Shen v. Prato CA2/8

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Filed 7/18/24 Shen v. Prato CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

WEN SHEN, B328235

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV09982)
v.

GARY PRATO,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Valerie Salkin, Judge. Reversed.
Law Offices of Liddle & Liddle and Raymond Zakari for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bowse Law Group and Michael A. Bowse for Defendant and
Respondent.
_________________________
Appellant Wen Shen appeals from the trial court’s order
denying her motion for attorney fees. She made the motion after
a split jury verdict. The jury decided in Shen’s favor on her cause
of action for retaliatory eviction under Civil Code section 1942.51
and in landlord Gary Prato’s favor on Shen’s cause of action for
breach of the warranty of habitability. Shen contends the trial
court erred in finding the lease agreement’s cap of $1,000 for
attorney fees and costs controlled over section 1942.5’s mandate
that a party prevailing under that section be awarded reasonable
attorney fees. We agree the trial court erred in finding that the
contractual cap on attorney fees controlled over section 1942.5.
As a consequence, the trial court erred in failing to undertake the
calculation of an award under section 1942.5. We reverse the
trial court’s order denying attorney fees and remand for the trial
court to determine a reasonable award of such fees.
BACKGROUND
In June 2017, Shen signed a three-year lease for a
residential property in Woodland Hills owned by Prato. Shen
lived there with her minor daughter, who attended school nearby.
In September 2018, Shen and her daughter returned home
after a weekend away to find that a toilet line in the second floor
master bathroom had burst. Shen alleged she observed
substantial sewage/water damage “throughout the house” as well
as mold. She deemed the house uninhabitable and moved to a
hotel, where she stayed until October 22, 2018. Shen and her
daughter returned to the house many days, however, to work and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

2
to do homework, respectively. Shen stated this was also
necessary to protect her personal property.
It is undisputed that Prato quite promptly sent service
technicians to the house to set up fans to dry out the house. The
parties agree that actual repairs were not promptly made, but
disagree as to the reason. Prato claims Shen obstructed the
repairs. Shen claims Prato sent repair people to the property
without warning her; then, on a second occasion, Prato gave them
entry without waiting for her representative to arrive and open
the house. The second time, Shen called the police. Prato
thereafter gave her a 60-day notice to move out.
Shen obtained counsel and continued to pay rent. It
appears that by September 29, 2018, Prato’s insurance company
had assigned a contractor to repair the property. Again a dispute
arose, this time about waivers related to the work. This dispute
resulted in Prato serving Shen with a three-day notice to quit at
the end of October 2018. Shen complied and moved out.
In March 2019, Shen filed the present action against Prato
on behalf of herself and her daughter. The second amended
complaint alleges six causes of action: breach of the warranty of
habitability, negligence, constructive eviction, nuisance,
retaliatory eviction under section 1942.5, and breach of quiet
enjoyment.
Prato subsequently moved for and secured summary
adjudication in his favor on the causes of action for negligence,
constructive eviction, nuisance, and breach of quiet enjoyment.
The trial court’s ruling on that motion is not included in the
record on appeal.
Ultimately, the habitability and retaliatory eviction causes
of action were tried to a jury. The only information in the record

3
on appeal about that trial is the judgment, which shows the jury
found in favor of Prato on the habitability cause of action and in
favor of Shen on the retaliatory constructive eviction cause of
action. The jury awarded Shen $7,520 in economic damages and
$12,500 in noneconomic damages, for a total of $20,020. The
judgment states Shen “shall have and recover . . . the sum of
$20,020 as compensatory damages, with interest, . . . together
with costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $_______ from
Gary Prato.”
Shen sought costs in the amount of $35,603.08 and
attorney fees in the amount of $246,430. She sought attorney
fees under section 1942.5, subdivision (i), which provides: “In any
action brought for damages for retaliatory eviction, the court
shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if
either party requests attorney’s fees upon the initiation of the
action.” (§ 1942.5, subd. (i).)
The trial court ruled on costs and attorney fees in two
stages. In its December 9, 2022, minute order, the trial court
granted Prato’s motion to tax costs over $1,000, on the ground
that the lease agreement between the parties capped costs and
attorney fees at $1,000. The trial court found that an additional
ground for striking costs was the amount of Shen’s recovery,
which fell below the $25,000 minimum amount for a court of
general jurisdiction. The trial court ruled that because the
judgment could have been rendered in a limited civil case, the
court had discretion to deny costs, including attorney fees,
entirely. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033, subd. (a); see Chavez v. City of
Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 987–988 (Chavez); Steele v.
Jensen Instrument Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 326, 331 (Steele).)
The court chose to award $1,000 in costs.

