In re J.M. CA5

CourtListener 10004510CalctappJul 16, 2024

Full text

Filed 7/16/24 In re J.M. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re J.M., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F087566
HUMAN SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. JD142247-00)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. OPINION
V.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Susan M. Gill,
Judge.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Carissa A. Edwards, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and DeSantos, J.
V.R. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her now
three-year-old son, J.M. (son), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1
Mother’s sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by finding the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA))2 did not apply to the proceedings
because the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) failed to make
adequate initial and further inquiry into whether son was potentially an Indian child
within the meaning of ICWA. The department concedes error, and that remand is
appropriate for the limited purpose of ensuring ICWA inquiry compliance.
We accept the department’s concession and remand the matter to ensure ICWA
inquiry compliance.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
On July 2, 2021, the department received a referral that mother and son’s father,
I.M. (father), engaged in domestic violence when son was nearly four months old. The
family had an open dependency case concerning mother and father’s daughter, A.M.
(daughter), who was detained in 2019. Mother regained custody of daughter in
December 2020, and mother was granted court-ordered family maintenance services.4
After investigating the referral, the children were taken into protective custody
pursuant to a protective custody warrant. While locating the children to take them into

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
3 Since the sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA, we primarily restrict our facts to
those bearing on that issue.
4 Daughter is not the subject of this appeal, and therefore she will only be
mentioned as necessary. Ultimately, another planned permanent living arrangement was
ordered for daughter.

2.
protective custody, the department had contact with various family members, including
paternal great-grandparents, paternal grandmother, D.H., and maternal aunt, R.M.
Maternal grandmother and mother’s siblings were in the hospital recovering from a car
accident.
The department filed a petition alleging son came within the provisions of
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) based on the parents’ history of ongoing domestic
violence, including four incidents in May and June 2021. On the department’s
ICWA-010(A) form attached to the petition, the social worker stated she had not yet been
able to complete the inquiry about son’s Indian ancestry status but did not explain why.
For the detention hearing, which took place on July 23 and July 26, 2021, father
filed an ICWA-020 form stating he had no Indian ancestry. Mother, however, did not file
an ICWA-020 form. The juvenile court found father to be son’s presumed father. At the
July 26 hearing, the court asked mother and father whether anyone in their families ever
told them they might have Indian or Alaskan Eskimo heritage, and both replied, “No.”
The court found ICWA did not apply because there was no reason to believe son was an
Indian child. The court ordered son detained from mother and father.
Prior to the jurisdiction hearing, the department filed an amended petition, which
added an allegation under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that mother had an extensive
criminal history of alcohol abuse dating back to 2014, which was unresolved, and mother
tested positive for ethyl glucuronide, which indicated she recently consumed alcohol.
The department’s report for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing stated that the
juvenile court found ICWA did not apply on July 26, 2021. In an interview with the
social worker, mother stated that maternal grandfather, with whom mother had a close
relationship, moved to Mexico when she was two months old and continued to reside
there. Mother mentioned the car accident that maternal grandmother and mother’s
siblings were involved in and stated they were getting better.

3.
At the November 2021 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the
first amended petition’s allegations true after the parents submitted on the department’s
report.
In the department’s report for the disposition hearing, the social worker stated that
mother and father, who were born in California, were of Hispanic descent with no known
American Indian or Eskimo heritage, and the maternal and paternal grandmothers lived
locally. Maternal grandfather lived in Mexico, while father did not have contact with
son’s paternal grandfather. In searching for relatives for placement, the social worker
identified 35 maternal relatives and 14 paternal relatives, including children and deceased
relatives, and mailed information to relatives about requesting placement. The social
worker emailed an orientation link to maternal grandmother and spoke with paternal
grandmother, maternal great-cousin Y.J., maternal great-aunt R.M., and maternal
second cousin Natalie, with whom son was placed in September 2021.
The disposition hearing was held in March 2022. After hearing some testimony
from mother, the juvenile court followed the department’s recommendation to deny
mother and father family reunification services as to son under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10). A section 366.26 hearing was set for July 8, 2022.
In the department’s report for the section 366.26 hearing, the department stated
that son’s caregivers wanted to adopt him. When addressing son’s contact with other
family members, the department also reported that paternal great-grandparents, with
whom daughter was placed, provided childcare for son, paternal grandparents visited the
children at paternal great-grandparents’ home, and maternal grandmother had been
supervising mother’s visits with son.
The section 366.26 hearing was continued to August 19, 2022. Four days before
the hearing, mother filed a section 388 petition asking for family maintenance services or
six months of additional family reunification services. Mother asserted as changed
circumstances that she completed multiple programs, and it was in son’s best interest to

