OIRAM ROMAN AYALA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Matthew S. Anderson, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
David M. McKinney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha
Cortina, Alan L. Amann and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Oiram Roman Ayala appeals an order summarily denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. 1 In our original
opinion, we affirmed the order on the belief the record of conviction proved
appellant was liable for murder as a direct aider and abettor. (People v.
Ayala (Mar. 16, 2022, G059900) [nonpub. opn.] (Ayala I).) However, the
Supreme Court granted review, and following its opinion in People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel), it directed us to reconsider the matter in light
of that decision. Curiel clarified the mens rea required for direct aiding and
abetting. Because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish
appellant possessed that mental state, we reverse the trial court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2006, appellant, Juan Roldan and several other
members of their gang confronted a rival outfit in a Santa Ana alleyway.
After the two groups exchanged insults and gang signs, someone in
appellant’s group yelled out, “Shoot them already,” and several shots rang out
in rapid succession.
Two of appellant’s rivals suffered fatal headshots, and a third,
Fernando Garcia, was shot in the stomach but survived. Garcia initially told
the police that Roldan was the shooter, but when investigators interviewed
him several months later, he said appellant was the one who pulled the
trigger.
Appellant and Roldan were charged with two counts of first
degree murder and one count each of attempted premeditated murder and
1
That section was originally housed in Penal Code section 1170.95, but it was
subsequently renumbered without substantive change as Penal Code section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
street terrorism. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 186.22, subd. (a).) The prosecution
also alleged a principal in the crimes intentionally discharged a firearm
causing death and great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e).) And it
alleged as special circumstances that defendants committed multiple
murders and intended to further the activities of their gang. (§ 190.2, subds.
(a)(3) & (a)(22).)
It took the state two trials to win a conviction. In the first trial,
the prosecution argued defendants were guilty as either the actual
perpetrators, or as direct aiders and abettors, but the jury was unable to
reach a verdict. In the second trial, the prosecution added a third theory of
culpability based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the
jury convicted defendants as charged. The trial court sentenced appellant to
multiple terms of life without parole on the murder counts, plus concurrent
terms on the remaining counts. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. (See
People v. Ayala (Jan. 30, 2012, G044395) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, appellant petitioned for resentencing. After appointing
appellant counsel and considering the record of conviction, the trial court
determined appellant was ineligible for resentencing because in finding the
special circumstance allegations true, the jury necessarily determined he
acted with the intent to kill. Therefore, it denied appellant’s petition for
failing to present a prima facie case for relief.
DISCUSSION
As noted at the outset, our analysis in this case is guided by the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Curiel, which made it clear that the
intent to kill, standing alone, is insufficient to defeat a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. Curiel also elucidated the requirements
for imposing murder liability on the theory of direct aiding and abetting. In
3
light of that decision, we conclude the trial court erred in denying appellant’s
petition at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
Appellant’s claim for resentencing is grounded in Senate Bill No.
1437 (SB 1437), which narrowed the scope of vicarious liability for the crime
of murder in California. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-4.) As relevant here, SB
1437 eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory for that
offense by providing that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
SB 1437 also led to the enactment of section 1172.6 , which is the
procedural mechanism for challenging a murder conviction based on vicarious
liability. To obtain relief under that section, the defendant must show 1) he
was prosecuted for murder on a theory under which malice was imputed to
him based solely on his participation in a crime, 2) he was convicted of
murder, and 3) and he would not be liable for murder today because of how
SB 1437 redefined that offense. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute applies in
an analogous manner to defendants who were convicted of attempted murder
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Ibid.)
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing for relief, the trial
court is required to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary
hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) At the hearing, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is ineligible for resentencing
because his conduct did in fact rise to the level of murder or attempted
murder as redefined by SB 1437. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Otherwise, the
defendant is entitled to vacatur and resentencing per the terms of section
1172.6.
In People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, our Supreme Court
ruled the bar for establishing a prima facie case for resentencing is very low,
4
and the trial court’s role in determining whether that bar has been cleared in
a given case is quite limited. (Id. at pp. 970-972.) While the trial court may
consider the underlying record of conviction, judicial factfinding is not
allowed. (Ibid.) Unless the record of conviction proves the defendant is
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law, the court must issue an order to
show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing on his entitlement to relief.
(Id. at p. 971, accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
The Supreme Court’s Curiel decision provides further guidance
on the resentencing process. As relevant here, the court held a jury’s finding
the defendant acted with the intent to kill does not foreclose resentencing
under section 1172.6. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 460-463.) Rather, the
record of conviction must establish the jury made all of the findings necessary
to support a conviction for murder or attempted murder under current law.
(Id. at pp. 463-471.) This requires proof the jury found the defendant
harbored the necessary intent and he committed the necessary act or acts to
be guilty under a presently valid theory of liability. (Ibid.)
