CourtListener 10005761•Bank v. America Data Services CA2/2
Full text
Filed 7/17/24 Bank v. America Data Services CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
HANMI BANK, B326850
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV04609)
v.
AMERICA DATA SERVICES
LLC et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Steven J. Kleifield, Judge. Affirmed.
Zarmi Law and David Zarmi for Defendants and
Appellants.
Buchalter, Robert M. Dato, Mark M. Scott and Adeline R.
Tungate for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellants American Data Services LLC (ADS) and its
managing member, James Shiau (collectively appellants), were
defendants in this action for breach of a finance agreement and
guaranty brought by respondent Hanmi Bank (Hanmi).1 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hanmi and
entered judgment in the amount of $101,870.82 against ADS and
Shiau, jointly and severally, plus costs and attorney fees. Hanmi
was also awarded certain personal property (computer
equipment), proceeds of the sale of which were to be used to
reduce the amount owed by appellants.
Appellants argue the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to Hanmi because there were triable issues of material
fact as to fraud in the inducement of the loan by certain brokers
who negotiated the terms of the loan with the original lender,
which assigned the loan to Hanmi. Appellants further argue the
trial court erred in declining to join the seller of the computer
equipment as an indispensable party.
We find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
In January 2019, ADS entered into an agreement with
Salamander Technologies, LLC (Salamander) to purchase
computer equipment for a national public safety
telecommunications system for first responders.
1 Shiau is sometimes referred to in the record as “Jimmy
Mou Kei Shiau.”
2 Because the matter comes to us after a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
appellants, who were the losing party below. (Elk Hills Power,
LLC v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 593, 606.)
2
Shiau negotiated financing from Targeted Lease Capital,
LLC (TLC) on behalf of ADS through unlicensed brokers George
Ravera of Equipment Finance Group and Barry Longwater of
Advis Capital. Prior to working with them, Shiau signed a
noncircumvent agreement with the brokers, agreeing not to
contact TLC directly in return for the brokers signing a
nondisclosure agreement. As a result, Shiau had no contact with
TLC and had to rely on the representations made by the brokers.
During negotiations, Salamander provided a letter to
Longwater, which provided, in part: “If it adds more comfort to
your financial partners, we would be willing to take over the
monthly payments owed so that the lending institution you are
partnering with will be made whole in the event of default for
whatever reason. [¶] . . . [¶] Let it therefore be know [sic] that
in the case of a default from the payment of the client, we will
take back the product and take over the monthly payments.” The
letter was signed by the chief strategy officer of OrangeHook,
Inc., which is the parent company of Salamander.3
According to Shiau’s declaration, the remarketing letter
was sent to and accepted by TLC. Shaiu represented he
“specifically asked the brokers if [TLC] had seen the Remarketing
[letter] and accepted it.” In response, Shiau was told, “if the
lenders have a personal guarantee from you or an organization
like Salamander, who do you think they would go to under a
default?” The brokers “informed” Shiau and ADS that TLC
3 Appellants refer to the letter as “the [r]emarketing
[a]greement.” The letter is not properly characterized as an
agreement as it lacked mutual consent and contained only one
signature. We will therefore refer to it as the “remarketing
letter.”
3
“received and accepted Salamander’s Remarketing [letter], and
that return of the equipment to Salamander would relieve
[appellants] of the obligations under the equipment financing
loan.”
On May 20, 2019, Salamander produced an invoice for
$70,923.38 for the equipment ADS needed to purchase for the
project. On May 30, 2019, ADS signed an equipment finance
agreement (loan or loan agreement) with TLC to borrow the
$70,923.38. To secure the loan, ADS provided TLC with a
security interest in the equipment. ADS agreed to make 36
monthly payments in the amount of $2,783.15, plus applicable
taxes and insurance. The loan agreement further provided that
late charges would accrue on any payment not paid when due,
and if ADS failed to make any payment when due or committed
any other default, the lender could (1) declare ADS in default and
exercise all of its rights and remedies under the agreement, (2)
declare all unpaid payments and all future payments
immediately due and payable, and (3) take possession of any or
all equipment, wherever located, without a court order.
On June 2, 2019, ADS made an advance payment of
$6,166.30 to Advis Capital, consisting of two months’ payments
and a $600 document fee. TLC paid the Salamander invoice in
two payments on June 10 and July 25, 2019.
On August 22, 2019, TLC assigned all its rights in the loan
agreement and the equipment to Hanmi.
