People v. Love CA2/7

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Filed 7/22/24 P. v. Love CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B331532

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA026047-02)
v.

JOHN W. LOVE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________
John W. Love appeals from an order denying his petition
for resentencing under Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6).1 In 1994, Love was convicted of second degree
murder. The jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences or felony murder doctrines. Love argues, however,
the aiding and abetting jury instruction combined with the
second degree implied malice murder instruction permitted the
jury to find him guilty of second degree murder under a theory of
imputed malice based solely on his participation in the crime.
We conclude the record of conviction does not refute Love’s
prima facie case for relief as a matter of law. We reverse and
direct the superior court to vacate its order denying the petition,
issue an order to show cause, and conduct further proceedings in
accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Crime2

One evening in June 1993, Earl “Little Bleep” Dodson
approached Gabriel Cuevas on the street and tried to rob him at

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We describe facts from our previous appellate opinion
(People v. Love (Feb. 19, 1997, B089161) [nonpub. opn.]) only to
provide context for our analysis of whether the jury instructions
foreclose the existence of a prima facie case. (See People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [courts may not consider factual
summary in appellate opinion to determine eligibility at prima
facie stage]; cf. § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [facts set forth in appellate
opinions may not be considered during the evidentiary hearing
occurring after a prima facie case has been found].)

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gunpoint. Cuevas shot Dodson and then went home and called
the police. Dodson died later that night.
The next evening, two young men knocked on the door of
the front house on 105th Street in Los Angeles, where Patricia
and Raul Reyes lived. Cuevas had lived in a trailer behind the
Reyes’s home. One of the men said something to Ms. Reyes in
English as she stood at her closed screen door, and she told them
that she did not speak English. The men walked to the front
gate, and one of them started shooting at the front door.
Mr. Reyes walked up to the door as the shooting started and was
fatally shot in the head.

B. A Jury Convicts Love of Second Degree Murder

The People charged Love and his codefendant Antione
Pope3 with the willful murder with malice aforethought of Raul
Reyes. (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1.) The People alleged Pope
personally used a firearm in the murder. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
The People alleged Love was a principal and was armed with a
firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The information alleged, under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), that Love had a prior serious
felony conviction for first degree residential burglary. Love
pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.
At trial, the prosecution proceeded on the theory that Pope
was guilty of murder with malice aforethought as the direct

3 Although we spelled Pope’s first name Antoine in our prior
opinion in Love’s direct appeal (People v. Love, supra, B089161),
the information spelled it Antione, so we adopt that spelling
here.

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perpetrator, and that Love was guilty of murder as an aider and
abettor who intended to facilitate the murder.
In July 1994, a jury found both defendants guilty. The jury
convicted Love of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1)
and found true the allegation that he was a principal armed with
a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found Pope guilty
of second degree murder, and found true the allegation that he
personally used a firearm in the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Love had waived his right to a jury trial as to the
enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)). At a bench trial, the court found the enhancement
to be true.
Love was sentenced to 15 years to life on the murder count,
plus five years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)(1)), and five years for the prior serious felony conviction
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). In 1997, this court affirmed
the judgment. (People v. Love, supra, B089161.)

C. The Superior Court Denies Love’s Petition under
Section 1172.6

In April 2022, Love, representing himself, filed a petition
for resentencing under former section 1170.95. Checking boxes
on a form petition, Love requested counsel and alleged that
(1) the People filed an information that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in the crime; (2) he was convicted of
murder following a trial; and (3) he could not now be convicted of
murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189.

