State v. Ellis

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LEROY ELLIS, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0230
FILED 06-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-135237-001
The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith
Counsel for Appellee

Michael J. Dew Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Michael J. Dew
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
STATE v. ELLIS
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Leroy Ellis Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences for child
sex trafficking. He argues the superior court erred by admitting evidence
of prior communications between Ellis and an undercover police officer.
Because the court admitted the evidence for a proper non-propensity
purpose under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 404(b) after Ellis placed
his ability to communicate and related characteristics at issue, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Investigators Identify Ellis as “Maccpheen,” Leading the
State to Charge Him with Child Sex Trafficking.

¶2 In September 2022, officers from the Phoenix Police
Department (“PPD”) arrested Ellis after an investigation into reports that a
minor was trafficked for prostitution in Arizona. PPD received a tip that a
fifteen-year-old girl from California (who we refer to by the pseudonym
Susan, to protect her identity as a victim) was brought to Phoenix and was
being trafficked by someone known as “Maccpheen.”

¶3 PPD officers found online advertisements with pictures of
Susan on websites including MegaPersonals, Escort Alligator, and Escort
Babylon. They observed photographs in the advertisements, including one
depicting Susan’s chest with a tattoo of the name “Leroy Ellis, Jr.” and
another depicting a forearm tattoo reading “Maccpheen.” Police databases
revealed Maccpheen was an alias associated with Ellis. Other social media
accounts and online content suggested Ellis was Maccpheen. After
identifying Ellis as a suspect, detectives used a phone number listed in an
advertisement to arrange for an undercover detective to meet with Susan at
Ellis’ apartment complex. Although the meeting did not occur, officers
observed Susan leave the apartment complex with Ellis. Officers arrested
Ellis during a traffic stop and seized cellular devices associated with Ellis
and Susan. Forensic examination of those devices revealed online
advertisements, communications relating to prostitution activity, and
messages exchanged with the undercover detective through the phone
number listed in the advertisements.

¶4 A grand jury charged Ellis with nine counts of child sex
trafficking. The indictment alleged Ellis recruited Susan from California,
arranged for her travel to Arizona, posted online advertisements for her
services, and received money she earned from acts of prostitution.

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STATE v. ELLIS
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B. The Court Limits the State’s Use of Ellis’ Prior Attempted
Pandering Conviction Under Rule 404(b), But Explains That
Ellis Could Open the Door to its Use in Rebuttal.

¶5 Before trial, the State moved to introduce evidence at trial
that, in 2014, Ellis communicated through text messages with an
undercover police officer posing as a young woman and attempted to
recruit her into prostitution, resulting in his pleading guilty to attempted
pandering. The State argued this evidence was admissible under Rule
404(b) because the 2014 conduct was substantially similar to the conduct
alleged in this case, so it could show Ellis’ intent, plan, knowledge, or
absence of mistake. Ellis argued the evidence was inadmissible, because
the attempted pandering offense was more than eight years before the 2022
charges, was not sufficiently similar to the charged offenses, and would
invite the jury to conclude that — because he had previously attempted to
entice an adult woman into prostitution — he committed the charged
offenses. Ellis further asserted he had been found to be “mentally retarded
with an IQ of 61,” “basically illiterate with a third grade level of reading
and writing,” and “cognitively incapable of planning child sex trafficking
activities.” Ellis claimed Susan prostituted herself without his knowledge.

