CourtListener 10010849•People v. Johnson CA2/3
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Filed 7/22/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B331851
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA080471)
v.
ANTHONY JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant Anthony Johnson was convicted
of attempted first degree murder in 2005. Johnson now appeals
from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1170.95.1 The trial court concluded Johnson did not
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing because
the jury’s verdict conclusively established he was the actual
shooter and acted with express malice aforethought. Johnson
contends the trial court erred because he may have been able to
present new evidence demonstrating that he was not the actual
shooter and that he did not act with intent to kill. We affirm the
order denying Johnson’s petition for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying offense
We take our statement of the facts underlying Johnson’s
crime from the Court of Appeal opinion affirming the judgment of
conviction. (People v. Johnson (Oct. 25, 2006, B187545) [nonpub.
opn.] (Johnson).)2
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the law as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this
opinion.
2 We refer to the Court of Appeal opinion only “for
background purposes and to provide context for the parties’
arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978,
2
“1. Prosecution evidence
“On the night of July 17, 2005, [fn. omitted] Lace O. was at
home when there was a knock on the front door. When Lace
opened it, she saw defendant Johnson and Joseph Boyd standing
on her doorstep. She knew both men well because she had grown
up with them.
“Boyd asked about Lace’s brother. Lace thought this was
odd because her brother had been gone for a year and a half.
While they were talking, John Martinez walked up. Lace was
also well-acquainted with Martinez. Lace spoke to Boyd for less
than a minute. Johnson did not say anything, but he suddenly
pulled a handgun from his pocket and pointed it at Lace. Lace
turned and ran. Johnson fired five shots, hitting Lace twice. She
fell to the floor and pretended to be dead. The three men fled.”3
Lace O. survived her injuries.
The underlying proceedings
The People charged Johnson with one count of attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)). The information also alleged that Johnson personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)).
In 2005, a jury convicted Johnson of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder and found true the three
firearm allegations. The trial court sentenced Johnson to
fn. 2.) We do not rely on the facts in the opinion to review the
trial court’s determination of Johnson’s eligibility for
resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 988.)
3 In the defense’s case at trial, Johnson called an alibi
witness who testified that she and Johnson were out of town
together on the day of the shooting. (Johnson, supra, B187545.)
3
consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole on the
attempted murder count and 25 years to life on the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court
stayed the sentences on the remaining firearm enhancements.
Resentencing proceedings
In November 2021, Johnson filed a habeas petition
requesting that the trial court resentence him under
section 1172.6. The trial court denied Johnson’s petition for
failing to make a prima facie case of eligibility.4 The trial court
stated that “[a] review of the jury instructions confirms that the
trial court did not give aiding and abetting instructions. In fact,
it instructed only on one theory of attempted murder – ‘express
malice aforethought,’ which the court defined as ‘a specific intent
to kill unlawfully another human being.’ (CALJIC 8.66.)” The
court concluded that the jury “undoubtedly convicted” Johnson of
attempted murder as the actual shooter under a theory of express
malice.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bills Nos. 1437 and 775 and Section 1172.6
In 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
4 In 2022, Johnson filed a second petition for resentencing of
his attempted murder conviction. The trial court found that it
had already denied this request in Johnson’s first petition for
resentencing, even though that petition predated the effective
date of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). The court
made the same findings on Johnson’s second petition as it had on
his first petition.
4
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707–708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
(Gentile).) The bill amended section 188 by adding the
requirement that, except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e),
“in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Senate Bill No. 775 expanded Senate Bill
No. 1437’s mandate, in part, by eliminating the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of attempted murder. (Senate Bill No. 775, § 1; § 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
Senate Bills Nos. 1437 and 775 created the section 1172.6
procedure, which provides resentencing relief to persons
convicted of qualifying offenses under the former law who could
no longer be convicted of those offenses under amended
section 188. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) After the filing of a petition and briefing by
the parties, the court must “hold a hearing to determine whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. If
the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall
provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
5
II. Prima Facie Stage and Standard of Review
At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) “While the trial court may look at the record
of conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief,” courts may not
engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 971, 972.) Rather,
“[t]he record should be consulted at the prima facie stage only to
determine ‘readily ascertainable facts,’ such as the crime of
conviction and findings on enhancements.” (People v. Duchine
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 (Ervin).) The court may make credibility
determinations adverse to a petitioner only if the record of
conviction “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition . . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
As relevant here, a petitioner fails to make a prima facie
showing for relief “if the record of conviction conclusively
establishes . . . that . . . the petitioner acted with malice
aforethought that was not imputed based solely on participation
in a crime.” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) The
trial court’s denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie
stage “ ‘is a purely legal conclusion,’ ” which appellate courts
review de novo. (Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)
III. The Record of Conviction Conclusively Establishes
Johnson is Ineligible for Relief
Johnson contends the trial court erred in denying his
petition at the prima facie stage. We disagree.