4.
provide her with services. The juvenile court set the section 388 petition to be heard on
the same day as the section 366.26 hearing.
The juvenile court continued both hearings to October 13, 2022. Maternal
grandmother, paternal great-grandfather, and paternal grandmother testified at the
October 13 hearing. The hearing was continued to November 14, 2022, and mother and
maternal grandmother testified at that hearing. At the hearing’s conclusion, the court
granted the section 388 petition and ordered son returned to mother’s custody with family
maintenance services.
Less than five months later, on April 3, 2023, the department filed a section 387
supplemental petition alleging the previous disposition was ineffective because mother
continued to engage in domestic violence with father and consume alcohol. Son was
taken into protective custody pursuant to a protective custody warrant.
The department spoke with relatives about the allegations, including maternal
second cousin Natalie, maternal grandmother, paternal great-grandparents, and paternal
grandmother. During the April 5, 2023 detention hearing on the section 387 petition,
which mother but not father attended, the juvenile court ordered son detained from the
parents and set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing for May 12, 2023. The court asked
mother if she had learned “anything new” about any Indian heritage in her family, and
mother replied she had not. The court stated there was no reason to change its earlier
finding that there was no reason to know or believe the children were Indian children.
On April 6, 2023, father emailed the social worker and asked if there was a form
he needed to fill out if his children “ ‘have Indian in them,’ ” and reported that he had
“ ‘59[ percent] Indian in me.’ ” The social worker provided him with an ICWA-020
form. The department’s report for the jurisdiction hearing detailed the subsequent efforts
the department made to identify potential Indian ancestry. On April 7, 2023, a social
worker began calling relatives asking about Indian ancestry. Paternal grandmother D.H.
reported possible Indian ancestry through paternal great-grandfather O.H., which he

5.
learned of through a DNA test. D.H. had not heard family members speak of possible
Indian ancestry prior to the DNA results, but she believed her mother might have
ancestry as she has “ ‘Cherokee features in her face.’ ”
Paternal great-grandfather O.H. told the social worker he had Native American
ancestry in the Yaqui tribe, but he did not know who the ancestry was through. He took a
DNA test which stated he was 59 percent Native American. Prior to the DNA test, he
had not heard about Native American ancestry in the family but said his sister, Do.H.,
would know more about that. Paternal great-grandaunt Do.H. said a DNA test revealed
Native American ancestry, which possibly was Yaqui through her mother, Je.H., and
Je.H.’s father, Antonio. Je.H. was alive, but had dementia, and Antonio was deceased.
Do.H. believed the ancestry is Mexican native, but she could not be sure, and to her
knowledge, no one was an enrolled member of a tribe. Paternal great-aunt R.G., who was
paternal grandfather Frank’s sister, and paternal great-grandmother J.H. said there was no
Indian ancestry in the family.
For the maternal family, maternal second cousin Natalie stated that her father and
maternal grandmother had the same parents and there was no Indian ancestry in the
family. Maternal grandmother stated there was no Indian ancestry in her family and to
her knowledge, maternal grandfather did not have any such ancestry. The social worker
mailed maternal grandfather an ICWA inquiry. Phone messages were left for maternal
aunt, M.I., and maternal great-aunt, R.M. The social worker mailed ICWA inquiry letters
to 45 maternal and paternal family members, but the record does not indicate if the
department received any responses.
At the end of April 2023, paternal great-aunt Stephanie filed a relative information
form stating she wanted to help care for son, which listed presumably paternal
uncle Robert as another relative who might be able to help with son, along with his
contact information. Another relative information form listed paternal aunt S.O. and her
phone number as someone who might be able to help.