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The superior court appointed counsel and ordered briefing.
In their response, the People argued Love was not entitled to
relief because the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
of liability that imputed malice to Love. Love, then represented
by counsel, filed a reply.
In June 2023, the trial court held a hearing on whether
Love had established a prima facie case for relief. Love was not
present at the hearing, but his counsel was, who noted Love was
not present because he was in state prison. Neither the People
nor Love’s counsel made any argument beyond what was in the
briefs.
The trial court found Love was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. Love timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6

Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984) and significantly narrowed the scope
of the felony-murder rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449; People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis)). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on one’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). Section 189 requires the People to prove that the

5
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an aider and
abettor to murder who had the intent to kill (§ 189, subd. (e)(2));
or a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with reckless indifference
to human life as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d).
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448; People v. Wilson (2023)
14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Strong, at p. 708.)
With these changes, the Legislature also provided in
section 1172.6 a procedure for “[a] person convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or manslaughter” to petition the superior court to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts if they could not now be convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter because of the changes to sections 188
and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) [extending Senate Bill No. 1437’s ameliorative
changes and procedure for potential relief to individuals
convicted of attempted murder, manslaughter, or murder under a
theory in which malice is imputed].)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner, if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(b)(3); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.) The
prosecutor must file a response to the petition and the court must
hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the petitioner has made the required

6
showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971; see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The
court may consider the record of conviction, which will
“necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at
p. 971; see Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any part of the
record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; see
People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘“[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’”’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52.) “We review de novo whether the trial court conducted a
proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).” (People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)

7
B. The Trial Court Erred in Denying the Petition at the
Prima Facie Stage

Love argues the aiding and abetting instruction (CALJIC
No. 3.01) combined with the second degree implied malice
murder instruction (CALJIC No. 8.31) permitted the jury to find
him guilty of second degree murder without finding he personally
harbored the mental state of implied malice. We agree.

1. Love made a prima facie case for relief

Love made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6. He stated in his petition for resentencing
that the People filed an information that allowed the prosecution
to proceed under a theory in which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in the crime, that he
was convicted of murder following a trial, and that he could not
now be convicted of murder because of changes to sections 188
and 189, effective January 1, 2019. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-
(3).) We accept these allegations as true, unless the record of
conviction establishes Love is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)

2. The trial court instructed the jury on aiding
and abetting and implied malice second degree
murder

The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of
second degree murder: (1) unpremeditated murder with the
intent to kill (express malice murder) using CALJIC No. 8.30,

8
and (2) implied malice murder using CALJIC No. 8.31. Under
CALJIC No. 8.30, the court instructed the jury on express malice
murder as follows: “Murder of the second degree is [also] the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when
there is manifested an intention to kill a human being but the
evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and
premeditation.”
Relevant here, under CALJIC No. 8.31, the court instructed
the jury on implied malice murder as follows: “Murder of the
second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human being
when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶]
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human
life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an
act, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that
his act would result in the death of a human being.”
Under CALJIC No. 3.01, the court instructed the jury on
aiding and abetting liability, in part, as follows: “A person aids
and abets the commission of a crime when he [¶] (1) with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶]
(2) with the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime, by act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the
crime. . . . [¶] Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does
not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to
aiding and abetting.”

9
3. The jury instructions were ambiguous and
allowed the jury to convict Love of second degree
murder without finding Love acted with the
mental state of implied malice

The jury instructions here were ambiguous as to the
mental state required to convict Love of implied malice
second degree murder. Although CALJIC No. 3.01 required Love
intend to aid and abet a “crime,” it did not specify that crime was
murder. Nor did it instruct the jury that the aider and abettor
must personally harbor the mental state of implied malice to be
convicted of second degree murder.
Where, as here, the petitioner is only charged with murder,
the “crime” could clearly reference “murder.” But CALJIC
No. 8.31 states that when a killing is a direct result of an
intentional act (the “natural consequences” of which are
“dangerous to human life” and that was “deliberately performed
. . . with conscious disregard for, human life”), “it is not necessary
to establish that the [direct perpetrator] intended that his act
would result in the death of a human being.” Knowingly and
intentionally aiding and abetting murder without an intent to kill
is an awkward, counterintuitive formulation, and one a
reasonable jury would likely struggle to parse correctly. Given
that ambiguity, a jury may have replaced the instruction’s
reference to the crime with the intentional act of the perpetrator
(Pope). Under that interpretation, the instruction reads only that
the aider and abettor (Love) must knowingly and intentionally
aid and abet the commission of Pope’s intentional act, without
any requirement the accomplice personally harbored malice. The
jury instructions, therefore, do not conclusively foreclose the
existence of Love’s prima facie case.

