People v. Avery CA2/3

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Filed 7/19/24 P. v. Avery CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B327229

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA004166)
v.

KYLE WHELAN AVERY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, John A. Torribio, Judge. Affirmed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In 1990, Kyle Whelan Avery pled guilty to attempted
residential burglary. In 2022, he filed a petition for a writ of
error coram nobis, seeking to vacate the prior judgment on the
ground that his trial counsel induced his guilty plea with faulty
advice. The trial court denied the petition. We affirm the trial
court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 1990, Avery was arrested after he was observed
forcing a screwdriver between the front doors of a residence, near
the deadbolt. The People charged Avery with one count of
attempted residential burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 664.)1 Avery
was represented by counsel. He pled guilty to the charge,
pursuant to a plea bargain. The trial court sentenced Avery to
the low term of one year.2
In August 2022, Avery filed a petition for a writ of coram
nobis to vacate the 1990 judgment.3 The petition alleges that
Avery’s trial counsel induced his guilty plea with faulty advice
regarding the strength of the People’s case. Avery contends the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2 Avery completed the one-year sentence. However, in 2001,
the People charged Avery with robbery and alleged the 1990
conviction as a strike. The 2001 information also alleged Avery
suffered a second strike in 1993. Avery indicates he is currently
serving a sentence of 35 years to life for robbery.

3 In March 2022, Avery filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The trial court denied the petition in July 2022.

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People would have been unable to prove he committed attempted
burglary, yet his counsel erroneously advised him to enter a plea.
Avery further asserts his trial attorney failed to investigate his
“childhood schizophrenia and educational handicap,” prior to
advising him to accept a plea deal.
In September 2022, the trial court denied Avery’s petition.
The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and, citing to
section 1265, subdivision (a), indicated the writ must be filed in
the appellate court. Avery timely appealed.4
DISCUSSION
I. Avery Fails to Establish Reversible Error
On appeal, Avery contends the trial court incorrectly relied
on section 1265, subdivision (a), and erred in concluding it did not
have jurisdiction to consider his petition. Although we agree that
the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Avery’s petition, we
will not reverse a trial court order merely because the decision
was given for a wrong reason. (People v. Mbaabu (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148, fn. 4 (Mbaabu).) “[W]e must affirm if the
court’s ruling was correct on any basis . . . .” (Ibid.; People v.
Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 50.) Here, we affirm the order because
the claims Avery attempted to raise in his petition do not support
the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis.
The writ of error coram nobis is a limited, non-statutory,
common law remedy. (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078,

4 In general, “the trial court’s denial of a petition for writ of
error coram nobis is an appealable order.” (People v. Allenthorp
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 679, 683, citing In re Horowitz (1949) 33 Cal.2d
534, 537; cf. People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 885, fn. 4
[reviewing court may summarily dismiss appeal if it initially
determines defendant has not made a prima facie showing of
merit].)

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1091–1092 (Kim).) To obtain coram nobis relief, “(1) Petitioner
must ‘show that some fact existed which, without any fault or
negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the trial
on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the
rendition of the judgment.’ [Citations.] (2) Petitioner must also
show that the ‘newly discovered evidence . . . [does not go] to the
merits of issues tried . . . (3) Petitioner ‘must show that the facts
upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the
exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time
substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ . . . .’
[Citations.]” (People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 230.)
Under section 1265, subdivision (a), “if a judgment has
been affirmed on appeal no motion shall be made or proceeding in
the nature of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis shall be
brought to procure the vacation of that judgment, except in the
court which affirmed the judgment on appeal. When a judgment
is affirmed by a court of appeal and a hearing is not granted by
the Supreme Court, the application for the writ shall be made to
the court of appeal.” However, if no appeal was taken from the
judgment, a writ of coram nobis may be addressed to the trial
court. (People v. E.B. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 47, 57; People v.
Wadkins (1965) 63 Cal.2d 110, 113.) In this case, there was no
appeal from the judgment, thus Avery could properly file the
petition in the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the claims Avery raised in
the petition did not provide a basis for the trial court to grant
coram nobis relief. Avery asserts his trial counsel misled him
about the law and the strength of the People’s case. He contends
counsel’s misrepresentations led him to plead guilty. Yet, it is
well established that a writ of coram nobis cannot be used to

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vacate a guilty plea based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.
(Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1093, 1095, 1104; Mbaabu, supra,
213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1145, 1147; People v. Ayala (1955) 138
Cal.App.2d 243, 245–246, 249 (Ayala).) Indeed, “ ‘[c]oram nobis
will not issue to vacate a plea of guilty on the sole ground that it
was induced by a false statement of defense counsel, even if
unwarranted and willfully false. [Citation.]’ ” (Ayala, at p. 250.)
Our high court’s decision in Kim is instructive. In that
case, the defendant challenged the validity of a prior conviction
with a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The defendant pled
guilty to crimes which, years later, triggered deportation
proceedings. (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1089–1090.) In his
petition, the defendant asserted he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his attorney failed to adequately investigate
the immigration consequences of the conviction or defend against
a plea that would result in a deportable conviction. (Id. at
p. 1089.)
Our high court explained that the defendant’s allegations
did not support issuance of a writ of error coram nobis.
“Defendant’s allegations that he would not have pleaded guilty
had he been armed with these additional facts, or that counsel
would have been successful in arranging a plea to a
nondeportable offense had these facts been known,
fundamentally misapprehends the pertinent inquiry. To qualify
as the basis for relief on coram nobis, newly discovered facts must
establish a basic flaw that would have prevented rendition of the
judgment. [Citations.] Such facts often go to the legal
competence of witnesses or litigants, or the jurisdiction of the
court. New facts that would merely have affected the willingness
of a litigant to enter a plea, or would have encouraged or

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convinced him or her to make different strategic choices or seek a
different disposition, are not facts that would have prevented
rendition of the judgment.” (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1102–
1103.)
Likewise, here, even if the facts Avery has alleged could be
deemed newly discovered, they would not provide a valid basis for
coram nobis relief. Avery’s petition asserts that he was
erroneously charged, and, if properly advised by trial counsel, he
would not have entered a plea.5 As in Kim, these are facts that
may have affected Avery’s willingness to enter a plea, or would
have encouraged him to seek a different disposition. They are
not facts that would have prevented the rendition of judgment.
There was no basis for the trial court to grant coram nobis relief.

5 Although Avery was charged with, and pled guilty to,
attempted residential burglary, his petition appears to rest on the
argument that the People would not have been able to establish
he committed burglary because there was no evidence of entry.
The petition further asserts the argument “is not being presented
as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but is nevertheless
the result of such ineffectiveness which is creating a serious
miscarriage in justice and is causing the petitioner to suffer a
current indeterminate sentence.” It thus appears that Avery is,
in fact, arguing that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused
him to plead guilty to a charge he now believes lacked merit.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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