CourtListener 10004444•People v. Sanchez CA2/7
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Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Sanchez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B323029
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. BA495806)
v.
LESTER RENE SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.
Tanya Dellaca and Patrick J. Hoynoski, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Michael C.
Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Lester Rene Sanchez was convicted of first degree burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459), violating a court order with a prior domestic
violence conviction (§ 166, sub. (c)(4)), and misdemeanor battery
(§ 242).1 After trial, he stipulated to the truth of six aggravating
circumstances, including that he “engaged in violent conduct that
indicates a serious danger to society.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(1).2)
At sentencing, Sanchez presented evidence he had suffered
childhood trauma in the form of physical abuse. He requested a
probationary sentence to pursue substance abuse treatment. The
trial court, citing the newly amended sentencing provisions in
section 1170, agreed Sanchez had suffered childhood trauma and
that this trauma was connected to his offenses. But the court
imposed the middle term sentence of four years based on the
aggravating factors, specifically Sanchez’s danger to public
safety.
Sanchez argues the court abused its discretion because the
court did not follow section 1170’s lower-term presumption for
defendants whose childhood trauma “was a contributing factor in
the commission of the offense.” (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
Because the court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the
aggravating factors against its finding of childhood trauma, we
affirm.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Sanchez’s Conviction
Sanchez was charged in connection with the harassment of
his former girlfriend, Ashley S., who was pregnant at the time
with his child. Sanchez was abusing drugs and alcohol, and the
couple argued frequently. In February 2021, Sanchez punched a
hospital security guard who would not let him attend Ashley’s
ultrasound appointment. After Ashley moved out of their shared
apartment, in April 2021, Sanchez broke into Ashley’s new
apartment through a window, pushed her up against a door, and
tried to take her cell phone as she called 911. After Ashley
obtained an emergency protective order against Sanchez in May
2021, Sanchez texted and called Ashley, threatening to shoot her.
Ashley had another young child, Robert, who was present
when Sanchez broke into Ashley’s apartment and who allegedly
witnessed other instances of abuse.
Sanchez was charged with first degree residential burglary
(§ 459); dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1,
subd. (c)(1)); three counts of criminal threats (§ 422); stalking
with a temporary order in effect (§ 646.9, subd. (a)); violation of a
court order with a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 166,
subd. (c)(4)); child abuse under circumstances likely to produce
great bodily injury or death (§ 273a, subd. (a)); assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)); and
misdemeanor battery (§ 242).
The People alleged six aggravating circumstances relating
to Sanchez’s sentence: (1) Sanchez committed a crime involving
great violence, cruelty, viciousness, or callousness
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(rule 4.421(a)(1)); (2) Ashley was a particularly vulnerable victim
(rule 4.421(a)(3)); (3) Sanchez dissuaded a witness or otherwise
interfered with the judicial process (rule 4.421(a)(6)); (4) he
engaged in violent conduct that indicated a serious danger to
society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); (5) he was on probation, post-release
supervision, or parole when the crime was committed
(rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (6) his prior performance on probation,
post-release supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory
(rule 4.421(b)(5)).
Sanchez proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty of
first degree residential burglary, violating a court order with a
prior domestic violence conviction, and misdemeanor battery.
Sanchez was acquitted on the remaining counts.
B. Sanchez’s Sentencing
After Sanchez was found guilty, but before the jury was
discharged, the trial court addressed the six alleged aggravating
circumstances with counsel. The court stated that “the new
statutory framework of [section] 1170” applied “wherein on any
counts that the jury has found the defendant guilty, there now
has to be a finding by the jurors of aggravating factors.” Sanchez
expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating
factors, and stipulated that all six factors were true.
Before sentencing, the trial court requested sentencing
memoranda from Sanchez and the People. The court advised
Sanchez’s counsel that, since the “statutory language has now
changed,” counsel should “present any and all evidence that you
have with regard to [section] 1170,” including “the psychological,
physical or childhood trauma, for instance, abuse, neglect,
exploitation, sexual violence, et cetera.”
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Sanchez’s sentencing memorandum asked the court to
impose a sentence of probation and order him to participate in a
substance abuse program, based on his substance abuse issues
and traumatic childhood. Sanchez described his “turbulent
family life, wherein his father would physically and verbally
abuse his mother. . . . [Sanchez] acted as a human shield to
protect his mother and siblings from his father’s drunken rage.