¶6 In a November 2024 written order, the court granted the
State’s motion in part, “precluding the State from eliciting testimony of the
Defendant’s other acts during [its] case-in-chief only.” The order explained,
however, that “[t]he State may bring in the Defendant’s other acts should
he testify.” During a pretrial hearing in January 2025, the court fleshed out
this ruling: Ellis could present limited observation evidence of his
communication abilities and behavioral characteristics, including evidence
he was gullible, naive, or easily manipulated. However, he could not
present “diminished capacity evidence” because it “is not admissible in
Arizona to negate mens rea.” The court explained witnesses could testify
to Ellis’ behavioral tendencies, such as whether Ellis could read, write, use
a cell phone, send texts, exchange money, drive, or perform like tasks, but
could not offer diagnoses, IQ evidence, or opinions that Ellis lacked the
capacity to commit the charged offenses. The court also explained that if
Ellis presented evidence suggesting he could not perform the activities
through which the charged offenses were allegedly done, the State could
rebut that evidence with prior acts showing that he could do those things.
Such evidence could include prior texting, and videos depicting him using
a phone, exchanging money, or engaging in related conduct.

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STATE v. ELLIS
Decision of the Court

C. Ellis’ Aunt and a Neuropsychologist Testify Ellis Was a
Poor Communicator, Gullible, Naive, and Easily
Manipulated, and Couldn’t Function Independently.

¶7 Although Ellis did not testify, his defense was that Susan
manipulated him and exploited his intellectual and communication limits.
During opening statements, Ellis’ counsel suggested Susan “took
advantage of” Ellis, and that Ellis lacked the sophistication and
independence necessary to do what the State alleged. Counsel argued Ellis
never had a job, lived on disability benefits, and depended on his aunt for
everything, including “living arrangements . . . food . . . [and] clothes.”
Counsel concluded “[i]t was [Susan] who manipulated [Ellis].”

¶8 Ellis called his Aunt Fay, who raised him. She testified he was
born prematurely, experienced developmental delays, and attended
special-education classes. She explained he needed her to assist him as an
adult, so she selected and paid for his apartments, helped purchase his
groceries, communicated with him mostly by phone because she often
couldn’t understand his texts, and visited him almost daily. She testified
Ellis struggled to communicate with others and was “gullible,” “naive,”
“didn’t really understand things as well,” and was “easily manipulated or
told to do things that he shouldn’t do or that he didn’t understand.”

¶9 Ellis also called Dr. Jon Van Doren, a neuropsychologist and
applied behavior analyst who interviewed Ellis in 2024 and prepared a
neuropsychological evaluation of him. Dr. Van Doren testified Ellis had
poor articulation, a limited vocabulary, difficulty expressing and
comprehending information, and often needed instructions repeated or
rephrased because he easily gets confused. He further testified Ellis
struggled on several neuropsychological tests, exhibited concrete rather
than abstract thinking, never showed the ability to function as an
independent adult, and relied on family support. Based on this evaluation,
Dr. Van Doren opined that Ellis exhibited naivete, gullibility, and
susceptibility to manipulation. Dr. Van Doren further testified that Ellis’
desire for normal relationships and acceptance by others made him
particularly vulnerable to manipulation.

D. The State and Ellis Dispute Whether Ellis Opened the Door
to Rebuttal Evidence of His Prior Acts.

¶10 After Ellis rested, the State asked the court to clarify its Rule
404(b) ruling. The State acknowledged the November 2024 written order
made Ellis’ prior conviction inadmissible unless he testified. However, the

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STATE v. ELLIS
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State argued, the court’s January 2025 elaboration of its ruling
distinguished between Ellis’ conviction and the underlying acts and
allowed the prior acts’ admission if the defense “put[] these three
characteristics at issue.” The State argued Ellis “put his ability to do this
crime at issue” and therefore “open[ed] the door to” rebuttal evidence
demonstrating he was capable of the conduct alleged, including evidence
he could communicate by text message and recruit individuals for
prostitution. The State also argued the defense’s presentation was “very
borderline on diminished capacity anyhow” because the defense was using
Ellis’ communication difficulties, gullibility, naivete, and susceptibility to
manipulation to argue that he “does not have the actus reus to commit th[e]
crime.” Finally, the State emphasized it sought to introduce only the
underlying acts and would not “discuss any arrests, court proceedings, [or]
conviction” unless Ellis changed his mind about testifying.

