CourtListener 10005756•People v. Castillo CA4/1
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Filed 7/17/24 P. v. Castillo CA4/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082186
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF004916)
MIGUEL ANGEL CASTILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County,
Monica Lepe-Negrete, Judge. Affirmed.
Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A
Sevidal and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Miguel Angel Castillo appeals from a judgment following his conviction
on one count of second degree murder under Penal Code1 section 187,
subdivision (a). Castillo argues the conviction should be reversed because the
trial court prejudicially erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter. In his view, the record contains
evidence showing he was provoked or acted in imperfect self-defense. The
Attorney General contends an instruction on the lesser included offense was
not warranted because neither provocation nor imperfect self-defense was
supported by substantial evidence. We agree and affirm the conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of August 5, 2021, two friends, K.A. and G.G., were at
G.G.’s grandmother’s house. Castillo lived across the street and invited them
over to his house. K.A. did not know Castillo well having only spent time
with him on two or three occasions in the week prior to August 5, 2021. Each
time K.A. was with Castillo, G.G. was present as Castillo and G.G. were
involved in a romantic relationship. K.A. had a previous conflict with
Castillo’s sister and was uncomfortable being at Castillo’s house. To make
K.A. feel more comfortable, Castillo suggested inviting C.L., the victim, over
to join them because K.A. and C.L. had been friends since elementary school.
Castillo and C.L. had been together earlier that day at C.L.’s grandmother’s
house. K.A. agreed, and Castillo called C.L. and invited him over.
After C.L. arrived at Castillo’s house, the group drank beer and took
Xanax. At some point, K.A. and C.L. left in Castillo’s mother’s car to drive
around Brawley. While they were driving, C.L. asked K.A. to take him
somewhere. K.A. said she felt uncomfortable taking C.L. where he wanted to
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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go because she had been drinking, did not have her driver’s license, and had
seen many police officers around. K.A. said that they should go back to
Castillo’s house. C.L. was upset because K.A. would not take him where he
wanted to go. During this conversation, C.L. pulled a gun out from under the
passenger side seat and pointed it at K.A., threatening to shoot her. After
C.L. put the gun away, K.A. and C.L. returned to Castillo’s house.
Once back at Castillo’s house, C.L. stayed in the car while K.A. went
inside and told G.G. that C.L. had pointed a gun at her and that she wanted
to go home. Castillo was in the room and heard K.A. tell G.G. about the gun
incident in the car. In response, when C.L. eventually joined the group
inside, Castillo said he wanted to talk to C.L. outside. Castillo and C.L. went
out into the backyard while K.A. and G.G. stayed inside the house. K.A. later
testified that she heard C.L. and Castillo arguing outside. After only a few
seconds, K.A. went out into the backyard where she saw C.L. backed against
a fence, hunched over, and clutching his upper left chest while Castillo stood
in front of him with a kitchen knife in his hand. K.A. did not see Castillo
stick a knife into C.L.’s chest, but K.A. reported that Castillo appeared to be
enraged and that C.L. was not making any aggressive movements towards
Castillo or attempting to fight back.
C.L. appeared to be in pain and immediately left Castillo’s house while
clutching his chest. C.L. ran a few blocks back to the home where he lived
with his grandmother, M.V. M.V. heard yelling coming from her front yard.
She investigated the noise and found C.L. leaning against a parked vehicle in
their neighbor’s driveway. When M.V. asked what was happening, C.L.
replied, “Nah, nah, I’m dying, I’m dying.” C.L. then collapsed in the front
yard. M.V. called 911.
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A responding officer arrived and found C.L. lying on the ground next to
a telephone pole. C.L. was having a hard time breathing and was bleeding
from his chest and mouth. C.L. identified Castillo as the one who had done
this to him. Shortly after, C.L. died from a single stab wound that penetrated
his heart. A responding officer found a steak knife in C.L.’s left shirt pocket.
Castillo was charged with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). At
trial, the jury acquitted him of first degree murder and convicted him of
second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).
DISCUSSION
Castillo contends that the court committed prejudicial error by failing
to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter
based on provocation or imperfect self-defense. We disagree. As we explain
post, substantial evidence was not presented at trial that Castillo was
provoked or acted with the unreasonable belief in the need to defend himself.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Our high court has settled that in a criminal case the trial court must
instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised
by the evidence regardless of whether the instruction was requested.