6
The jury’s verdict conclusively establishes that it found
Johnson harbored express malice as the actual shooter. Johnson
does not dispute that the trial court instructed the jury solely on
the theory that it had to find Johnson acted with express malice
aforethought, or the specific intent to kill, to convict him of
attempted murder.5 (CALJIC No. 8.66; People v. Lee (2003) 31
Cal.4th 613, 623 [“Attempted murder requires the specific intent
to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing”].) Additionally, the jury
found that Johnson acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation in the commission of the attempted murder,
meaning the jury necessarily found Johnson acted with express
malice. (See People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 891, 910 [a
verdict of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
“necessarily rested on a jury finding that appellant acted with
express malice”].) By convicting Johnson of attempted first
degree murder and finding that he personally and intentionally
used a firearm causing bodily injury, the jury’s verdict
unambiguously found Johnson guilty of attempted murder as the
actual shooter personally harboring the specific intent to kill.
Johnson does not argue that the jury instructions were
erroneous or otherwise dispute that the record of conviction
excludes the possibility that the jury convicted him of first degree
attempted murder under an invalid theory. Instead, he contends
that, at an evidentiary hearing, he may have been able to present
new evidence that would show he was not the actual shooter—
5 Although no jury instructions were submitted as part of the
record on appeal, neither party disputes the trial court’s
characterization of the jury instructions in its order denying
Johnson’s petition.
7
based on a purported misidentification by the victim—or that he
“lacked a culpable mental state.”
These arguments fundamentally misunderstand the scope
of section 1172.6.6 Section 1172.6 does not afford a petitioner an
opportunity to establish that, given the chance to present new
evidence, he might be able to undermine the factual basis for a
conviction that is otherwise legally valid under the amended law.
Instead, the law is limited to providing relief only to those
individuals who could no longer be convicted of murder because of
the changes to the malice requirement reflected in amended
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1158, 1166 [petitioner failed to show he could not be convicted
today “ ‘because of’ ” changes to malice requirement in § 188 and
§ 189], review granted May 1, 2024, S284232; People v. Daniel
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 678 [rejecting claim that evidentiary
hearing was required to allow petitioner to present new evidence
that might undermine finding he was the actual killer].) Johnson
has advanced no theory that would bring his contentions within
the scope of section 1172.6.
Indeed, as our high court has explained, section 1172.6
“strongly suggests” the Legislature intended trial courts to
consider “many, and perhaps most,” prior jury findings on
resentencing, whether adverse or favorable to a defendant.
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715; cf. People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433, 465 [a court giving effect to preclusive jury findings
does not engage in factfinding].) The statute does not reflect a
6 Because we address the merits of Johnson’s argument, we
need not resolve whether he forfeited the issues he asserts on
appeal by failing to raise them at the hearing on his petition, or
whether this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
8
legislative intent “to permit wholesale relitigation of findings
supporting murder convictions” in resentencing proceedings.
(Strong, at p. 715; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549
[“[A] section [1172.6] petition is not a means by which a
[petitioner] can relitigate issues already decided”].) The trial
court therefore properly gave effect to the jury’s findings that
Johnson was the actual shooter, and acted with specific intent to
kill, to conclude he did not establish a prima facie case for relief.
Johnson cites the Lewis decision’s reliance on People v.
Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 (Drayton), a habeas case, to
argue that the trial court should have evaluated his prima facie
case “notwithstanding” factual issues resolved against him by the
jury. Johnson misinterprets the case law. The Lewis court cited
Drayton for the proposition that courts must take a petitioner’s
factual allegations as true at the prima facie stage. But the
Lewis court also adopted from Drayton the qualifier that when
the record of conviction “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971, citing Drayton, at p. 979.)
Lewis therefore confirms that the trial court may find a petition’s
allegations not credible at the prima facie stage when facts
conclusively established by the record of conviction contradict
those allegations.
Here, the jury’s verdict conclusively established that the
jury found Johnson was the actual shooter and that he acted with
the specific intent to kill. The trial court properly gave effect to
these findings to conclude Johnson failed to establish prima facie
eligibility for resentencing relief.
9
IV. Johnson Has Not Established a Violation of His
Constitutional Rights
Finally, Johnson argues that the trial court’s denial of his
petition at the prima facie stage violated his federal and state
rights to equal protection and due process, and federal and state
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. These
arguments are unavailing.
A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if
undisputed facts contained in the record of conviction do not
demonstrate the petitioner’s ineligibility for relief as a matter of
law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–
972.) In this case, the record of conviction conclusively
establishes Johnson is ineligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6. Therefore, he is not similarly situated to other
petitioners who are entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the
statute. (People v. Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1565
[“only those persons who are similarly situated are protected
from invidiously disparate treatment” under equal protection
clause].) Johnson states no other basis for his argument that the
denial of his petition violated his substantive due process rights
or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Additionally, Johnson’s only procedural due process
argument is that the trial court unlawfully deprived him of his
liberty interest in resentencing relief by erroneously denying his
petition before a hearing. As explained above, we find no error in
the trial court’s conclusion that Johnson failed to make the
requisite prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing.
Johnson does not challenge the constitutionality of the
procedures in section 1172.6 or state any other basis for his
procedural due process claim.
10
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
BERSHON, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
11
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