In re V.S. CA1/5

CourtListener 10004449CalctappJul 16, 2024

Full text

Filed 7/16/24 In re V.S. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re V.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168829 & A169488
v.
(Marin County
R.S.,
Super. Ct. No. JV26726A)
Defendant and Appellant.

R.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders placing Mother’s
daughter, V.S. (Minor), with the paternal grandparents, and subsequently
terminating Mother’s parental rights. We reject the challenges.

1
BACKGROUND1
“Prior Dependency Proceeding
“In October 2018, Marin County Health and Human Services (the
Department) filed a [Welfare and Institutions Code2] section 300 petition on
behalf of [Minor, then two months old]. The petition alleged Mother ‘has a
longstanding history of alcohol abuse and has been unable to maintain
sobriety for more than a very short period when outside of a residential
treatment program.’ The Department stated Mother was ‘charming, smart,
capable and a very good mother when she is sober,’ but there had already
been multiple incidents of Mother drinking to excess while caring for Minor.
Mother had been to treatment about five times in her life.
“Mother submitted to jurisdiction and the juvenile court ordered
reunification services. Mother received 15 months of reunification services,
during which time she relapsed three times. In February 2020, Mother had
been sober for six months and Minor was returned to her care. Mother
received an additional five months of family maintenance services before
dependency was dismissed in July 2020 with custody to Mother.
“Current Dependency Proceeding
“In October 2022, the Department filed the underlying dependency
petition, alleging Mother had relapsed multiple times since the termination
of the prior proceeding.

1 Much of the relevant background was set forth in an opinion on a

previous appeal, which we quote at length here. We omit background facts
regarding Minor’s father, who is deceased.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

2
“The Department reported Mother first relapsed in the fall of 2020,
while living in New York. In December 2020, a New York court granted
temporary custody of Minor to the paternal grandmother. Mother entered
treatment, and in the fall of 2021, Minor was returned to Mother’s care. In
June 2022, Mother relapsed again. In September, Mother left Minor with the
maternal grandmother in Marin County and entered a treatment program in
Pennsylvania. After the maternal grandmother left Minor with the maternal
grandfather, who was in recovery and relapsed while caring for Minor, the
juvenile court ordered Minor detained and placed in foster care.
“In late November 2022, the juvenile court sustained the petition and
ordered reunification services to Mother, including substance abuse and
mental health services. That month, Mother began drinking daily while
residing in a Marin County sober living home, but initially was able to
conceal the relapse. In December, she was discharged from the sober living
home after staff searched her room and found empty wine bottles and
numerous empty nitrous oxide cannisters. In early January 2023, Mother
told the Department she was staying with her boyfriend in New York. While
out of state, Mother did not engage in services and did not test, despite
multiple testing appointments arranged by the Department. She later told
the Department she was drinking heavily throughout this period, and also
drove drunk and used cocaine.
“In late February 2023, Mother returned to Marin County and entered
residential treatment. . . . [¶] In May 2023, shortly before the six-month
review hearing, the Department filed a section 388 petition requesting the
court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
. . . [¶] . . . [¶] Following the contested hearing [on July 13], . . . [t]he court
terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.” (R.S. v.

3
Superior Court of Marin County, Oct. 18, 2023, A168434.) This court denied
Mother’s writ petition challenging the order. (Ibid.)
Shortly thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held on a section 388
petition filed by the paternal grandparents requesting Minor be placed with
them in New York, where they live.3 On July 25, 2023, the juvenile court
issued a written order granting the paternal grandparents’ request for
placement. Mother appeals from this order (case No. A168829).
In advance of the November 2023 section 366.26 hearing, the
Department filed a report recommending the juvenile court terminate
Mother’s parental rights and set a permanent plan of adoption. On
November 7, Mother requested a bonding study, which the juvenile court
denied. On November 16, following the contested section 366.26 hearing, the
juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights and set a permanent plan
of adoption. Mother appeals from this order (case No. A169488) and we
consolidated the two appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Placement With Paternal Grandparents
Mother appeals the juvenile court’s order placing Minor with the
paternal grandparents. We find Mother lacks standing to appeal this order.
To determine whether a parent has standing to appeal a juvenile
court’s placement order, a court must “precisely identify [the parent’s]
interest in the matter. . . . [A]fter reunification services are terminated or
bypassed . . . , ‘the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of
the child [is] no longer paramount. Rather, at this point “the focus shifts to
the needs of the child for permanency and stability . . . .” ’ [Citation.] For