(People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 181.) If the evidence raises a
question of whether all of the elements of the charged offense were satisfied
and the question is material enough to merit consideration by the jury, it is
error for a trial court not to instruct on a lesser included offense.
(See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 (Breverman).)
However, the trial court should instruct on a lesser included offense
only when there is substantial evidence on which a jury could reasonably
conclude that the defendant committed the lesser uncharged offense as
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opposed to the greater charged offense. (People v. Nelson (2016)
1 Cal.5th 513, 538 (Nelson).) The substantial evidence requirement is not
satisfied by just any type of evidence regardless of its weakness. (See ibid.)
Evidence that is minimal, insubstantial, or would require the jury to make
speculative inferences about the case is insufficient to require an instruction
on a lesser included offense. (See People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132.)
We review de novo the question of whether the trial court improperly
failed to instruct on a lesser included offense (People v. Souza (2012)
54 Cal.4th 90, 113), and in deciding the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defendant. (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
The courts should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses when deciding if
there is substantial evidence of a lesser offense. (Breverman, supra,
19 Cal.4th 162.)
B. Voluntary Manslaughter Based on Heat of Passion
“ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.’ (§ 187, subd. (a).) ‘Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice.’ (§ 192, subd. (a).) Manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of murder, and a defendant who commits an intentional and
unlawful killing but who lacks malice is guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Heat of passion is one of the mental states that precludes the formation of
malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter.”
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 538; see Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 154.) Heat of passion is “caused by legally sufficient provocation that
causes a person to act, not out of rational thought but out of unconsidered
reaction to the provocation.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.)
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Our Supreme Court has explained that a heat of passion theory of
voluntary manslaughter has two components, an objective component and a
subjective component. (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 (Moye).)
Under both elements, provocation may occur over a period of time (People v.
Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 571–572) and may be anything that arouses
intense fear, anger, or jealousy. (People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
1688, 1704 (Fenenbock).)
We look first at the subjective component. Our high court has
explained that to prove the subjective element, the defendant “must be shown
to have killed while under ‘the actual influence of a strong passion’ induced
by such provocation.” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 550; see Nelson, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 539.) The court emphasized that heat of passion is not
satisfied when the defendant is provoked then later kills. (Nelson, at p. 539.)
Castillo argues that he confronted C.L. immediately upon learning of
C.L.’s threat to K.A. Additionally, K.A. testified that she heard Castillo and
C.L. arguing. When K.A. went outside, Castillo appeared to be “enraged” and
looked “mad and angry.” This evidence suggests that Castillo was provoked
at the time he killed C.L. Therefore, Castillo did provide some evidence that
he satisfied the subjective element for heat of passion.
But, even if we presume Castillo’s reason was actually obscured as a
result of a strong passion, the record does not reflect sufficient evidence that
a reasonable person would feel provoked to respond with that level of passion
under these circumstances.
As previously noted, to satisfy the objective element, the defendant’s
heat of passion must be due to “sufficient provocation.” (Moye, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 550.) The provocation must be caused by the victim. (Id. at
pp. 549–550.) Provocation is legally sufficient when such provocation would
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induce a person of average disposition to react as a result of passion and not
from judgment. (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 539.) Heat of passion is
sufficient to negate malice because a person in this state simply reacts from
emotion due to the provocation without exercising sound deliberation or
judgment. (Ibid.)
There is no evidence that C.L. directly provoked feelings of intense fear,
anger or jealousy in Castillo. (Fenenbock, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1704.)
Castillo contends that C.L. being armed and aggravated after threatening to
shoot K.A. in the car serves as a basis for proving provocation. However, the
record does not contain any evidence that C.L. directed any of his threats to
or aggravation with K.A. at Castillo. Instead, when K.A. told G.G. and
Castillo about what had happened with C.L. in the car, C.L. remained
outside. When C.L. did reenter the house, there is no evidence that he came
inside brandishing a gun or making threats towards anyone in the group.
Rather, C.L. rejoined the group and Castillo immediately asked to talk to
C.L. outside.
Additionally, the evidence shows that Castillo lacked an emotional
connection with K.A. and that he was not present when C.L. made threats to
K.A. in the car. Castillo and K.A. were practically strangers having only
spent time together on two or three occasions, with their only real connection
to each other being their mutual friend G.G. When Castillo stabbed C.L.,
K.A. had only known Castillo for less than a week. While K.A. admitted to
being scared when C.L. threatened her with a gun in the car, once back in
Castillo’s home K.A. did not ask either Castillo or G.G. for help or express
any continuing concern for her safety. Rather, K.A. simply asked to go home.