10
4. The prosecution’s closing argument did not
clarify the mental state required to convict Love
of second degree murder

The prosecution’s closing argument did not resolve the
ambiguity in the jury instructions. In closing, the prosecutor
stated, “Mr. Love is just as guilty of this crime as Mr. Pope is.
Only one person pulled the trigger, but the law says, so what; an
aider and abettor is just as guilty as the person who pulls the
trigger. I want you to look at the instructions on aiding and
abetting. They are very important. And the first one is what’s
described as principals. The persons concerned in the
commission of a crime who are regarded by law as principals in
the crime thus committed and [are] equally guilty thereof include
those who directly and actively commit the act constituting the
crime. That’s Mr. Pope. Those who aid and abet the commission
of the crime. That’s Mr. Love. Mr. Love actually even rises above
the level of aiding and abetting. He may not pull the trigger, but
he is just as active in this case as anyone else.” The prosecutor
concluded, “Mr. Pope is clearly guilty of murder in the first-
degree. Mr. Love, the law says that Mr. Love stands in his shoes.
If you help somebody commit an offense, you stand in their shoes.
You are just as guilty of what they are guilty of if you aid and
abet that murder. Mr. Love is guilty, also.”
The prosecution’s closing, therefore, focused on Love’s
actions—his participation in the shooting—rather than his
intent. When discussing Love’s statement that he was present at
the victim’s house, the prosecution stated, “I don’t want you to
consider his statement for the truth of that. I just want you to
consider it for the truth of the fact he was there. He was there
with Mr. Pope and he knew what was going on.” It’s possible that

11
the jury interpreted this to mean Love knew Pope was going to
shoot and kill Reyes. But it’s also possible to interpret this to
mean Love knew he and Pope were going to Reyes’s house with
the intent to intimidate or assault him, but did not have the
necessary murderous intent.
The ultimate question is whether “‘the record . . .
“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
[section 1172.6] petition.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
Only “[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief” may the trial court
dismiss the petition. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708, italics added.) Given the ambiguous jury instructions,
which were not clarified by the prosecutor’s closing argument, we
cannot say the record conclusively establishes Love is ineligible
for relief.

5. We did not previously reject Love’s argument

The People argue that on direct appeal, this court rejected
the same argument that Love makes here—that “the instructions
permitted the jury to convict appellant of murder without making
the requisite mental state finding for aiding and abetting
liability.” We disagree. On direct appeal, this court held that
“CALJIC No. 8.31 was a correct statement of law and set forth
the elements the jury had to find to convict Pope of murder. The
aiding and abetting instructions, CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and . . . 3.01,
indicated appellant had to have the requisite intent to facilitate
or encourage the perpetrator’s criminal purpose before the jury
could find him guilty as an aider and abettor. . . . The prosecutor
argued to the jury implied malice findings applied only to the
jury’s determination of Pope’s guilt for murder and appellant’s

12
liability as an aider and abettor revolved around the criteria
given [to] the jury in the aiding and abetting instructions. Under
these circumstances, there is no likelihood the jury
misunderstood CALJIC No. 8.31.” (People v. Love, supra,
B089161.)
In other words, this court stated the jury instructions
properly set forth aider and abettor liability, which required the
jury to find Love had the intent to facilitate or encourage Pope’s
criminal purpose. But, as discussed, criminal purpose does not
necessarily equate to intent to kill. Particularly given the
Supreme Court’s guidance that prior opinions may not be
conclusive in our review at the prima facie stage, we disagree
that this court previously addressed and rejected Love’s current
argument. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 [“the probative
value of an appellate opinion is case-specific, and ‘it is certainly
correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers’”].)