At appellant’s trial, the prosecutor argued appellant was guilty of
first degree premeditated murder and attempted premeditated murder for
personally firing the shots that killed and injured the victims. That was a
plausible theory since the surviving victim Fernando Garcia identified
appellant as the shooter. However, the prosecutor did not attempt to sell this
theory very hard. In fact, because Garcia initially identified Roldan as the
shooter, the prosecutor told the jury she believed Roldan was the actual
gunman. Nevertheless, she argued that even if that was the case, appellant
was still liable for murder and attempted murder because 1) he directly aided
and abetted Roldan in carrying out the shooting, and/or 2) those crimes were
5
a natural and probable consequence of the targeted crime of disturbing the
peace that appellant aided and abetted.
Consistent with the prosecutor’s theories, the trial court
instructed the jury on first degree premeditated murder, attempted
premeditated murder, direct aiding and abetting, and the natural and
probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting. In addition, the jurors
were instructed per CALJIC No. 8.80.1 that if they found appellant guilty of
first degree murder, they had to determine whether the special circumstance
allegations were true. Under that instruction, if the jurors did not believe
appellant was the actual killer, they could only find the special circumstance
allegations true if appellant possessed the intent to kill, and he “aided,
abetted or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder in the first
degree.”2
Thus, by finding appellant guilty of special circumstances
murder, the jury determined, at a minimum, he harbored the intent to kill,
and he aided, abetted or assisted another in committing first degree murder.
The question we must decide is whether those findings satisfy all of the
requirements for a currently valid theory of murder. More particularly, we
must ascertain whether those findings prove appellant could still be
convicted of murder on the theory of direct aiding and abetting, which would
disqualify him for resentencing as a matter of law. (See Curiel, supra, 15
2
The instruction was worded as follows: “Unless an intent to kill is an element of a
special circumstance, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually
killed a human being, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the
special circumstance true. [¶] If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human
being, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider and
abettor, you cannot find the special circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted or
assisted any actor in the commission of the murder in the first degree.” (CALJIC No. 8.80.1.)
6
Cal.5th at p. 462 [despite the passage of SB 1437, direct aiding and abetting
remains a valid theory of murder under California law].)
In our previous opinion in this case, we answered that question
in the affirmative. We determined that even if the jury did not convict
appellant as the actual killer, its true finding on the gang special
circumstance allegation proved not only that he intended to kill, but that he
also directly aided and abetted the actual killer, so as to render him ineligible
for resentencing. In so doing, we interpreted the phrase “aided, abetted or
assisted” the commission of first degree murder in CALJIC No. 8.80.1 to
encompass all of the elements of direct aiding and abetting. (Ayala I, supra,
G059900, at pp. 9-10.) The Attorney General relies on that interpretation in
urging us to again affirm the denial of appellant’s petition. He contends an
affirmance is required because the jury found all of the elements needed to
convict appellant of murder under current law as a direct aider and abettor.
However, as Curiel makes clear, a finding of aiding, abetting or
assisting, without more, does not conclusively establish direct aiding and
abetting. Indeed, Curiel ruled that to be liable for directly aiding and
abetting the crime of murder, the defendant must not only possess the intent
to kill, he must also aid “‘the commission of that offense with “knowledge of
the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends.”’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.
463.) In other words, the necessary mental state consists of both “intent and
knowledge.” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 579 (Lopez).)
7
The Attorney General correctly notes that the jury’s instruction
on aiding and abetting contained both of those requirements.3 Thus, if
CALJIC No. 8.80.1 had been worded to require the jury to find that appellant
intended to kill and that he “aided and abetted” first degree murder, then it
would be reasonable to conclude it found all of the requirements for direct
aiding and abetting.
However, CALJIC No. 8.80.1 was not worded in that fashion. It
did require proof that appellant harbored the intent to kill. But as far as
appellant’s actions were concerned, it merely required proof that he “aided,
abetted or assisted” the commission of first degree murder. Thus, the jury
could have convicted appellant of special circumstances murder simply
because, acting with the intent to kill, he “assisted” another person in
committing first degree murder.
Even when an accomplice harbors malice, assisting is not the
same as aiding and abetting, as that term was defined in Curiel, and as it
was defined for the jury in this case. Although the language in CALJIC No.
8.80.1 “evokes similar concepts, it does not cover all of the elements of direct
aiding and abetting.” (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 587.) As a matter of
fact, CALJIC No. 8.80.1 “falls far short of explaining these principles to the
jury.” (Id. at p. 588; see also Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 464-465 [using
the Lopez decision as a frame of reference for its analysis of the record of
conviction presented in that case].)
3
Per CALJIC No. 3.01, the jury was instructed: “A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and [¶] (2) With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the
commission of the crime.”
8
Because CALJIC No. 8.80.1 did not require the jury to find
appellant knew of the perpetrator’s unlawful intent to commit murder and
knowingly assisted him in achieving that unlawful objective, its true finding
on the gang special circumstance allegation is insufficient to disqualify him
for resentencing relief. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying his petition
at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp.
470-471.)
DISPOSITION
Our prior decision in Ayala I is vacated, and the trial court’s
order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is
remanded for the issuance of an order to show cause and an evidentiary
hearing on appellant’s entitlement to relief as provided in section 1172.6,
subdivisions (c) and (d).
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
GOODING, J.
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