3 The section 388 petition was filed in April 2023, but the evidentiary

hearing was continued to follow the six-month review hearing.

4
this reason, the decision to terminate or bypass reunification services
ordinarily constitutes a sufficient basis for terminating parental rights.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) A few statutory exceptions to this rule permit the
juvenile court not to terminate parental rights when compelling reasons show
termination would be detrimental to the child. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi).)”
(In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236–237.) Therefore, “[a] parent’s appeal
from a judgment terminating parental rights confers standing to appeal an
order concerning the dependent child’s placement only if the placement
order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument against terminating
parental rights.”4 (Id. at p. 238.) For example, a parent may have standing
to appeal an order removing a child from a relative placement because “[t]he
placement of a dependent child with relatives can, under certain
circumstances, make the termination of parental rights unnecessary.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)” (Id. at p. 237.)
Mother argues the placement decision impacted her ability to present
evidence supporting the parental-benefit exception to adoption (see post, part
III) because her visits with Minor were reduced to twice per month and
changed from in-person to virtual. Minor’s placement with the paternal
grandparents began in mid-August 2023, only three months before the
contested section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court had years of visitation
reports before it, including lengthy excerpts from in-person visit reports for
January to July 2023, set forth in the Department’s section 366.26 report; as
well as reports from the Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) describing
in-person visits in the spring and summer of 2023, submitted by Mother at
the section 366.26 hearing. Mother fails to explain how having more frequent

4 Mother concedes this standard applies to her appeal from the

placement order.

5
and in-person visits during the final three months could have materially
impacted the parental-benefit exception determination. (See In re Richard C.
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1196 [“The kind of parent-child bond the court
may rely on to avoid termination of parental rights under the [parental-
benefit exception] does not arise in the short period between the termination
of services and the section 366.26 hearing.”].)
Mother also contends that, even though the foster family Minor was
placed with before the challenged placement order wanted to adopt Minor,
“they were so supportive of [Minor] continuing her relationship with
[Mother], that they may have ultimately opted for a legal guardianship” had
Minor’s placement not been changed to the paternal grandparents. Mother
provides no record support for this sheer speculation, which is not sufficient
to establish standing. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1000
[standing not established where “[a]ny prejudicial effect on [the appellant’s]
interest in these proceedings is merely speculative”].)
Finally, Mother argues the placement decision may have impacted the
juvenile court’s order on the bonding study because Minor’s New York
location “increase[d] the difficulty of obtaining a bonding study”; decreased
the efficacy of any such study because of the necessity that it be conducted
virtually; and, “given the [paternal] grandparents vitriol towards the mother,
the court may have believed that a bonding study taking place after [Minor]
was moved to New York would only add to the tension.” As discussed below
(post, part II), the court’s primary reason for denying Mother’s bonding study
request was the presence of ample evidence on Minor and Mother’s
relationship already in the record. This reason is not even tangentially
related to the difficulty or efficacy of a bonding study given Minor’s out-of-
state placement or the potential for increasing tension between Mother and

