CourtListener 10007145•People v. Jaramillo CA2/2
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Filed 7/18/24 P. v. Jaramillo CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B332970
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA357891)
v.
VINICIO MARCELO JARAMILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michael E. Pastor, Judge. Affirmed.
Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Vinicio Marcelo Jaramillo (defendant),
appeals from the order denying his petition for vacatur of his attempted
murder conviction and for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95),1 entered after an evidentiary hearing
held pursuant to subdivision (d) of that statute. Defendant contends
substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding he
directly aided and abetted the attempted murder with intent to kill.
We disagree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
2009 conviction
In 2009, a jury convicted Jaramillo of the attempted murder of
David Diaz (Diaz) and found the commission of the crime to be willful,
deliberate, and premeditated. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 1.) The jury
found true the allegation that the crime was committed for the benefit
of a gang and that a principal intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury, within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (e)(1). Defendant was also convicted
of carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him in a public place,
under former section 12031, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). Defendant
was sentenced on count 1 to life in prison plus 25 years to life for
firearm enhancements, and to a consecutive term of two years on count
2. The judgment was affirmed in People v. Jaramillo (May 31, 2011,
B221863) [nonpub. opn.].
Relevant 2009 trial evidence
Eyewitness testimony
Jessi Hernandez and Manuel Sanchez both testified to the events
they witnessed on June 8, 2009. Sanchez was driving and Hernandez
1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2
was in the back seat with her young daughter when a beige Toyota
Camry cut them off as it came out of a motel parking lot, causing
Sanchez to brake and utter an epithet. Hernandez and Sanchez both
saw four Hispanic males with shaved heads whom Hernandez said
looked like gang members. The driver turned and looked at Sanchez,
while the two backseat passengers gave them dirty looks.
After the Camry made a turn, Sanchez did the same and was
driving behind it when the Camry stopped and began backing up.
Sanchez too had to back up. When the Camry stopped about two feet in
front of Sanchez’s car, the front passenger, Henry Lona, got out with a
gun in his hand, that he pointed at the car parked at the curb trying to
come out of the parking space but was blocked by Sanchez’s car. Lona
started shooting. Hernandez told Sanchez to get the license plate
number as she held her daughter and hunkered down. Lona then got
back in the Camry that drove off and made a right on Avalon Boulevard
at a speed Hernandez described as “burning rubber.” Sanchez
described it as being at a normal speed. Hernandez then called 911.
Diaz, the driver of the targeted car, looked injured to Sanchez. The car
backed up, hit the parked vehicle behind it and drove off. The car also
made a right turn on Avalon. Hernandez gave the 911 operator the
license plate number.
When Hernandez later spoke to law enforcement, she identified
Lona as the shooter from a photographic lineup. Sanchez also
identified a photo of the Camry and a photograph of Lona.
Gang expert testimony
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officer Jesse
Drenckhahn, who was assigned to Newton Division Gang Enforcement
Division, testified as the prosecution’s expert on gang culture. He
described his education, training, and expertise in that area, as well as
his experience and contact with gang members.
Officer Drenckhahn explained that people become gang members
in different ways. One way is to be “jumped in” meaning initiated into
3
the gang with a beating by members of the gang for certain period of
time. Or the prospective member could do what is called “putting in
work” meaning to commit crimes on behalf of the gang, such as
assaulting rival gang members or committing shootings, robberies, and
other crimes. On rare occasions a prospective gang member is “courted
in” by other members due to the person’s strong association with the
gang, such as a long family lineage with the gang.
Respect is of ultimate importance to gangs and gang members.
Respect means that the gang will be feared by rivals and members of
the community, which allows them to engage in criminal activities
without being reported to the police. Gangs create fear by wearing
gang-related tattoos, vandalizing and spraying graffiti using the gang’s
name, committing violent crimes in public, displaying gang hand signs,
approaching confronting people to identify their gang to them and ask
about their gang associations.
