CourtListener 10000939•People v. Alexander CA4/1
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Filed 7/12/24 P. v. Alexander CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083360
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD252994)
KENDOL JOHN ALEXANDER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lisa R. Rodriguez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Kendol John Alexander was sentenced to prison for nine years
for perpetrating a robbery and an attempted robbery at a beauty salon in San
Diego. The sentencing court imposed and stayed a one-year prison prior
enhancement under former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), for a
separate robbery conviction Alexander suffered in 2010.1
Years later, the Legislature added section 1172.75 to the Penal Code.
Section 1172.75 declares most previously imposed prison prior enhancements
legally invalid (§ 1172.75, subd. (a)), and it compels trial courts both to recall
the sentence of any inmate who is currently serving a term for a judgment
with a now-invalid prison prior enhancement and to resentence the inmate
(id., subds. (c)–(d)). In the proceedings below, Alexander argued he was
entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75 because he was serving time
for a judgment that included a purportedly invalid—albeit stayed—prison
prior enhancement. However, the trial court declined to grant any relief to
Alexander. It reasoned that section 1172.75 applies only when an inmate’s
sentence includes a prison prior enhancement that the sentencing court
imposed and executed (rather than imposed and stayed).
The Courts of Appeal are divided on whether section 1172.75 applies to
an inmate when his or her sentence includes an otherwise-qualifying prison
prior enhancement that was imposed and stayed, or whether it applies only
when the inmate’s sentence includes a prison prior enhancement that was
imposed and executed. (Compare People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
665 [recall and resentencing is available when prison prior enhancement is
imposed and stayed]; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
(Saldana), review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 [same]; People v.
Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300 (Christianson), review granted Feb.
21, 2024, S283189 [same]; and People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276
[same], with People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted Feb.
21, 2024, S283169 [recall and resentencing is only available when prison
prior enhancement is imposed and executed].) In Christianson, our court
determined that section 1172.75 applies where, as here, the sentencing court
imposed and then stayed the prison prior enhancement at issue.
(Christianson, at pp. 311–317.)
We adhere to the Christianson decision, which in our view sets forth
the correct statutory interpretation of section 1172.75. Therefore, we reverse
the order denying relief to Alexander and we remand the matter to the trial
court with directions to recall the sentence and conduct a full resentencing
proceeding under section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d).
II
BACKGROUND
A. The Judgment of Conviction
On February 3, 2014, Alexander was charged by information with
second degree robbery (§ 211) and attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664). The
information alleged a prison prior enhancement (former § 667.5, subd. (b)), a
serious felony prior enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a strike prior
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), all arising from a previous robbery conviction
Alexander suffered in 2010.
On August 14, 2014, Alexander pleaded guilty to both charges and
admitted the prior conviction allegations. On December 19, 2014, he was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of nine years, consisting of a four-year
term for the robbery conviction (the low term of two years doubled due to the
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strike prior), a concurrent four-year term for the attempted robbery
conviction (the middle term of two years doubled due to the strike prior), and
a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony prior enhancement. The
sentencing court imposed and stayed execution of a one-year term for the
prison prior enhancement, which it memorialized on the written abstract of
judgment. Alexander appealed and our court affirmed the judgment. (People
v. Alexander (Apr. 21, 2016, D067307) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. The Section 1172.75 Proceedings
After the enactment of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified
Alexander as an inmate who was serving a sentence that included a prison
prior enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), which might no
longer be valid under section 1172.75. After learning this information, the
trial court appointed a public defender for Alexander and solicited briefing
from the parties to determine Alexander’s eligibility for a recall of his
sentence and resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (c).
In his written briefing, Alexander argued he was entitled to a recall of
his sentence and a full resentencing because he was currently serving a term
of incarceration for a judgment that included a prison prior enhancement the
Legislature had deemed invalid after its imposition. By contrast, the district
attorney argued a recall of the sentence and a full resentencing were
unwarranted because Alexander was not actually serving any additional time
in prison for his stayed prison prior enhancement. The district attorney
contended that section 1172.75 allows for a recall of an inmate’s sentence and
resentencing only when the sentencing court imposes and executes (rather
than imposes and stays) a qualifying prison prior enhancement.