6. Love could not have raised these arguments on
direct appeal

Love relies heavily on People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689, People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi), and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257
(Maldonado). Those cases addressed jury instructions similar to
the ones given here. Powell addressed instructional error on
direct appeal, while Langi and Maldonado found the petitioners
had established prima facie cases for relief under section 1172.6
because of ambiguities in the jury instructions. (Powell, at
p. 714; Langi, at pp. 982-983; Maldonado, at p. 1266.) In a
footnote, the People argue “[t]he decisions in Langi and
Maldonado were also incorrectly decided because they failed to

13
consider the language of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3)
requiring that defendants show they can no longer be convicted of
murder ‘because of changes’ made by Senate Bill 1437.” In
support, the People cite People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 921 (Berry-Vierwinden).
In Berry-Vierwinden, our colleagues in the Fourth District,
Division One, affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition
under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. The case involved
a similar instructional problem to the one presented here. The
decision relied on the requirement in section 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(3), that the petitioner must “establish that he
‘“could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.”’” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 933.)
The court concluded the alleged issue in the jury
instructions in that case could have been raised on direct appeal
under People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy). (Berry-
Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) McCoy held that
“‘“when guilt does not depend on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, . . . the aider and abettor must know and
share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.”’” (Berry-
Vierwinden, at p. 935.) Thus, any error was not created by
Senate Bill No. 1437. (Berry-Vierwinden, at pp. 935-936; see also
People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173 [“When Flores
was convicted in 2010, a provocative act murder conviction
required the defendant personally harbor malice, whether it was
the defendant or an accomplice who committed the provocative
act that caused the death”]; People v. Burns (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 862, 868 [“The Supreme Court’s McCoy decision

14
. . . made clear that the direct perpetrator’s mental state
could not be imputed to an aider and abettor, whose mental state
had to be independently evaluated”].) The Berry-Vierwinden
court disagreed with Langi and Maldonado to the extent they
“can be read to suggest that such an instructional error may be
asserted as a basis for section 1172.6 relief—even if the alleged
error could have been raised on direct appeal under then-existing
law not changed by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Berry-Vierwinden, at
p. 936.)
We agree with Berry-Vierwinden and its progeny. A
petitioner may not raise a claim on a section 1172.6 petition that
could have been raised on direct appeal. Unlike the petitioner in
Berry-Vierwinden, however, Love could not have raised his
arguments here on direct appeal. The Berry-Vierwinden court
emphasized that by the time of the defendant’s conviction, the
law was “already clear” and “unmistakable” under McCoy—the
challenged theory was “already prohibited.” (Berry-Vierwinden,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 935-936.)
But here, Love was convicted in 1994, and this court issued
the opinion affirming his conviction in 1997, several years before
McCoy made clear that “a direct aider and abettor’s ‘mental state
is her own; she is liable for her mens rea, not the other person’s.’
(McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) We are not aware of any cases that
extend the holding in Berry-Vierwinden to cases in which the
petitioner’s argument could not have been raised on direct
appeal. The infirmity in this case—the possibility of convicting
Love without a finding that he acted with implied malice—arose
at least in part “because of changes” made by Senate Bill
No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see also People v. Strong, supra,

15
13 Cal.5th at p. 712 [“[S]ection 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3)’s
‘because of’ language does not require a showing that a claim to
relief under Senate Bill 1437 arises from no other cause—only
that the 2019 changes supply a basis for the claim and so are a
cause”].)
Because the record of conviction does not conclusively
negate the possibility that the jury found Love guilty of
second degree murder without finding that he personally
harbored the mental state of implied malice, an evidentiary
hearing is required.4

4 Love also argues that he had a statutory and constitutional
right to be present at the prima facie hearing. Because we find
the court erred in denying the petition at the prima facie stage on
other grounds, we need not reach this issue.

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DISPOSITION

The order denying Love’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 is reversed. The matter is remanded, and
the superior court is directed to issue an order to show cause and
conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).

RAPHAEL, J.*

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice under article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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