People v. Grajeda CA2/6

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Filed 7/15/24 P. v. Grajeda CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B321230
(Super. Ct. No. 2018035973)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

GERARDO RODRIGUEZ
GRAJEDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Gerardo Rodriguez Grajeda drove an SUV
through an intersection in downtown Oxnard and ran over Jorge
Tejeda, killing him. At the police station the next day, appellant
broke a window by kicking it. He later jumped a fence in the
station’s private parking lot and was captured a block away.
Appellant was convicted, by jury, of second degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a))1, misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1

otherwise stated.
(b)(1)) and misdemeanor resisting arrest. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1).)
The jury found that appellant personally used a deadly weapon in
committing the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), but found not true
the allegation that the murder was willful, deliberate and
premeditated. The trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years to
life on the murder conviction, plus one year on the deadly weapon
allegation, and time served for the misdemeanors.
The sole contention raised on appeal is whether the
prosecuting attorney committed misconduct in his closing and
rebuttal arguments. He argued that appellant’s accident
reconstruction expert, Jason Fries, concluded the collision was an
accident because the expert had a financial bias. The prosecutor
described Fries’ reconstruction videos as “cartoons” that ignored
crucial evidence by failing to consider appellant’s behavior in the
minutes before the collision. Noting that Fries was paid $17,000
for his testimony, the prosecuting attorney argued, “So if Jason
Fries is able to convince a jury that he’s not guilty of murder, how
much in demand would Jason Fries’s services be when the word
of something like that gets out?” Appellant contends this was
misconduct because the argument urged jurors to consider the
consequences of a not-guilty verdict and to convict appellant so
that other, guilty people would not go free. We affirm.
Facts
Because appellant raises only one issue relating to
the closing arguments, our summary of the facts will be brief and
will focus on the expert witness testimony and portions of the
closing arguments relating to that testimony.
After spending the evening out, Jorge Tejeda, his
twin brother Daniel and two friends ended up at Taco de Mexico,
a taco restaurant in downtown Oxnard. Their car was parked in

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a nearby alley. The group left the restaurant after about an hour
and walked back toward their car. On the way, they saw a group
of men, including appellant, beating another man. Appellant was
kicking and punching the man who was on the pavement.
Christian Navarro, the victim of that beating,
testified that appellant approached him in the alley and asked if
Navarro was “messing with” his girlfriend. Someone hit Navarro
who blacked out.
As Tejeda and his companions walked to their car,
appellant approached them very aggressively. He asked Antonio
Zazueta, one of Tejeda’s companions, “Where are you from.”
Zazueta replied that they weren’t from anywhere; they were just
there to have fun and didn’t want any trouble. Appellant said
they weren’t answering his question and reached for something
in his back pocket. Jorge Tejeda punched appellant. Appellant
removed his belt which had a heavy buckle and used it to swing
at Jorge Tejeda. Eventually, Zazueta got the belt away from
appellant and threw it away.
While this was happening, Daniel Tejeda noticed a
group of men running toward them. Daniel shouted that they
should run. As they did so, Zazueta heard appellant say, “You
will see now, motherfuckers. You are going to pay for it.” A
bystander who was waiting for food at the taco restaurant heard
appellant say, “I’m going to kill you all, motherfuckers.”
Jorge and Zazueta were running together. Appellant
went looking for them in his Jeep Cherokee. At some point, an
acquaintance of appellant’s, Robert Villaruel, got in the Jeep to
join the chase. When they spotted Jorge and Zazueta, Villaruel
jumped out of the Jeep to chase them on foot. Zazueta ran
through the intersection and onto some train tracks. Jorge, who