Officer Drenckhahn explained that gangs have internal rules or
codes of conduct. Gang members commonly work as a team. Their
code requires them to back one another up, and if they do not they face
discipline by other members. A member should never have contact
with or assist law enforcement, should back one another up in
confrontations with rivals, and should actively participate in or
advance the gang in committing crimes. Discipline for rule breaking
ranges from a beating to death. Reporting to law enforcement will also
bring discipline upon rival gang members.
Officer Drenckhahn testified that the shooting on June 8, 2009,
was in the territory of the Playboys gang. Officer Drenckhahn was
acquainted with defendant, having come in contact with him in April
2009, and was of the opinion defendant, Lona and Diaz were all
members of the Playboys gang. This opinion was based upon his and
other law enforcement officers’ contact with them, as well as their
many Playboy gang related tattoos, as depicted in photographs shown
to the jury. Given a set of hypothetical facts mirroring the shooting in
4
this case, Officer Drenckhahn’s opinion was with multiple gang
members acting against one member of their own gang, it was likely to
be discipline for an offense against the gang or disrespect toward the
gang.
Investigation
Four spent bullet rounds were found in the street near the
shooting, and two damaged SUVs were parked nearby, one with a
bullet hole in the headlight and a round inside. On July 2, 2009,
Detective Douglas Bell visited Diaz’s home and observed Diaz had a
wound to his left thumb, a bullet wound to his left chest, and a graze
wound to his forehead. When Detective Bell asked Diaz about the
events of June 8, he said, “ ‘I didn’t see shit,’ ” and refused to look at
suspect photographs. Detective Bell made a later attempt to serve a
subpoena, but Diaz ran into the house, locked himself in, and
eventually escaped though the back door.
Detective Kevin Raines testified that he was a LAPD gang
investigator involved in the investigation of the shooting of Diaz on
June 8, 2009. Detective Raines checked Department of Motor Vehicles
registration records for the license number reported by a witness, and
found the Camry was registered to defendant’s mother.
On June 12, 2009, Officer Drenckhahn and his partner, Officer
Sanchez were patrolling in a marked black-and-white police car, the
general area of the shooting, within the territory of the Playboys gang.
They were aware of the June 8 shooting and had been asked to keep an
eye out for the Camry. Around 9:30 p.m., that night, they saw the
Camry parked at a curb on East 49th Street with two men and two
women standing near the trunk, drinking beer and eating pizza.
Officer Drenckhahn recognized one of them to be defendant. One of the
women was Lona’s sister Desiree Lona. The officers detained the group
for drinking and violating an injunction. Defendant asked Officer
Drenckhahn what was wrong and said the car was his mother’s. When
Officer Drenckhahn started to pat him down, defendant said he had a
5
gun in his right front pants pocket. A loaded .380 caliber
semiautomatic handgun was removed from defendant’s pocket.2 A later
search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System disclosed no
firearms registered to defendant.
Defendant’s police interview
After defendant waived his Miranda rights,3 Detective Raines
interviewed him in several sessions. Recordings of the interviews were
played for the jury, with Detective Raines explaining the meanings of
certain terms in street slang, such as: “OG,” an older gangster or older
member of the gang; “strap” and “heat,” a gun; “dumped on,” being shot
or shot at; and a “minute,” a while or longer, even up to a month or two.
Detective Raines began the interview by asking defendant if he
wanted to talk about what happened Monday at 51st Street and Avalon
Boulevard involving his mother’s car.4 Defendant claimed his mother
drove the car that day and said, “ ‘I don’t even know, sir.’ ” When
Detective Raines told defendant that one of his “homies” was shot on
51st Street and Avalon Boulevard, defendant asked, “One of my
homies?” and “He got shot?” Detective Raines told defendant witnesses
had come forward and described what happened. After lengthy,
unsuccessful attempts to persuade defendant to tell him about the
shooting, Detective Raines asked defendant his reason for being out
there, and what he said about “him and the other homies.” Defendant
said the preceding day “ ‘he was … talking shit … with our other
homies, you know, and I don’t know what happened.’ ”
2 The parties stipulated the gun was tested, compared to the
bullets found at the scene of the shooing and found not to be the
firearm that fired those bullets.