6.
The combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held in July 2023. The
parents, maternal grandmother, and paternal great-grandparents were present at the
hearing. The juvenile court found the allegations of the section 387 petition true, denied
the parents reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing for October 30, 2023,
which was later continued to January 2, 2024. The court also granted section 388
petitions filed by paternal great-grandfather, paternal great-grandmother, and paternal
grandmother requesting visitation with son. Despite the department’s recitation in the
report of its efforts to inquire into father’s claim of Indian ancestry, the court did not
address ICWA or revisit its finding that ICWA did not apply.
The department’s report for the section 366.26 hearing confirmed son and
daughter were residing with maternal second cousin Natalie. Natalie wanted to adopt
son, but she was not ready to adopt daughter as daughter had behavioral problems that
required more intensive services. Mother attended 27 of a possible 52 visits with the
children, and the department assessed their relationship with mother as minimal.
Regarding ICWA, the department reported that the juvenile court found on
July 26, 2021, that it had no reason to believe son was or may be a member of or eligible
for membership in a federally recognized tribe, and there was no reason to know he was
an Indian child. The department recognized the finding was made without prejudice, as
the department has a continuing duty of inquiry. Nevertheless, it asserted ICWA did not
apply. The department did not address its prior inquiries into father’s claim of Indian
ancestry or provide evidence of further inquiries. The department continued to report that
father did not have any known Indian heritage.
Mother was present at the section 366.26 hearing. Her attorney objected to the
department’s recommendation to terminate parental rights over son. Mother made a
statement to the juvenile court that she disagreed with the termination of her parental
rights. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that son was likely to be
adopted and terminated parental rights.

7.
DISCUSSION
Under California’s statutory scheme to comply with ICWA, the juvenile court and
county child welfare department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire
whether a child,” who is the subject of a juvenile dependency petition, “is or may be an
Indian child.”5 (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9; Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.481(a).)6 The department’s initial duty of inquiry begins at the referral
stage, when the department must ask “the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether
the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
Once a child is taken into temporary custody, the duty of initial inquiry includes “asking
the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, [and]
others who have an interest in the child … whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child ….” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)7 “Under both ICWA and California law, ‘ “extended
family member[s]” ’ include the child’s ‘grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.’ ”
(In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)

5 An “Indian child” is defined in ICWA as an unmarried individual under 18 years
of age who is either (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or (2) is eligible
for membership in a federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member of
a federally recognized tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903 (4), (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting
federal definitions].)
6 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
7 There is a split of authority among the appellate courts as to whether the initial
duty to inquire includes extended family members in all cases, or only when the child is
removed from parental custody without a protective custody warrant. This issue is
currently under consideration by our Supreme Court in In re Ja.O. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
672, review granted July 26, 2023, S280572. In In re Jerry R. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
388, we concluded the broad duty to inquire of extended family members and others
under section 224.2, subdivision (b) is triggered regardless of whether a child is taken
into temporary custody by a social worker without a warrant or is taken into protective
custody via a warrant. (Jerry R., at pp. 411‒426.) We will follow our decision in
Jerry R. until the Supreme Court provides additional guidance in Ja.O.

8.
At each party’s first appearance in court, the juvenile court must ask each
participant “whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child,” and “instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive
information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (c); see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2024).) The court must also order each parent to
complete a Judicial Council form ICWA-020, Parental Notice of Indian Status.
(Rule 5.481(a)(2)(C) & (a)(3).)
If the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or the department “reason to believe”8
(but not sufficient evidence to determine there is “reason to know”)9 that an Indian child
is involved in a proceeding, “further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the
child” is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2) enumerates
three duties of further inquiry: (1) interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and
extended family members to gather biographical information regarding the child;

8 “There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child
whenever the [juvenile] court, social worker, or probation officer has information
suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or eligibility for
membership includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but does not
establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for reason to know enumerated” in
section 224.2, subdivision (d)(1)–(6). (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
9 The enumerated grounds for “reason to know” are: “(1) A person having an
interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian
organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the child’s extended family
informs the court that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of
the child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska
Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court, Indian
tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information
indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The child who is the subject of the
proceeding gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The
court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[; and/or] [¶] (6) The
court is informed that either parent or the child possess[es] an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d); see
25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c) (2024).)