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was tired from running, tripped. As he was getting up, Villaruel
“body slam[med]” him back down to the pavement.
Bystanders saw appellant make a U-turn and then
accelerate toward the intersection. He paused briefly as Villaruel
jumped out of the way. Then, appellant drove through the
intersection, hitting Jorge and running over him. The bystanders
described appellant driving toward Jorge rather than trying to
avoid a collision. After hitting Jorge, appellant drove off without
stopping.
Expert Witnesses
Oxnard police officer Justin Songer performed a sight
distance analysis of the intersection to identify what appellant,
as a driver, saw or reasonably could have seen at about the time
of the collision. Using appellant’s own SUV, Songer and two
volunteers who were approximately the size of the victim and
Villaruel reenacted the incident to determine when appellant
might reasonably have seen the victim. Songer opined that an
“expectant driver” would be able to see people in the intersection
from a distance of 531 feet. He estimated that a less observant
driver could have seen people in the intersection at 357 feet. The
victim and Villaruel would have been fully illuminated by the
headlights of appellant’s SUV within 37.9 feet of the point of
impact.
Richard Godfrey, an accident reconstruction expert,
disagreed with most of Songer’s opinions. He opined that, if the
SUV was traveling at 22 miles per hour when it neared the
intersection, and appellant saw the victim at from a distance of
37.9, he would not have been able to stop in time to avoid the
collision with the victim.

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Appellant’s second accident reconstruction expert,
Jason Fries, used security camera video obtained from several
area businesses and laser scans to create a virtual model of the
intersection and an animated reconstruction of the collision.
Fries opined that appellant was traveling at 22 miles per hour as
he approached the intersection. He applied the brakes and
decelerated to 20.6 miles per hour and then 17.7 miles per hour
before braking as hard as possible in the intersection. The Jeep
was traveling at 8.8 miles per hour when it hit Jorge. Fries
opined that, as Jorge was getting up from the pavement, he
stumbled forward and put himself in the path of the Jeep just 0.4
seconds before the collision. Appellant would not have had
enough time to perceive Jorge and react before hitting him. The
collision was, in Fries’ opinion, unavoidable.
The animation also showed that, rather than
traveling in a straight line through the intersection, appellant
steered or swerved in the direction of the victim. Fries opined
that appellant had been preparing to make a left turn when he
entered the intersection; his path of travel was consistent with
turning into the far east lane of the cross street. Fries was paid
$17,000 for his services.
Closing Arguments
In his closing argument, the prosecuting attorney
described appellant as aggressively looking for a fight when he
approached Jorge and his companions that night. Jorge hit
appellant, who then vowed to kill Jorge. He used his car to stalk
Jorge through the streets and alleys of downtown Oxnard and
then to murder him. Appellant was a “bundle of anger, and
that’s why Jorge Tejada is dead, not because of some accident
that Fries wants you to show you some cartoons and try and tell

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you that your brain didn’t process what it did. Your eyes didn’t
see what it did, and your ears didn’t hear what it did.” The
prosecutor referred to Fries as a “smooth witness,” a “good
talker,” and a “professional expert” who was both “charming” and
“extremely bias[ed].” Fries was “biased to tell you how none of
this was the defendant’s fault, that the victim just stepped in his
pathway.”
In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor repeated his
claim that Fries had a financial bias which explained the opinion
that the collision was an accident. “[H]e makes $17,000 for this
case. He testifies all over. We have a case where the defendant
stated what his intent was. He was looking for a fight that night.
That’s very clear. When he lost, he said multiple times that he’s
going to kill. [¶] He pursued the victims. He pursued the
victims throughout downtown Oxnard, for over a third of a mile,
and then he struck and killed the person he said he was going to
kill, the person he had fought with.”
The prosecutor continued, “So if Jason Fries is able to
convince a jury that he’s not guilty of murder, how much in
demand would Jason Fries’ services be when the word of
something like that gets out?” Appellant’s counsel objected that
this was improper argument; the objection was overruled.
Returning to his theme, the prosecutor argued, “What happens if
the next guy who gets mad and runs someone over is a hedge
fund man . . . .” Appellant’s counsel objected again and was again
overruled. The prosecutor concluded this portion of the argument
by stating, “So of course he wants to win, and you could tell by his
attitude on the stand he was biased.”