¶11 Ellis rejected the State’s interpretation of the court’s rulings,
arguing his prior acts were inadmissible. He argued the court limited
admission of the prior-act evidence to circumstances in which Ellis testified
or raised a diminished-capacity defense, and that he had done neither. Ellis
maintained he merely presented admissible “behavioral-tendency
evidence” or “observation evidence” about his limitations and had
presented no diminished-capacity defense.

¶12 The court rejected Ellis’ arguments. The court observed the
defense had “made much of the fact that Mr. Ellis has very poor
communication abilities, that he is gullible and easily manipulated and
naive.” The court further explained that it did not read the earlier rulings
of the prior judge in the case to condition admission of the evidence on the
presentation of a diminished-capacity defense because “[d]iminished
capacity isn’t allowed in Arizona,” so “that wouldn’t make sense.” While
“recogniz[ing] that the evidence is very prejudicial,” the court concluded it
was “more probative than prejudicial.” The court found the evidence
admissible under Rule 404(b) as showing “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, [and] absence of mistake or accident.”

¶13 Defense counsel objected that the ruling penalized Ellis for
exercising his right not to testify because “[o]ne of the big reasons he
decided not to testify [was] because he didn’t want any evidence of his prior
conviction coming in,” and if an undercover officer testified about their
texts with Ellis, “the jury will know that there was at least an investigation,
if not a prior conviction out there.” The State responded that Ellis was not
being punished for declining to testify because the conviction was still

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STATE v. ELLIS
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excluded and only the underlying acts would be admitted because the
defense “opened the door” by placing the relevant characteristics at issue.

E. An Undercover Officer Testifies Ellis Previously Used
Social Media and Text Messages to Recruit Her Into
Prostitution and to Discuss Dividing the Proceeds 50/50.

¶14 The State then called a PPD Sergeant, who testified that while
working undercover in PPD’s vice unit in 2014, she created a social media
profile and was contacted by a man identifying himself as “Phoenix Locc
Cuhz.” The Sergeant testified the person later identified himself as “Pheen”
and communicated at first through social media messages, and later, texts.

¶15 The Sergeant identified an exhibit containing her messages
with the man, which included discussions about forming a “team,”
“choosing up,” loyalty, and splitting earnings “50/50.” The Sergeant
testified that based on her training and experience investigating
prostitution, “choosing up” meant declaring loyalty and agreeing to work
for a pimp, and that the communications were the man’s effort to recruit
her into prostitution under his direction. She further testified that after the
undercover operation concluded, investigators interviewed Ellis and
confirmed that the phone number from which the messages were sent
belonged to him, and that he was “Pheen.” The court admitted the
messages into evidence over Ellis’ Rule 404(b) objection.

F. The Jury Convicts Ellis of Child Sex Trafficking.

¶16 The jury found Ellis guilty of eight counts of child sex
trafficking and acquitted him of one count alleging transportation for
purposes of child sex trafficking. The jury also found the aggravating
circumstance of emotional harm to the victim for seven of the eight counts.
The superior court sentenced Ellis to 22 years of imprisonment on each
count, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total of 176
years. Ellis timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9;
A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1); A.R.S. § 13-4031, -4033(A).

DISCUSSION

The Superior Court Properly Admitted the Evidence of Ellis’ Prior
Acts Under Rule 404(b) for a Purpose Other Than Showing His
Propensity to Commit the Charged Offenses.

¶17 Ellis argues the court abused its discretion by admitting the
evidence of his prior acts relating to his 2014 charge for attempted

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STATE v. ELLIS
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pandering. He contends the evidence was inadmissible propensity
evidence and that the court’s November 2024 order precluded its admission
unless he testified. Ellis further argues that, relying on that ruling, he
elected not to testify. The State argues that, by presenting evidence of his
difficulty communicating, gullibility, naivete, susceptibility to
manipulation, and inability to function independently, Ellis placed his
ability to engage in the charged conduct directly at issue. This, the State
contends, opened the door to rebuttal evidence showing he could
communicate through texts, understood prostitution-related terminology,
and knew how to recruit people into prostitution. The State also argues the
challenged evidence was not offered to establish propensity, but instead to
rebut Ellis’ claim that he lacked the ability, knowledge, and sophistication
needed to commit the charged offenses. We agree with the State.