3 See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444–445.
4 We summarize only such portions of the interview (which takes
approximately 80 pages of transcript) as may be relevant to our
discussion.
6
Defendant later explained his group was going to the liquor store
and he started “talking shit” to defendant’s other homie, who got mad.
Defendant’s “ ‘other homie got out of the [Camry] and he started
talking with this fool [who was on the phone in his parked car] and
then that fool got shot, you know.’ ” Defendant claimed not to have
heard what they were talking about, just the shots. His reaction was
“What the fuck?” and “Who got shot?” He also claimed to not know why
his homie did it and that he did not back the car up after it was
stopped. Defendant admitted to knowing his homie carried a .38
handgun that defendant had seen in his pocket. When asked whether
defendant saw the .38 handgun while driving on 51st Street, defendant
said, “ ‘No, because I seen like – you know. When somebody stands up
[inintelligible.]’ ” Lona showed it to him and defendant said, “ ‘[W]hy
are you bringing that shit?’ ” Defendant resisted naming the shooter
but finally told Detective Raines that his homie was called “ ‘Little
Lazy.’ ” Defendant claimed to not know his real name, so Detective
Raines showed him a photo lineup from which defendant identified the
shooter.
Defendant’s testimony
Relevant direct examination
Defendant testified at trial through an interpreter. He claimed to
have asked for an interpreter for his interview, but Detective Raines
refused, saying he spoke English well and did not need an interpreter.
Defendant lived in this country about 13 years, having arrived when he
was 11 or 12 years old. He attended school only one year in the seventh
grade. Defendant testified he became a member of the Playboys gang
when he was beaten into the gang at the age of 15, and had been a
member for about 10 years. He chose Little Sleepy as his gang
nickname. He had been arrested several times for “ ‘tagging’ ” but had
never been in jail. He claimed not to have sold drugs, as the gang did
not require it. He also claimed never to have attempted to or murdered
anyone.
7
Defendant testified he did not know Diaz would be shot and
would not have gone along if he had known. Earlier that day,
defendant went to a hotel to visit another gang member and was
surprised to see Lona there, along with about five others, just hanging
out. After about 20 minutes Lona asked for a ride to the store and back
to buy beer. The store was about five minutes away.
On the way to the liquor store they saw Diaz park his car and
Lona told defendant to stop because he had to talk to Diaz. Defendant
claimed he backed up the car, trying to get out of the way of the cars
behind him. Lona got out, left the door half open, and defendant heard
shots. Defendant had been trying to make a call and thought someone
was shooting at them. Lona returned to the car seconds later.
Defendant heard Diaz’s car hit the car behind him, turned, and saw it
was Diaz with a hole in the windshield. Lona put his gun between his
legs and told defendant to step on it. Defendant claimed this was the
first time he saw Lona with a gun. He drove three to five minutes back
to the motel. During the drive, defendant and the other passengers
asked Lona why he had done that. Lona told them not to say anything
to anyone about what had just happened.
Defendant claimed no knowledge of Lona and Diaz having had
problems in the past. He explained Diaz was an older gangster, and
defendant used the term “talking shit’” with Detective Raines because
Diaz had been in an argument with some of the lesser gang members
two weeks before the shooting. Defendant admitted to have been there,
but claimed not to have understood the argument. He knew Lona was
a dangerous person and one of the back seat passengers was even more
dangerous and “ ‘in no way’ ” did he have any idea when Lona told him
to stop the car that Lona would try to kill Diaz.
Relevant cross-examination
When the prosecutor asked why defendant in his interview with
Detective Raines referred to Diaz as “ ‘the fool ’” and Lona as “ ‘my
homie,’ ” defendant blamed it on his poor understanding of English and
8
his nervousness in the interview. Defendant said he did not know what
he was saying.
Defendant did admit knowing the Playboys committed crimes
such as selling drugs, fighting rival gangs, tagging walls and violent
assaultive crimes, including murder, but denied ever being involved in
a shooting or engaging in any violent crimes. Defendant denied ever
having seen any Playboy gang member committing crimes, other than
tagging and selling drugs, before this one. He said he knew about the
violent crimes because he heard others talk about them, adding they
did not talk to him about them.