And, ultimately, she did not even insist on leaving immediately; instead, she
decided to remain at Castillo’s house. Thus, K.A., the person at whom C.L.’s
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threat was directed, did not appear to be significantly emotionally affected by
C.L.’s actions. Castillo was only a third party to the situation. Without
further evidence, we cannot say a reasonable person in his shoes would have
felt particularly inflamed by the information that K.A. shared.
Furthermore, the situation in its entirety lacked a sense of urgency.
C.L.’s threat to K.A. happened while they were alone in a car and away from
Castillo’s house. Thus, C.L.’s threat to K.A. occurred well before either
Castillo or G.G. were aware of it. When K.A. informed G.G. and Castillo of
the threat, C.L. remained outside Castillo’s house. Instead of immediately
pursuing C.L., Castillo waited until C.L. returned inside before asking to talk
with him. Under these circumstances, where the threat was made to
someone with whom Castillo did not share a close relationship, no current
threat existed at the moment Castillo argued he was provoked, the victim of
the threat, K.A., was not unduly upset about it, and C.L. was known to be
armed, we cannot say a person of average disposition exercising sound
deliberation would be induced to react rashly and instigate a confrontation.
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 539.) Therefore, we conclude there was
insufficient evidence in the record to warrant a voluntary manslaughter
instruction based upon heat of passion.
C. Voluntary Manslaughter Based on Imperfect Self-Defense
Imperfect self-defense also reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter.
(People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 970.) When the trier of fact finds that a
defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but
unreasonably, believed they were in imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice, the mental
state required for murder. (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1048.)
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Therefore, the defendant cannot be convicted of a crime greater
than voluntary manslaughter. (Ibid.)
Castillo makes two arguments to support that he acted in imperfect
self-defense. First, Castillo contends that C.L. was armed and became angry
when he confronted C.L. about the threat made to K.A. Second, Castillo
contends that after he stabbed C.L., and the perceived threat of C.L.’s anger
had subsided, Castillo did not continue to pursue C.L. showing that his
actions were only defensive.
First, we consider Castillo’s argument that evidence of C.L. being
armed and angry was sufficient to cause Castillo to unreasonably fear for his
life and act in imperfect self-defense. To satisfy imperfect self-defense, the
defendant’s fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.
(People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 345.)
Castillo does not present any evidence that C.L.’s anger after being
confronted led him to actually believe his life was in imminent peril.
Additionally, while there was evidence that C.L. was armed with both a gun
and steak knife on August 5, 2021, the record does not indicate that C.L. took
out either weapon during his interaction with Castillo, much less brandished
one or the other in a menacing or threatening manner. In fact, the
responding officer found the steak knife in the breast pocket of C.L.’s shirt,
which suggests that C.L. never removed the knife from his pocket or
attempted to use it against Castillo during their confrontation. No gun was
found on C.L.’s person. Further, Castillo relies on the presence of
methamphetamine in C.L.’s system to emphasize that C.L. was acting
“aggressive and angry” as a result of the drugs. However, there is no
indication in the record that Castillo knew of C.L.’s drug use at the time of
the stabbing, so there was no basis for Castillo to have a heightened concern
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about C.L.’s behavior. Without further factual support, we cannot conclude
that C.L.’s anger, possession of weapons, or drug use caused Castillo to
believe that he had to stab C.L. to defend against imminent peril or great
bodily injury. (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1166.)
Additionally, the scene K.A. described when she walked outside and
observed C.L. and Castillo suggests that C.L. was put in a disadvantaged
position for ambush. Even if C.L. was angry about being confronted by
Castillo, within seconds of going outside, Castillo had backed C.L. up against
a fence and then stabbed him. The nature of this confrontation does not
support the conclusion that Castillo was acting from a position of defense.
We also are not persuaded by Castillo’s argument that the fact that he
did not pursue C.L. shows that his actions were solely defensive. Castillo did
not provide any authority stating that the decision not to pursue a victim as
they flee from a scene is a sufficient basis for giving an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. Castillo may have
not pursued C.L. following the stabbing for a number of reasons. Absent any
authority or further factual findings, we do not find Castillo’s decision to not
pursue C.L. alone a sufficient basis to require instruction.
Thus, we conclude the record did not contain sufficient evidence of
provocation or imperfect self-defense to support a voluntary manslaughter
instruction.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
CASTILLO, J.
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