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Discussion
The standards for establishing prosecutorial
misconduct or error are settled. (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1234, 1275.) A prosecutor violates the federal
constitution “when the prosecutor’s actions ‘comprise a pattern of
conduct that is serious and egregious, such that the trial is
rendered so unfair that the resulting conviction violates the
defendant’s right to due process of law.’” (People v. Daveggio and
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 853 (Daveggio and Michaud),
quoting People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 718.) The error
“must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1158, 1202 (Cole), quoting United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S.
97, 108.) Comments by the prosecutor violate state law, even if
they do not violate federal constitutional standards, if the
prosecutor uses “deceptive or reprehensible methods [to attempt]t
to persuade [either] the court or jury.” (People v. Watkins (2012)
55 Cal.4th 999, 1031; Daveggio and Michaud, supra, at p. 854.)
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Appellant has the burden
to establish that “there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion . . . .” (People
v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 910 (Dworak).) “‘In conducting
this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most
damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the
prosecutor’s statements. . . .” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th
659, 667.)
A prosecutor has wide leeway in closing argument to
state his or her views regarding the evidence. (People v. Panah
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 463.) “‘“‘The argument may be vigorous as

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long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can
include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn
therefrom. . . .’”’” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.) This
means that prosecutors may point to an expert witness’ financial
bias and argue, if supported by the evidence, “‘“that a witness’s
testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or even a patent ‘lie.’”’”
(Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 910; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4
Cal.4th 155, 180.)
It is, however, improper for the prosecutor to
misstate or mischaracterize the evidence, or to base an argument
on facts that are not in evidence. (People v. Parson (2008) 44
Cal.4th 332, 360.) Because jurors may not be influenced by
prejudice or public opinion, it is error for the prosecutor suggest
that they might face “social pressure and community obloquy” if
they reach the “wrong” verdict. (People v. Shazier (2014) 60
Cal.4th 109, 145; see also People v. Morales (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
917, 928 [misconduct to invite jurors to “disregard instructions
and consider public opinion” in reaching their verdict].) Federal
courts also hold that a prosecutor may not “‘urge jurors to convict
a criminal defendant in order to protect community values,
preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking,’” nor may a
prosecutor “ ‘point to a particular crisis in our society and ask the
jury to make a statement’ with their verdict.” (United States v.
Sanchez (9th Cir. 2011) 659 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Sanchez).)
Here, the prosecutor argued that Fries was not a
credible expert because he had an obvious financial bias and
because he ignored crucial evidence, including evidence that
appellant had threatened to kill the victim, was purposefully
searching for him and intentionally steered his SUV toward the
victim rather than maintaining a straight line of travel through

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the intersection. This was proper commentary on the witness’
bias and credibility.
Appellant contends the prosecutor committed
misconduct when he said, “So if Jason Fries is able to convince a
jury that he’s not guilty of murder, how much in demand would
Jason Fries’ services be when the word of something like that
gets out?” We disagree. This statement refers to the witness’
financial incentive to conclude that the collision was an
unavoidable accident. It was not misconduct to point out that the
witness’ reputation would be bolstered by a favorable result in
this case.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the
prosecutor’s comment, “What happens if the next guy who gets
mad and runs somebody over is a hedge fund man . . . .
[¶] [¶] So of course [Fries] wants to win, and you could tell by
his attitude on the stand he was biased.” Again, the comment
refers to the witness’ financial bias. It does not urge jurors to
base their verdict on the possibility that an acquittal would allow
future guilty defendants to go free. There is no reasonable
likelihood the jurors would have understood this statement to
mean that an acquittal in this case would allow a guilty “hedge
fund man” to avoid punishment in the future.
For similar reasons, we conclude the prosecutor’s
comments did not amount to a federal due process violation.
The prosecutor’s argument focused on the expert’s financial bias
and failure to consider relevant evidence. These issues are fair
game. He did not urge the jury to send a message to future other
drivers or to convict appellant to preserve civil order, protect
community values or deter future lawbreaking. (Sanchez, supra,
659 F.3d at p. 1256.) The comments were also brief, not

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inflammatory and relatively mild. They did not “‘comprise a
pattern of conduct that is serious and egregious, such that the
trial is rendered so unfair that the resulting conviction violates
the defendant’s right to due process of law.’” (Daveggio and
Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 854.)
We conclude the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal
arguments did not “infect the the trial ‘with such unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process’ [citation] or involve
‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to
persuade . . . the jury’ [citations]. We presume the jurors treated
‘the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an
attempt to persuade’ [citation], and we find nothing in the record
that would suggest otherwise.” (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.
1204.)
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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Ryan J. Wright, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Dwyer + Kim and Jin H. Kim, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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