Defendant admitted he purchased the gun found by Officer
Drenckhahn on the street about one week earlier, from an unknown
person he met through “Dopey,” a Playboys member. Defendant said
he was going to register the gun, because he was afraid Lona would
harm him and his family. Defendant explained he was not afraid of
Lona’s sister as she was not a violent person. He did find it strange she
told him her brother was looking for him. He was stopped as he was
passing by, the group suggested they get pizza, which they did. He was
afraid but felt he was being pressured to stay. He did not think it
seemed strange until they told him to stay.
When asked about Diaz’s argument with lesser gang members,
defendant denied he understood what they were arguing about,
explaining he did not hear and did not want to get involved as it was
none of his business. He claimed not to know who started it and Lona
did not say anything about the dispute, as Lona did not know about it.
Defendant acknowledged telling Detective Raines that Diaz was
“talking shit” with others the day before and that he also told Detective
Raines Diaz was “punking the youngsters,” but then testified the
argument occurred two weeks before the shooting and claimed he did
not remember which homie got mad or who Diaz was “punking.”
Defendant testified that all but one of the people at the motel
were gang members and he knew only their nicknames. He found it
9
strange that Lona was there because defendant had never before seen
him there. When Lona asked defendant to take him to buy beer,
“Temper,” the violent one, and “Smurf” went with them. Defendant
then admitted he had seen and heard about Playboy members
committing violent crimes. He explained that before June 8 he had not
seen the violent crimes, but now he was afraid of them because he
knew they could kill.
Regarding the events surrounding the shooting, defendant
testified when he stopped the car, Lona got out, leaving the car door
half open. Defendant then heard about five or six shots. Defendant
claimed he tried to cover himself because he thought someone was
shooting at them. Defendant explained he stopped the car because
Lona said he wanted to see “ ‘what’s up this fool,’ ” meaning he wanted
to talk to him. Defendant admitted having told Detective Raines that
Lona got out of the car and started talking and explained he only
thought he was going to talk to him, but he did not. Defendant also
explained when he told Detective Raines that his “homie got out of the
car and went to shake his hand,” he had thought that was what Lona
was going to do. Defendant claimed it was after the shooting when he
saw Lona with a gun and asked, “Why are you bringing this shit?”
Defendant attributed conflicts between what he told Detective
Raines and his testimony to not being able to use an interpreter during
the police interview. At the end of the interview Detective Raines
offered to have defendant write his statement in Spanish, but
defendant wrote it in English. He explained he was nervous and “[i]t
was what I could do at that moment.”
Defendant admitted to having lied in the interview by relating
facts about his mother’s car and the shooting. He also lied when he
said, “ ‘I don’t even know who capped this fool,’ ” and when he denied
the others got back in the car. Defendant explained he did not intend
to say anything about the case because he felt intimidated and afraid
and thought Lona’s sister was in the building.
10
Petition for resentencing
In 2022, after defendant filed a petition for vacatur and
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6, the trial court issued an order
to show cause and scheduled an evidentiary hearing that was held
August 7, 2023. (See § 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).) Prior to the hearing
the parties agreed to the admission of the transcripts of defendant’s
2009 trial testimony and police interview. The trial court reviewed all
documents, heard the arguments of counsel, and denied the petition on
August 7, 2023.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of denial.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends substantial evidence did not support the trial
court’s finding of the specific intent required to convict him of
attempted murder.
I. Senate Bill No. 1437
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill
No. 1437, which amended the laws pertaining to felony murder and
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The
statute bars murder liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846)
and this bar has been extended to attempted murder convictions.
(People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) Section 1172.6
provides a procedure for those convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek retroactive relief if
they could not now be convicted under the amended laws. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.)
11
Although an aider and abettor can no longer be convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, the amended law does not bar the conviction of one who
directly aids and abets attempted murder. (People v. Coley, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) “Attempted murder requires the specific intent
to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th
613, 623.) To be guilty of attempted murder as a direct aider and
abettor a person must share the perpetrator’s intent to kill. (Id. at
p. 624, citing People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118.) At the
evidentiary hearing conducted pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d), “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, . . . that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see id., subd. (c).)