ADS made another seven payments of $2,783.15 on the
loan, with the last payment on March 5, 2020. Shortly
thereafter, the COVID-19 pandemic hit and ADS’s efforts to work
with first responders was stymied.
4
Shiau contacted TLC and asked for COVID-19 relief on the
loan. TLC presented an “Amendment to Agreement”
(amendment) permitting ADS to make payments of $100 for
three months, with monthly payments of $2,981.94 per month
commencing on September 1, 2020. The amendment listed the
lender as Hanmi. This was the first time ADS was notified of the
assignment of the loan. Shiau signed the document and returned
it to TLC. There was no counter signature to the amendment
and ADS continued to make payments directly to TLC.
On October 27, 2020, a representative of TLC e-mailed ADS
asking that ADS resolve the failure to make payments on the
loan. ADS responded that Salamander had taken the equipment
back and “we are working out with [Salamander] payments
under the Remarketing agreement now. So one of us should get a
payment out to you shortly.”
On November 11, 2020, Hanmi sent a demand letter for
$81,032.71 to ADS via Shiau, asserting that Hanmi was the
holder of rights under the loan agreement.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hanmi filed a complaint against appellants on February 4,
2021, alleging breach of the loan agreement, recovery of personal
property, conversion, and breach of guaranty. The third cause of
action for conversion was voluntarily dismissed by Hanmi.
Hanmi filed a motion for summary judgment on April 8,
2022. Hanmi argued the facts were undisputed in the case; the
loan was enforceable; and the damage calculation was objectively
quantifiable.
Appellants filed an opposition on June 10, 2022. Among
other things, appellants argued fraud in the inducement of the
5
loan agreement on the ground that TLC, Hanmi’s assignor, had
no intention of honoring the remarketing letter or the terms of
the invoice. In addition to this fraud, TLC used unlicensed
brokers to negotiate the terms of the loan agreement. Appellants
pointed out that Salamander took the equipment back and was
thus an indispensable party to Hanmi’s second cause of action for
return of personal property.
Following Hanmi’s reply and supplemental briefing, the
trial court held a hearing on October 26, 2022. On November 16,
2022, the trial court entered judgment on the matter in favor of
Hanmi. Appellants were jointly and severally liable for
$101,870.82 plus costs and attorney fees. In addition, Hanmi was
to recover possession of the computer equipment, and if sold, the
proceeds of such sale would reduce the amount owed by
appellants under the judgment.
On December 16, 2022, appellants filed a motion for new
trial, arguing the court failed to rule on its evidentiary objections,
failed to admit parol evidence of fraudulent inducement, failed to
allow appellants to assert affirmative defenses, and awarded
excessive damages.
The court denied the motion. On January 12, 2023, the
court issued a written order, noting it considered and rejected the
remarketing letter as a defense to Hanmi’s summary judgment
motion. Furthermore, fraud in the inducement is an affirmative
defense, which appellants did not plead in their answer, therefore
it could not be pursued in opposition to summary judgment. In
addition, there was no evidence Hanmi made any fraudulent
misrepresentations or that any fraudulent misrepresentations
were made by anyone authorized to speak on Hanmi’s behalf. As
to the failure to name Salamander as an indispensable party, the
6
court “rejected the argument that [Hanmi] should have sought
redress against a third party when it had no legal obligation to do
so.”
On February 10, 2023, appellants filed their notice of
appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standards of review
Summary judgment is proper where “there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(c); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
843.) On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review
the record de novo to determine whether any triable issues of fact
compel reinstating the action. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare
Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) We need not defer to
the trial court’s reasoning, but may affirm the summary
judgment if it is correct on any ground that the parties had an
adequate opportunity to address in the trial court, regardless of
the trial court’s stated reasons. (Martin v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 161.)
A court’s decision as to whether a party is indispensable to
an action is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (County of San
Joaquin v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1997) 54
Cal.App.4th 1144, 1151.)
II. No triable issue of fact
The trial court granted summary judgment to Hanmi,
finding the parties entered into an enforceable loan agreement
and Hanmi’s assignor fully performed. Appellants defaulted on
7
the loan agreement and failed to comply with the terms of the
loan agreement.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because triable issues of fact existed as to
whether appellants had a defense that the loan agreement was
obtained by misrepresentations, and whether such
misrepresentations could be construed against Hanmi.