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After a hearing, the trial court agreed with the district attorney and
declined to grant relief to Alexander. Alexander filed a timely notice of
appeal from the trial court’s order denying relief.
III
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Alexander contends that his stayed one-year prison prior
enhancement is legally invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), and,
therefore, the trial court erred when it declined to recall his sentence and
resentence him under section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d). For reasons
we shall explain, we agree with Alexander.
A. Statutory Framework
Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b), required a
sentencing court to impose a one-year sentencing enhancement “for each
prior separate prison term” served by the defendant, unless the defendant
remained free from custody for a period of five years. (Former § 667.5,
subd. (b).) This sentencing enhancement is commonly known as a prison
prior enhancement. Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–
2020 Reg. Sess.) limited a sentencing court’s ability to impose a prison prior
enhancement only to those cases in when the defendant’s past convictions
were for certain specified sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)
In 2021, the Legislature approved Senate Bill No. 483 for the stated
purpose of “ensur[ing] equal justice and address[ing] systemic racial bias in
sentencing” by “retroactively apply[ing] ... Senate Bill [No.] 136 ... to all
persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for [a]
repealed [prison prior] sentence enhancement[].” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
To achieve this objective, Senate Bill No. 483 added section 1171.1 to the
Penal Code, a statutory provision that was subsequently renumbered to
5
section 1172.75 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) For
purposes of this opinion, we will refer to this provision as section 1172.75.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), declares, “Any sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 667.5 ... is legally invalid,” except for certain specified prison prior
enhancements based on past convictions for sexually violent offenses.
(§ 1172.5, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) compels CDCR and the county
correctional administrator of each county to “identify those persons in their
custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a),” and to provide the person’s name,
birth date, and identifying case information to the court that sentenced the
person. (Id., subd. (b).) Subdivision (c) instructs the court, upon receipt of
such information, to “review the judgment and verify that the current
judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in [section 1172.75,]
subdivision (a).” (Id., subd. (c).) “If the court determines that the current
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court
shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), outlines the procedures applicable to
the full resentencing proceeding. It states that resentencing “shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination
of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.
Resentencing ... shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally
imposed.” (§ 1172.5, subd. (d)(1).) It requires the court to “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law
that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id.,
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subd. (d)(2).) It also directs the court to “consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).)
B. Application
The question at issue here is whether a prison prior enhancement
based on a past conviction for a non-sexually violent offense is “imposed” for
purposes of section 1172.75, subdivision (a), and thus legally invalid under
that subdivision, when the sentencing court imposes and then stays the
enhancement or, alternatively, whether a prison prior enhancement is
“imposed” only when the court imposes and then executes the enhancement.
This question is central to resolving the current dispute because the recall
and resentencing procedures set forth in section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and
(d), apply only when an inmate is serving a term for a judgment with a
sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a)—i.e., an enhancement
that was “imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 667.5 ....” Because this question is a question of law, we apply a de
novo standard of review. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 308, 310
review granted.)
In Christianson, our court concluded that, “[o]n its face, the word
‘imposed,’ in this context, is at least somewhat ambiguous. As our high court
has explained, ‘it is important to understand that the word “impose” applies
to enhancements that are “imposed and then executed” as well as those that
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are “imposed and then stayed.[”] However, as a practical matter, the word
‘impose’ is often employed as shorthand to refer to the first situation, while
the word ‘stay’ often refers to the latter.” ’ ” (Christianson, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 311, review granted.) Despite this apparent ambiguity, we
rejected the district attorney’s claim in that case—an argument the district
attorney reasserts here—that the Legislature intended the word “imposed,”
as used in section 1172.75, to mean enhancements that were imposed and
executed.
As we explained in Christianson, “[s]ection 1172.75 requires the CDCR
to identify all inmates ‘currently serving a term for a judgment that includes
an enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (b), italics
added.) A judgment may include a sentence that has been imposed but
suspended or stayed. [Citation.] Thus, by its plain language, all that is
required for the CDCR to identify an inmate under section 1172.75,
subdivision (b) is for the enhancement to be included in the abstract of
judgment, regardless of whether it is imposed or stayed. Had the Legislature
intended for the language in subdivision (b) to limit the identification to those
inmates that would necessarily be required to serve an additional term based
on the enhancement, it certainly could have done so.” (Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311–312, review granted; id. at p. 313 [“if the
Legislature had intended to limit section 1172.75 only to those individuals
that were currently serving an additional term based on the enhancement, it
had the ability to do so”].)