II. Standard of review
The jury here was instructed that a defendant could be convicted
of attempted murder either pursuant to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or as a direct aider and abettor. The prosecutor
argued both theories at trial. At the section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearing, the prosecution was therefore required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt defendant was a direct aider and abettor who shared
the perpetrator’s intent to kill Diaz.
The trial court sits as an independent fact finder. (People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951) and must “ ‘review all the
relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make
determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard . . . .’ ” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480,
quoting People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298). On appeal
from the denial of a petition after hearing, our task is to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have made the same
determination beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Vargas, at p. 951.)
12
We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See
People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233–234.) Under the
usual substantial evidence standard, “we must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The
standard is deferential, but the evidence in support of the judgment
must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value; ‘a mere possibility’ or
‘[s]peculation is not substantial evidence’ [citation].” (People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 120.) We defer to the trial court’s resolution of
conflicts and credibility determinations. (People v. Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “The same standard applies when the
conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical
inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
Reversal on a substantial evidence ground “is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conclusion of the trier of fact].’ ”
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
“[W]hen a criminal defendant claims on appeal that his
conviction was based on insufficient evidence of one or more of the
elements of the crime of which he was convicted, we must begin with
the presumption that the evidence of those elements was sufficient, and
the defendant bears the burden of convincing us otherwise.” (People v.
Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) “[T]he defendant must
present his case to us consistently with the substantial evidence
standard of review. . . . If the defendant fails to present us with all the
relevant evidence, or fails to present that evidence in the light most
favorable to the People, then he cannot carry his burden of showing the
evidence was insufficient because support for the [ruling] may lie in the
evidence he ignores.” (Id. at p. 1574.)
13
Defendant has failed to carry his burden here. He recites the
rule that the evidence must be summarized in the light most favorable
to the ruling, but he has argued the opposite, omitting most of his
interview with Detective Raines as well as his cross-examination
testimony, and ignoring his own admissions. Nevertheless, we have
reviewed the trial transcripts and summarized the relevant evidence in
the light most favorable to the ruling, and we discuss defendant’s
contentions.5
III. Premeditation and deliberation
Defendant contends the prosecution was required to prove not
only that he harbored an intent to kill when he aided and abetted the
attempted murder, but also that he personally premeditated and
deliberated the attempted murder. We disagree. Although the trial
court found defendant personally premeditated and deliberated his
intent to kill, the court was not required to do so. “ ‘[W]illful,
deliberate, and premeditated’ does not establish a greater degree of
attempted murder but, rather, sets forth a penalty provision
prescribing an increased sentence (a greater base term) to be imposed
upon a defendant’s conviction of attempted murder when the additional
specified circumstances are found true by the trier of fact.” (People v.
Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 669, disapproved on another ground in
People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 550, fn. 6.) If such a special
allegation is found true due to the mental state of the perpetrator,
additional punishment may be imposed upon an aider and abettor who
5 Defendant complains in his reply brief that the People rely on the
factual summary in the appellate opinion in People v. Jaramillo, supra,
B221863, contrary to what is permitted by section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3). The People also incorporated by reference the factual summary
in the prosecution’s reply to the petition below. We have not considered
the facts contained in the People’s brief on appeal, but instead rely on
our own independent review.
14
acted with an intent to kill, but who did not personally deliberate and
premeditate. (People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 624–625.) There
is thus no separate offense of premeditated and deliberated attempted
murder. Only where the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof
as to the underlying prior offense, here attempted murder, that special
allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction are vacated.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
As defendant concedes, Lona’s shooting Diaz several times at
close range showed Lona intended to kill (see People v. Smith (2005) 37
Cal.4th 733, 742) and defendant does not dispute it supported an
inference that Lona’s intent was premeditated and deliberated, citing
People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 230 (“a close-range shooting
without any provocation . . . or evidence of struggle . . . demonstrates
premeditation and deliberation”). The attempted murder committed by
Lona was therefore a premeditated and deliberated crime, regardless of
whether defendant personally premeditated and deliberated. (See
People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 624–625.) As such, we need not
address defendant’s lengthy analysis of selected evidence under the
factors which may support a finding of premeditation and deliberation,
as discussed in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15.