Specifically, appellants point out that although Longwater
and Ravera were unlicensed, TLC, as a state licensed lender, was
liable for any misrepresentations made to appellants in
connection with the loan. (Fin. Code, § 22602, subd. (b).)
Appellants do not articulate the exact words of the alleged
misrepresentations, but appear to argue that the brokers led
appellants to believe that TLC “accepted” Salamander’s
remarketing letter and agreed it would pursue Salamander
before suing appellants. Therefore, according to appellants, the
remarketing letter was an integral part of the loan agreement.
When a loan is assigned, the assignee steps into the shoes of the
original lender. (Citing Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 287.) Thus, appellants argue, there
was a triable issue of fact as to whether appellants could assert
the provisions of the remarketing letter to defend against
Hanmi.4
4 The parties disagree as to whether appellants were
permitted to raise this affirmative defense for the first time in
opposition to summary judgment, as appellants did not assert
fraudulent inducement as a defense at any time prior to opposing
Hanmi’s summary judgment motion. (See, e.g., California Bank
& Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625, 637, fn. 3 [“A
party may not oppose a summary judgment motion based on a
8
There is no triable issue of fact as to whether appellants
can assert the remarketing agreement against Hanmi. The
remarketing letter does not, as a matter of law, alter the terms of
the loan agreement. When there is no material conflict in the
evidence, courts interpret a contract as a matter of law. (Brown
v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 433.) Appellants point to
no material conflict in the evidence as to the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the remarketing letter. The letter
was sent from the chief strategy officer of OrangeHook, Inc., the
parent company of Salamander, to Longwater, one of the brokers.
The letter expresses that its purpose is to let Longwater know
that Salamander “stand[s] fully behind [its] product” and has “a
countless array of clients that we can very quickly remarket the
product to in the event [ADS] is unable to make the payments.”
The letter then states, “If it adds more comfort to your financial
partners, we would be willing to take over the monthly payments
owed so that the lending institution you are partnering with will
be made whole in the event of default for whatever reason.”
(Italics added.) There is no evidence that this “willingness” was
ever reduced to a formal binding agreement between any parties
to the loan agreement. Nor was it reduced to a formal binding
agreement between appellants and Salamander. It is a
unilateral letter, signed by one party, lacking the essential
claim, theory, or defense that is not alleged in the pleadings.”];
but see also Nieto v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co.
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 75 [“an affirmative defense may be
raised for the first time in a summary judgment motion absent a
showing of prejudice”].) We decline to address this issue, as we
find that even if considered, appellants’ affirmative defense must
fail as a matter of law.
9
elements of contract formation such as mutual assent and
sufficient consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550.) In short, the letter
has no legal binding effect on any individual or entity. Any claim
by Shiau that he understood the remarketing agreement to
amend the loan agreement is undermined by the language of the
loan agreement, which specifically provides, “This Agreement
contains the entire agreement between you and us, and it may
not be altered, modified, terminated or otherwise changed except
in writing by both of us.” The remarketing letter is not a legal
alteration of the loan agreement and may not be interpreted as
such.
Nor can appellants claim that they acted based on
fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the remarketing letter.
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are a
misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to defraud,
justifiable reliance, and resulting damage. (Anderson v. Deloitte
& Touche (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1474.) First, appellants
have not been clear about any specific misrepresentations made
by the brokers. The remarketing letter was written by a
representative of Salamander, with one broker as a recipient—
not an author. While Shiau represents he was informed that
TLC “accepted” the letter, there is no evidence that TLC
specifically agreed to pursue Salamander before it pursued
appellants for missed payments.5 In fact, when Shiau sought
5 Shiau’s representation that he was informed that TLC
“accepted” the letter arguably violates the parol evidence rule,
which prohibits evidence of representations that are contrary to
the terms of a written contract that was intended to be a
complete and final statement of the parties’ agreement. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1856.) Hanmi objected to Shiau’s declaration on this
10
assurance that TLC would pursue Salamander for any default,
one of the brokers—it is not clear which one—responded with a
question: “if the lenders have a personal guarantee from you or an
organization like Salamander, who do you think they would go to
under a default?” Any reliance on these vague representations of
the brokers was patently unreasonable. To the extent that
appellants relied on the remarketing letter for assurance that
Salamander, not appellants, would be sued for any default, such
reliance was also patently unreasonable, as the remarketing
letter created no legal obligation as to any individual or entity
and did not alter the loan agreement. Appellants have not shown
that there exists a triable issue of material fact as to fraudulent
inducement.