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The trial court explained its decision in part as follows:
“Although Defendant’s conduct in evicting Plaintiff was found to
be retaliatory, in this case, Defendant’s conduct was
understandable due to Plaintiff’s obstructionist behavior.” The
court also stated: “The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ efforts in
litigating this case were grossly excessive. [¶] . . . [¶] In light of
Plaintiff’s limited success, her requested costs of $35,603.08, i.e.
$14,525.08 greater than the damages amount awarded to
Plaintiff by the jury, are inflated. [¶] In the event a
determination is later made that the Court’s analysis that the
contract terms do not bar the recovery of costs exceeding $1000,
the Court would decline to make a large cost award.”
In its February 7, 2023, order, the trial court ruled on
Shen’s motion for attorney fees. The trial court again relied on
the provision in the lease agreement limiting costs and attorney
fees to $1,000. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees
on the ground that the $1,000 cap had been reached with the cost
award. The court found that the retaliatory eviction cause of
action arose out of the lease agreement, and so the contractual
$1,000 limitation was valid. (Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic
Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071 (Drybread).) The court
considered and rejected Shen’s argument that section 1942.5,
which provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees when a
tenant prevails on a retaliatory eviction cause of action,
controlled. Relying on the bare text of Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021, the court found that the attorney fee provision in
the lease agreement controlled over the statutory provision.

5
DISCUSSION
A. Costs Other Than Attorney Fees Are Governed by the Lease
Agreement.
Section 1942.5 does not provide for an award of costs (as
opposed to attorney fees). Accordingly, we see no error in the
trial court’s decision to limit the award of such costs to the $1,000
amount specified in the lease agreement. The trial court,
however, provided a number of alternate bases for its decision on
such costs. It then expressly incorporated its analysis on the cost
issues into its February 7, 2023, order on attorney fees, stating
the prior order “should be considered a part of this decision.”
Thus, we do consider some of the non-attorney-fee cost analysis,
and find it erroneous as applied to attorney fees, as set forth in
more detail below.
B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021 Does Not Give
Absolute Priority to Contractual Fee Limitations Over
Statutory Fee Provisions.
On review of an award of attorney fees after trial, the usual
standard of review is abuse of discretion. “However, de novo
review of such a trial court order is warranted where the
determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney
fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to
statutory construction and a question of law.” (Carver v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142 (Carver).) Put
differently, “ ‘the determination of the legal basis for an attorney
fee award is subject to independent review. [Citation.] In such a
case, the issue involves the application of the law to undisputed
facts. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Further, where an issue of
entitlement to attorney fees and costs depends on the

6
interpretation of a statute, our review is de novo.” (Wohlgemuth
v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258.)
The trial court found that the retaliatory eviction cause of
action was a tort claim, which “is directly related to the tenancy
and thus to the lease agreement.” The court then found:
“Because the claim arises out of the agreement, Plaintiffs are
bound by the express terms of the contract, and thus limited to
recovery of $1,000 in costs and attorney fees collectively.”
Retaliatory eviction is both a tort and a statutory cause of
action. (See Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 251
(Barela).) Shen clearly alleged a statutory cause of action. There
is no dispute that the parties treated the cause of action as a
statutory one throughout the proceedings.2 While the trial court
is correct that a tort cause of action can arise from a contract,
that rule is simply not relevant in this case, which involves only a
statutory cause of action.
The trial court relied on Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
17 Cal.4th 599 to support its conclusion that the request for fees
was contractually based, but that case recognized three bases for
attorney fees: “a legal basis . . . grounded in an agreement,
statute, or other law.” (Id. at p. 606.) As the Santisas Court
expressly noted, the parties seeking attorney fees in that case did