6
the paternal grandparents, and there is therefore no basis to find the
placement decision had any impact on this ruling.
Because Mother lacks standing to challenge the placement order, we
will dismiss this appeal.
II. Bonding Study
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her
request for a bonding study. We disagree.
On November 7, 2023, the initial date set for the section 366.26
hearing, Mother requested a bonding study.5 Following argument, the court
denied the request, reasoning: “I’m aware of the bonding studies and what
they are and what they do. I’m aware in such cases it’s suggested it’s a good
idea. Frankly, in this particular case, I don’t think it’s necessary. [Minor]
has been involved with this Court for a lot of years, and we’ve had a lot of
contested hearings. I’ve heard a lot of testimony. I’ve read a lot of reports.
And in this particular case, [Minor] has not been in mother’s care for the
majority of her life. So I don’t feel like this is a case that -- that would
particularly help this Court. I’m aware of the very strong feelings by mother.
I’m aware of strong feelings by [the] prior resource family. And I have read
. . . the CASA reports. But in this particular case, I don’t think a further
delay [for] a bonding study is going to serve this Court or [Minor], frankly. So
I’m going to decline the request for the bonding study under those
circumstances.”
“[E]xpert psychologists who have observed the child and parent and can
synthesize others’ observations will be an important source of information

5 Mother previously requested a bonding study in May 2023, prior to

the termination of reunification services. The record does not disclose a
ruling on this request.

7
about the psychological importance of the relationship for the child,” and
therefore “courts should seriously consider, where requested and appropriate,
allowing for a bonding study or other relevant expert testimony.” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632–633 & fn. 4.) However, “ ‘[t]here is no
requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a bonding
study as a condition precedent to a termination order.’ ” (In re Richard C.,
supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.) “Bonding studies after the termination of
reunification services would frequently require delays in permanency
planning. . . . [T]he denial of a belated request for such a study is fully
consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes, and with due
process.” (Id. at p. 1197.) An order denying a bonding study is reviewed for
abuse of discretion; in other words, “whether, under all the evidence viewed
in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the juvenile court
could have reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding study.” (In re
Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341.)
Mother asserts the juvenile court could not decide whether the
parental-benefit exception applied without a bonding study, but fails to
explain why it was unreasonable for the court to determine that its years-
long experience with the case was sufficient. Mother also fails to address the
court’s concern about the delay that would result from granting the request.
Mother has not established an abuse of discretion. Mother’s contention that
the bonding study denial violated her due process rights is similarly
unavailing. (In re Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.)
III. Parental-Benefit Exception
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding the parental-benefit
exception to adoption did not apply. We affirm.

8
“Even when a court proceeds to select a permanent placement for a
child who cannot be returned to a parent’s care, the parent may avoid
termination of parental rights in certain circumstances defined by statute.
One of these is the parental-benefit exception. What it requires a parent to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that the parent has
regularly visited with the child, that the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship, and that terminating the relationship would be detrimental
to the child. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Evid. Code,
§ 115.) The language of this exception, along with its history and place in the
larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in situations
where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s
relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a
new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child. While application of the
beneficial parental relationship exception rests on a variety of factual
determinations properly reviewed for substantial evidence, the ultimate
decision that termination would be harmful is subject to review for abuse of
discretion.” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629–630.)
A. Additional Background
In an October 25, 2023 report filed in advance of the section 366.26
hearing, the Department recommended the juvenile court terminate Mother’s
parental rights and set adoption as Minor’s permanent plan. Minor’s
placement with her paternal grandparents in New York had begun in mid-
August. Minor was “thriving,” “meeting all her developmental milestones,”
and had “a lovely relationship” with the paternal grandparents and a
paternal aunt who also lived in the home.
Mother had regularly visited Minor in-person before the move to New
York and by video after the move. The visits were positive and Minor enjoyed