The remarketing letter created no legal obligation on the
part of TLC or its assignee, Hanmi, to pursue Salamander for
payment before pursuing appellants. No triable issue of fact
exists supporting appellants’ theory that Hanmi should be
imputed to have “accepted” the remarketing agreement or can
legally be held to its words. Appellants have also failed to raise a
triable issue of fact as to fraudulent inducement by the brokers,
as they have failed to articulate specific misrepresentations or
reasonable reliance. Thus, summary judgment in Hanmi’s favor
was properly sustained.6
ground, but the trial court failed to rule on the objection. Thus,
we consider it part of the record on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (q).)
6 The parties disagree as to the enforceability of the waiver
of defenses provision of the loan agreement, which provided: “We
may sell, assign or transfer this Agreement or any part of it
11
III. Indispensable party
Appellants argue that the judgment must be reversed
because Hanmi failed to join Salamander as an indispensable
party to the action. “‘A person is an indispensable party if his or
her rights must necessarily be affected by the judgment.’” (Save
Our Bay, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 686, 692.) “‘Failure to join an “indispensable” party
is not “a jurisdictional defect” in the fundamental sense; even in
the absence of an “indispensable” party, the court still has the
power to render a decision as to the parties before it which will
stand.’” (Id. at p. 693.) The trial court’s determination as to
whether a party is indispensable is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (County of San Joaquin v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.)
and/or our interest in the Collateral without notifying you and
you agree that if we do, the new Lender will have the same rights
and benefits that we now have, but will not have to perform any
of our Obligations pursuant to this Agreement. You agree that
the rights of the new Lender will not be subject to any claims,
defenses or setoffs that you may have against us or the Vendor.”
Shiau initialed the page containing this provision and signed the
loan agreement, thereby consenting to its terms. While such
provisions are enforceable under California Uniform Commercial
Code section 9403, certain exceptions are laid out in California
Uniform Commercial Code section 3305, including “fraud in the
inducement.” (Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. B.C.B.U.
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 493, 504; see Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3305,
subd. (a)(1)(C).) We find that we need not determine whether
this provision of the loan agreement is enforceable in this matter,
as the remarketing letter does not, as a matter of law, affect the
contractual relationship between the parties, nor have appellants
raised a triable issue of material fact as to fraudulent
inducement.
12
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, a party should
be joined in litigation if “(1) in his absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to
a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.” If a
party fits one of the above descriptions, the trial court then
determines whether the party is indispensable. (City of San
Diego v. San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 69, 83.)
In determining whether a party is indispensable to
litigation, the trial court considers the following factors: “‘(1) to
what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might
be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence
will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant
will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.’” (City of San Diego v. San Diego City Employees’
Retirement System, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 83-84.) After
considering these factors, the court must “‘determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.’” (Id. at
p. 83.)
13
When there is a defect or misjoinder of parties to litigation,
the party against whom the complaint has been filed may object,
by answer or demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d).)
Appellants here filed no such objection, either in their answer or
by way of demurrer. Further, appellants could have filed a
complaint or cross-complaint naming an indispensable party
pursuant to Code of Civil procedure section 389, and were
entitled to move to dismiss the matter under that statute. (See,
e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 15,
19-22.) Appellants took no such action, nor do they address these
procedures in their briefing to this court. Although an objection
to nonjoinder of an indispensable party may be made at any time,
the court may consider what measure the complaining party
itself took to avoid prejudice. (Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf
Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 370, fn. 11.) Appellants point
to their opposition to Hanmi’s motion for summary judgment as
the first time they raised the issue of Salamander as a potential
indispensable party.
In support of their position that Salamander is an
indispensable party, appellants argue that Hanmi was aware
that TLC had accepted the remarketing letter and that ADS had
returned the equipment to Salamander pursuant to that letter
and the terms of the invoice. Appellants cite no legal authority
suggesting that these facts render Salamander an indispensable
party. Further, appellants fail to articulate how the joinder of
Salamander would create a triable issue of material fact as to
appellants’ obligations under the loan agreement. As set forth
above, the terms of the loan agreement were not affected by the
remarketing letter as a matter of law. Hanmi was not required
to seek redress against Salamander, as Salamander had no legal
14
obligations under the loan agreement, and Hanmi had no legal
relationship with Salamander. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to consider Salamander an indispensable
party.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each party will bear their own
costs of appeal.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
________________________
LUI, P. J.
________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.
15
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.