2 There are very few documents in the record related to the
actual trial of this matter. They show, however, that the cause of
action was treated as statutory. For example, Prato
acknowledged in his settlement conference statement that the
retaliatory eviction claim was a statutory claim. After trial, Shen
sought attorney fees pursuant to section 1942.5. Prato’s motion
to tax costs acknowledged that Shen had prevailed on a statutory
cause of action.

7
not contend that their claim had a legal basis “grounded in a
statute or other noncontractual source of law.” (Id. at pp. 606–
607.) The same is true of the other cases relied upon by the trial
court; none involved a party seeking attorney fees under a
statute. (Drybread, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071; Gil v.
Mansano (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 739, 743–744; Gonzales v.
Personal Storage, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 464, 480.) We find
the trial court’s reliance on these cases inapt.
The trial court did acknowledge that Shen was seeking
attorney fees under section 1942.5 but found that under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021, “where attorneys’ fees are
authorized by statute but capped by private contract, the trial
court is to award attorneys’ fees pursuant to the contract.” This
is a fundamental misreading of Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 provides in pertinent
part: “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by
statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of
the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) As the California
Supreme Court has explained, Code of Civil Procedure section
1021 simply codifies the American rule, “which provides that
each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his own attorney
fees.” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 278 (Trope).) Since
the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 in 1872,
the Legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to the rule and
courts have equitably created other exceptions, such as the
common fund theory of recovery. (Trope, at p. 279.) A third
category of exception is an agreement between the parties.
(Ibid.) We see nothing in the language of Code of Civil Procedure

8
section 1021 or the reasoning of Trope to suggest that an
agreement between the parties controls or necessarily cancels out
a statutory exception to the rule. In other words, we conclude
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 does not elevate a
contractual exception to the American rule over a statutory
exception to the American rule.
C. Section 1942.5 Is Designed to Accomplish an Important
Public Purpose Which Cannot Be Contravened by Private
Contract.
As pertinent here, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has
described the opening clause of Code of Civil Procedure section
1021 as “a limitation on the right of parties to agree to fees
entitlements.” (Carver, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 147.)
This is not a blanket limitation on such agreements,
however. As more fully developed by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in later cases, “ ‘[T]he question is whether the statutory
attorney fees provision expressly, or the policy of the statute
implicitly, overrides the freedom to contract for a different
outcome.’ ” (Dorsey v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 583,
594, quoting County of Sacramento v. Sandison (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 646, 651.)3 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
has reached a similar conclusion, relying on section 3513, which
provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended
solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason
cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” (§ 3513.) The
Fifth District has held that section 3513 applies to mandatory

3 This reasoning has recently been adopted by our colleagues
in Division Five of the Second Appellate District Court of Appeal
in Soni v. Cartograph, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1, 11.

9
statutory provisions for the recovery of attorney fees, when such
provisions were “designed to accomplish an important public
purpose.” (Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1, 12.)
Section 1942.5 expressly provides that “the court shall
award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”
(§ 1942.5, subd. (i), italics added.) The history of section 1942.5
shows that mandatory attorney fees are an integral part of the
statutory retaliation cause of action. “Section 1942.5 was [first]
enacted into law as part of comprehensive landlord-tenant reform
legislation.” (Kriz v. Taylor (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 302, 310
(Kriz).)4 “[T]he obvious intent of this statutory scheme [is] to
encourage private initiative to enforce tenantability standards.”
(Kriz, at p. 311.) More specifically, after section 1942.5 was
enacted in 1970, but before it became effective, the California
Supreme Court recognized the common law doctrine of
retaliatory eviction as a defense in unlawful detainer
proceedings. (Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507,
512.) As the Court subsequently explained, in so doing, it applied
the “ ‘persuasive reasoning’ ” of “the leading authority in the
area, Edwards v. Habib (D.C. Cir. 1968) 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126
[397 F.2d 687]” to California law. (Drouet v. Superior Court
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 583, 591–592.) Our Supreme Court
summarized that reasoning: “ ‘ “[e]ffective implementation and
enforcement of the codes obviously depend in part on private
initiative in the reporting of violations. . . . To permit retaliatory
evictions . . . would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the