He would take the blows for them from a very young age.”
Sanchez stated that the trauma he suffered from this experience
was “[t]he primary reason” for his substance abuse.
The People’s sentencing memorandum requested an upper
term prison sentence on the burglary count, based on “the
numerous factors in aggravation.”
The trial court sentenced Sanchez on July 28, 2022. The
court first discussed Sanchez’s criminal history and his history of
violating domestic violence court orders. It stated that Sanchez
“shows a very clear history of . . . not following the rules, [and]
disregarding all laws.” The court observed Sanchez “had three
DV victims in his past.”
Sanchez addressed the court, explaining his “rough
childhood” and “my stepdad beating my mom and beating me up,
showing me . . . bad things, like drinking [and] drugs.” His
counsel argued that “[Sanchez] had a lot of issues in his life
stemming from a traumatic childhood as well as drug and alcohol
abuse.”
After hearing from Sanchez and his counsel, the court
addressed mitigating factors. The court stated: “Pursuant to
statute 1170, et seq., the Court must consider the rearing of the
defendant and any and all childhood traumatic experiences that
may have impacted him. Here, the defendant points out the
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beatings he received as a child from his father.” The court
observed, “[Sanchez] has adopted what he learned from his
family rearing. . . . Rather than helping people and protecting the
women, he takes part in the wrongdoing to others, to women, to
his family[.]”
The court further noted Sanchez had completed several
rehabilitative programs while incarcerated. But the court also
observed Sanchez was “still contacting the victim” as recently as
June 2022, and Sanchez had already received rehabilitative
programs after his previous convictions. The court remarked, “I
have to focus on the conduct of the incident, as well.” And the
court further stated: “I understood you grew up in a really bad
situation. Unfortunately, a lot of us do. The difference is you’re
going to make that choice whether you’re going to do the right
thing or not. You chose to do the wrong.”
The court concluded:
[T]he aggravating factors were found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by stipulation and admission.
Pursuant to the People’s brief on pages 4 and 5, the
Court finds that the defendant is a public safety
concern and a public safety issue, thereby complying
with [section] 1170 in that I have found that the
childhood trauma is true but that the defendant is a
public safety concern. And the aggravating factors
have been found true permitting this Court to
consider all triad options.
However, because the defendant has never served in
state prison, in addition to the mitigating factors, the
Court shall sentence to the mid-term of 4 years. I
will not take the high term.
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Sanchez received a total sentence of five years and two
months, including consecutive terms of eight months for violating
a court order with a prior domestic violence conviction and six
months on the battery count.
Sanchez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Sanchez’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
abused its sentencing discretion under the recent amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b).
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
“Section 1170, subdivision (b) governs imposition of a
judgment of imprisonment when a statute specifies three possible
terms.” (People v. Suazo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 681, 704.)
Through Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124, effective
January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170,
subdivision (b), “in several fundamental ways.” (People v. Flores
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.) These amendments took
effect approximately eight months before Sanchez’s sentencing.
As relevant here, “the new statute creates a presumption
that the sentencing court ‘shall’ enter a lower term sentence
when, among other things, a ‘psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma’ contributed to the offense. [Citation.] The sentencing
court may only depart from this lower term presumption if it
finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances such that the lower term would be contrary to ‘the
interests of justice.’” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
419 (Salazar), quoting § 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (b)(6)(A).)
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“Discretionary sentencing decisions, such as whether ‘the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice’ (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 428, fn. 8; accord, People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
189, 205 (Hilburn).) A sentencing court must exercise “‘“informed
discretion”’” and abuses its discretion when it misunderstands
“‘the scope of its discretionary powers.’” (People v. Gutierrez
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) “‘To prove an abuse of discretion,
“‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly
show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’”’”
(People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Sentencing
Sanchez to the Middle Term
Appellate courts generally “presume that the [trial] court
‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’”
(People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) Sanchez concedes
this general principle, but argues the trial court misunderstood
and therefore abused its sentencing discretion under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). He asserts the trial court was
required to apply a presumption of the lower term sentence
because his childhood trauma was a contributing factor in his
offense and the court “never mentioned the low term
presumption.”
As a threshold matter, Sanchez did not argue in his written
sentencing memorandum or oral arguments presented to the trial
court that the lower term presumption applied to his sentence.