We thus turn to defendant’s claim that his attempted murder
conviction must be vacated because no substantial evidence supported
a finding he shared Lona’s intent when he facilitated Lona’s attempt to
kill Diaz.
IV. Intent to kill
The trial court found defendant remained guilty of attempted
murder as a direct aider and abettor.
A direct aider and abettor of attempted murder is one who
encourages or assists the direct perpetrator sharing his intent to kill
and intending to facilitate the killing. (People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th
at p. 624.) “ ‘[I]t is well settled that intent to kill or express malice, the
mental state required to convict a defendant of attempted murder,
15
may . . . be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of
the crime.’ ” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701.)
At the hearing on the petition defendant objected to the
consideration of any gang expert opinion. On appeal, defendant argues
the gang expert’s opinion does not supply substantial evidence of intent
to kill because gang membership alone is insufficient proof of intent or
aiding and abetting. (See e.g. People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
934, 992, and cases cited therein.)
A gang expert may not give an opinion on the defendant’s state of
mind or whether he committed the crime (People v. Vang (2011) 52
Cal.4th 1038, 1047–1048), but “[t]he People are generally entitled to
introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is
relevant to the charged offense. [Citation.] ‘Evidence of the
defendant’s gang affiliation — including evidence of the gang’s
territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal
enterprises, rivalries, and the like — can help prove identity, motive,
modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or fear, or
other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.’ ” (People v.
Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31.) Expert opinion is ordinarily
admissible for such purposes if “guided by hypothetical questions …
‘ “rooted in facts shown by the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Renteria (2022)
13 Cal.5th 951, 967.)
Gang evidence can thus provide evidence of motive and of intent
to kill. (See People v. Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 31–33.) And
“evidence of motive is often probative of intent to kill.” (People v.
Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741.) Moreover, despite defendant’s
suggestion to the contrary, proof of intent and aiding and abetting was
not solely dependent upon defendant’s gang membership, and the
expert did not give his opinion as to whether defendant facilitated the
crime or intended to kill.
Officer Drenckhahn testified that respect is of ultimate
importance to gang members, and that gangs have internal codes of
16
conduct. Discipline for a member who fails to comply may range from a
beating to death. Officer Drenckhahn expressed his opinion based
upon hypothetical facts that an assault by multiple gang members
against one member of their own gang is likely to be meant as
discipline motivated by an offense against the gang or disrespect
toward the gang.
Defendant, Lona, the two backseat passengers during the
shooting, and Diaz were all members of the Playboys gang. Sometime
before the shooting Diaz, an older Playboys member, and some younger
members engaged in an argument during which Diaz was “punking the
youngsters.”6 Defendant told Detective Raines the argument occurred
the day before the shooting but testified that it had been two weeks
before the shooting. Defendant said Diaz was “ ‘talking shit with our
other homies,’ ” and defendant denied knowing or understanding what
the argument was about, though he was present during the argument.
The trial court was not required to believe defendant and was entitled
to reject all or part of the testimony (see People v. Hamlin (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1463). The trial court did not believe him. The court
found defendant was “ ‘aware of the underlying circumstances
involving the beef’ ” and Diaz, providing evidence of motive to seek
revenge for Diaz’s disrespect.7 The trial court was justified in making
6 Defendant was approximately 26 years old at the time of trial.
7 Defendant contends the argument between Diaz and the younger
gang members cannot suggest a motive because it was trivial and he
and Diaz shook hands afterward. Defendant also notes his statement
to Detective Raines that Lona “shoot for no reason another homeboy
from the same hood.” It is not for an appellate court to overrule a trial
court’s credibility determination. (People v. Hamlin, supra, 170
Cal.App.4th at p. 1463.) Furthermore, “the judgment is not subject to
reversal on appeal simply because the prosecution relied heavily on
circumstantial evidence and because conflicting inferences on matters
bearing on guilt could be drawn at trial.” (People v. Millwee (1998) 18
Cal.4th 96, 132.)