4 At that time, section 1942.5 provided only a defense to
eviction.

10
housing code as a means of upgrading the quality of housing.” ’
[Citations.] An eviction under such circumstances, Judge Wright
reasoned, would not only punish the tenant for a complaint that
she had a constitutional right to make ‘ “but also would stand as
a warning to others that they dare not be so bold, a result which,
from the authorization of the housing code, we think Congress
affirmatively sought to avoid.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 591.)
Courts first recognized a cause of action for retaliatory
eviction in Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278 (Aweeka).
The Aweeka court, however, relied on existing statutory
provisions, such as section 3294, to flesh out the cause of action.
(Aweeka, at p. 281.) In 1979, the Legislature responded by
repealing and reenacting it with amendments to section 1942.5
which included such a cause of action. (Rich v. Schwab (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 803, 810 (Rich).) “Importantly, and consistent
with the earlier holding in Aweeka, the 1979 legislation added
subdivisions (f) and (g) to section 1942.5 and therein created
statutory rights of action against landlords who unlawfully
retaliate against their tenants.” (Rich, at p. 811.)
Then-subdivision (g) included the attorney fees provision of
section 1942.5. (Rich, at p. 811.) The Legislature made this
provision mandatory. We conclude the key role of attorney fees
in creating a viable cause of action for retaliatory eviction
indicates that attorney fees are part of a tenant’s rights under
section 1942.5 and cannot be waived.
The California Supreme Court first considered this version
of section 1942.5 in Barela. “In interpreting section 1942.5, the
court was expansive, emphasizing the ‘important public policy’
the remedies authorized by that statute serve. (Barela, supra,
30 Cal.3d at pp. 253, 254.) Section 1942.5, the court said, ‘is a

11
remedial statute aimed at protecting tenants from certain types
of abuses’ (Barela, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 251), and ‘[i]mplicit in
the passage of any remedial legislation is a general intent to
protect from intimidation those who report violations of the law.’
(Id. at p. 252.) Thus, section 1942.5 is to be ‘ “liberally construed
to effect its objectives and to suppress, not encourage, the
mischief at which it was directed.” ’ ” (Winslett v. 1811 27th
Avenue LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 252.) “By building upon
the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction, the Legislature
embraced the high court’s recognition of the vital importance of
private enforcement in this arena.” (Id. at p. 255.)
More generally, it is well recognized that without a
“ ‘ “mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees,” ’ ” private
actions to enforce public policies will frequently be impractical.
(Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 583 [California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) action].) As our Supreme
Court has explained: “the aim of fee-shifting statutes is ‘to enable
private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries
resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific . . .
laws.’ ” (Ibid.)
The court in Aweeka, in first recognizing a retaliatory
eviction cause of action, noted that consequential damages might
be “nominal.” (Aweeka, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 281.) Punitive
damages can help make such a cause of action more viable in
some cases, but they are uncertain even if the tenant prevails.
Thus, “reasonable” attorney fees are necessary to make private
actions feasible under section 1942.5. Permitting the parties to
agree to less than reasonable attorney fees frustrates the
Legislature’s intent.

