CourtListener 10005759•In re J.P. CA2/6
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Filed 7/17/24 In re J.P. CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re J.P., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B332922
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 2018022666)
Law. (Ventura County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In a petition filed under Welfare & Institutions Code
section 6021, J.P. was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187)
and the enhancement allegation that he personally used a
firearm. (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d).) He was 17 years old
All statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions
1
Code, unless otherwise stated.
at the time of the alleged offense. After a hearing, the juvenile
court ordered appellant transferred to the superior court. (§ 707,
subd. (a).) Appellant contends the order is not supported by
substantial evidence. We affirm.
Facts of the Offense
On July 1, 2018, an acquaintance hosted a 17th
birthday party for appellant at a hotel in Oxnard. Among the
guests were Hector Solarez, appellant’s 15-year-old girlfriend,
C.E., her 19-year-old sister, G.E., and G.E.’s boyfriend, Edwin
Zavala. The party guests listened to music and drank alcohol.
An argument erupted around 10:00 p.m. after G.E. told everyone
to quiet down. Solarez brandished a gun and challenged Zavala
to a fight. Appellant took the gun from Solarez. G.E. told Solarez
to leave and he did. Both Edwin and appellant also left.
G.E. invited some other friends, including the victim,
Donald Reyes, to the hotel room. Appellant and Solarez, who
both seemed to be intoxicated, returned to the room around 3:00
a.m. Solarez insisted on retrieving a bottle of alcohol he had
brought to the party. G.E. offered to get it for him.
In the meantime, Solarez and Donald Reyes got into
an argument. G.E. intervened, trying to prevent a fight.
Appellant was standing behind G.E. He pulled the gun out of his
waistband, reached around G.E. and fired at Reyes three times,
killing him. He then fled the scene with Solarez.
Following his arrest, appellant initially denied any
involvement in the shooting. He eventually stated that he fired
the gun in self-defense because he saw the victim reaching for
something. Appellant admitted that he disposed of the gun by
burying it near some railroad tracks and that he washed the
clothing he had been wearing that night.
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Facts at Transfer Hearing
Appellant’s first transfer hearing, in September 2018,
resulted in an order transferring him to criminal court. The
parties stipulated that the juvenile case would be reinstated and
the transfer hearing reset in the juvenile court. That hearing
was held in March 2021 and again resulted in an order
transferring the case to criminal court. We denied appellant’s
petition for extraordinary writ. (J.P. v. Superior Court, B312478,
rev. den. Oct. 27, 2021, S271044.)
Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended
the legal standard for transfer proceedings, raising the burden of
proof and clarifying the factors the court is required to consider in
deciding a transfer petition. (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) The
superior court stayed proceedings and remanded the matter to
the juvenile court for a third transfer hearing conducted under
the new standard. This appeal follows the juvenile court’s third
determination that appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation
while under juvenile court jurisdiction and that the matter
should be transferred to the superior court.
Appellant’s Family Circumstances and Social History
The third transfer hearing included evidence of
appellant’s family circumstances, social history and cognitive
development. Appellant was repeatedly physically and
emotionally abused by his step-father. His mother testified she
was not able to protect appellant from her husband because she
was afraid he would inform immigration of her legal status and
that he might harm appellant even more.
The family moved frequently, leading appellant to
attend three different elementary schools. He was diagnosed
with a learning disability and had an individual education plan
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(IEP). Appellant attended Oxnard High School but was three
years behind his grade level. His IQ is estimated to be between
71 and 80. He has been diagnosed with Other Specified Trauma-
Related Disorder, Cannabis Use Disorder, Alcohol Use Disorder,
and borderline intellectual functioning.
The family’s last move brought them to a
neighborhood with frequent shootings. Around the same time,
appellant became friends with Solarez who was four years his
senior. Appellant’s mother believed that Solarez had a negative
effect on appellant’s behavior. His grades got worse and he
became more rebellious at home.
Appellant’s Conduct in Custody
Within the first three weeks after his detention in the
juvenile facility, appellant received three write-ups for fighting,
one of which he was alleged to have started. He was also
disciplined for three minor infractions. While in custody,
appellant graduated from high school and participated in
individual therapy and four rehabilitative programs. He was also
chosen to work in the laundry and the canteen.
Authorities transferred appellant to adult jail on his
18th birthday. In the first 16 months of his incarceration,
appellant received 9 disciplinary write-ups for fighting,
possession of contraband, tampering with a security device and
receiving tattoos. Over the next four months, appellant accrued
13 major incident reports. Two of these involved battery on other
inmates. Two others involved the manufacture and consumption
of jail-made alcohol.
Expert Testimony
Dr. Blake Carmichael, a clinical psychologist at UC
Davis Children’s Hospital, was retained by the prosecution and
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opined that appellant was not fit for treatment under juvenile
jurisdiction. He concluded appellant should be transferred to
criminal court based on the severity of the offense, the criminal
sophistication he exhibited and the likelihood that he would not
be rehabilitated before expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction.
In evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by appellant, Carmichael noted in his written report
that the shooting itself appeared not to have been planned.
However, appellant possessed the gun for several hours
beforehand, providing him time to consider whether he needed to
have it or use it. Appellant demonstrated some sophistication
when he disposed of the gun soon after the shooting and washed
the clothes he had been wearing. He and Solarez appeared to
have coordinated a story about the shooting to deceive law
enforcement.
In evaluating the likelihood that appellant would be
rehabilitated before the expiration of juvenile jurisdiction,
Carmichael opined there was not enough time left for
rehabilitation given appellant’s age. Personal factors including
appellant’s cognitive abilities, lack of self-awareness, history of
chronic abuse and trauma, absence of family support indicated he
was less likely to be rehabilitated. Carmichael noted that
appellant only succeeded at school when he was in custody,
indicating that he needed an “external locus of control” to change
his behavior. “Relying on external or situational factors, rather
than adopting a genuine desire/motivation to change, detracts
from an amenability or investment in rehabilitation.” Appellant’s
conduct in custody, including the incident reports and his tattoos,
indicated that he was becoming more entrenched in a gang
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lifestyle. This also weighed against rehabilitation and in favor of
transfer to criminal court.
Deputy Probation Officer Danielle Matsuda testified
that the probation department evaluated appellant in 2018 and
again in 2023. On each occasion, the department recommended
that appellant be transferred to criminal court based on the
seriousness of the offense and the degree of criminal
sophistication appellant demonstrated. Officer Matsuda
acknowledged, however, that it was possible appellant could
rehabilitate. The department’s report noted that his behavior in
custody had been mostly compliant, that he had performed
satisfactorily in high school before his detention, and that his
family was willing to help him rehabilitate.
Dolores Barnett is the supervisor of programming at
the county’s Secured Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF). She
testified that, in addition to high school and a college program, all
youth at the SYTF have access to evidence-based “mental health
services . . . substance abuse, health classes, relationship
programming, domestic violence prevention programming . . . and
. . . reentry programs . . . .” The facility also has programming
specifically directed toward gang-involved youth.
Dr. Rahn Minagawa, a clinical psychologist retained
by the defense, testified about adolescent psychology, substance
abuse, gang involvement and the developmental aspects of
trauma. He recommended against transfer to criminal court
because he opined appellant was amenable to rehabilitation. The
defense also retained Dr. Elizabeth Cauffman, a developmental
psychologist. She testified about adolescent development and
criminal recidivism, noting that, “over time what we see is most
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youth desist from criminal behavior,” by the time they reach age
25. She also acknowledged that some youth continue offending.
The Juvenile Court’s Order
The juvenile court found the prosecution had carried
its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
appellant is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. It found that some of the
section 707 factors weighed against transfer to criminal court,
including appellant’s minimal prior delinquent history and the
success of previous attempts at rehabilitation. The criminal
sophistication factor also weighed against transfer because the
offense was not “terribly sophisticated,” and “wasn’t planned in
advance.” Appellant did not “wait in hiding” or commit the crime
in a “covert manner. He didn’t bring the weapon to the hotel
room.”
The remaining two factors were the “most heavily
weighed factors in the Court’s position.” First, the court found
the circumstances and gravity of the offense weighed in favor of
transfer. The court emphasized that appellant “was the actual
shooter. He was not a get-away driver; he was not someone who
took [part] in the conspiracy. He was the actual shooter. The
argument which led to the shooting was relatively minor. He was
not the main person involved in the verbal argument; he stepped
in before the shots were fired.”
Finally, the court concluded appellant was not likely
to rehabilitate before juvenile jurisdiction expires. The juvenile
court acknowledged that the probation department believed it
was possible to rehabilitate appellant and that appellant had
shown potential for growth by graduating from high school,
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working with canines and working as a laundry person and in the
canteen.
The juvenile court concluded, however, that appellant
had regressed while in adult custody. His inability to “at least
abstain from engaging in a battery while this matter was
pending,” in the juvenile court’s view, was “not consistent with
someone his age with the trajectory that in plus or minus three
years, he’s going to be rehabilitated.” His behavior in custody
was not, in the court’s judgment, consistent with growth and
better decision making. The court also noted that appellant had
affiliated with a gang while in jail, engaged in fights and
possessed a weapon. The juvenile court concluded this factor
favored transfer to adult court because, “the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.”
Contentions
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s finding that
he is not amenable to rehabilitation was not supported by
substantial evidence. He further contends the juvenile court did
not properly apply the amenability criterion in ordering his
transferred to the criminal court.
Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s determination to
transfer a minor to criminal court for abuse of discretion. (J.N. v.
Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 (J.N.).) “The
court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and
its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] A decision
based on insufficient evidence or the court’s ‘“erroneous
understanding of applicable law”’ is subject to reversal.” (Kevin
P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187 (Kevin P.).)
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Discussion
The ultimate question in a transfer petition is
whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation before the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction expires. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); In re E.P. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) To order a minor’s transfer to superior
court, the juvenile court must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation prior to
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3).) In making that determination, the juvenile court must
consider five specific factors: “(A)(i) [t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor. . . . (B)(i) Whether the
minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction. (ii) When evaluating the criterion specified in
clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow
and mature. (C)(i) The minor’s previous delinquent history. . . .
(D)(i) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor. . . . (E)(i) The circumstances and gravity
of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by
the minor.” (Ibid.) The court is required to “recite the basis for
its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall
include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.” (Ibid.)
The prosecution bears the burden to produce evidence
of the rehabilitation programs available to the minor and
whether sufficient time remains in the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction for the minor to be rehabilitated. (J.N., supra, 23
Cal.App.5th at p. 721.) “Given the Legislature’s refocusing on
minors’ amenability to rehabilitation, expert testimony will likely
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be necessary for a complete analysis. . . . ‘Since the dispositive
question is the minor’s amenability to treatment through the
facilities available to the juvenile court, testimony of experts that
the minor can be treated by those facilities is entitled to great
weight in the court’s ultimate determination. Moreover, if the
court otherwise decided that the [juvenile court] program was
best suited to the needs of the minor, it could hold him unfit if
those experts testified that rehabilitation might require
treatment beyond the date of his mandatory discharge.’” (In re
S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1286-1287, quoting Jimmy H. v.
Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709, 714-715.) While the court
must consider each of the criteria listed in section 707, the weight
given to each criterion “‘is within the court’s discretion’ . . . .”
(Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.)
Appellant contends the transfer order is not
supported by substantial evidence because the prosecution did
not introduce expert testimony regarding the programs available
to him in the juvenile system, why they were unlikely to result in
his rehabilitation, or why they would take longer more than three
years to rehabilitate him. The record, however, includes
substantial evidence supporting the finding that appellant was
not amenable to timely rehabilitation.
Probation officers Matsuda and Barnett described
both the programs appellant had participated in while in juvenile
custody and those that would be available to him at the county’s
Secure Youth Training Facility. These included post-secondary
education, mental health care, and cognitive behavioral health
programs relating to aggression, peer influences, behavioral
triggers and substance abuse. The court also heard testimony
that, while in juvenile custody, appellant had graduated from
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high school, participated in a dog training program and worked
in both the laundry and the canteen. Finally, the trial court
considered evidence of appellant’s conduct while in adult custody,
including evidence that he had been in several fights and
possessed weapons.
The prosecution’s expert witness, Dr. Carmichael,
opined that it would be “very challenging” to rehabilitate
appellant in the time remaining before expiration of juvenile
court jurisdiction. He based this opinion on several factors,
including the “risk factors” associated with appellant’s family
circumstances and history of abuse as well as his behavior while
in juvenile and adult custody. Carmichael was concerned that
appellant appeared to lack motivation to engage with services
and improve. Because he believed appellant was “reliant on
external forces to make significant decisions,” Carmichael opined
it was less likely that treatment would result in “sustained
improvement.” By the time of the 2023 hearing, appellant had
been in adult custody for two years. During that time, he
engaged in several fights, possessed weapons, made and
consumed alcohol and received gang tattoos. Carmichael noted
that appellant continued to associate with a gang and opined that
the loss of those two years for treatment made it even less likely
he could be rehabilitated before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
expired.
Appellant contends the juvenile court did not
properly apply the amenability criterion because it focused on his
behavior while in adult custody. But appellant’s behavior in
custody was only one of the factors the juvenile court considered.
Section 707 does not require the juvenile court to
focus exclusively on expert testimony regarding amenability to
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rehabilitation. (In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 416-417.)
Instead, the statute mandates that the juvenile court consider
each of the enumerated criteria and that, in evaluating whether
the minor can be rehabilitated, it “shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to the minor’s potential
to grown and mature.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).)
The juvenile court’s lengthy remarks demonstrate
that it fully complied with the statute. It expressly addressed
each of the statutory criteria. The juvenile court explained that
evidence of appellant’s behavior in adult custody was relevant to
the determination of whether appellant was amenable to
rehabilitation. “One predictor of future conduct is looking at the
past. He did well five years ago in a certain facility,” but he had
“somewhat regressed” while in adult custody. Appellant’s
inability to abstain from fighting while the transfer motion was
pending was one fact indicating to the juvenile court that
appellant was unlikely to be rehabilitated. This reasoning is
consistent with section 707 and was not error.
Conclusion
The trial court’s order of October 5, 2023,
transferring this matter to the superior court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
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Ferdinand D. Inumerable, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, Thomas
Hartnett, Snr. Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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