We also noted that, upon receipt of the relevant information from the
CDCR, the trial court must “ ‘verify that the current judgment includes a
sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (c),
italics added.) At this point, the incorporation of subdivision (a) requires that
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the current judgment include a sentencing enhancement imposed pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b). However, the use of the word ‘verify’ suggests
that the sentencing court is doing just that, verifying that the individual the
CDCR identified is in fact an individual described by the statute, not looking
to see if the inmate meets an additional requirement (i.e., that the
enhancement is imposed and not stayed). It does not follow logic or reason to
read these two subdivisions together in a manner that would require the
CDCR to identify a larger class of inmates—all those serving time on a
judgment that include a now invalid enhancement—only for the trial courts
to then look at the same abstracts of judgment available to the CDCR to
determine whether the previous court imposed additional time for, or stayed,
the relevant enhancements.” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312,
review granted.)
Moreover, we rejected a claim from the district attorney that the
resentencing procedures set forth in section 1172.75, subdivision (d), would
be infeasible if we were to construe the statute as applying to stayed prison
prior enhancements. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311–312,
review granted.) Pertinent here, subdivision (d)(1), states that resentencing
“shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result
of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,” unless the court finds a
lesser sentence would endanger public safety. We determined that “if
‘imposed’ is read to include both ‘imposed and executed’ and ‘imposed and
stayed’ throughout the statute, then the sentence ‘originally imposed’ also
includes any additional terms that were imposed and stayed, and removing
the stayed term from the abstract of judgment results in a ‘lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed.’ ” (Christianson, at p. 312.) In particular,
we reasoned that when a court stays punishment, the court “retains the
9
ability to lift the stay and impose the term under certain circumstance, such
as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated. [Citation.] Thus, a stayed
sentence enhancement remains as part of the judgment and continues to
carry the potential for an increased sentence in certain circumstances, and
removal of the stayed enhancement does provide some relief to the defendant
by eliminating that potential.” (Ibid.; see also Mayberry, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at pp. 674–675 [“Imposed-but-stayed prior prison term
enhancements carry the possibility of execution,” therefore, “striking them
now as invalid eliminates their impact from the ‘originally imposed’ sentence
referred to in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1)”]; Saldana, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1278 [rejecting argument “that defendants serving
sentences with stayed enhancements will not be subject to a lesser sentence
... if their enhancements are stricken”], review granted.)
Finally, we observed that the overarching “statutory scheme at issue
here involves statutory amendments expressly aimed at reducing sentences
by retroactively eliminating a sentencing enhancement described as
exacerbating ‘existing racial and socio-economic disparities in our criminal
justice system.’ ” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 314, review
granted.) We noted, for example, that the resentencing procedures set forth
in the statutory scheme promote this legislative goal insofar as they “require
that the trial court conduct a full resentencing for those defendants impacted
by the now invalid enhancement in light of all associated sentencing reform.”
(Ibid.) Given this legislative objective, we inferred that the Legislature
presumably “intended to provide broad relief to all defendants impacted by
the now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements.” (Ibid.; see also
Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278, review granted [discussing the
10
Legislature’s goal of retroactively reducing sentences through
section 1172.75].)
In sum, we adopt the analysis and conclusions from Christianson as
though they were set forth in full in this opinion. Applying Christianson
here, it is apparent the trial court erred when it declined to grant relief to
Alexander. The sentencing court originally imposed and stayed the prison
prior enhancement at issue in 2014 for a past robbery conviction. Thus, the
prison prior enhancement is legally invalid under section 1172.75,
subdivision (a). Because Alexander is serving a prison term for a judgment
with a legally invalid prison prior enhancement, the trial court must recall
the sentence and conduct a full resentencing proceeding. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (c); see Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, review granted [“ ‘By
its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that
the trial court strike the newly “invalid” enhancements.’ ”].) During that
resentencing proceeding, the trial court “shall apply the sentencing rules of
the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
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IV
DISPOSITION
The denial order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial
court with instructions to recall the sentence and conduct a full resentencing
proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d).
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
RUBIN, J.
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