12
Thus, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to conclude
section 1942.5 is not specific enough to expressly override the
general freedom to contract for attorney fees, we find that the
policy of section 1942.5 does so implicitly.
D. A Statutory Remedy Protecting a Statutory Right Cannot Be
Waived.
Section 1942.5 expressly provides: “Any waiver by a lessee
of the lessee’s rights under this section is void as contrary to
public policy.” (§ 1942.5, subd. (f).) Prato contends that attorney
fees are a remedy and not a right, and that the distinction
between statutory rights and statutory remedies is well
established and long recognized. We do not see how this
distinction assists Prato. As Prato points out, “ ‘a remedy is the
means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury.’ ”
(Curbelo v. Matson Navigation Co. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 305,
308.) Retaliatory eviction is a statutory right with statutory
remedies. Permitting tenants to waive (or limit) the remedies
would leave no meaningful way for them to enforce the right. For
attorney fees, the remedy is mandatory: the prevailing party
“shall” be awarded “reasonable” attorney fees. (§ 1942.5,
subd. (i).) Thus, at least when a statutory right is enforced by a
mandatory statutory remedy, a prohibition against waiving the
statutory right necessarily includes a prohibition against waiving
the mandatory statutory remedy.
Prato also contends that the bar on waivers is not absolute,
and that under section 1953, subdivision (b), a waiver is valid if it
is included in a lease agreement provided to lessees before they
take possession of the premises. Prato has misread that section.

13
Sections 1953, subdivision (a), 1942.1, 1942.5, and 1954
include express provisions that waivers and/or modifications are
void as contrary to public policy. Section 1953, subdivision (b),
provides: “Any provision of a lease or rental agreement of a
dwelling by which the lessee agrees to modify or waive a
statutory right, where the modification or waiver is not void
under subdivision (a) or under [s]ection 1942.1, 1942.5, or 1954,
shall be void as contrary to public policy unless the lease or
rental agreement is presented to the lessee before he takes actual
possession of the premises.” (§ 1953, subd. (b).) In other words,
where a lease agreement includes a waiver provision that is not
(already) void under the specified code sections, that waiver
provision is (nevertheless) void, unless it is presented to the
lessee before possession. Section 1953, subdivision (b) creates a
prohibition against waiver where none already exists; it does not
provide an exception to already existing waiver prohibitions
found elsewhere in the specified sections.
E. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033 Does Not Apply
Where, As Here, There Is an Applicable Mandatory Attorney
Fees Provision.
Prato contends there is, nevertheless, another basis to
support the trial court’s denial of attorney fees. In its December
9, 2022, order awarding costs, the court found that Code of Civil
Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a) provided “an additional
basis to limit costs.” The trial court pointed out that “[u]nder this
provision, courts have denied the award of costs, including
attorney fees, to the prevailing plaintiff when the damage award
was less than $25,000 and thus could have been recovered in a
court of lesser jurisdiction. (See Chavez[, supra,] 47 Cal.4th 970
[at pp.] 987–988; Steele[, supra,] 59 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 331.)”

14
(Italics added.) The trial court did not specifically address Code
of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a) in its subsequent
February 7, 2023, order on attorney fees, but did state its
analysis from the earlier order was incorporated therein.
Accordingly, we address the applicability of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1033 to this case.
Shen contends Code of Civil Procedure section 1033,
subdivision (a) does not apply to mandatory statutory attorney
fees provisions. She points out that both Chavez and Steele
involve attorney fees under FEHA, which are permissive, not
mandatory. She contends a different result is required when
attorney fees are mandated by statute. We agree in part.
We have previously agreed with the Sixth District Court of
Appeal’s analysis on this issue. (See Gramajo v. Joe’s Pizza on
Sunset, Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1105–1108.) As the
Sixth District explained: “In Chavez, the California Supreme
Court examined the application of [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 1033, subdivision (a) to an action brought under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code,
§ 12900 et seq.), which grants the trial court discretion to award
attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th
at pp. 975–976.) The [C]ourt in Chavez held that by its plain
meaning, [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1033, subdivision (a)
applies in the FEHA context and gives the trial court discretion
to deny attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who prevails under FEHA
but recovers an amount that could have been recovered in a
limited civil case. (Chavez, at p. 976.) The [C]ourt explained:
‘[W]e perceive no irreconcilable conflict between [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 1033[, subdivision ](a) and the FEHA’s
attorney fee provision. In exercising its discretion under [Code of