9.
(2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the State Department of Social
Services for assistance in identifying tribes with whom the child may be affiliated; and
(3) contacting tribes, or any other person who may reasonably be expected to have
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility for membership in a tribe.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)10
If, after further inquiry is conducted, “the [juvenile] court, a social worker, or
probation officer knows or has reason to know … that an Indian child is involved” in the
dependency proceeding, formal notice shall be sent to the child’s parents or legal
guardian, Indian custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe for any hearing that may
culminate in an order for foster care placement, termination of parental rights,
preadoptive placement, or adoptive placement so the tribe may exercise its right to
intervene. (§ 224.3, subd. (a); see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)
The department “is required to document its ICWA inquiry efforts throughout the
proceedings, beginning with the petition, which must be filed with a completed Judicial
Council form ICWA-010(A), Indian Child Inquiry Attachment ([rule] 5.481(a)(1)).” (In
re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 566.) All filings thereafter must include “a
detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status .…” (Rule 5.481(a)(5).)
If the juvenile court finds the department conducted “proper and adequate further
inquiry and due diligence … and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child,” then the court may find that ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2);
rule 5.481(b)(3)(A).) The court must “ensur[e] that the [d]epartment has made an

10 “Contact with a tribe” for the purpose of the department’s duty of further inquiry
“shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail contact to each
tribe’s designated agent for receipt of notices under [ICWA]” and “include sharing
information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
eligibility determination, as well as information on the current status of the child and the
case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)

10.
adequate inquiry under ICWA and California law, and if necessary, the court must
continue the proceedings and order the [d]epartment to fulfill its responsibilities.” (In re
Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 431.) “A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does
not apply implies ‘that social workers had fulfilled their duty of inquiry.’ ” (In re
Dominick D., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that there is no reason to know whether a
child is an Indian child under a substantial evidence standard, and the court’s findings
that the department has conducted a proper and adequate inquiry and used due diligence
for abuse of discretion. (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 600–601 (K.H.); In re
Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005.)11 In assessing prejudice stemming
from an inquiry error, “the focus is on the missed opportunity to uncover relevant
information necessary to make a reliable, informed determination concerning whether the
child is or may be an Indian child.” (K.H., at p. 609.)
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that ICWA does not apply to
this case because: (1) the department did not make an initial inquiry of extended relatives
before father notified the social worker of possible Indian ancestry; (2) although the
department spoke with paternal and maternal relatives after father’s notification, in
compliance with its duty of further inquiry, the department failed to attempt to obtain
information regarding paternal great-grandaunt Do.H.’s claim of Indian ancestry in the
Yaqui tribe through her mother and father, and did not contact the Yaqui tribe or BIA;
and (3) the court did not ensure the department made an adequate inquiry and provided
proper notice to the tribes.

11 There is a split of authority among the courts of appeal regarding how to evaluate
claims of ICWA inquiry error. (See K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 611–618
[summarizing the varied approaches].) Our Supreme Court has granted review on the
issue in In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted September 21, 2022,
S275578. We will apply the standards this court articulated in K.H. until the Supreme
Court provides additional guidance in Dezi C.

11.
The department has responded with a letter brief, which states in relevant part:
“Respondent concedes that the juvenile court may have erred in making a finding under
[ICWA], based upon an inadequate inquiry by the [department],” and “[r]espondent
respectfully requests that the matter be remanded, on conditional reversal, to the juvenile
court to ensure compliance with the inquiry provisions of [ICWA].” As we explain, we
accept the concession.
Initial Duty of Inquiry
Mother first asserts the juvenile court’s finding that there is no reason to know son
is an Indian child is not supported by substantial evidence because the department did not
discharge its initial duty of inquiry before father informed the social worker of potential
Indian ancestry.
The record shows the department and the juvenile court failed to discharge several
duties related to the initial duty of inquiry: (1) the social worker stated on the
ICWA-010(A) form filed with the dependency petition that she was unable to complete
the inquiry about son’s Indian status but did not explain why; although the court asked
the parents at the detention hearing whether anyone told them they might have Indian
heritage, the court did not require mother to complete an ICWA-020 form and did not
ensure the department complied with its duty of asking extended family members about
Indian heritage before finding there was no reason to believe son was an Indian child; and
(3) thereafter, prior to father’s claim of Indian heritage, the department did not document
that it inquired of extended family members about son’s Indian status despite extended
family members being available for interview throughout the case.
Clearly, the department failed to comply with its initial duty of inquiry and the
juvenile court erred in failing to ensure such compliance and in finding there was no
reason to know son is an Indian child and ICWA did not apply at the July 26,
2021 detention hearing. This was error. The department, however, did subsequently
inquire of maternal and paternal extended family members once father informed the