9
them, but Minor was able to leave “without emotional disruption, and seems
to accept that she has visits with this loving visitor who is her mother, who
she loves, but is able to detach from at the end of the visits without incident
or questions about when she can return to the care of her mother.” The
Department stated Minor’s relationship with Mother “can be best described
as a loving visitor.” The report included pages of excerpts from detailed
visitation notes from 2023 visits.
The Department noted Minor had spent “more than half her life . . . out
of her mother’s care” and the periods “[Minor] spent in care of her mother
were fragmented timeframes . . . .” It concluded, with respect to the parental-
benefit exception, “[Minor] deserves to have stability and love that is
consistent over time and not sporadic and reliant on an adult who is
struggling with an addiction to the degree that it compromises the care of
[Minor]. Anything short of an adoption, could leave [Minor] and her paternal
grandparents vulnerable to future legal and/or emotional disruption. This
occurred one time already, when [Mother] [went] to New York Family Court
for and was granted return of [Minor] from her paternal grandparents care
back to her care. [Mother] shortly thereafter relapsed again . . . . [Minor] can
grow up with her paternal relatives and have shared life memories with her
biological family. They love her dearly and want to give her a good, stable
life. While [Minor] does have a relationship with [Mother], it is unpredictable
and inconsistent. The relationship is not so strong that it outweighs all the
benefits that she would gain from being adopted by her paternal relatives.”
In a November 13, 2023 addendum report filed in advance of the
continued section 366.26 hearing, the Department provided updated
information about video visits, including one where Mother left the screen
when Minor went to the bathroom and, when Mother returned, the

10
supervising social worker noticed Mother was noticeably breathing faster
than normal, her eyes were closing, and Mother soon disconnected from the
video visit. The Department reiterated its recommendation that that juvenile
court terminate parental rights and set a permanent plan of adoption.
Minor’s counsel agreed with this recommendation.
The contested hearing was held on November 16, 2023. Mother did not
cross-examine the Department social worker or any other Department
representative. Mother submitted CASA reports from 2023 and a 2023
report from Minor’s former foster parents. The CASA also provided an
informal update about a recent video visit where Minor showed the CASA a
card and told her, unprompted, that the card was for Mother.
The maternal grandmother testified that Minor lived with her for most
of the first year of Minor’s life, for around six months with Mother when
Minor was two years old, and for a couple of months when Minor was three or
four years old. At the time of the hearing, the maternal grandmother had not
seen or spoken with Minor for over a year. The maternal grandmother
testified she had seen Mother being playful with Minor, cooking for her, and
setting appropriate boundaries. Minor turned to Mother for help and
reassurance. Mother was “the one constant” in Minor’s life. On cross-
examination, the maternal grandmother clarified, “there’s a big difference
between sober [Mother] and intoxicated [Mother], and when I talk about the
good cook, when I talk about the good mother, it’s sober [Mother].”
Minor’s foster father from January 2023 through the summer of 2023
testified that Minor was wary of him at first, but warmed up to him after she
saw him interacting with Mother. The former foster father attributed this to
Minor looking to Mother for guidance: “If these people are all right with you
then they’re going to be all right with me.” Minor would ask about Mother,

11
said she missed Mother, called Mother “mom” and “mommy,” and was excited
and enthusiastic about visits with Mother. On cross-examination, he
conceded that Minor also called her former foster mother “mom” and
“mommy”; and that, in March 2023, he told the Department Minor did not
talk about Mother much, did not want to leave the car for her first in-person
visit with Mother that month, and was dysregulated before and after visits
with Mother.
Mother testified about the timeline of her and Minor’s living situations
over the years, her parenting of Minor when Minor lived with her, and her
visits when Minor did not. Mother testified she and Minor “always had a
very very special bond . . . and I think that she will be forever devastated if
she doesn’t return to me, and I understand that’s not really what’s in
question right now, but to never see me again, that is my biggest fear [for
Minor], and I don’t think that she would be able to wrap her head around it,
especially with her father being gone, too.”
The juvenile court issued a written order terminating Mother’s
parental rights. With respect to the parental-benefit exception, the court
found Mother had established the first prong, regular visitation. As for the
benefit to Minor from continuing the relationship, the court found, “the
interactions between Mother and [Minor] are calm and engaged. [Minor]
does not show any signs of distress when separating from Mother at the
conclusion of the visits, has lived with Mother sporadically and briefly[6], and
their visits have not progressed since last year. While this may be a loving

6 After reviewing the timeline of Minor’s placements, the juvenile court

found, “Overall [Minor] has lived with Mother for six weeks in 2018, zero
weeks in 2019, 3-4 months in 2020, four months in 2021, and six months in
2022. A total of 15.5 months. [Minor] is 5. She has been in Mother’s care for
about 25% of her life in relatively short stints.” (Footnote omitted.)