17
its credibility determinations against defendant, as defendant gave
many clearly conflicting and evasive answers to both Detective Raines
in his interview and in his trial testimony. He also admitted he lied in
some parts. “[A] witness knowingly false in one part of his testimony is
to be distrusted in the whole.” (People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67, 86.)
“Evidence of motive aside, it is well settled that intent to kill or
express malice, the mental state required to convict a defendant of
attempted murder, may in many cases be inferred from the defendant’s
acts and the circumstances of the crime. [Citation.] ‘There is rarely
direct evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such intent must usually be
derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the
defendant’s actions.’ ” (People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741.)
On June 8, 2009, either one day or two weeks after Diaz had
disrespected younger members of his gang, defendant joined a
gathering of Playboys gang members in a motel room and was there
just 20 minutes before leaving with Lona and “Temper,” both of whom
defendant knew to be particularly violent members of his violent gang,
and one other person, “Smurf.” As the trial court found, defendant
knew that Lona was armed with a firearm. Defendant admitted he
knew Lona carried a handgun and that he had seen the gun in Lona’s
pocket while Lona was standing, before they got into the car. When
Lona showed the gun to him defendant claimed he said, “ ‘[W]hy are
you bringing that shit?’ ” Defendant did not state the response, but he
nevertheless drove Lona and the other gang members to Diaz’s
location. When they located Diaz in his parked car, defendant backed
up close to Diaz’s car. Although defendant claimed he backed up
intending to allow cars behind him to pass, he in fact blocked the car
behind him, preventing the two witnesses from passing the Camry
without backing up, which in turn prevented Diaz from moving his car
until the shooting was over and the Camry left the scene. In sum,
defendant met with a group of fellow gang members after Diaz had
disrespected them or other fellow gang members, and then knowing
18
that Lona was armed, defendant drove him and two others until Diaz
was spotted. Defendant then stopped and backed up the car,
preventing Diaz’s escape, waiting until Lona with his gun, got out of
the car and back in again. Defendant then drove Lona away from the
scene.
Defendant suggests because neither Lona, Diaz, nor the two
other gang members offered statements or gave testimony to contradict
his own, the only evidence of his state of mind is his version of the
events. Again, the trial court did not have to believe him. “Direct
evidence of the mental state of the accused is rarely available except
through his or her testimony. The trier of fact is and must be free to
disbelieve the testimony and to infer that the truth is otherwise when
such an inference is supported by circumstantial evidence regarding
the actions of the accused. Thus, an act which has the effect of giving
aid and encouragement, and which is done with knowledge of the
criminal purpose of the person aided, may indicate that the actor
intended to assist in fulfillment of the known criminal purpose.”
(People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 558–559.)
As the trial court found here, defendant was “ ‘not simply driving
by a location where Mr. Diaz is located. [Defendant] engages in very
specific conduct with his vehicle . . . : pulling up, cutting off, and, in
fact, engaging in conduct so forceful and aggressive that there’s an
entirely innocent car full of people which has to take evasive action to
avoid being hit because of [defendant’s] decision to stop and then back
into the area of the other vehicle, and that demonstrates a very
deliberate course of conduct on the part of [defendant], not just to scare
and intimidate, but actually set the scene to provide [Lona] with the
opportunity to do something further.’ ”
The most reasonable inference is that “something further” was
Lona’s intent to shoot Diaz at close range, and defendant concedes that
the evidence established that Lona intended to kill Diaz. Defendant’s
conduct showed he knew Lona’s purpose when, knowing Lona was
19
armed, he drove him and their two fellow gang members close to Diaz
and facilitated Lona’s purpose by trapping him.
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that defendant was a direct aider and abettor who shared the
actual killer’s intent to kill, such that any rational trier of fact could
have made the same determination beyond a reasonable doubt. (People
v. Vargas, supra, at p. 951.) One who directly aids and abets attempted
murder may still be convicted after the amendments to sections 188
and 189. (People v. Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) Thus
defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
DISPOSITION
The order of August 7, 2023 denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
_______________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
______________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.
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