CourtListener 10004447•People v. Lopez CA2/6
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Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Lopez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B327881
(Super. Ct. No. CR47771C)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Ventura County)
v.
BENNY MENDEZ LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Benny Mendez Lopez appeals from a postjudgment motion
for resentencing. He is serving a sentence of 25 years to life for
first degree murder. He accomplished this crime using a baseball
bat. (See People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 440.) He
was represented by appointed counsel at an abbreviated
evidentiary hearing. He was not physically present in court and
did not appear either by telephone or “zoom” video. The
transcript of the brief resentencing hearing is appended hereto as
Exhibit A and incorporated herein. A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to be present at a resentencing proceeding.
(People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 347-348.) Thus, the
trial court erred by going forward with the hearing in his absence
without an explicit waiver of the right to be present. (People v.
Santos (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 666, 677-678, review granted Mar.
14, 2024, S284341.) Error in proceeding without physical
“presence” or a waiver is not reversible if the error was/is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 678.)
The trial court’s error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Appellant falsely checked the box that he could not be
presently convicted under the murder statutes now extant.
Nothing in the new and ameliorative murder statutes has
anything to do with appellant’s conviction for first degree
murder. This murder conviction has nothing to do with the
“natural and probable consequences” theory of murder now
jettisoned by the Legislature. It also has nothing to do with the
Legislature modifying the felony murder rules.
Appellant beat the victim to death with a baseball bat with
the assistance of his gang cohorts. This was, as a matter of law, a
premeditated murder. He was, and is, ineligible for resentencing
as a matter of law. Nothing he could say, by way of law, or facts,
could change this result. Competent and experienced counsel,
obviously recognized this and submitted the matter for the trial
court’s ruling. It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for an
attorney not to make a frivolous presentation to the court.
Relying upon People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 59-
60, appellant contends, “Given that counsel presented no
evidence and made no arguments at the evidentiary hearing,
respondent will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant’s absence was harmless.” (Bold and capitalization
omitted.) The case relied upon is factually distinguishable
because in Basler, there was a true issue as to the degree of
appellant’s culpability for the murder. That is not the situation
2
here. To the extent that our holding is at variance with Basler,
we decline to follow it. We briefly explain why. The trial court
could, and did, reasonably credit appointed counsel’s
representation that no further evidence was to be introduced.
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 827; see also Huang v.
Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 183, citing Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140 [“‘“‘[a]ll intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters
as to which the record is silent . . .’”’”]; People v. Torres (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 984, 989.) Thus, a silent record is not a basis for
declaring reversible error.
If appellant was deprived of presence at the hearing which
he wanted, his remedy is to seek relief in a habeas corpus
petition. Appellant’s present appointed counsel speculates on
what appellant could have done at the evidentiary hearing. It
may well be that appellant told his attorney that he did not want
to present any evidence. This inference is likely. Appellant had
written a letter to the victim’s family which, in pertinent part,
provides: “I made the biggest and worse imaginable decision of
my life and beat and killed Mr. Billy Zara. I made the horrible
choice as a coward and picked up the baseball bat and hit Mr.
Billy Zara that ended his life and taking away his right to live.”
If sincere, this apology will assist appellant at a future parole
hearing. But it is not relevant at a resentencing hearing. It may
explain why appellant did not want to be present at the
resentencing hearing.
Reversal for appellant’s presence or for securing a waiver of
presence would be an idle act. We hasten to observe that if there
was any possibility of relief, we would grant relief.
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Disposition
The judgment (order denying resentencing) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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EXHIBIT A
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David R. Worley, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Richard Lennon, Executive Director, Rudy Alejo,
Staff Attorney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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