12
and affectionate relationship, the evidence is reflective of the ‘incidental
benefit’ that interaction between natural parent and child will always confer.
[Citation.] It is not the ‘substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent[’] required by the exception.” In finding termination of the
relationship would not be detrimental to Minor, the juvenile court found it
was “not a difficult decision”: to place Minor with the paternal grandparents
in a guardianship “would render [Minor’s] custody [open] to ongoing
challenges and the [paternal grandparents] would undoubtedly face another
challenge to the guardianship in New York . . . with a court without this
court’s historical context. [¶] . . . A guardianship simply will not provide a
permanency for [Minor]. The crazy merry-go-round of [Minor’s] life cannot
keep going.”
B. Analysis
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in its analysis of the benefit to
Minor of continuing the relationship with Mother. Mother focuses on a
statement by the court that there was no “evidence of day-to-day
interactions” or significant “history of day-to-day care.” Mother argues this
consideration was erroneous, relying on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
289, 300, which held, “Neither section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), nor [In
re] Autumn H. [(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567] requires proof that . . . the
noncustodial parent has maintained day-to-day contact with the child.” In re
S.B. does not hold that an absence of day-to-day contact is never relevant to
the analysis. (See also In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“the
[parent-child] relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors”].) In In re
S.B., the father was the minor’s “primary caregiver for three years” and, after
the minor was detained because of the parents’ drug use, the father
“immediately recognized that his drug use was untenable, started services,

13
maintained his sobriety, sought medical and psychological services, and
maintained consistent and regular visitation with [the minor]. He complied
with ‘every aspect’ of his case plan” and “visited [the minor] three days a
week,” but acknowledged that “health problems impeded his ability to care
for [the minor] full time.” (In re S.B., at pp. 293–294, 298.) On these facts,
and evidence of the minor’s attachment to the father, the Court of Appeal
held the juvenile court’s finding that the father did not have a parental
relationship with the minor lacked substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 298.) No
such facts are present here. Ample evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding that Minor did not have a sufficiently substantial attachment to
Mother to warrant application of the parental-benefit exception.
Mother also relies on In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, in which
the Court of Appeal remanded the juvenile court’s rejection of the parental
benefit exception because “the juvenile court considered improper factors” in
considering the minors’ relationship with the parents. (Id. at p. 1230.)
Mother points to the court’s observation that “the record suggests that the
parents presented evidence to support a finding that they had a beneficial
relationship with their children, should the juvenile court credit that
evidence,” including reports that the minors looked forward to visits with the
parents and were happy to see them. (Id. at p. 1229 & fn. 4, italics added.)
In re B.D. did not hold that such evidence either must be credited or required
a finding of substantial benefit.
Mother contends there was evidence of Minor’s strong emotional
attachment to and reliance on Mother. Even so assuming, this alone does not
render the court’s finding lacking in substantial evidence. (In re Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640 [“[Factual] determinations should ‘be upheld if . . .
supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the

14
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result
had it believed other evidence.’ ”].)
Finally, Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
determining termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to
Minor. Mother contends, “it is clear that [Minor’s] relationship with her
mother was a very important one to her and that she was emotionally reliant
on the relationship.” Mother’s recitation of evidence arguably supporting this
proposition does not establish the juvenile court abused its discretion. (In re
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641 [“A court abuses its discretion only
when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.]
But ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that
of the trial court.’ ” ’ ”].) While conceding that a guardianship could be subject
to a future challenge, Mother nonetheless claims that potential risk was
outweighed by the benefit of maintaining a relationship with Mother. The
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining otherwise. (Ibid.)
IV. ICWA
Finally, Mother argues the Department and the juvenile court failed to
conduct adequate inquiry regarding Minor’s Indian ancestry as required by
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).7 We disagree.
“To determine whether ICWA applies to a dependency proceeding, the
juvenile court and [the Department] have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty

7 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for

consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native
American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

15
to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be
or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This duty
to inquire consists of two phases—the duty of initial inquiry and the duty of
further inquiry. [Citation.] . . . Once a child is taken into temporary custody,
the duty of initial inquiry includes asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
extended family members, and others who have an interest in the child
whether the child is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b); § 306,
subd. (b).) Extended family members include adults who are the child’s
stepparents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews,
or first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); []§ 224.1, subd. (c).) The
juvenile court must ask each participant at the first appearance ‘whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child,’
and the court must ‘instruct the parties to inform the court if they
subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an
Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (c); see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2022).)” (In re
Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 566.)8 “A juvenile court’s finding
that ICWA does not apply implies ‘that social workers had fulfilled their duty
of inquiry.’ [Citation.] ‘We review a court’s ICWA findings for substantial
evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 567.)
Mother does not challenge the adequacy of the inquiry with respect to
the paternal family or with respect to her personally, nor does she contend
there was reason to believe Minor was an Indian child. Instead, Mother’s
sole argument is there is insufficient evidence the Department or juvenile

8 “If the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or [child welfare agency]

‘reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,’ then
‘further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child’ must be
made. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)” (In re Dominick D., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 566.)

16
court asked the maternal grandparents about Minor’s possible Indian
ancestry. Mother concedes that a Department report from the current
dependency proceeding represents, “In the prior case involving [Minor], the
maternal grandparents . . . stated they are not members or citizens of an
American Indian tribe or Alaska Native Village.” However, Mother argues
this is insufficient to satisfy the inquiry obligation.
Mother first contends the statement in the Department report is
insufficient because there is no contemporaneous documentation of such an
inquiry in the Department reports from the prior dependency proceeding.
The Welfare and Institutions Code “authorize[s] the admission of a social
worker’s report—including hearsay in the report—in any dependency
proceeding.” (In re M.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1071, italics omitted.)
The statement in the Department’s report about the inquiry of the maternal
grandparents was therefore admissible evidence. Mother fails to provide
authority that “the presumption in Evidence Code section 664 that official
duty has been regularly performed” (In re S.B. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 808,
812–813) is rebutted by the absence of contemporaneous documentation in
prior reports. We note that, for the first ten months of the prior dependency
proceeding, Minor was placed with the maternal grandparents and they met
and spoke with the Department often, providing numerous opportunities for
the inquiry to have taken place.
Mother also contends that, even if the Department inquired as to the
maternal grandparents in the prior dependency proceeding, the Department
and juvenile court were obligated to inquire again at the commencement of
the current dependency proceeding. Section 224.2 provides, “[t]he duty to
inquire begins with the initial contact”; the Department “has a duty to
inquire” “[i]f a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare

17
department pursuant to Section 306”; and “[a]t the first appearance in court
of each party, the court shall ask each participant present in the hearing
whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subds. (a)–(c).) Only two years and a few months
elapsed between termination of the prior proceeding and the instant petition,
the current proceeding continued under the same case number as the prior
proceeding, and the same bench officer presided over both proceedings.
Under these circumstances, we decline to construe section 224.2 to obligate
the Department and juvenile court to repeat the recent prior inquiry of the
maternal grandparents as to Minor’s possible Indian ancestry. (See In re
K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 603 [“statutes are interpreted to ‘ “avoid a
construction that would produce absurd consequences, which we presume the
Legislature did not intend.” ’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
In case No. A168829, the appeal is dismissed. In case No. A169488, the
order is affirmed.

SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.

BURNS, J.
CHOU, J.

(A168829 / A169488)

18

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.