15
Civil Procedure] section 1033[, subdivision ](a) to grant or deny
litigation costs, including attorney fees, to a plaintiff who has
recovered FEHA damages in an amount that could have been
recovered in a limited civil case, the trial court must give due
consideration to the policies and objectives of the FEHA and
determine whether denying attorney fees, in whole or in part, is
consistent with those policies and objectives.’ (Chavez, at
p. 986.)” (Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 761, 778 (Almanor).)
The Almanor court, however, was faced with a different
statutory attorney fees provision. As the court explained: “The
reasoning of Chavez is of limited applicability here. Unlike the
fee provision under FEHA, which is discretionary and therefore
not irreconcilable with [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1033,
subdivision (a), the fee-shifting provision of the Davis–Stirling
Act is mandatory. (Civ. Code, § 5975; Salehi[ v. Surfside III
Condominium Owners Assn. (2011)] 200 Cal.App.4th [1146,]
1152.) The circumstances in which a court might deny or reduce
a fee award under a permissive statutory provision, like FEHA,
such as because special circumstances ‘ “ ‘would render such an
award unjust,’ ” ’ do not apply equally where a statute mandates
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. (Graciano v. Robinson
Ford Sales, Inc.[ (2006)] 144 Cal.App.4th [140,] 160 [(Graciano)]
[principles applicable to permissive attorney’s fee statutory
provisions do not apply to mandatory fee-shifting statutory
provisions].)” (Almanor, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 778–779.)5

5 We note that even when a statutory attorney fees provision
is permissive, Chavez requires that a trial court exercising
discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 “must give
due consideration to the policies and objectives of the [specific

16
F. The Trial Court Retains Discretion to Reduce the Amount of
Attorney Fees Awarded Under Section 1942.5.
The Almanor court found that in the absence of specific
authority to apply Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 to
mandatory fee provisions, the court would not find an abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s decision not to reduce attorney fees
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033. (Almanor,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 779.) We are faced with a different
situation: The trial court in this case suggested that it could deny
attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033,
subdivision (a).
The trial court did not consider the conflict between Code of
Civil Procedure section 1033 and section 1942.5. We recognize
that Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 has a public policy
purpose: “ ‘to discourage plaintiffs from “over filing” their cases’
and thereby ‘wast[ing] judicial resources.’ ” (Carter v. Cohen
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1053.) As we have discussed,
section 1942.5 also embodies an important public policy, and
attorney fees are an important part of enforcing that public
policy. We note that Code of Civil Procedure section 1033’s
provisions on attorney fees are discretionary while section
1942.5’s provision on such fees is mandatory. This difference is
not insignificant. We find that the approach set out by the

attorney fees and cost shifting statute at issue] and determine
whether denying attorney fees [pursuant to the discretion
granted in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a)],
in whole or in part, is consistent with those policies and
objectives.” (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 986.)

17
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Graciano appropriately
addresses the situation before us.
As the Graciano court explained, where “a statutory fee
provision mandates fees to a prevailing party: Having found a
party to be prevailing under such a provision, the court has no
discretion to decline to render an award of reasonable attorney
fees.” (Graciano, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 160.)
Here, the trial court never made a reasoned analysis for
attorney fees because it relied on the attorney fees cap in the
lease agreement. “ ‘When the record is unclear whether the trial
court’s award of attorney fees is consistent with the applicable
legal principles, we may reverse the award and remand the case
to the trial court for further consideration and amplification of its
reasoning.’ ” (Graciano, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 148–149.)
We express no opinion on the reasonableness of plaintiff’s request
for fees and leave to the sound discretion of the trial court the
decision of what constitutes a reasonable award.
DISPOSITION
The order denying attorney fees is reversed and remanded
for reconsideration. Respondent to pay costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J. WILEY, J.

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