12.
department that he might have Indian heritage, which can serve to fill its duty of initial
inquiry. (In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 176–177 [since the department has a
continuing duty of inquiry, the department may satisfy its duty of inquiry even after the
court finds that ICWA does not apply].) Mother does not contend that the subsequent
inquiry was inadequate to fulfill the department’s initial duty of inquiry.
Duty of Further Inquiry
Mother next contends the department failed to fulfill its duty of further inquiry
once father informed the social worker that he may have Indian ancestry. The duty of
further inquiry arises when there is a reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is
an Indian child, which is shown when there is information suggesting that either the
parent or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
The question is whether the disclosure by paternal great-grandfather and paternal
great-grandaunt that there may be Yaqui ancestry on the paternal grandmother’s side of
the family gave the department and juvenile court “reason to believe” son is an Indian
child.12 The “ ‘reason to believe’ standard requiring further inquiry should be broadly
interpreted.” (In re S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 303, 317.) A report of possible Indian
ancestry is sufficient to trigger the duty of further inquiry, as general ancestral
information is “ ‘essential’ ” to the court’s and department’s “ ‘ “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” ’ ” to “ ‘broadly’ ” construe the duty of further inquiry. (In re

12 Paternal great-grandfather’s DNA test result by itself is arguably of little
usefulness in determining whether son is an Indian child. As explained in In re J.S.
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, since the term “Native American” as used by ancestry.com
includes ethnic origins from North and South America, unless the identity of a tribe or a
specific geographic area of possible ancestry origin is provided, the BIA cannot assist the
department in identifying the tribal agent for any relevant federally recognized tribes.
(Id. at pp. 689‒690.)

13.
E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 147‒148, citing In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275,
295.)
Here, paternal great-grandaunt Do.H. and paternal great-grandfather O.H.
identified the Yaqui tribe as a potential source of Indian heritage. Their claim of Indian
ancestry with the Yaqui tribe was sufficient to establish a reason to believe son may be an
Indian child, thus triggering the duty to conduct further inquiry.13 (§ 224.2, subd. (e); In
re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 743‒744 [the mother’s statements of Blackfeet and
Cherokee heritage and the father’s assertions of Blackfeet, Cherokee, and/or Choctaw
heritage was sufficient to require further inquiry]; In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
388, 404 [the paternal grandmother’s claim she had Cherokee ancestry triggered further
inquiry]; In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 292 [the mother’s ICWA-020 form
indicating Cherokee ancestry on her maternal side and possible Indian ancestry of an
unknown tribe through her paternal grandfather required further inquiry].)
Other than attempting to ask all maternal and paternal relatives whether there was
any Indian heritage in the family, the record does not show the department conducted
further inquiry about son’s potential connection to the Yaqui tribe, such as by contacting
the tribe or BIA, or attempted to obtain information about paternal family members that
would assist the tribe or BIA in identifying whether father or son are eligible for tribal
membership. The department does not discharge its duty of further inquiry until it makes
“a ‘meaningful effort’ to locate and interview extended family members and to contact
BIA and the tribes.” (In re K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.)

13 We note that paternal great-grandaunt Do.H. believed the ancestry was Mexican
native, although she could not be sure. There is one federally recognized Yaqui tribe in
the United States—the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona. (See Indian Entities Recognized
by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs
(89 Fed.Reg. 944 (Jan. 8, 2024).) There would not be a reason to believe that son is an
Indian child if the paternal family’s heritage is from a Yaqui tribe located in Mexico.

14.
Because the department did not adequately investigate the paternal relatives’
claims, the juvenile court erred in failing to revisit its July 26, 2021 finding that ICWA
did not apply, which itself was erroneous due to the inadequate initial inquiry.
Specifically, although the department recited in its report for the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing on the section 387 petition that the paternal relatives had claimed
Yaqui ancestry, the court did not ask the department for updated information about the
results of its inquiry or whether the department contacted the tribe or BIA. The court
therefore abused its discretion by failing to comply with its affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether son may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
Since the juvenile court abused its discretion and further inquiry may “uncover
relevant information” on whether son is an Indian child (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 609), we accept the department’s concession that its inquiry may have been
inadequate, and remand is appropriate so the court may ensure compliance with ICWA’s
inquiry provisions. On remand, the court must exercise its discretion to determine
whether the department’s further inquiry is adequate and the department used due
diligence in a manner consistent with this opinion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s July 26, 2021 finding that ICWA does not apply is
conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions to order the
department to comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in
section 224.2, subdivisions (b) and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an
adequate inquiry was made consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds
that ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and proceed in compliance
with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not
apply, the court shall reinstate its ICWA finding. In all other respects, the court’s order
terminating parental rights is affirmed.

15.

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