“Generally, if a party does not object to the sentence in the trial
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court,” that party “may not claim on appeal the trial court failed
to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing
choices.” (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778 (Tilley)
[defendant forfeited claim to the lower term presumption because
he “did not seek the lower term based on section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) [or] object to the imposition of the middle
term”]; accord, People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 730-731;
cf. People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840 [forfeiture
does not apply where a defendant challenges a sentencing court’s
“apparent misapprehension of statutory sentencing obligations”].)
But even considering Sanchez’s argument on the merits, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Sanchez
relies on People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861 (Lee) and argues
the record “‘affirmatively demonstrate[s]’” that the trial court
misunderstood its discretion. (See id. at p. 866.) In Lee, the trial
court expressly stated it lacked discretion to reduce a wobbler to
a misdemeanor when the court actually had such discretion
under section 17, subdivision (b). (See id. at pp. 867-869.) Lee
does not support Sanchez.
The record before us does not “affirmatively demonstrate”
that the trial court was unaware of its new discretion under
section 1170, subdivision (b). (See Lee, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at
p. 866.) Unlike the trial court in Lee, the trial court here did not
misunderstand its sentencing authority under section 1170.
Although the court did not expressly refer to the lower term
presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the record before
us clearly reflects the court conducted its sentencing in
conformity with the statute and the presumption.
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The court first determined that Sanchez had suffered
childhood trauma, and it discussed how this experience
contributed to Sanchez’s offenses. The court then balanced the
six aggravating factors against the mitigating factor of Sanchez’s
childhood trauma and concluded that the aggravating factors
supported a middle term sentence. In ruling that Sanchez
presented “a public safety concern,” the court examined the
aggravating factor under rule 4.421(b)(1) that Sanchez’s conduct
“indicates a serious danger to society,” citing the portion of the
People’s sentencing memorandum addressing this factor.
The court also demonstrated an understanding of how the
lower term presumption applied to Sanchez’s case, explaining
that its middle term sentence “compl[ied] with [section] 1170 in
that I have found that the childhood trauma is true but that the
defendant is a public safety concern.” With this statement, the
court recognized Sanchez’s childhood trauma was “true” and
connected to his offenses, which would warrant a lower term
sentence under section 1170’s statutory presumption. But the
court ultimately found the aggravating factors overcame the
presumption, and imposed a middle term sentence in accordance
with section 1170.
Because the court determined that Sanchez experienced
childhood trauma, examined the trauma’s connection to his
offenses, and then carefully weighed the aggravating and
mitigating factors, the court did not abuse its discretion by
selecting a middle term sentence. (See Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 428, fn. 8 [observing a court would not abuse its “broad
sentencing discretion” by imposing a middle term or lower term
sentence after weighing aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstance of childhood trauma]; Hilburn, supra,
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93 Cal.App.5th at p. 206 [court did not abuse its sentencing
discretion where “the record establishes the court carefully
considered the relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstances” and determined the aggravating factors
warranted the middle term].) In other words, the court did not
abuse its discretion by declining to impose the lower term
sentence because in its assessment, the six aggravating factors
that Sanchez stipulated to outweighed the mitigating factors,
effectively rebutting the presumption.
Sanchez further argues the trial court erred by “seemingly
us[ing] [his] childhood trauma to justify selecting the mid-term.”
Sanchez cites the court’s remark that experiencing “poverty,”
“physical abuse,” and “substance use” as a child “should have
shown [Sanchez] right from wrong.” The court did not improperly
consider Sanchez’s childhood trauma. The court acknowledged
Sanchez “grew up in a really bad situation” and stated “he wasn’t
given [a] chance when he was just a child.” But, despite this
childhood trauma, the court concluded Sanchez “knew” his
conduct “was wrong” and “the conduct of the incident” shows “a
complete lack of thought process” and “maturity.” Under these
circumstances, the court’s consideration of the circumstances of
the offense alongside Sanchez’s childhood trauma was not an
abuse of discretion. (See Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 206
[no abuse of discretion where court considered mitigating
circumstance of youth and “the circumstances of the crime
itself”].)3
3 Sanchez further argues he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney “never specifically argued that the
low term presumption under the newly amended section 1170
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
applied.” He requests that, if we find his argument forfeited, we
consider whether his attorney was ineffective. Since we
addressed Sanchez’s argument on its merits, we need not
consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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