¶18 Ellis properly objected at trial, so we “review the superior
court’s decision to admit [the] other-acts evidence for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. L&L Invests. LLC, --- Ariz. ---, --- ¶ 41, 587 P.3d 615, 625
(App. 2026). Although Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of other-act
evidence to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity, such evidence may be
admitted for “other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

¶19 Ellis focuses exclusively on the November 2024 order’s
statement that the State could introduce the evidence of his prior text
messages if he testified. But the order said more. The same ruling barred
the State from eliciting testimony concerning Ellis’ prior acts during its
“case-in-chief only.” But the challenged evidence was not admitted during
the State’s case-in-chief. Rather, it was admitted in rebuttal after Ellis
presented evidence of his communication difficulties, gullibility, naivete,
and susceptibility to manipulation. Moreover, in later pretrial proceedings,
the court permitted Ellis to present observational evidence of his
communication abilities and behavioral characteristics, which included
gullibility, naivete, and susceptibility to manipulation, while recognizing
that the State could rebut evidence suggesting Ellis lacked the ability to use
a cell phone, send text messages, exchange money, or engage in conduct
related to the charged offenses. As the State notes, the court said the “State
absolutely can rebut that they think he can use a cell phone and knows how
to text and read and write . . . if the defense opened the door to all of those
things.” Thus, admissibility did not turn solely on whether Ellis testified.

¶20 Ellis then presented precisely the type of evidence that
opened the door to the rebuttal of which he complains. Through Aunt Fay

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STATE v. ELLIS
Decision of the Court

and Dr. Van Doren, Ellis presented evidence he had significant
communication difficulties (including difficulty texting coherently), was
gullible and naive, easily manipulated, and lacked the sophistication
needed to engage in the conduct the State alleged. Ellis’ defense was not
merely that he did not commit the charged offenses. Rather, he argued his
limitations rendered him incapable of engaging in the charged conduct and
that the victim manipulated him. Once Ellis advanced that theory, evidence
tending to show that he could communicate through text messages,
understood prostitution-related terminology, and was capable of recruiting
another person into prostitution became relevant to rebut those claims.

¶21 The challenged evidence was thus not admitted to establish
that Ellis acted in conformity with a criminal disposition or had a
propensity to engage in prostitution-related offenses. Rather, it was
admitted to rebut the limitations and characteristics Ellis placed before the
jury. Because the State offered the evidence to rebut those claims, its
relevance did not depend on an inference that Ellis acted in conformity with
a criminal character, as prohibited by Rule 404(b).

¶22 Ellis argues that because he denied committing the charged
offenses, the State could not introduce prior-act evidence to prove intent,
knowledge, or plan, relying on State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102 (1996), State v.
Torres, 162 Ariz. 70 (App. 1989), State v. Hughes, 189 Ariz. 62 (1997), and State
v. Vigil, 195 Ariz. 189 (App. 1999). But those cases are distinguishable. In
each, the defendant’s prior conduct only fairly suggested propensity. But
unlike the defendants in Ives, Torres, Hughes, and Vigil, Ellis placed his
ability to engage in the charged conduct at issue by arguing that his
communication difficulties, gullibility, naivete, and susceptibility to
manipulation rendered him incapable of committing the offenses. Once he
did so, the State was entitled to rebut those claims. The prior
communications were also probative of Ellis’ knowledge of prostitution-
related terminology and practices, including recruiting individuals to work
for him and discussing how earnings would be shared. The court was thus
within its discretion in concluding the evidence was admissible under Rule
404(b) for purposes other than showing Ellis’ propensity to commit the
charged offenses, and that its probative value outweighed the danger of
unfair prejudice.

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STATE v. ELLIS
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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